This will only interest my legal philosophy readers, but I do want to commend to their attention this paper by Richard Stillman, who trained as a philosopher of language with Stephen Neale before coming to Chicago to study law (and jurisprudence). He has identified something important about at least one subset of theoretical disagreements in the U.S. context (a source of one of Dworkin’s main examples). I discuss Stillman’s views, as well as those of Luka Burazin & Giovanni Battista Ratti, Aaron Graham, Torben Spaak, and Bill Watson in the new “Postscript on Theoretical Disagreements” in my forthcoming book.
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As far as I am concerned, I am open to being convinced that AI is good for the profession. However,…
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Wallace’s distinction between the value of the philosophical process and the value of its product suggests a further complication, one…
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I’m not sure whether an interactive, online logic textbook counts as an open-access philosophy book, but for those who might…
For a slightly more positive assessment, JS Mill: “The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an…
People should understand what precipitated my remarks here at Leiter Reports. Also, a few replies and comments on the conversation:…