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The Religion of Civil Liberties

I said in an earlier post that “religion” should be confined to the theistic religions. That is sensible when the issue is the role of faith-based morality in public policy. But in other contexts a broader sense of the word, to denote the embrace of a system of thought that is not responsive to scientific or pragmatic argu­ment and hence is dogmatic, and that occupies a central place in the ideology of its adherents, can be illuminating. I am in­creasingly struck by the aptness of the term to the type of civil libertarian who will have no truck with tradeoffs between secu­rity and liberty. The choicest recent example of this outlook happens to be found in the opinion by an English judge, Lord Hoffman of the House of Lords, in a decision invalidat­ing a post-9/11 British law allowing indefinite detention, with­out a hearing, of aliens suspected of terrorism who can’t be deported, either because no nation will accept them or only a nation in which they would be exposed to torture or other seri­ous harms.

The case is A v. Secretary of State, [2004] UKHL 36, [2004] All ER(D) 271 (Dec. 26, 2004). I am not interested in whether it was decided correctly—one would have to know more about English and international human rights law than I do to opine responsibly on that question—but only in the mind­set illustrated by Lord Hoffman’s opinion. Noting that “the power which the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people indefinitely without charge or trial,” he says that “nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the United Kingdom.” This is a pious fraud, ignoring a long history of abuses of civil liberty by British police and security agencies, documented by the English legal historian A. W. Brian Simpson in his book In the Highest Degree Odious and by others. And Hoffman quickly retrenches by adding that the draconian laws enacted to curb the Irish Republican Army, laws similar to those challenged successfully by “A,” were justifiable because “it was reasonable to say that terrorism in Northern Ireland threatened the life of that part of the nation and the territorial integrity of the United King­dom as a whole.” He acknowledges that “the threat of…atrocities" similar to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. “in the United Kingdom is a real one.” But he denies that it is “a threat to the life of the nation….Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda.” Actuallly, there is more doubt that the United Kingdom will survive Islamist terrorism than there was that it would survive the Irish Republican Army, the aims of which were modest compared to those of Osama bin Laden and his associates and which did not aspire to the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Hoffman adds that “terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government.” But considering how fiercely the British authori­ties responded to the 9/11 attacks one imagines that their response to a similar or worse attack on Britain would leave little of the institutional framework of civil liberties standing; and Hoffman surely regards that framework as an important part of “our institutions of government.”

He concludes with what has become the first article in the civil liberties common book of prayer: “The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accor­dance with its traditional laws and political values, come not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.” What he is saying is that terrorism is not a “real threat,” but the enactments of a democratic legislature (“laws such as these”) are. Terrorism that kills thousands of people (in time, it could be millions) is less menacing than laws that cut back on “traditional laws and politi­cal values,” even if the “traditions” are only a few years old. An ordinary sensible person would think that terrorism on the scale enabled by modern technology and inflamed by religio-political fanaticism can do more harm to a nation than a law authorizing the in­definite detention of nondeportable aliens suspected of being terrorists. To think otherwise is to be in the grip of a dogma that flaunts its defiance of common sense. Credo quia absudum est.

Civil liberties have real benefits that are entitled to considerable weight whenever measures to increase public safety are proposed. But in Lord Hoffman’s opinion, as in similar pronouncements by American civil libertarians, the effort is to place the existing level of civil liberties beyond pragmatic assessment by according them transcendent value compared to which considerations of physical survival are made to seem petty.

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29 responses to “The Religion of Civil Liberties”

  1. Keith Burgess-Jackson

    This is another instance of the clash between absolutism, which permits no tradeoffs, and moderation, which does. Do you subscribe to any absolute values, Judge Posner?

  2. I am in­creasingly struck by the aptness of the term to the type of civil libertarian who will have no truck with tradeoffs between secu­rity and liberty.

    The problem with this formulation is that it presupposes that surrendering liberty to the government will make us safer. Those of us born into privilege (and into the right skin color) don't experience government oppression, and thus might view the government as protector. But I'm not sure how many more people need to be released from death row, or how many more videos we need of young black men being beaten beyond what's needed to subdue them, before we realize that surrending liberties to the government will make us safer is a wrong assumption.

    I also think your argument is overbroad. Do the civil liberties that should be surrendered in the nature of security include free speech, or merely the protections usually affored in criminal cases? I see a lot of First Amendment devotees critical of criminal justice technicalities (which include only constitutional rights that defeat prosecutions, rather than prosecutorial tactics that cover what most of us would consider innocent conduct. Indeed, all mala prohibita crimes are technicalities.) But surely bad ideas (e.g., communism, or the current attack on science), with the death and destruction those ideas bring cause as much a loss of liberty as requiring the government to present evidence of wrongdoing before it detains someone. So what liberties should be surrendered in the sake of safety?

    I don't think that resisting governmental encroachment into our civil liberties is dogmatic in the way that religious beliefs are. Religion is based on faith. An (almost) uncompromising devotion to civil liberties is based on reason and experience. History has shown that in the long run, more power in the hands of government leads to less safety, since there is no oppressor as one who acts under color of law, since those acting under the law are often above the law.

  3. The conclusion of this powerful post seems justified by a questionable understanding of what’s wrong with the civil liberties “dogma." The problem with holding civil liberties above all other interests, including avoiding a huge death toll, can’t be that such a view is, as you say, un- “responsive to scientific or pragmatic argument and hence is dogmatic.” For is any pragmatic or scientific argument really capable of defeating Lord Hoffman’s view, if, as he claims, civil liberties is so valuable as to be worth untold costs in life and limb? Can you scientifically “calculate” that civil liberties are actually not worth that much?
    Rather, the considerations to which such fanatics are most unresponsive are countervailing moral considerations, which are equally unscientific. In this case: they ignore that there is (or, if you prefer, we as a society find) high value in saving thousands of lives, even greater value than avoiding one suspect’s indefinite detention. Might you accept a revised version of your critique of “dogma” — defined, instead, as a moral policy opinion that does not yield an inch to countervailing (though unscientific) moral policy considerations?

  4. What could be more transendent than a government holding a suspect for an indefinite period of time?

    Presumably, the government has evidence to support labeling someone a terrorist, but they don't want to try them because it would reveal intelligence sources, methods, etc.

    Surely these intelligence secrets have a shelf life. Surely after a year or two, a trial could be held without giving away anything that justified the further suspension of the accused terrorists' civil rights.

    Yes, the 'war on terrorism' is serious, but it's hardly World War 2, or even a Tsunami. It doesn't warrant such an extreme change in accepted civil rights as indifinite detention without a hearing. "To think otherwise is to be in the grip of a dogma that flaunts its defiance of common sense. Credo quia absudum est."

  5. The problem with pragmatism, they say, is that it's great in theory but won't work in practice.

    Consider the waste and inefficiency of democratic government. Wouldn't an enlightened dictatorship be preferable, for many reasons? Why, sure it would. "But dictatorships are bad!" Pooh, pooh–that's absolutism. We must be pragmatic. "But how do we trust the dictator to be enlightened?" What, are you demanding a perfect system? Democracy's not perfect, why should dictatorship be held to a double standard?

    Sigh. They also say that you've got to stand for something or you'll fall for anything. I was quite proud of Lord Hoffman's words. And I have no trouble seeing how liberty has more to fear from dangerous precedents than from bombs. Compromises are always necessary, and few if any rights are absolute. But look what the Lords rejected: indefinite detention without a hearing. "Locking them up and throwing away the key," in other words. What earthly reason do we have to believe that such draconian measures are necessary? If these people are bad enough to detain indefinitely, then what's the burden in a hearing wherein we explain how we know they're so bad?

    By keeping his thumb on the scales, Judge Posner is able time and again to claim that security outweighs liberty. But a society that will trade its most fundamental liberties for "security" will end up neither free nor secure. You don't have to be a philosopher (let alone a judge) to see that; you just have to read a little history. As Thucydides supposedly said, "History is philosophy learned from examples." That's more truly practical than this post-Deweyan pragmatism that always ends up on the side of the big battalions.

  6. Your argument is surely overbroad inasmuch as it refers to "civil liberties." Most civil libertarians would consider such diverse topics as due process and freedom of speech to fall under the same umbrella, yet these two forms of liberty are properly defended against your argument on separate grounds. You have argued (here by implication, but explicitly in the past) that restrictions on speech may be justified in times of war. The logic of the argument seems flawed to me: surely the better response in troubled times is MORE speech, not less. (This space is too limited to engage in lengthy defense, but you have certainly given short shrift to the importance of civil liberties.) And with regard to due process (and the right to a hearing), it is unclear why you believe that allowing these aliens hearings would pose a threat to national security. Exactly what type of hearing do you have in mind – an immigration hearing? Habeas? Criminal charges – perhaps conspiracy? Surely the concern of the civil libertarian is that the government will abuse its power and indiscriminately detain, say, young Muslim men, without evidence sufficient to meet the ordinary standard for a criminal conviction or deportation order. Is your fear that, if allowed a hearing, it is possible that terrorists will win their case? Do you have the same objection to presuming criminal suspects innocent in the United States – concern that criminal suspects, if granted hearings, might win their case?

  7. It is undoubtedly true that the British police and security agencies have a long tradition of violating civil liberties. But then so do the American police and security agencies. Would you, on these grounds, deny the propriety of an American judge seeking to refer to American traditions concerning life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? Would you deny that the values expressed in the Declaration of Independence form part — and indeed a constitutive part — of the US tradition, just in case those very values have been sorely traduced by the United States and its constituent parts on many, many occasions?

    Incidentally, it is pretty poor of you to cite Hoffmann as "the choicest recent example" of someone who will on principle not countenance tradeoffs between security and liberty, given that, in the very judgement you cite (and as you admit in you post), he does countenance such tradeoffs. It is just that, unlike you, he does not believe that this threat is of sufficient gravity to justify the suspension of such liberties.

    I'm curious to know Brian's opinion on all this, since he regularly mentions violations of civil liberties in the US that are justified (by their perpetrators) as necessary for security. (And Brian has also linked to material from John Gardner concerning such measures in the UK.) There seems to be a matter of fact here, not one of principle: is the threat from Al Quaeda sufficiently great to justify the curtailment of civil liberties? Hoffmann say no. Posner seems to say yes. What does Leiter think?

  8. As I'm sure Chris knows, I'm with Lord Hoffman. Pious frauds are no objection to the rhetoric of a judicial opinion; they are the very lifeblood of all political rhetoric, of which this is merely an instance, and they function more as exhortations, rather than descriptions. In the abstract, of course, Dick is right that anyone should be ready to trade civil liberties off against security, but the problem never arises in the abstract, but in the real world, where state actors have all too frequently bad and/or ulterior motives, such that we want ways to "strap them to the mast." The "religion of civil liberties" is nothing other than a rhetorical strapping to the mast of state actors who, for all kinds of reasons, would love nothing better than to dispense with due process and the rights of those accused. As a student of public choice theory, Dick Posner must surely acknowledge the general need for constraints on state actors motivated largely by the desire to maximize their tenure and power.

    Let us remember, too, that to prevent 9/11, it would not have been necessary to sacrifice our civil liberties. It would have sufficed to have had, like Britain or France or Israel, real airport security procedures.

  9. Hmm—let’s see. In your first posts, you seemed to declare that all attempts at ethical argumentation and justification were merely “figleafs” and “rationalizations” for positions that were held on non-rational grounds, i.e. that were not responsive to evidence, argument, and so on.

    Today you say that any “system of thought that is not responsive to scientific or pragmatic argument” should count as a religion in some broader sense.

    Can we infer that you think that all ethical systems count as religions in this broader sense? Doesn’t that tend to suggest that this “broader sense” is really too broad to do any useful intellectual work, and is merely a broad brush for tarring your opponents?

    When I hear someone declaring that Kant, Mills, Rawls, and Singer are all in the same boat with Luther, the Pope, and Jim Jones, this does not make me think they have discovered a startling and hither-to-unsuspected boat. It makes me think they are not very good at boat-spotting.

  10. Shag from Brookline

    Where should the line (or lines) be drawn? Is there a bright line? Does survival always trump liberty? Philosophers differ from judges in their approaches. Judge Hoffman made a decision. What decision might Judge Posner have made in a similar situation in America? We have a history going back at least to Lincoln's days, WW I, WW II and currently of similar circumstances (torture as well as confinement). Does the SCOTUS repent at leisure, as in the case of Japanese internment during WW II? Currently the SCOTUS decisions seem to be on a better track. History may tell us what security requires, assuming we survive. But decisions have to be made currently.

    I have just started to read David Hackett Fischer's "Liberty and Freedom, A Visual History of America's Founding Ideas" just published by Oxford University Press. I shall be thinking of Judge Posner's posting and the comments as I continue to read its over 700 pages.

    The comments indicate the answer is not simple. More dialogue is crucial. If the spread of democracy is a valid goal of the U.S., then the practice of the U.S. to its principles of democracy must be adhered to with great care.

  11. Well, I think Judge Posner has a point about the quasi-religious nature of some civil liberties supporters, but I think Brian may have a better responses, which I think is ironically more pragmatic than that of the Judge.

    I am troubled when a pragmatist says something like "terrorists have killed thousands, in time it could be millions." Surely, such blithe fears are not a sound basis for policymaking. We know from the data that terrorism has been a very small risk to life, I'd want to see evidence suggesting (a) that the threat will dramatically escalate and (b) that the countermeasures would actually be effective, before taking any dramatic countermeasures. I'm not sure that data exists. And Brian's point about the pragmatic consequences of state power also finds more historical support than concern for terrorist threats, I think. {I might even extend this concern a little farther than Brian}

  12. Security vs Liberty? Does it matter in deciding on this issue that the actions of the Gov't that wants more power to keep us secure is the entity whose policies in some part created or at least aggravated the problem of terrorism?

  13. Keith Burgess-Jackson

    Different people have different values. Everyone values liberty to some extent. Everyone values security to some extent. Some people value liberty more than security. Some people value security more than liberty. Suppose I value security more than liberty. You say, “You shouldn’t.” What does that mean? Shouldn’t, given what? To persuade me to assign less value to security and more to liberty, you must show that I’m committed to doing so by some other or higher-order value to which I subscribe; otherwise, you’re just saying that you have different values, which of course we knew. Some of the people who have commented on Judge Posner’s post seem to think there’s a single correct answer to the question of what’s more valuable, security or liberty. There isn’t.

  14. Why are arguments regarding security not subject to the same critique? Arguments for security are often cast in dogmatic terms, too, and proponents of sacrificing civil liberties are often impervious to "scientific or pragmatic argument." Terrorism is simply assumed to be a monumental risk, and it is not treated in a rational way by responding to it proportionately with regard to other risks. Does the US's risk of death from terrorism, for example, equal the risk of death from the flu? Flu deaths are estimated to be around 30,000 to 40,000 in a good year. Terrorism is nowhere near this danger level. Certainly, we should guard against terrorism, but often measures for "security" are really resemble religious sacrifices of civil liberties, akin to those in ancient religions sacrificing humans to avert calamity. Rarely do discussions about the sacrifice of civil liberties explain the corresponding security benefit, why such a benefit could not be achieved in other ways, and why such a security measure is the best and most rational one to take.

    The government could do quite a lot to prevent flu deaths. Sadly, it doesn’t devote sufficient attention and resources to issues such as this, or motor vehicle accident deaths (which are at about the same number as flu deaths). Instead, because terrorism is dramatic and gets lots of news coverage (like shark bites), it gets a disproportionate amount of attention.

    True, Judge Posner argues, there is always the danger of a terrorist attack with nuclear or biological weapons. This is certainly a risk, but it must be dealt with like other risks. A more likely and frightening risk, in my humble opinion, is that of an epidemic of SARS or a similar disease. Of course, little attention is placed on risks such as these in the mad rush to throw liberties in the fire to provide some modicum of feeling like we’re really doing something to stop the terrorists. Terrorism is certainly a risk, and it has resulted in thousands of deaths over the past 10 years in the US. But the flu, car accidents, and other problems have resulted in hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of deaths. Frankly, I’m quite surprised that Posner adopts the argument of “security at great cost.” I would expect a pragmatic thinker, and one who (as an economist) is well versed in assessing risks, to see the risk of terrorism for what it is, rather than adopt positions that resemble the hysterical ones often made in favor of security. There are often solid pragmatic reasons why we have many of the liberties we have, and arguments over liberty and security are almost always ones where liberties are questioned, doubted, and put on the sacrificing block – with far less critical scrutiny given to security measures. I would like to see Posner apply his critical insights with equal vigor to the security side of the debate.

  15. It's disheartening that Posner uses misleading rhetoric to unfairly paint Lord Hoffman as a religious nut (where religion = civil libertarianism). Most egregiously, take this sentence of Posner's:

    An ordinary sensible person would think that terrorism on the scale enabled by modern technology and inflamed by religio-political fanaticism can do more harm to a nation than a law authorizing the in­definite detention of nondeportable aliens suspected of being terrorists.

    Setting aside the embedded ad hominem attack ("If you don't agree with me, you're bizarre and not sensible"), Hoffman's target was not a "law authorizing the indefinite detention of nondeportable aliens suspected of being terrorists," it was a law authorizing such detention without a hearing.

    It is not absurd to think that giving the executive branch unlimited, unreviewable power to coerce its citizens is, indeed, a great threat to democratic society. It is not absurd to think that laws allowing indefinite unreviewable detention are a step along the road toward such unlimited, unreviewable executive power. And it is emphatically not absurd to find pernicious certain post-9/11 British and American laws that trade security off against liberty because, as a practical mattter, one believes that the tradeoffs are unnecessary–that we can in fact protect ourselves from terrorist attacks without giving the executive sweeping and unreviewable coercive powers.

    Finally, it's just funny that Posner implies that "the enactments of a democratic legislature" can't threaten society in the same way terrorism can. Of course they can–if you're not in the majority.

  16. Keith Burgess-Jackson

    Judge Posner has had disparaging things to say about philosophers in various places (including Overcoming Law, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, and Public Intellectuals. Sometimes, when I read these remarks, I don't recognize myself, which leads me to believe that Judge Posner dislikes only certain types or styles of philosophy. I wonder what Judge Posner thinks about this post, in which I set out my conception of philosophy.

  17. Judge Posner's comments, summarized in the last paragraph, could be seen as suggesting that the civil libertarians views lack common sense, are too academic: an oft-heard complaint from judges. Lord Hoffman recently wrote, about common sense, in another context:

    "But there is sometimes a tendency to appeal to common sense in order to avoid having to explain one's reasons. It suggests that causal requirements are a matter of incommunicable judicial instinct. I do not think that this is right. It should be possible to give reasons why one form of causal relationship will do in one situation but not in another."

    In my view, Judge Posner’s critique of A v Secretary of State has too much rhetoric and too little analysis. If we need succinct proof of that, it’s the last paragraph of Judge Posner’s post – there are some words missing in the paragraph but the context is clear enough. The capitalization is mine for emphasis.

    "Civil liberties have real benefits that are entitled to considerable weight whenever measures to increase public safety are proposed. But in Lord Hoffman's opinion, as in similar pronouncements by American civil libertarians, the effort is to place the existing level of civil liberties BEYOND PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT by according them transcendent value compared to which considerations of physical survival are made to seem petty."

    It’s an entirely inaccurate summary – particularly the words in italics – of both Lord Hoffman’s speech and point made in A v Secretary of State. The decision was all about a pragmatic balancing of competing interests as all of the speeches make clear. It's most unlikely Judge Posner missed this. Indeed, one wonders why Judge Posner didn’t quote from the speech of the one dissenting judge. Perhaps that’s because Judge Posner saw how weak that analysis was. In substance, the legislation wasn’t bad enough to strike down because, as of the hearing, only 17 people were being held. I quote the concluding paragraph from the dissent of Lord Walker:

    "[218} I think it is also significant that in a period of nearly three years no more than seventeen individuals have been certified under section 21. Of course every single detention without trial is a matter of concern, but in the context of national security the number of persons actually detained (now significantly fewer than 17) is to my mind relevant to the issue of proportionality. Liberty in its written submissions (para 8) appears to rely on the small number of certifications as evidence that there is not a sufficiently grave emergency. That is, I think, a striking illustration of the dilemma facing a democratic government in protecting national security. I would dismiss these appeals."

    I’m reminded of the title to a very good Canadian book about the Canadian anti-Jewish immigration policy in the period up to and during WWII: None Is Too Many. We might ask Judge Posner: How many detainees would have been enough?

  18. If Posner wants to illustrate that there are civil libertarians who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty, he should have used an example of a civil libertarian who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty. Instead he uses as the choicest example he could find, someone who Posner notes quickly retrenches from his lack of truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty by defending the draconian laws enacted by the British to curb the Irish Republican Army.

    Posner’s real quarrel with Lord Hoffman isn’t Hoffman’s generic position regarding tradeoffs between security and liberty but instead what Posner judges an inaccurate portrayal of British legal history and, more significantly, what Posner considers (in my opinion, correctly) an irrational conclusion that the Islamist-jihadist terrorist threat, unlike the terrorist threat posed by the Irish Republican Army, threatens the life of the nation.

    Posner’s example, by virtue of its being the choicest, actually illustrates how few and far-between are civil libertarians who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty. While Posner’s actual complaint against Hoffman himself is narrow and specific to Hoffman’s assessments of facts and Hoffman’s choice of phrasing, there’s no mistaking that Posner’s target is civil libertarians such as, well, me: civil libertarians who believe that there are not one but instead two threats to the life of the nation, one threat springing from the other—the physical threat from potential terrorists and the threat to cherished traditional laws and values.

    We—my civil-libertarian ilk and I—position the balance between the two (the bell curve, so to speak) very differently than does Posner. We believe that the according of basic due process of law to those held for suspicion of terrorist plotting or terrorist affiliation makes Americans, on balance, safer rather than less safe, as due process is unlikely to result in the acquittal of actual terrorists and removes an important motive for the increasing rage toward the U.S. among Muslims worldwide. It’s that that has become the first article in our common book of prayer.

    Posner should concede that this is his real complaint, and he should address it unmasked by mischaracterization of the position of most of civil libertarians.

  19. Judge Posner,
    You seem to suggest that civil libertarians irrationally cling to absolutes — in a nutshell give us all of our liberty or nothing. That may be a fair critique of (some) civil libertarians, but it is also the type of generic critique made of anyone who subscribes dogmatically to his beliefs. My point being is the same criticism could be said of your stance — you cling dogmatically to pragmatism. So I ask, if those in charge have a dogmatic belief structure, how can we expect them to act pragmatically? For example, if the executive dogmatically chooses to make decisions on knowingly false information, how can we describe that decision-making as pragmatic?

  20. (1) When there is great uncertainty as to whether locking up people will reduce terrorism risk, much less definitely prevent an attack, it seems perfectly reasonable to treat the relevant liberties AS IF they were absolutes. Part of the reason for this is the obvious tendancy to overestimate the risk surrounding potential disasters like nuclear attack when they are compared with much more certain but relatively small costs (a single or few detentions).

    (2) I agree with Judge Posner that civil liberties can be defended with a vehemence resembling religiousity. When certain religious or libertarian values are threatened one's entire utility function gets thrown out of whack, as it were. That is, I can well imagine an Englishman thinking [in econo-speak]: "Much of the satisfaction I get from a wide range of things relating to my Englishness depends on living in a country where we uphold certain principles. Degrade those libertarian principles and the utility I get from this wide range of things will be substantially reduced."

    I don't see what's irrational per se about having one's utility functions bear such a property: where the occurance of a certain kind of event or threatening of a certain kind of value can have resonate throughout the value system.

  21. I see two arguments in Judge Posner's post.

    One argument is metaphysical: a consequentialist quibbling with a deontologist. Like many, I'm deontological on Saturdays, Mondays, and Wednesdays, and consequentialist on Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. Today is a Friday, so I don't care.

    Judge Posner's other argument is empirical. He assumes (at least, I think, implicitly) that al Quaeda is some kind of existential threat. I don't see it. No more so than the Baader-Meinhof gang, or the Red Army factions, or Aum Shinkryo. Nihilistic young men have always been with us, and always will be. At one time, they did amount to an existential threat, because their muscles and disregard for their lives were the essence of military force. Today?

    Adam Smith has noticed that we are beyond muscles; our society functions on division of labor. This is as true in killing people efficiently as it is for any other line of business. Industrial division of labor is not a core competency of nihilistic young men.

    In other words, I don't think that nihilistic young men are particularly good at killing large numbers of people, assuming that elementary precautions are taken. Romantics are as inefficient as killers as they are in anything else. (We are talking efficient killers, on the level of an existential threat. They can be effective ones, on the individual level.)

    We do need to take precautions, because even romantics can effectively attack a completely defenseless society. These precautions are mostly boring technological and infrastructural ones. They are of little interest to romantic young men. Unfortunately, they also seem to be of little interest to many romantic older men, who dream of their minions manfully and totally defeating the nihilistic young men, on the battlefield or the courtroom. But they are the precautions we need.

    The repressive precautions that fascinate the older romantics are precisely those that recruit the younger romantics to their cause.

    To sum up, I am accusing Judge Posner of committing some of the sins I think he most dreads: supporting romanticism, and ignoring the lessons of economics.

  22. Not familiar with Lord Hoffman’s opinion in total nor English law. Speaking in terms of civil liberties and government/military detention in general, Hoffman’s reasoning echoes that of the US counterparts defending civil liberties. The US advocates who place civil liberties over civil restrictions cite the 5th amendment in similar cases and argue for a violation of “due process.” Such US cases involve “enemy combatants” detained pursuant to executive war powers. Did Hoffman rely on English law similar to that of the 5th amendment? Maybe the Magna Carta? Who knows? But there is something striking in the Hoffman case that most pedestrians are capable of realizing: the right to argue against criminal charges or an indictment of mass proportion. In the realm of the possible, Hoffman and US advocates of civil liberties are motivated not only from an “alleged” ideology but rather from the sheer possibilities that at times agents may be mistakenly identified as terrorists; the worse case scenarios where abuses of various powers of detention are enforced; and finally the possibility of crushing unwanted dissenters where the gov detains suspicious agents without the possibility of tribunal evaluation, identifying such agents “enemy combatants“ or, for the English, the English equivalent. All this serves to motivate the protection of civil liberties–in this particular case, something like “due process“ but across the Atlantic. If something like that is correct, then Hoffman’s stance doesn’t seem so off base. Given the right to defend oneself from charges, no matter how extreme, is a right worth preserving no matter how dangerous the geopolitical situation. Fairness dictates that some rendition of “due process” (at the level of the world court–or there ought to be a corresponding tribunal consisting of judicial members of the coalition of the willing to hear terrorist indictments) should be granted to would be rogue non-national terrorist suspects–but that‘s to tap into a pair of different topics. (Those guilty of terrorist activity are more than likely to generate a preponderance of evidence.) More to the point. Describing Hoffman as a person who de-emphasizes the Muslim fundamentalists “terror” threat of the English nation in order to preserve English civil liberties just might be to pigeonhole for narrative convenience. Maybe Lord Hoffman knows something about terrorism that the American Public doesn’t. That something just might be the extra-positive law considerations leading to his opinion.

  23. The fundamental premise that Justice Posner bases his argument is that the preservation of life is the ultimate value upon which laws should be based and decisions considered. He nowhere appreciates that in states with laws which severely curb those civil liberties Justice Posner would readily curtail; life is not much worth living.

    Analogous consideration is found in cases involving the termination of life support for the terminally ill where the preservation of life must be weighed against quality of life. The insistence that physicians be forced to continue futile and painful treatment simply to adhere to the primitive instinct for the preservation of life is neither scientifically nor pragmatically sound. Likewise, curtailing civil liberties which facilitate a minimum quality of life in order to preserve life for its own sake is primitive and unnecessary.

    It seems to me that Justice Posner's reification of life above quality of life is more in line with religious conviction, than with sound scientific or pragmatic consideration. A true pragmatist does not hold the value of life an absolute where the continuation of that life would entail severe hardship to both the individual and the society at large. Similarly, a pragmatist would not accept draconian security measures in order to preserve lives where those measures undermined the very condition under which those lives are bareable and worthwhile.

    My point is that the value of life is best not treated as an absolute due to the potential for abuse by the state against its own citizens. The "right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" are best treated as absolutes, not for any "transcendental" reasons, but simply because "it works better that way." History is witness to several examples where compromise of civil liberties have led to much human suffering.

    Contrary to bad popularizations of the philosophy, genuine pragmatism does permit absolute truth where the adherence to that truth can be shown to work better than the alternatives, I believe Peirce referred to it as "the Method of Tenacity." It isn't wrong that Justice Posner has placed an absolute value on life, it's simply that it can be pragmatically shown that his position to hold life absolutely or tenaciously and civil liberties tentatively is wrong.

    Kosta

  24. I take it that Judge Posner endorses

    "If a person's beliefs are not responsive to scientific or pragmatic argument then the belief system held by the person is dogmatic."

    The point has been made that it is odd to think of science having much to say about things like core ethical principles, and so it is odd that the lack of responsiveness of core ethical principles to scientific fact should be so important.

    It is also odd to hold it against ethics that it is not responsive to pragmatic argument, at least on the core questions. After all pragmatic arguments essentially consist of the assumption that some goal is worthwhile, and reasoning aiming at showing that X is better than Y for acheiving the goal. But people disagree about which goals are worthwhile and it is this disagreement to which ethical thought directs itself. If we want to decide what goals are worthwhile we reason ethically, so it is hard to see how arguments which simply assume the answer to that question could be relevant to what the correct answer to that question is.

    Perhaps Judge Posner would bring up the criticisms of ethical theory that he and Dr. Leiter have presented, that it is generally causally inert. I suppose that may be right (though I don't think it is. people are probably too stupid to understand Kant, but that just means they accept bad theories, not that they don't accept theories. i see reason to call the public ignorant and stupid, but I cannot see reason to call them practically arrational), but again I don't see the relevance. I see the relevance of this point to the question of whether 'A Theory of Justice' should be adopted as the platform at the next Democratic Convention, but not whether I apply theoretical ethics to my decisions. It is a curious move from 'it is useless in dealing with others' to 'I shall not use it myself'. Once you are presented with the question, 'What ought I do?' I don't see good reason not to think about it the way that great philosophers (and novellists and theologians) have. I certainly don't see historical materialism as a reason.

    As for definitions of 'dogmatic' and 'religious' I guess I follow Wittgenstein a bit in thinking that we might never have a definition as short and clear as the one you offered. I would think though that even an imprecise characterization of 'dogmatism' would contain a clause about lack of argumentation or appeal to non-public authority, and I think that religion has something to do with the supernatural.

  25. I take it that Judge Posner endorses

    "If a person's beliefs are not responsive to scientific or pragmatic argument then the belief system held by the person is dogmatic."

    The point has been made that it is odd to think of science having much to say about things like core ethical principles, and so it is odd that the lack of responsiveness of core ethical principles to scientific fact should be so important.

    It is also odd to hold it against ethics that it is not responsive to pragmatic argument, at least on the core questions. After all pragmatic arguments essentially consist of the assumption that some goal is worthwhile, and reasoning aiming at showing that X is better than Y for acheiving the goal. But people disagree about which goals are worthwhile and it is this disagreement to which ethical thought directs itself. If we want to decide what goals are worthwhile we reason ethically, so it is hard to see how arguments which simply assume the answer to that question could be relevant to what the correct answer to that question is.

    Perhaps Judge Posner would bring up the criticisms of ethical theory that he and Dr. Leiter have presented, that it is generally causally inert. I suppose that may be right (though I don't think it is. people are probably too stupid to understand Kant, but that just means they accept bad theories, not that they don't accept theories. i see reason to call the public ignorant and stupid, but I cannot see reason to call them practically arrational), but again I don't see the relevance. I see the relevance of this point to the question of whether 'A Theory of Justice' should be adopted as the platform at the next Democratic Convention, but not whether I apply theoretical ethics to my decisions. It is a curious move from 'it is useless in dealing with others' to 'I shall not use it myself'. Once you are presented with the question, 'What ought I do?' I don't see good reason not to think about it the way that great philosophers (and novellists and theologians) have. I certainly don't see historical materialism as a reason.

    As for definitions of 'dogmatic' and 'religious' I guess I follow Wittgenstein a bit in thinking that we might never have a definition as short and clear as the one you offered. I would think though that even an imprecise characterization of 'dogmatism' would contain a clause about lack of argumentation or appeal to non-public authority, and I think that religion has something to do with the supernatural.

  26. Please forgive me for the double post.

  27. It may be that in the long run that basic infrastructural measures like locking down fissionable material and virulent germs makes the threat of romantic nihilists "non-existential," such that for that anticipated future our current constitutional freedoms are just right, but what about the mean time? What if we can't secure world WMD fast enough to know there aren't a few out there either in the hands or at high risk of entering the hands of the romantics? I also think "nihilist" mischaracterizes Bin Laden's crew. I'd call them utopian extremists. Lenin and Stalin organized division of labor and built thermonuclear weapons–albeit while working within a sovereign and secure piece of real estate. But I don't see why we should assume real estate and statehood are prerequisites. As US operations in Iraq show, you don't need to be capable of imposing control over a society to destroy it, and while a number of boots on the ground may be necessary, a little modern technology goes a long way.

  28. [This is a typo-corrected repost of a comment posted Dec. 31. the correction changes the clause in the second paragraph from “threatens the life of the nation” to “doesn’t threaten the life of the nation.”]

    If Posner wants to illustrate that there are civil libertarians who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty, he should have used an example of a civil libertarian who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty. Instead he uses as the choicest example he could find, someone who Posner notes quickly retrenches from his lack of truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty by defending the draconian laws enacted by the British to curb the Irish Republican Army.

    Posner’s real quarrel with Lord Hoffman isn’t Hoffman’s generic position regarding tradeoffs between security and liberty but instead what Posner judges an inaccurate portrayal of British legal history and, more significantly, what Posner considers (in my opinion, correctly) an irrational conclusion that the Islamist-jihadist terrorist threat, unlike the terrorist threat posed by the Irish Republican Army, doesn’t threaten the life of the nation.

    Posner’s example, by virtue of its being the choicest, actually illustrates how few and far-between are civil libertarians who will have no truck with tradeoffs between security and liberty. While Posner’s actual complaint against Hoffman himself is narrow and specific to Hoffman’s assessments of facts and Hoffman’s choice of phrasing, there’s no mistaking that Posner’s target is civil libertarians such as, well, me: civil libertarians who believe that there are not one but instead two threats to the life of the nation, one threat springing from the other—the physical threat from potential terrorists and the threat to cherished traditional laws and values.

    We—my civil-libertarian ilk and I—position the balance between the two (the bell curve, so to speak) very differently than does Posner. We believe that the according of basic due process of law to those held for suspicion of terrorist plotting or terrorist affiliation makes Americans, on balance, safer rather than less safe, as due process is unlikely to result in the acquittal of actual terrorists and removes an important motive for the increasing rage toward the U.S. among Muslims worldwide. It’s that that has become the first article in our common book of prayer.

    Posner should concede that this is his real complaint, and he should address it unmasked by mischaracterization of the position of most of civil libertarians.

  29. re: theory v. practice, utopia v. feet-of-clay.

    Nicely written. I'm reminded that MAD required the U.S. president to be able to incinerate a 1/10th the world in 5 minutes, with few, if any, democratic controls. Those in the politburo responsible for ideology thought we would, by necessity, have to become an true dictatorship because no person with that amount of absolute power would willingly part with it. They were surprised.

    The same argument applies here to the purists. Where's the limit? One killed in error to save 10 or 100 or 1000 (aka the measure of effectiveness and risk of the death penalty)?

    Is there a (U.S.) alternative that could be legislated that wouldn't set off these absolutist antibodies (and keep soldiers from simply eliminating every person in the kill area v. attempting to extract some intelligence value), i.e. save more lives (of the enemy) than would be taken otherwise? Perhaps legislate a ceiling on these types of detentions w/ regular review of numbers and details. 100 a year, 1,000 a year, 10,000 a year (based on the scale of the emergency, presidential finding, etc.)? Utopia meets ground-truth time. Curiously, it's only because small groups and individuals are becoming so much more powerful (relative to the society) that we have these challenges. If we were as poor we were 50 years ago (pre bomb), we would not have these problems. And there is no liberty without economic liberty (i.e. it sets the order of magnitude of comfort and freedom we live within).

    /Ari

    ps. national-means secrets have a half life of 15-20 years. The most expensive secrets have a half life of 50 years. Diplomatic cables generally stay secret for about 70 years (average person's lifetime).

    Dispassionate (based on all the facts) history doesn't get written for at least 50 years (WW2 is now coming into focus, w/ last of Japanese cable traffic published).

    So, if secrets are to be kept, an (open) trial would have to wait 30-40 years.

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