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Response to Comments on Citing Foreign Courts

Lawrence v. Texas, invaliding state sodomy laws, was one of the decisions in which the U.S. Supreme Court cited a foreign case, and a comment asks whether I think the decision was wrong. I think it would be possible to write a respectable, narrow opinion invalidating those laws, which have come to seem ridiculous, though so inconsequential are they that it hardly seems worth the bother. The trouble is that Justice Kennedy wrote a very broad opinion, with language that armed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to create a constitutional right of gay marriage, setting off a firestorm. Many liberals now recognize that the Massachusetts court made a serious political mistake. The judges of that court (the judges in the majority, that is) might say that law must not bend to politics, but that would be a ridiculous statement when the issue is gay marriage. Neither the U.S. nor the Massachusetts constitution speaks to gay marriage. The decision that there shall be a right to such marriage is a political decision, in the sense that it rests–it has to rest, there is no other foundation for it–on the ideology, values, temperament, and so forth of the judge, rather than on some "observer independent" source of guidance. When such a decision is contrary to strong public opinion, its undemocratic character is unmistakable, and the decision arouses indignation and strengthens the opponents of (a certain kind of) judicial activism.

In light of several of the comments, I need to clarify what I mean by saying that judges can properly (in my view) cite foreign cases as source of relevant information, but not as precedents. What I mean by citing a case as a precedent is recognizing that its mere existence, as distinct from the cogency of its reasoning or the relevance of information revealed in it, is a reason for deciding the present case the same way: "a" reason, not necessarily the reason, or a controlling reason. No one supposes that a foreign decision would be a binding precedent on an issue of domestic law. My target is citing a foreign decision that, say, announces a constitutional right to gay marriage and saying or implying that the bare fact that a respectable foreign court has announced such a right is a reason why we should do likewise. That is to accord authority to a foreign decision, rather than to treat such a decision as one might treat a law review article–as a source, possibly, of excellent arguments or persuasive facts, but not as an authority.

One commenter asks, wouldn’t it have been a good thing if, before the Civil War, the Supreme Court had taken note of the fact that the other nations of what we regarded as the civilized world had outlawed slavery? Could not the Court have used that international consensus to outlaw slavery in the United States? It could not have, because the preservation of slavery was the essence of the compromise that enabled the U.S. Constitution to be ratified, and because a decision outlawing slavery would have precipitated the secession of the southern states even quicker than the election of Lincoln did–he campaigned only to limit the spread of, and not to abolish, slavery. Abolition had to await the Emancipation Proclamation (of uncertain constitutionality) and the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Slavery is a good example of a practice believed to be contrary to natural law; and one comment notes the affinity between the concept of natural law and the idea of international legal norms as a source of guidance in interpreting local constitutional law. I have a qualified sympathy for the idea of natural law. If a novel case arises–one that cannot be decided by subsumption under clear statutory or constitutional language or precedent–the judge will have to look elsewhere, and if one wants to call the elsewhere "natural law" I have no strong objection, as long as it is understood not to be Thomas Aquinas’s concept of natural law. The vaguer, less consistent, more anachronistic, more gap-ridden, and more absurd the orthodox materials of judicial decision (constitutional and statutory text, precedent, etc.) are, the more the judges will be on their own in deciding cases. And that is the situation in which American judges, especially appellate judges, often find themselves. Whether they draw on economic theory or political principles, or on some inarticulate notion of what is fair or right, to decide cases in the broad open area of American law, they will be going outside the positive law in any useful sense of that term–and, as I say, if you want to call where they are going natural law, that is all right with me. Yet in the context of pre-Civil War U.S. law, natural-law arguments for the unconstitutionality of slavery would have collapsed in the face of the constitutional text and history and the political balance of power. And given the cultural heterogeneity of the world, we must recognize, in very sharp contrast to advocates of Catholic natural law, that natural law is primarily a national rather than an international body of thought.

Several comments ask how one state should treat the decisions of another state, and how a court should treat its old decisions. I recognize analogies here to the citation of foreign courts, but the differences seem to me more important. A court in one state will not feel itself bound by a decision of another state, but will recognize that decision as an authority, and for the very good reason that the legal cultures of the states are, today at any rate, pretty similar in most areas. Similarly, a court will not consider it absolutely bound by its old decisions, but will treat them as authorities, in part because there is a considerable continuity in legal culture within a state over time, and in part because of the reliance interests that judicial decisions generate.

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20 responses to “Response to Comments on Citing Foreign Courts”

  1. In "Overcoming Law" you noted that sometimes the best a pragmatist can do is simply to 'muddle through' the available information in order to arrive at solutions. This description captures what I believe is pragmatism's beauty, but what many consider its essential failing, namely, that it does not provide an Answer due to the arbitrary selection of inputs and stopping points in pragmatic calculations. Could you elaborate on this description and how you might respond to the objection that a 'pragmatic legal opinion' is merely the subjective muddling of a judge (or hard-working, under-appreciated clerk)?

    Also, I would really enjoy any comments on the statuts of the public intellectual in America. Does Brian qualify? Is the public intellectual's role supposed to be a productive one, i.e., should the person offer solutions? Or, should the person serve more as a critic of society, its institutions, etc.?

    I've enjoyed your writings over the last few days. Thanks for your time and sincerity.

    LKH

  2. >….with language that armed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to create a constitutional right of gay marriage….

    This is idiotic. The Mass SJC did not "create" a "constitutional right" to "gay marriage." The Mass SJC determined that the refusal by the state of Massachusetts to recognize and give legal effect to relationships of same-sex couples (which you would like to refer to as "gay marriage") on the same basis that it recognizes and gives legal effect to relationships of opposite-sex couples (which you would apparently like to refer to simply as "marriage") violated the declaration in the state constitution that "all men are born free and equal." The SJC stayed its decision for six months–six months during which same sex relationships would be discriminated against–to give the legislature time to correct the situation. It failed to do so, so the SJC's decision went into effect.

    I'm sure that even a federal appeals court judge can recognize the difference between a creation of a right and a determination that withholding a right that is granted to others violates the constitution.

  3. Indeed, today, slavery may be "a good example of a practice believed to be contrary to natural law." But, historically "advocates of Catholic natural law," from St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas to, the recently beatified, Bl. Pope Pius IX teaching after the U.S. Civil War, have affirmed the consistency of slavery and natural law.

    Accordingly, "[i]n the context of pre-Civil War U.S. law, natural-law arguments for the unconstitutionality of slavery would have collapsed," not only for the legal reasons cited, but additionally because of the historical opinion of natural law theorists and canon law in favor of slavery.

    This history is sobering for enthusiasts of Catholic natural law.

  4. I too thought that Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence was very broad. Any reaction to Sunstein's suggestion that Kennedy is a minimalist/incrementalist (something Sunstein approves of), and that Lawrence is consistent with that minimalism?

  5. I don't think that Judge Posner has adequately deflected the sister state problem. The key sentence: "A court in one state will not feel itself bound by a decision of another state, but will recognize that decision as an authority, and for the very good reason that the legal cultures of the states are, today at any rate, pretty similar in most areas."

    I think that this point is false to fact–at least relevant fact. We've been talking about social issues throughout, not the UCC. I think that we've found out that Massachusetts legal culture on social issues is more similar to Canada than to Texas. Judge Posner's argument implies that Massachusetts and Canada should cite each other and abjure Texas, while Texas would be free to cite Alabama, abjuring all foreign law–including Massachusetts'.

    Also, a technician's point on old cases. In some fields of law (e.g., payments), the old cases are much better than the new ones, and maybe deserve more authority than current cases. Payments was a sexy legal issue of the day, and attracted minds like Mansfield's and Story's. Even judges of Cardozo's era were well-grounded in bills and notes. It's pretty fusty stuff today, and most modern judges don't know what they are talking about in payments cases. (Neither do most of the lawyers, for that matter.)

  6. Judge Posner describes the anti-sodomy laws invalidated in Lawrence as "ridiculous" — and they are — but he adds that they were "so inconsequential" that invalidating them "hardly seems worth the bother." The importance of Lawrence seems lost on Judge Posner. While it is true that few people in recent times have been prosecuted for sodomy, the fact that homosexual activity was criminal in many states was used to harm homosexuals in several ways. For example, numerous courts relied on the fact that people who engaged in homosexual acts were criminals to justify stripping homosexuals of their right to child custody, to adopt children or to serve as foster parents. In some states, homosexuals were denied employment in law enforcement because they were openly breaking the law themselves. These types of harms are far from inconsequential, and laws that foster this sort of discrimination are very worthy of being invalidated.

  7. Joe,

    See, your argument here is not bizarre and ridiculous. Unlike your argument that North Korea is a republic, in the sense used in the U.S. Constitution.

    In fact, I think in a narrow sense, your reasoning here is more persuasive than Posner's. Legal culture certainly cannot be the grounds which makes citing decisions as authority (persuasive or binding) legitimate. Who is to say when a legal system is "similar enough" to be such an authority or not? This is too fuzzy and not a satisfactory standard for decision.

    In Erie, the general common law died and the Supreme Court proclaimed, correctly, that law must be derived from the will of a sovereign. At that time, customary international law was considered incorporated as part of our law, meaning as general common law, not binding on the states under the Supremacy clause. Today, there exists judge made federal law which you might call common law, but unlike pre-Erie general common law, it is binding on the states and must basically be derived from sovereign authority.

    That should be the real rule of decision; not some fuzzy cultural point. I do not think we should object if Texas cites the law of Louisiana as persuasive authority, even though Louisiana is a civil law state which might make it quite a bit different from Texas in terms of legal culture. On the other hand, I do think we should object when courts incorporate either international law or foreign law as U.S. law. Such law cannot be said to be derived from the consent of the governed and is therefore illegitimate.

    This is different from being inspired by the reasoning of non-U.S. citizens in making decisions. If, hypothetically, Judge Posner reads and finds persuasive the writings of an economist from the Austrian school and finds it relevant to a case in question, there should be no objection to that inspiration, even if it is decisive in his thinking and the case in question. Just as we should not object to members of Congress being inspired by and making laws based on that inspiration after seeing what other countries do. (Members of Congress have the right to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, but no powers with respect to foreign law.)

  8. Judge Posner —

    A court in one state will not feel itself bound by a decision of another state, but will recognize that decision as an authority, and for the very good reason that the legal cultures of the states are, today at any rate, pretty similar in most areas.

    Hmmm. I don't want to suggest that you dance too far off topic (or too far into nuance), but I'm now curious as to whether you'll address Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, which governs how a U.S. District Court deals with an fairly-presented issue of foreign law before it.

  9. Shag from Brookline

    Judge Posner:
    I appreciate your response to my comment on the Civil War and slavery. I am well aware of the compromise necessary for the enactment of the Constitution. But circumstances change sometimes that require bold action but not necessarily a civil war. Thomas Jefferson post-Bill of Rights constructed the wall of separation between church and state the structure of which has been challenged primarily only in recent years. The Bill of Rights imposed limitations upon the federal government and not the states (until the Civil War Amendments, if then). As a result, states could, and did, have established religions. (In fact, I learned to my surprise that my liberal Commonwealth of Massachusetts was perhaps the last state – in the mid or late 1830s – to disestablish its designated religion.) This apparently came about voluntarily presumably due to the wisdom of the populace that the First Amendment’s establishment and free exercise clauses made sense for the states, without the need for amending the Constitution. The abolitionists and others against slavery, however, could not overcome the economic issues that were strong not only in the south but also in the north.

    Justice Thomas, it is reported, has expressed the view that states should be able to have established religions. Apparently he does not accept that the Civil War Amendments (particularly the 14th) incorporated some, if not all, of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states. Perhaps there could have been more precise language used by the framers of these Amendments specifying which if any of the Bill of Rights Amendments were to be incorporated. Perhaps there was a “compromise” in order to enact these Amendments. Subsequent SCOTUS decisions into the 20th Century held that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated into the 14th. This was done over a long period of time, without the need for a war. Circumstances changed, requiring bold action.

    Let’s jump to 1954 and Brown v. Board of Education. Just imagine how long it took to reach the point of implementing the 14th Amendment. No civil war resulted, although there were (and continue to be) difficult issues of race. Then there followed the many Warren Court decisions on individual rights under the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment after a dearth of many, many decades during which such rights may have been ignored and had not been recognized. Again, no civil war resulted, although undoing the Warren Court seems to be the conservative mantra especially today.

    I had raised in an earlier comment on one of your prior posts your views of natural law. You have touched on natural law with this post in a limited way as it pertains to slavery. (By the way, I was pleased to learn that your would not ascribe to the Thomas Aquinas view of natural law.) Perhaps natural law concepts could be applied to the situations I describe here. But I like to think it is more a matter of common sense and applying hermeneutic principles in interpreting and construing the Constitution rather than original intent, original meaning, strict construction, etc, that impose too many limitations and limit progress and growth. Who knows, we may have to think more internationally with what we are presented with so early in the 21st Century. But I’m just a country lawyer who first studied ConLaw (1952) when it was primarily about the Commerce Clause, which is also currently under attack.

    I have appreciated your posts and in particular that you took the time to read the comments and respond. I have read several of your books, especially on Justice Holmes. While I always respected you (even if I may not have agreed with you), I appreciate you even more now. You have provided me and others with a wonderful opportunity. Thanks.

  10. Good post, JP (Judge Posner:))

    You have hit exactly on the fulcrum between what the law requires and what political (often shifting) factions desire at any particular time.

    Simple example:

    1. Some people think sodomy is bad. Some don't.
    2. Some people think sodomy is bad enough to be outlawed in Texas. More people now probably disagree.
    3. Some people think that the Texas law outlawing sodomy is bad. Some don't.
    4. Some Federal judges think the Texas law outlawing sodomy is not only bad, but unconstitutional.

    In my view, Nos. 1-3, are purely political questions, and reasonable folks can differ on which side of the fence they stand. Myself, I would err on the side of promoting individual liberty, but that's neither here, nor there.

    As to No. 4, it is absolutely clear that the Constitution is silent on the issue of sodomy. Period. There is no Federal right to sodomy, just as there is no obligation to ban it.

    So, again, my own view, is to allow the states to either ban it or legalize it or, Hell, even subsidize it, if they wish. But, it isn't a Constitutional question, no matter how one slices it.

  11. What do you think about the argument that the Pierce-Meyer-Griswold-Roe line of cases (that's sex, marriage, child-bearing & child-rearing) represent a body of rights not specifically denominated in the Constitution but nonetheless basic? (The Palko position, I think. Call them… 9th Amendment freedoms.) Perhaps in the 1980s it was reasonable to fear that the line of cases would explode and Bowers v. Hardwich was somehow necessary to cut it off (analogously, Cleburne was necessary to cut off the endless addition of suspect classes). But in the fullness of time it seems the exclusion of sodomy and of homosexuals has made the right-to-privacy (I'm speaking in code, I don't really mean a right to _privacy_) untenably inconsistent. A narrow decision—and by that you mean one on Equal Protection grounds—wouldn't cure the doctrinal shortcoming.

    And of course there's the problem that they're not in the Constitution. But the presence of a constitution doesn't preclude other sources of higher law, or natural law, or limitations in the notion of law itself (cf. Fuller; but cf. Hart). Some criminal jurisprudence cases could be seen as interpreting the basic notion of criminal law rather than of any positive proscription of the Due Process Clause. (See the collected works of George Fletcher.) Of course we often subsume such basic notions of what the law must be into constitutional doctrines, but there's no especial reason to think we're not fooling ourselves.

  12. On Thursday, Jan 13, 4-5:30 pm est, at American University law school in DC, Justices Scalia and Breyer will hold a conversation on the topic of "The Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional Adjudication." RSVP by Jan 10 to secle@wcl.american.edu if you plan to attend. However, the event will also be livestreamed on the web; details available beginning Jan 10 at http://www.wcl.american.edu.

  13. David,
    I think that our expressed disagreements are becoming smaller, hence tractable.
    We both agree that–barring a treaty–a foreign sovereign cannot prescribe a binding rule of decision for another. After all, that is what sovereignty means. (Of course, a United States court can perform a choice of law analysis, and impose a foreign rule on the litigants, but this is not a surrender of sovereignty.)
    We both agree that a foreign court decision (or a foreign statute), gets at least as much dignity as a law review article. You, I think, would read "at least" as "no more." I'm not sure.
    The nub of our remaining disagreement, I think, is the Charming Betsy case, to which another poster alluded. This old Marshall opinion holds that US extraterritorial statutes are to be construed, if possible, as being consistent with international law. The case affirms that Congress wins in case of a clear conflict. But it is a thumb on the scale, pushing interpretation of extraterritorial statutes in the direction of international law. It is good law today, but extends no further than extraterritorial law.
    You, I believe, would hold that the Charming Betsy principle should not be extended to non-extraterritorial US law, especially social issues and Constitutional law. I'm not sure. The Declaration of Independence is admittedly not a valid source of Con law, but it is a profound statement of American legal culture. "A decent respect to the opinions of mankind" might require that "we should declare the causes which compel us" to be so different from the rest of the world in social issues. Not so much the death penalty, which I think is hardwired into the Constitution. The Charming Betsy principle defers to plain text. But if the international trend toward gay marriage becomes prevalent enough, the extended Charming Betsy principle might require our courts to explain to the rest of the world why we are different.

  14. I wonder on what basis Judge Posner thinks "it would be possible to write a respectable, narrow opinion invalidating [state sodomy] laws." Justice O'Connor's equal-protection approach would have been narrower, but would have left untouched those state laws against sodomy by all persons (Texas, recall, forbade only gay sodomy).

    What better path does the good judge think that the Court missed?

    (Leaving aside the judge's notion that the laws were "inconsequential." That's a carefully chosen word, but still, there are social and political consequences from a group's defining behavior being a criminal offense.)

  15. A suggestion for a new topic — Undergraduate Education:

    In Overcoming Law Judge Posner talks a great deal about Tom Wolfe’s The Bonfire of The Vanities. But has he read Wolfe’s latest work, I Am Charlotte Simmons? It amounts to a social commentary on the utter depravity (there’s no other way to put it) of today’s undergraduate students. According to Wolfe’s account, even the smartest, most dedicated students are allowing themselves to be seduced by the trappings of fraternal social life — endless beer parties, casual sex, and a pathetic yearning for “popularity” — to the clear detriment of their education, going so far as to feign stupidity for fear of appearing (of all horrible things) academically inclined. Even if he hasn’t read the book, what is his impression of the current undergraduate population at America’s top universities? Is it any different now than in the 1950s/60s when he went to school? If Wolfe is accurate in his portrayal, is this a phenomenon or just more evidence of America’s historically anti-intellectual bent?

  16. Joe,

    The Charming Betsy doctrine, certainly as articulated by Justice Marshall in 1804, in The Charming Betsy case, is quite strongly worded. "An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible constructions remains." For some strange reason, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law uses much softer language to describe the canon, despite being written by international law advocates: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States." Interesting, the doctrine was first invented by Justice Marshall in Talbot v. Seeman, an 1801 decision.

    I think the doctrine is flawed. Perhaps Justice Marshall's interpretation of the statutes in question in the cases before him was reasonable, given the context and his strong desire to avoid decisions which might be a pretext for a foreign nation to start a conflict with our then fledgling Republic. I think the doctrine should be limited to their context, despite the broad language used by Marshall. In his opinion, Marshall in no way connected his prudential decision to interpret U.S. statutes in this manner with any provision of the Constitution. Certainly, circumstances have changed much since 1801 and 1804. Among other things, the Erie decision requires that law originate from a sovereign authority; it may not be invented from nothing by the federal courts like general common law. The context has changed. General common law is dead; the Charming Betsy doctrine should die as well.

    The Charming Betsy doctrine perhaps has less to do with international law than with giving excessive discretion to the judiciary, or to the executive. Marshall said we should not interpret statutes to conflict with international law "as understood in this country." The question immediately arises, understood by who? Well, if the judiciary takes it upon itself, it certainly can read a lot of different and conflicting things into customary international law (CIL). Even international courts have a hard time understanding CIL, for example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) often must make a decision about which General Assembly Resolutions are "political" and which are "legal." Obviously, such ambiguity leads to discretion. I don't see Charming Betsy as anything more than providing cover for a false formalism justifying judges in doing what they already are inclined to do anyway, figleafing if you will. Charming Betsy, in practice, would also increase the power of the executive, since executive interpretations of international law are often deferred to. But why should the executive have so much power when it comes to interpreting United States law? It's one thing when they receive Chevron deference, there the legislature has already made a decision to delegate certain powers to an executive agency; its another thing to give them such powers over the interpretation of other laws where no similar delegation of authority has been granted.

    Ultimately, I think that the degree to which the United States wants to align itself with international "law" is ultimately a political question, not a judicial question. Charming Betsy shifts the burden of inertia to the political branches. If they do not act and clearly lay out what doctrines of international law they don't want influencing a given statute, then the courts may twist the meaning of the statute to suit its own views of international law. This is what occureding in United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). It really is ridiculous. It results in judicial and executive aggrandizement over that of the legislature. Further, to the extent that it, in effect, makes U.S. citizens subject to law over which they did not consent, the doctrine is illegitimate. This seems especially applicable if the interpretation of old laws is interpreted in light of newly discovered CIL.

    I think the courts are getting a little ahead of themselves. They should leave foreign affairs to the political branches. If the political branches want to pass laws which are in "comity" with international law, then they should make the political (not legal) decision to do so. They really do not need the courts to selectively help them in this regard.

    You would think that judges would learn a little humility about their ability to advance their personal political agendas in light of the Goodrich decision. I wonder what turnout would have been like in Ohio without the state Constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage being on the ballot. Bush may owe re-election to the Massachusetts SJC. That IS delicious irony. Hmm… what bothers me more, gay marriage in Massachusetts (until the state Constitution is amended) or the election of John Kerry as President. Sometimes I really do think that that checks and balances idea implemented by the founders is brilliant. Maybe I don't dislike the Charming Betsy doctrine much. Wait until it is applied in a socially significant manner by some wacko left-wing judge, and I am already seeing increased electoral dominance by Republicans. There is a political cost to not recognizing certain boundaries that the judiciary shall not cross. Not that I expect to resolve that debate here, but I sometimes wonder why those who advocate for international comity don't focus on the political arena more. That is where the real battle will be fought.

    Your last statement, I think, misunderstands the proper role of courts. It is not the job of courts to explain to the rest of the world anything. That would be the job of the President. Your characterization of Charming Betsy in this manner lends strength to the argument that the doctrine should be discarded, and I think reveals that the doctrine has the potential to give courts an excessive role in foreign relations.

    The bottom-line, I think, is if you can't link the law to the consent of the People, then it is not legitimate law. This includes the twisting and remaking of U.S. law via the Charming Betsy canon.

  17. David,
    You made a lot of good points, many of which I agree with. I wanted to concentrate on your separation of powers point, with which I'm not sure I agree. The relevant text (which I hope I'm not taking out of context): "Your last statement, I think, misunderstands the proper role of courts. It is not the job of courts to explain to the rest of the world anything. That would be the job of the President."
    The President does not have a Constitutional monopoly over foreign affairs. Congress, for example, has enacted many statutes to express its foreign policy preferences. I personally think that many of these statutes are unwise exercises of micromanagement, but they are indubitably Constitutional.
    The separation of powers, I think, has two dimensions. One is straightforward: a clear Constitutional monopoly on a particular power. For example, only the President can pardon; a unanimous Congress cannot. But the more common separation of powers is structural. The substantive power will typically overlap among the branches, which have different tools for exercising the power. Foreign affairs is a good example. The President has the head-of-state function, and Congress has the purse. In effect, these branches constantly compete and cooperate in formulating foreign policy. Do the courts have anything?
    I think so. Think of the choice of law. US courts can decide to impose foreign law on US litigants. Congress has the supervening power to enact choice-of-law rules, but this power remains in the courts until Congress has exercised it. And Congress hasn't exercised it. US courts can also impose foreign fora on US litigants, and they claim the Constitutional right to do so, by finding that a foreign defendant has no minimum contacts in the US. (Some may find the French more congenial: a Frenchman can always sue a foreigner in a French court.) So the courts are fairly active in the business of importing foreign law. And we have not touched on enforcement of foreign judgments, in which the United States is notoriously deferential (by world standards) to foreign sovereigns.
    If you don't want to discard all of this, I don't see why the Charming Betsy rule is all that offensive. It is an interpretive rule, and thus far more modest than a Constitutional doctrine such as minimum contacts. It retains a link to the consent of the People, a doctrine that you think more highly of than I do. (My own politics is in large part a reaction to the 1960's, so I dread Rousseau, or anything that sounds like the General Will.)
    This, of course, evades the question of whether the Charming Betsy should be expanded. I think that one can accept the current scope of the doctrine without insisting on expanding it.

  18. Joe,

    I appreciate your comments. But I think you should look into Curtiss-Wright and reflect for a moment on the President's power as the "sole voice" in foreign affairs. Obviously, Congress does have the ability to impact foreign affairs; it can regulate foreign commerce, define and punish the law of nations, regulate the armed forces, and declare war. But as far as diplomacy goes, the President is in charge. Only the President can negotiate treaties or appoint ambassadors (with the advice and consent of the Senate) and the President represents the United States to the rest of the world.

    I think there are some interesting arguments and clearly tension either way concerning the tensions between the Presidents powers and the powers of Congress. For example, the Congress has power to regulate the armed forces, the President is Commander-in-Chief; the line between these powers can be ambigious at times and very little has been resolved by the courts due to the political question and other justiciability doctrines.

    But the question of the judiciary "explaining" anything to the rest of the world is just absurd. I have no problem if Justice O'Connor goes to foreign countries to visit; I do have a problem if she thinks she has any right to insert herself into the making of foreign policy. That is an absurd and improper role for a judge to play. If other countries are concerned about U.S. policy, they should go to the President and negotiate a treaty; not try to bypass the political branches by going to Justice O'Connor. But you know, it's tough being a judge and having too few checks on the exercise of your discretion. It can lead to arrogance. Anyway, I think its pretty clear — the courts have no role in foreign affairs when it comes to diplomacy. It is not their role to explain or justify to other countries the political decisions made by the other branches of government.

    Charming Betsy is problematic. Congress maintains ultimate authority, but it shifts the burden of inertia. As you know, bicameralism and the President's veto power and the like are all meant to increase that inertia. It would seem strange to say the least to have a U.S. statute's interpretation dynamically change due to changes in the judiciary's view of CIL. And what would be the difference between that and adopting the CIL in question directly? Not always so much.

    As far as foreign law applying to U.S. litigants, this occurs only when those litigants have some sort of contact with a foreign forum. In contrast, Charming Betsy can impact purely domestic matters as a generally applicable canon of statutory construction. As you mentioned, these rules can be changed by Congress at any time. Unlike Charming Betsy, which applies to every U.S. statute with CIL implications (in the modern world with the transformation of CIL, probably every statute), these choice-of-law rules deal with discrete and limited problems. In fact, the Charming Betsy doctrine may be the manner in which CIL is able to exert it's biggest impact on the U.S. legal system. As the Ninth Circuit said in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Charming Betsy is the "plainest evidence that international law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress." 630 F.2d 876.

    So, I think you have it exactly backwards. Those who leave the confines of the United States, either literally or figuratively through contract, are going to naturally expose themselves to the dictates of foreign law. In this, the parties essentially consent. Charming Betsy, in contrast, applies to all U.S. code and has no link to the consent of particular parties before a court.

    In general, I do not see the linkage that you claim exists between Charming Betsy and anything derived from the consent of the People. In fact, I see the opposite, because in essence, it foists CIL, to which they did not consent, onto them. Certainly, the presence of choice-of-law rules does not change this basic point.

    Im not sure what linkages you are trying to make between Rosseau, the 1960's and powers derived from the consent of the governed. It sounds interesting. I will note one thing; I think it is unfortunate when anyone, left or right, makes their politics largely a function of reaction, whether to the 1960s or any other discrete phenomenon. Such robs the individual of intellectual independence; rather than searching for truth where ever it may lie, one is always considering the relation of ideas to whatever one is reacting against.

    I do not see any alternative which will preserve the rights and interests of the People than to make government accountable to them, and them alone. We already face enough agency problems with the interests of the People being represented by the few; certainly such problems would only increase when power rightly belonging to the People is delegated to foreigners who are unaccountable to the People. If you have an alternative theory, it would be great to hear. In the meantime, I will stick with my populist theory that government should be, in Lincoln's words, "of the people, by the people, [and] for the people." That such a system of government is the only way to preserve individual liberty.

    What is the current scope of the Charming Betsy doctrine anyway? That is not exactly a settled question or unambigious question. One things is nearly for certain, the scope of the doctrine is not likely to remain static.

  19. Dear Judge Posner,

    I was struck by your comment that the decision of the Court to validate same-sex marriages was 'undemocratic'. I take it that what you mean by this is that the decision is contrary to the views of the majority. That seems undeniably true.

    Of course, it is never the Court's job to make any decision—even in the most mundane case—according to no more than popular opinion at a given time, albeit what passes for popular opinion is itself far from unimportant. For example, individual rights should be respected, all things considered, even when a majority might like to restrict them. A Court that defended the individual rights of members of some persecuted minority may not be doing the most popular thing—and may well upset the majority—but it may well be respecting the rule of law. Is the rule of law 'undemocratic'?

    If your earlier description of democracy—as an event where citizens gather together at regular intervals to select certain politicians without having to explain their decisions to anyone—is correct, I am not sure how this might possibly conflict with a Court 'democratically'(?) making an unpopular judgement.

    Finally, I wonder if —if it is the case that legal cases should be decided with an eye to minimising costs— the Court did the right thing: it made the right decision to allow same-sex marriages. If it were not allowed now, then it would be sometime in the near future.

    I'd appreciate any thoughts on this. I've simply loved your messages each day.

  20. 'International Law' means Euro-Law, and is cited only in the advance of liberal causes. No one cites some International Association of Islamic Jurists on why women shouldn't drive, for example.

    European citizens have little say in these unelected councils–and Americans have none. The danger is that they will come to believe they have a right to legislate for Americans…and our courts will cede our right to consent.

    Texas' sodomy laws should have been struck down on 'cruel & unusual' grounds, not based on Justice Kennedy's uber-libertarian fantasy-Constitution. (And it matters; it's the difference between saying you can't beat your children because violence is wrong or saying you can't beat your children because they are property of the State.) By Kennedy's logic, assisted suicide, drug use, prostitution, polygamy and all other consensual adult behaviors are constitutional rights.

    As for SSM, no citizens of any state have ever approved of a constitutional provision that would demand it. Including Massachusetts. The judges there simply wanted it, so they "found" it and imposed it. I too, can find all my favorite policies in a constitution–that is, if I can make words mean what I wish them to mean.

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