As the fallout from the failed Israeli-US campaign in Lebanon spreads, the risk grows that it will become radioactive.  The ceasefire there is unstable; and Ahmadinejad’s remarks about Israel could not be more obnoxious.  Now, Republicans in and close to the White House and Congress are demanding that the intelligence services produce a pretext for striking militarily at Iran, according to the New York Times (Aug. 24) "Some in G.O.P. Say Iran Threat Is Played Down."  It seems that the CIA and other US intelligence agencies are reluctant to shill for the neocons and Bush as they did in 2002.  The warmongers are livid:

“The people in the [intelligence] community are unwilling to make judgment calls
and don’t know how to link anything together,” one senior United States
official said. 

“We’re not in a court of law,” he said. “When
they say there is ‘no evidence,’ you have to ask them what they mean,
what is the meaning of the term ‘evidence’?”

In the same story, Newt Gingrich is reported to explain what "evidence" means:

“When the intelligence community says Iran is 5 to 10 years away from a
nuclear weapon, I ask: ‘If North Korea were to ship them a nuke
tomorrow, how close would they be then?’”

And, if North Korea had shipped them one last week…?  So, that’s settled: there is evidence that Iran possesses weapons of mass destruction.  (Any questions?)  In any case, this administration prides itself on its unique understanding the nature of the post-9/11 world and the lesson of 9/11: "Take threats before they
fully materialize."  And how to take the Iranian threat?  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept-Oct., 2006) reminds us of the following:

During an impromptu April 18 press conference, President George W. Bush
was asked if his assertion that "all options are on the table"
regarding Iran included the possibility of a nuclear strike. Bush
reiterated, "All options are on the table. We want to solve this issue
diplomatically, and we’re working hard to do so." In no uncertain
words, the president of the United States directly threatened Iran with
a preemptive nuclear strike.

Working hard at diplomacy is not something this administration is likely to be remembered for.  Or is Bush’s incuriosity and belligerence simply a tactic?  The Bulletin reminds us that there are many precedents for nuclear brinksmanship as a negotiating ploy:

Bush’s statements regarding Iran are particularly reminiscent of a
diplomatic strategy employed by President Richard Nixon known as the
"madman theory." [1] 

Madman theory?  The footnote explains:

[1]  The theory was first made public by Nixon’s chief of staff, H. R. "Bob"
Haldeman. "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North
Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything
to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God’s
sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him
when he’s angry–and he has his hand on the nuclear button’–and Ho Chi
Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." H. R.
Haldeman, The Ends of Power (New York: Times Books, 1978).

Hmmm….communism then, "Islamo-fascism" now (other fascisms being presumably benign).  The Bulletin story continues:

The
madman theory, or, as Nixon and his chief of staff Bob Haldeman
described it, "the principle of the threat of excessive force," was at
the center of this strategy. "Nixon was convinced that his power would
be enhanced if his opponents thought he might use excessive force, even
nuclear force. That, coupled with his reputation for ruthlessness, he
believed, would suggest that he was dangerously unpredictable" ….  As part of
the strategy, underlings would transmit information to foreign
officials saying that Nixon might be unstable or unpredictable and that
unless concessions were made he might order the use of military force
or even nuclear weapons. The entire effort was conducted in extreme
secrecy with only a few U.S. officials even aware of it.

Reliance on a "principle of the threat of excessive force" might explain the extent of Israel’s devastation of the civilian infrastucture of Lebanon.  (After all, following Warren Quinn, if you have the right to threaten (what some might think "excessive") force, you must have the right to use it.)  Moreover, the unguarded obnoxiousness of Bush’s public conduct and the incoherent obsessiveness of his public utterances could be explained as calculated moves in a grand game.  A game, unfortunately, that two can play.  Come October, will Ahmadinejad have pulled the nuclear finger?