In The National Law Journal (subscription-access only), though Professor Bainbridge has choice excerpts, including his own rather wicked comments!  His objections go a bit further than my own concerns.  Good empirical work has been invaluable for many areas of legal scholarship for decades and decades; the unfortunate development has been the trendy, bandwagon character of the current "explosion" of work, with the resulting influx onto the market of hordes of "empiricists" many of whom are doing work of dubious merit or relevance.  The NLJ article gives the mistaken impression that the dispute is between "empiricists" and doctrinalists, but that's not quite right (though there is certainly that aspect of the divide):  it's also between empiricists and other interdisciplinary scholars.   The common intellectual currency of what we do in law school, after all, is argument and analysis, and the discursive and conceptual skills required to do that at a high level are not necessarily what PhD empiricists learn, though it marks common for other scholarly disciplines, such as economics and philosophy.   My own inclination is (within reasonable limits) to see "a thousand flowers bloom" in the academy–though the notorious intellectual narrowness and parochialness of at least some empiricists is, I am told, an obstacle to that at some schools.  But most law schools with a strong "empiricist" contingent–for example, Berkeley, Cornell, Chicago, and Columbia–seem to have managed a pluralistic approach quite well.