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Philosophy Departments That Advertise Through the APA But Violate Its Anti-discrimination Policies

Brian Leiter

Charles Hermes, a PhD student at Florida State University, invited me to post the following letter he has sent to the APA:

I applied to a position at Westmont College that was posted in the American Philosophical Association’s Jobs for Philosophers.  When Westmont decided to pursue my application further, they requested that I sign a statement of ‘faith’.  Part of their statement of faith includes the clause:  “The college will not condone practices that Scripture forbids. Such activities include…homosexual practices.”  To avoid offending those Christians who love their neighbors, and who leave the judging for God, I will hereafter refer to statements like these as statements of discrimination instead of statements of faith.

While I am happily married, with no intention of engaging in homosexual practices, I cannot endorse a policy that discriminates against homosexuals.  For that reason, I withdrew my application.  A version of this prohibition against homosexuality from Westmont College can be found at:  http://www.westmont.edu/_faculty_staff/pages/employment/index.html

After withdrawing my application, I began to worry that I have not completely withdrawn my consent of these discriminatory policies.  After all, I belong to the American Philosophical Association which advertised for a position that requires signing a statement of discrimination. 

While I found Westmont’s restriction deplorable, they were not the only position advertised in the 2006-2007 JFP which required signing a statement of discrimination. 

Wheaton College requires its applicants to sign a form with the following statement. “We believe that these Christian standards will show themselves in a distinctly Christian way of life, an approach to living we expect of ourselves and one another. This lifestyle involves practicing those attitudes and actions the Bible portrays as virtuous and avoiding those the Bible portrays as sinful…Scripture condemns the following:…homosexual behavior and all other sexual relations outside the bounds of marriage between a man and woman.” A version of this form can be found at:

https://www.wheaton.edu/HR/Application.pdf

Bethel College, also posting in the 2006-2007 JFP, has its applicants sign a statement of discrimination which includes the clause: “The Bible also identifies character qualities and actions that should not be present in the lives of believers.  For example, …homosexuality”.  A copy of this application can be found at:

http://www.bethel.edu/human-resources/apps/bu-faculty-appl.pdf

While I am not overly proficient in using internet search sites, it took only fifteen minutes to discover Wheaton’s and Bethel’s anti-homosexual policies.  Perhaps, someone more proficient could discover other programs we advertise for who practice similar policies. 

In the defense of the APA, we do have an anti-discrimination policy that reads: 

Further, The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. At the same time, the APA recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation; it is not inconsistent with the APA’s position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school’s religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliations do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement. Advertisers in Jobs for Philosophers are expected to comply with this fundamental commitment of the APA, which is not to be taken to preclude explicitly stated affirmative action initiatives. The APA Board of Officers expects that all those who use the APA Placement Service will comply with the letter and spirit of all applicable regulations concerning non-discrimination, equal employment opportunity and affirmative action.

As we can see from the examples of Westmont, Wheaton, and Bethel colleges, our expectation that advertisers comply with our fundamental commitments is not well grounded.  Hopefully the APA will begin to ensure that advertisers live up to our expectations.  If not, I suggest that the internet is a powerful tool.  I hope other members of the APA will help in the effort to make the APA’s anti-discrimination policy more than just words.

Should the APA bar these institutions from advertising in JFP?  Non-anonymous comments strongly preferred, as always; post only once, comments may take awhile to appear.

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50 responses to “Philosophy Departments That Advertise Through the APA But Violate Its Anti-discrimination Policies”

  1. John Oberdiek

    Yes, absolutely, the APA should bar these institutions from advertising in JFP. The APA is right to reject discrimination against gays and lesbians, and the least the APA could do to put its anti-discrimination policy into effect is to withold its imprimatur from the hiring practices of the institutions that violate its policy.

    Reply
  2. Andrei Buckareff

    I have had experiences similar to Charles's. On one occassion, I was interviewed by a department at a self-described Christian liberal arts college that has very strong ties to the Presbyterian Church where a plurarlity of viewpoints are allegedly tolerated with respect to sexual conduct. However, I was put on the hot seat by a theologian who is an activist on the right in the Presbyterian Church. Said theologian has devoted much of his energy to depriving the same status in the church to gays and lesbians as heterosexual persons. While I was told that my views on sexual ethics did not hurt my candidacy, I'm sure they did given that none of the persons I know who advanced to become finalists were similarly grilled (and none of them are liberal Episcopalians). On another occassion, I was interviewed for a post at a school affiliated with the Free Methodist Church. This time I looked up their statement on sexual conduct (but only after scheduling an interview with them). I found it to be rather vague, but it could easily be read as proscribing homosexual behavior. I was forthcoming in my interview about my views on human sexuality. The interviewer practices a "don't ask, don't tell" policy. But I found it scary to think that I could wind up at a school where I would not be free to engage in open-ended inquiry in my classes and even be honest about my views on sexuality. I was relieved when I did not become a finalist for that post. Still, I couldn't help but wonder whether my explicitly articulated views made me a less attractive candidate.

    Like Charles, I find the policies and the conduct of some of the people at some of these schools deplorable. That said, it seems consistent for the APA as an organization to condemn certain practices while recognizing that some institutions tie the hands of departments by having antiquated statements on sexual conduct and religious affiliation (even in cases where the departments do not protest being bound by such statements). A religious school that has a distinctively religious mission should be allowed to discriminate on the basis of its religious teachings. I agree that this is not a good policy for those schools. And it is arguably even bad for those institutions for other reasons–e.g., the quality of education received by the students may not be as good as what they would experience in a more pluralistic environment.

    For what it is worth, some schools, demand that faculty not only be conservative Christians and discriminate against gays and lesbians, but they demand that their faculty attend churches in a specific denomination and send their children to the denomination's private schools. Calvin College is one such college. If Calvin has restrictive statements on sexual conduct, then it goes a step beyond Westmont by not only discriminating against gays, lesbians, and liberal Christians, but it discrimintes against other conservative Christians! But it is part of Calvin's mission that it educate students in accordance with certain principles that are, in part, derived from the Reformed Christian tradition. Any discriminatory policies that follow from these commitments, insofar as they clash with what the APA indicates is unethical, is permissible (even if not good or right). I will not apply for jobs at schools with discriminatory policies. And I suggest that others with similar convictions do not apply to them either. But I recognize that they have a right, insofar as it is part of their mission, to discriminate because of how their religious commitments are connected to how they conceive of their institutional goals.

    For what it is worth, if we suppose that Paul Kurtz's Center for Inquiry became a liberal arts college tomorrow, it seems they should have the right to discriminate against persons who are not naturalists or who have explicit religious commitments that are incompatible with metaphysical naturalism. The same goes for an institution that explicitly endorses promotion of a particular world view as one of its goals (e.g., a Rabbinical school, a seminary, a Buddhist college, etc).

    I am not defending the practices of these schools. I hope they change. We can exert some pressure by openly declaring their policies as unethical. But it seems reasonable to allow them to advertise posts. We can flag such institutions as practicing discriminatory hiring. But barring them from advertising seems unnecessary.

    Reply
  3. Steven Nadler

    Perhaps an even more effective move would be to allow them to advertise in JFP, but to warn them that their ads will be tagged with an explicit censure (one that cites the APA policy that they violate and in what way they do so). That way the APA could make even more clear its rejection of such discrimination.

    Reply
  4. Andrei Buckareff

    In the interest of full-disclosure, I should note that I have been active in trying to get schools with anti-GLBT policies to change (see http://www.soulforce.org/article/1018). Incidentally, it is not only religious schools that have such policies. Military colleges also have anti-GLBT policies. For more info, go to: http://www.soulforce.org/

    Also, if it was not clear, I endorse a proposal similar to what Steven suggests.

    Reply
  5. Clayton Littlejohn

    At the very least the APA should not allow these institutions to use the JFP or hold interviews at the conventions until their hiring practices conform to the APA's anti-discrimination standards to show respect for its gay and lesbian members. The APA would do the same if the discrimination were on grounds of race or sex, right?

    Reply
  6. Dean C. Rowan

    Westmont College is, alas, a beautiful campus in one of the wealthiest neighborhoods of California, if not the country. The proscription against "homosexual practice" is evidently gratuitous, because it's redundant, at least for the time being. Mr. Hermes left out an important element of the context appearing in the web version. The passage reads, "The college will not condone practices that Scripture forbids. Such activities include…sexual relations outside of marriage, homosexual practice…." Obviously, if extramarital sex is not condoned, neither is homosexual practice, since it will only occur outside of marriage in California, where "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized…." Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5.

    The APA policy also tests the limits of consistency, despite its claim to the contrary. It "recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation," but these commitments must "not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement," such as sexual orientation. As Stanley Fish has noted time and time again, the principle of tolerance that moves open minds and hearts to "recognize[] the special commitments" of some groups encounters its own undoing in failing to extend to some groups' discriminations deemed intolerant. The APA is crafting its own secular definition of what constitutes direct relation to a religious purpose.

    Rather than bar the advertisements, I think the APA should adjust the language of its policy, as Mr. Nadler recommends, simply to refuse to endorse the unacceptably discriminatory practices of some religious institutions.

    Reply
  7. MB

    Some observations. In a thread on this blog just a few weeks ago, several posters openly advocated policies in hiring faculty which violate the APA statement quoted above by Charles Hermes. (http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2007/04/some_questions_.html) Using "demographic attributes" (as they were called in that thread) such as race or gender were promoted as a way of increasing diversity, which seems like a good goal given that philosophy is dominated by white males.

    But the APA statement considers unethical "all forms of" such "discrimination." This leads me to think that we read "discrimination" in two ways: on the first, call it the pejorative sense (discriminationPEJ), discrimination involves EXCLUDING people on the basis of some criterion like those listed in the APA statement; this is presumably what the APA has most in mind. But on the second way of reading it, call it the differentiation sense (discriminationDIF), discrimination involves mere differentiation or distinction between people. It is this second sense that is invoked when people in the aforementioned thread advocate hiring underrepresented groups: we ought to discriminateDIF, ie, discern which of our job candidates are women, minorities, etc, so as to INCLUDE them.

    A crucial question is whether (the practice of) discriminationDIF entails discriminationPEJ. But another concern is that there may be a double standard here: we can permit certain forms of discrimination but not others. If so, for consistency's sake, we should consider either (i) applying the APA standard uniformly, permitting no such discrimination by any institutions, religious or otherwise; or (ii) reformulate the discrimination position in order to justify discriminationDIF but proscribe discriminationPEJ. This latter option would require a defense of why the line is drawn where it is; and in particular it would need to explain why certain policies, like those of the religious institutions named, are engaged in discriminationPEJ rather than discriminationDIF.

    Reply
  8. Anonymous Princeton Professor

    My university also discriminates in its hiring practices: we will not hire murderers, nor those who believe that they are required by God to murder others. Should we be disallowed from advertising in the JFP? Should we try to make hiring decisions from a standpoint of ethical neutrality? Now, most (but not all) APA members believe that homosexuality is morally permissible, whereas murdering (whether or not in God's name) is not. But the APA should recognize the plurality of its membership — and the APA majority has no right to discriminate against the minority of its members who hold traditional religious beliefs. If the APA bans these colleges from advertising, then it would be guilty of discriminating against these colleges (and their professors, and Christian graduate students) on the basis of religious creed.

    By the way, Wheaton et al also require professors to ascent to the authority of the Christain Scriptures. Is that also discriminatory against those of different religions or to atheists? If so, then we should begin the pogrom against the religious institutions in our society.

    Reply
  9. janaki

    Yes, the APA should bar these institutions from advertising in JFP. If the APA has a policy against discrimination, they should enforce it. If not, what's the point of the policy?

    Reply
  10. Mark Murphy

    It might be useful to get clear on what discrimination is being alleged here.

    It is not merely the requirement that successful job candidates must subscribe to a statement of faith: that is, I take it, covered under the 'religious affiliation' qualification to the APA's standard.

    It is not that folks are being denied jobs for having a certain sexual orientation. Or, if that is the allegation, no evidence has been introduced that this is the case. It is perfectly compatible with Westmont's, Wheaton's, Bethel's (etc.) explicit standards to hire candidates with either homosexual or heterosexual orientations.

    So, what is the discrimination being alleged? It must be in the particulars of the standards for ethical conduct that these schools require faculty to subscribe to. Is it that they have a standard of sexual conduct that forbids homosexual conduct? It would seem weird if that were sufficient — we wouldn't call an institution discriminatory if its standards of conduct precluded faculty from engaging in any sexual conduct at all. (Imagine Shaker U.) Is it that the standards of sexual conduct are more demanding on homosexuals as a class than they are on heterosexuals as a class? Why would the difference in demandingness count as discrimination, though?

    I have a suspicion. My suspicion is that folks find the traditional Christian sexual ethic absurd, and so any attempt to build an institution that takes that sexual ethic on board will ipso facto count as discriminatory. But this seems to stretch the notion of discriminatory to serve rhetorical purposes rather than use the concept of the discriminatory for the sake of clear ethical/political evaluation.

    Reply
  11. Alva Noe

    I would support banning private institutions that discriminate on the basis of race, creed, gender, sexual orientation, etc, from participation in the functions of the APA. However there is no reason to think (on the basis of the what has been stated above) that Westmont College discriminates in this sense. No language on the web site suggests that only certain kinds of people are welcome at Westmont. As far as can be gathered from the mission statement, the college is open to people of any race, gender, sexual orientation; it would seem even to be open to non-Christians. They have articulated a system of values and a code of conduct for members of their private community and they require that anyone wishing to join their private community be willing to accord with these. What is proscribed is behavior. As they write: "The Westmont community chooses, freely and willingly, to impose upon itself rules for behavior which serve both the long range interests of the institution and the immediate good of its individual members." It is entirely appropriate for a private institution to articulate this sort of mission statement. In fact, it is admirable. I would not support banning private institutions whose values I or a majority of members of the APA deplore — and I do deplore the values of Westmont College — from participation in the functions of the APA.

    Reply
  12. Matt Weiner

    Anonymous Princeton Professor demolishes up a ridiculous succession of straw arguments.

    Should we try to make hiring decisions from a standpoint of ethical neutrality?

    No, and no one suggested that we should, or anything that entailed it.

    Now, most (but not all) APA members believe that homosexuality is morally permissible…. But the APA should recognize the plurality of its membership — and the APA majority has no right to discriminate against the minority of its members who hold traditional religious beliefs.

    This seems like a strange argument. Why should the minority rule in this case. If the point is that any individual APA member should be free to put into effect his or her own moral code without censure from the APA, would you be willing to extend that to APA members who think it is immoral for women to work outside the home, and so refuse to hire women? What about those who think that support for the current Administration of the U.S. is immoral; does this oblige the APA to remove "political convictions" from its statement?

    By the way, Wheaton et al also require professors to ascent to the authority of the Christain Scriptures. Is that also discriminatory against those of different religions or to atheists?

    As Mark Murphy points out, this is covered by the following language in the policy:

    "it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school's religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliations do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement."

    If so, then we should begin the pogrom against the religious institutions in our society.

    Given the history of pogroms and who they were carried out against, this is extraordinarily offensive.

    Mark Murphy asks why it should count as discrimination if a standard of sexual conduct is more demanding on gays and lesbians than on heterosexuals. Disparate impact is a well-known standard in discrimination law. If a policy required faculty members to attend religious services on Sunday but not on Friday or Saturday, that would be a facially neutral policy but would be discriminatory against Jews (and, I believe, Muslims) even though it regulates religious conduct rather than religious belief.

    Reply
  13. Duncan Richter

    I don't think it is that people find Christian sexual ethics absurd. In this case I think many people find them unethical.

    Mark Murphy asks "Why would the difference in demandingness count as discrimination?" I don't understand this. Why would it not?

    Reply
  14. Ralph Wedgwood

    Bob Jones University once instituted a ban on interracial dating among its students. The officials at Bob Jones sincerely believed that such interracial dating was contrary to Scripture. They also believed that this ban in no way discriminated against people purely on the basis of their race, since the ban applied equally to members of all races. Moreover, they may also have believed that this ban was quite consistent with the value of free speech and academic freedom, since the ban only outlawed a certain *activity* – it did not outlaw the expression of any particular viewpoint or belief.

    It seems clear to me that Westmont College's ban on homosexual activity is related to sexual orientation discrimination in fundamentally the same way as Bob Jones's ban on interracial dating was related to race discrimination. (Compare the similarity between the Supreme Court's arguments against anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence vs. Texas and the Court's arguments against anti-miscegenation laws in Loving vs. Virginia.)

    I wonder if all the intelligent philosophers who have written in favour of the APA's support for Westmont College would have taken a similar line if the APA had provided the same kind of support to Bob Jones University?

    Reply
  15. Gualtiero Piccinini

    Should the APA bar these institutions from advertising in JFP? Absolutely.

    Reply
  16. Mark Murphy

    I apologize for the succinctness.

    It is not at all surprising that, for any given set of moral standards, there will be groups of people that find it much more difficult to comply with such standards than others. It seems peculiar that this brute fact is sufficient to make for discrimination. We need an argument that moral standards must be equally demanding or that only moral standards that are equally demanding can be made into institutional requirements. It is not clear how these arguments would go.

    Reply
  17. Matt Weiner

    We need an argument that moral standards must be equally demanding or that only moral standards that are equally demanding can be made into institutional requirements.

    I don't think we do. Given the APA's antecedent (and laudable) condemnation of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, we only need an argument that moral standards should not place an unfair burden on people of different sexual orientations. To use another phrase from anti-discrimination law, by APA standards gay and lesbian people are a protected class. And it is clear that moral standards that specifically forbid gay and lesbian sex place an unfair burden on gay and lesbian people; indeed, that seems to be their purpose.

    Of course the APA expresses a certain moral point of view by condemning discrmination based on sexual orientation. It also expresses a certain moral point of view by condemning discrimination based on race, sex, and religion. Anyone who thinks that the APA shouldn't express any moral standards at all should object to the whole antidiscrimination policy; otherwise, it's hard to see why the point of view of those who condemn gay and lesbian sex should be privileged over the point of view of (what I presume to be) the majority of APA members who voted for the antidiscrimination policy.

    Reply
  18. Mark van Roojen

    Ralph Wedgwood and Matt Weiner are particularly on point here. But there are a few further points worth making.

    If the most rigorous remedy proposed above were adopted, the APA would not be banning the institutions in question from doing what they wish; the APA would merely be refusing to provide its services to the institutions that discriminate against certain groups picked out precisely because people in these groups are and have been subject to widespread and virulent prejudice. And the APA would be refusing to provide them in precisely the arena where offering such services might reasonably be thought of as collaborating in the offensive behavior. I don't see that as a form of discrimination, even when it may make it more difficult for people with certain religious beliefs to hire employees. It certainly doesn't place an undue burden on the exercise of religion.

    Just as much as these institutions are voluntary organizations and therefore arguably exempt from anti-discrimination requirements that should rule out any similar policies adopted by governmental organizations, the APA is also a voluntary organization. As such, it is open to its members to decide that associating with institutions that practice and advocate discrimination of this sort is not what they want to do.

    It may or may not be the best policy for the APA to adopt. Perhaps Steven Nadler's suggestion early on in this thread is a better one. There may be some value in allowing such organizations to advertise, especially insofar as continued interaction might have some effects in getting the institutions to think about changing their policies. But whatever the best remedy, the outcry that such remedies would themselves be discriminatory or otherwise inconsistent ignores the institutional role of the APA and the close nexus between the services it provides and the kind of discrimination being complained of.

    Reply
  19. Joseph Long

    It appears the APA is faced with a bit of a dilemma to be sure: either it fails to abide by its own language or does not. Of course, the APA’s failing to abide by its own language amounts to the APA’s being inconsistent with itself; if, on the other hand, the APA abides by its own language, then it must reject (perhaps withhold JFP postings for) institutions based on those institutions’ religious affiliation, which also seems inconsistent with the Association’s language: "The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on…religion,…."

    Based on the majority of responses, it appears most would grab the dilemma by the second horn: The APA should reject certain institutions based on those institutions’ religious affiliations, for, it would be said, those affiliated religions hold tenets which are inconsistent with the APA’s anti-discrimination statement. But why embrace the second horn rather than the first? What principle underlies this move? Presumably, since both of the above horns lead to inconsistency within the APA's position, the underlying principle should be something external to that position. The only principle I can think of seems to be this:

    (M) If S is morally permitted to choose to A, then T is morally obligated to permit S to A.

    If (M) were true, then the APA could withhold JFP postings from certain religious institutions and could do so on moral grounds. But surely (M) is false; counterexamples are immediately obvious: S is morally permitted to choose to drive one make of automobile while working for another automobile maker, but surely Chevrolet is not morally obligated to permit S to drive a Honda while S is working for Chevrolet. If a person has a choice over whether to perform some action A, then why can’t an organization require of those whom it hires to refrain from performing that action? If there is none–and it seems there isn't–then preventing these institutions from posting positions in JFP would be equally discriminatory.

    Reply
  20. Alastair Norcross

    The distinction between behavior and orientation that has been appealed to by some posters is clearly irrelevant in this context. Imagine an institution that claimed to be open to hiring women, but that also required its employees to pee standing up. If we agree, as I think we should, that the kind of discrimination that aims to exclude some people based on class membership is condemnable in the case of (at least) classes based on gender, race, and sexual orientation, then it is clear that both my hypothetical institution and the actual institutions that ban homosexual conduct practice condemnable discrimination. The clear intent of these bans is to exclude homosexuals from the faculty (and student body). For these institutions, or their apologists, to claim "we are quite open to hiring homosexuals, just so long as they don't engage in homosexual behavior" is no less pathetic sophistry than for my hypothetical institution to claim "we are quite open to hiring women, just so long as they pee standing up". I would favor the APA barring such institutions from advertising in the JFP. The alternative of allowing such advertisements, but tagging them with an explicit warning might also be appealing. Like a government health warning. "WARNING, this institution is hazardous to your moral health." If the American Philosophical Association can't take a moral stand, who can?

    Reply
  21. Matt Weiner

    Thanks Mark.

    I want to mention that considerable parts of my comments are quotes from other posts; I meant to italicize them, but carelessly failed to preview or notice that the italics hadn't shown up.

    Also, I haven't made my mind up about any remedy; I'm just stating support for the APA's policy.

    Reply
  22. Mark Murphy

    Matt Weiner appeals to disparate impact and protected classes. We should get straight what is involved with this. What is unjustified is discrimination that, even if resulting from a facially neutral standard, has an adverse impact on some protected class, where the application of that standard is not justified as a matter of necessity. Now, the last part is the difficult part. No one is going to claim that a university's tenure rule (perhaps, a certain level of publication) is discriminatory if it turned out to be the case that (e.g.) it has an adverse impact on older faculty members, or on younger faculty members, even if age is one of the protected classes mentioned in the APA statement. But this will be precisely the claim of the religious institutions in question. What they are trying to do — to foster a community in which a certain way of life is supported and endorsed — is itself legitimate, even if it also has the effect of placing demands on some members of the community that are motivationally more difficult to endorse. What are they going to do — require adherence to the traditional Christian norms of moral life, except where they have to do with sex?

    (I would also be curious to know whether such motivational difficulty is itself something to be comprehended under 'adverse impact.' Maybe the real lawyers can speak to this, and to whatever rationale for this is relevant.)

    I am not at all interested in making the claim that Mark van Roojen sets out to refute — that the APA would be discriminating against religious institutions by enforcing their anti-discrimination norms in the way favored by most of the commenters on this thread. But it is risible to equate the voluntariness of membership in, say, the faculty of Wheaton with the voluntariness of membership in/use of the APA for hiring matters. We all know that the APA has a near-monopoly as the gateway into the profession, through advertising of positions, a centralized set of interview sites, and so forth. Let's not play like it's otherwise.

    Reply
  23. Alastair Norcross

    There seems to be some confusion about the relation between the APA's anti-discrimination policy and its acceptance of religious affiliation as an acceptable criterion of job eligibility. Some have even claimed that the APA's policy is internally inconsistent. In fact, that is clearly (though, apparently, not clearly enough) not the case.
    The relevant clause from the APA's policy, as quoted in Charles Hermes' original post, is "it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school's religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliations do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement."
    As the last clause makes clear, the opposition to discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. trumps the use of religious affiliation as a criterion. One problem lies in the inclusion of "religion" in the original list of protected classes. If the criteria for the relevant religious affiliation include not being of a different religion, which seems likely, then any demand for religious affiliation will be trumped by the APA's anti-discrimination policy. This doesn't make it inconsistent. It simply renders the bit about religious affiliation being sometimes an acceptable criterion empty, since never satisfied.
    The way to preserve the spirit of the APA policy is simply to exclude religion from the list of discriminated against classes that can trump the use of religious affiliation. This seems right to me. If we think it's OK for religious colleges to hire only adherents of their religion, that doesn't extend to just any religious view. We wouldn't accept a college's insistence on hiring only faculty who practiced human sacrifice, even if that practice was an integral part of a particular religion. Many versions of Christianity, for example, have no problem with homosexual behavior. Those that do deserve our condemnation, and certainly don't deserve our support.

    Reply
  24. Mark Murphy

    Alastair Norcross's example is inapt. Given the context, it is obvious that the peeing-standing-up rule is intended to block women from being hired. If he thinks that these Christian colleges have a no-homosexual-conduct rule in order to preclude those with a homosexual orientation from being hired, then this bespeaks great ignorance.

    Again: If one wants to foster a community in which certain sorts of moral standards are upheld, then it makes perfect sense not to hire those who are committed to the flouting of those standards. This means, in the case in question: no one will be hired who is committed to engaging in extramarital sex, or indeed who is unwilling to commit not to, just as no one will be hired who is committed to anything else deemed a vice within a traditional Christian ethic.

    Reply
  25. Clayton Littlejohn

    I suppose this is in response to Joseph Long's comment.

    You wrote:

    if, on the other hand, the APA abides by its own language, then it must reject (perhaps withhold JFP postings for) institutions based on those institutions’ religious affiliation, which also seems inconsistent with the Association’s language: "The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on…religion,…."

    The APA states that it will respect an institution's religious commitments up until the point that those commitments constitute a kind of discrimination it regards as objectionable. I can't see how you could make that out to be an inconsistency without abusing the ellipsis.

    Reply
  26. David Friedell

    I don't have any substantive comments to add, but I thought some of you might enjoy Stephen Colbert's recent take on the role of religion in discrimination against gays and lesbians.

    http://www.crooksandliars.com/2007/05/08/colbert-defends-christianistss-right-to-discriminate-against-gays/

    Reply
  27. Anon

    "This means, in the case in question: no one will be hired who is committed to engaging in extramarital sex, or indeed who is unwilling to commit not to, just as no one will be hired who is committed to anything else deemed a vice within a traditional Christian ethic."

    Norcross' comment is perfectly apt. A homosexual is going to engage in homosexual activity. A woman can pee standing up, but not without a loss of dignity and damage to herself. A homosexual can abstain from all homosexual activity, but not without a loss of dignity and damage to herself. Of course she might freely choose to be celibate, but that's another matter, just as some women might freely choose to pee standing up.

    Reply
  28. Alastair Norcross

    Mark Murphy writes of me "If he thinks that these Christian colleges have a no-homosexual-conduct rule in order to preclude those with a homosexual orientation from being hired, then this bespeaks great ignorance."
    I would counter that if he thinks that this isn't the purpose of the no-homosexual-conduct rule, then this bespeaks great naivety. Of course, few colleges will brazenly admit this, but we're adults here, and can see through this kind of sophistry.

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  29. Stephen Young

    This discussion has so far incorporated at least three different, difficult concepts: (1) discrimination against a protected class; (2) freedom of association for private religious institutions; and (3) affirmative action. In my view, the discussion does not need to touch on (3) and is probably only made more confusing by references to (3), but that's just my initial take.

    However, (1) and (2) are important, difficult, and butting heads with each other, as they often do. Respecting private religious institutions' freedom to associate with others of the same religion is arguably an important part of protecting freedom of religion. If it is, and if freedom of religion and freedom of religious association are civil liberties we want to maintain, we should not lightly burden or interfere with them.

    However, hard cases arise when an institution's decision to associate only with others of the same religious views (and who conform to the same religion-based code of conduct) excludes members of identifiable groups that have been burdened by discrimination. For example, the Bob Jones University ban on interracial dating would be tough for most people to swallow, as would the hypothetical institution that refused to hire women because its religious views held that it is immoral for women to work outside the home.

    Since the APA's policy lists sexual orientation as a protected class along with gender, race, etc., the APA cannot consistently view the Westmont, Wheaton, and Bethel homosexual-excluding policies as any different from the Bob Jones no-interracial-dating policy or the hypothetical no-female-employee policy. All such policies should simply be viewed as protected-class-excluding (PCE) policies, and the APA policy appears to prohibit job advertising from schools with PCE policies (although the policy's wording is a bit unclear, I agree with Alastair's interpretation, i.e., that anti-discrimination trumps religious association).

    Accordingly, if the APA wants to continue to permit Westmont and other schools with PCE policies to advertise through the APA while remaining consistent with its own anti-discrimination policies, the APA must (A) strike sexual orientation from its list of protected classes or (B) exempt private religious institutions from its anti-discrimination policies. There seems to be no principled basis for adopting (A), and (A) would be offensive to a great many APA members. Adopting (B) would be a strong statement in favor of respecting freedom of religion, but it might be too strong, as it would commit the APA to permitting advertising from private religious institutions that exclude or burden race, gender, and other protected classes.

    Some might argue that there is a middle path, such that the APA could permit ads from schools with arguably PCE policies when they're not too egregious but forbid ads from schools with policies that are truly offensive, such as the Bob Jones or female-excluding example. But essentially, this is just a back door to (A) without having to explicitly adopt (A), as it would be easy and natural for many people to characterize race- and gender-excluding policies as "egregious" and homosexual-excluding policies as somehow "neutral." As a society, we are not yet accustomed to keeping our discrimination based on sexual orientation in check, and we are less shocked by instances of it than by other sorts of discrimination.

    As Mark van Roojen pointed out, the APA is not a governmental entity and is not in a position to prohibit schools from adopting PCE policies, so the APA anti-discrimination policy does not burden private institutions the way a government intervention would. Therefore, the civil liberties consideration does not weigh as heavily with me, in this case, as the arguments in favor of the APA's broadly inclusive anti-discrimination stance, and I think that the APA should maintain its anti-discrimination policy and prohibit Westmont, Wheaton, and other schools with PCE policies from using its advertising services.

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  30. Joshua A. Miller

    I believe Mark van Roojen hits the nail on the head; we need not invoke the statist language of First Amendment law, as the APA is one private organization attempting to determine its relationship to other private institutions. As a result, the APA has neither the coercive power to change the policy of these universities nor a responsibility to the academic community to preserve just hiring practices. The same holds true for the Chronicle of Higher Education, who refuse to advertise positions that use "language that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion (unless permitted under federal and state law), creed, sex, national origin or ancestry, marital status, status with respect to public assistance, disability, age, or sexual orientation." They nonetheless have ads posted by Wheaton and Bethel.

    At present, the JFP puts an asterisk next to non-compliant advertisers: I see nothing wrong with this practice, as it gives fair warning to applicants, who may, after all, share the institution's hateful inclinations. However, I have heard that asterisks are very expensive to print. Thus, perhaps the APA should consider a tiered pricing structure: institutions who discriminate on the basis of sexuality could be charged double or triple to include their ads. Anything left after bearing the cost of the asterisks could be used to fund an award for a young and promising GLBT scholar, or perhaps simply for the best paper refuting natural law theories each year.

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  31. Joseph Long

    Professor Norcross makes a good point when he writes: “As the last clause makes clear, the opposition to discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. trumps the use of religious affiliation as a criterion.” But this merely pushes the issue back a step: What is the principle for disfavoring the significance of religion vis-à-vis “race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.” as a criterion? Why is it that religion gets trumped by all the others? Whatever the reason, the institutions whose job postings would be blocked would be discriminated against on the basis of religion per se. And herein, I believe, lies the inconsistency: On the one hand, the APA claims to reject discrimination on the basis of religion; on the other, it allows religion alone to be trumped by all other criteria.

    At this point, the “distinction between behavior and orientation” becomes quite relevant, for it opens up the possibility that there is a moral reason for taking religion as the odd man out: If S’s preference to A determines S’s A-ing, then perhaps it would be immoral to discriminate against S on the basis of her A’ing. The principle would have to do with its being immoral to hold someone accountable for some action over which she has no control. But it is not at all clear that institutions–even religious ones–hold that the presence of a preference (unlike female anatomical form) implies certain determinate actions. So, my question stands, what is the principle for devaluing religion relative to the other criteria? The APA anti-discrimination statement offers no such principle. Thus, it looks like religion’s being the sole trump-worthy criterion is arbitrary, which, I take, is inconsistent with the spirit of the APA anti-discrimination statement.

    But surely, with a few modifications the APA can alter the statement to make it obviously–even to me–consistent. It is not clear, however, how such modifications can result in both consistency and religion's being the sole trump-worthy criterion. Professor Norcross's suggestion, "to preserve the spirit of the APA policy [by simply excluding] religion from the list of discriminated against classes that can trump the use of religious affiliation" seems odd, given that freedom of religion (so long as that religion does not require immoral acts of its followers such as human sacrifice) is one of the primary rights accorded men and women by the Constitution. So, mine is not a question of whether the APA statment is being consistent–surely it can be made so; rather, I fail to see how the APA statement can be made consistent while also making religion the sole trump-worthy hiring criterion.

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  32. Forsooth N. Anonymous

    I concur with Professor Murphy: the purpose of the institutions policies is not to exclude homosexuals, but to foster a community shaped by a certain theology. It would be clearly intended to exclude, or at least burden, a certain group if the demands of the theology were selectively written into the policy, but the policies appear fairly comprehensive given the breadth of theological restrictions.

    One complicating factor that has been only implicit, and sometimes overlooked, is that the burdens involved are not intended by the colleges in question to be perceived as imposed by the colleges. It is relevant that these restrictions appear in the colleges' statements of faith—that is, they are statements of belief. The colleges don't mean to impel people towards belief by hiring them (as if they could), but expect that the people they hire will already be like-minded. As such, anyone hired by the college (provided honesty on the part of the candidate), if homosexual, will not understand the burdens of the theology as being placed on her by her job. She will understand herself as already subject to those burdens. (This is especially relevant to Anon's post.)

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  33. Alexander R Pruss

    Regarding the question whether the prohibition of same-sex sexual activity derives from a desire not to hire persons with a homosexual orientation, it is of course possible that in some particular case this is so.

    However, barring evidence to the contrary, it seems that the simplest explanation of why a Christian college wishes to require faculty to refrain from same-sex sexual activity is that it believes that Christian morality prohibits same-sex sexual activity.

    We can try to test this explanation through thinking through a counterfactual. Suppose that for some odd reason the college got a large collection of applications from academically qualified heterosexually oriented persons who engage in same-sex sexual activity. (They presumably would be engaging in the same-sex sexual activity for profit, to satisfy curiosity, on a whim, to win a bet, to make a political point, or because their doctor recommended it for their heart, etc.) Would the college have any less interest in barring these persons from faculty positions? If the answer is negative, then it seems likely that the primary focus of the policy is the prohibition of same-sex sexual activity. And it does appear that the answer is likely to be negative. The college administrators would surely see same-sex sexual activity done by heterosexually-oriented persons as just as morally problematic on biblical grounds as same-sex sexual activity done by homosexually-oriented persons.

    A closely related question one can ask to test the focus of the policy is this: If the college found that its policy was resulting in the turning down of large numbers of heterosexually-oriented persons who happen to engage in same-sex sexual activity, would they see that as a side-effect of the policy, or would they see that as a success of the policy? If as a side-effect, then orientation is what their real concern is. But if as a success, then it is the activity that is their real concern. I think it's pretty clear that they would see their policy as successful in a case like this, and hence the same-sex sexual activity is the primary focus of the policy.

    Let's see how this counterfactual test would work for an ostensibly non-religious college (and hence one not permitted to discriminate on religious grounds) that wanted to ban Muslim faculty and proceeded by prohibiting faculty to pray facing Mecca, but claimed that it wasn't discriminating against Muslims, since not all Muslims pray facing Mecca and not all who pray facing Mecca are Muslims. Suppose that the college suddenly got a large influx of applications from non-Muslims who prayed facing Mecca (e.g., Christians and Jews who like to at least occasionally pray facing Jerusalem, but which in fact is essentially the same direction as Mecca from where the college is located). Would they have any less interest in barring these applicants? I think the answer is clearly positive. It would be clear that the policy was not for them. It is would be clear that insofar as these applicants were being banned, the purposes behind the policy were not saved.

    Moreover, it would be unlikely that the non-religious college would be able to give any comprehensible reason for why that particular direction for prayer was banned as opposed to others without noting that this was the direction that Muslims tend to pray in. However, the Christian college can give a comprehensible reason for why same-sex sexual activities are prohibited without making any reference to the fact that these activities are engaged in by people of homosexual orientation. (The reason would have to do with the Biblical commitments of the college. One might, of course, argue that the authors of the Biblical texts themselves were intending to discriminate against those of homosexual orientation. However, it is not clear that these authors had much of a concept of sexual orientation at all, and even if they had it, there does not seem to be any evidence that discrimination based on sexual orientation was their reason for prohibiting same-sex sexual activity. It seems to me more probable that any explanatory relationship would go the other way–any discriminatory attitudes towards the orientation being explained by a belief that same-sex sexual activity is perverse.)

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  34. bill wringe

    So, what is the discrimination being alleged? Is it that they have a standard of sexual conduct that forbids homosexual conduct? It would seem weird if that were sufficient — we wouldn't call an institution discriminatory if its standards of conduct precluded faculty from engaging in any sexual conduct at all.

    Hmm. Wouldn't the same line of reasoning enable us to conclude that an institution which refused to hire any women was not discriminatory, since we wouldn't call an institution that hired nobody at all discriminatory.

    Given the number of religious institutions in the USA, the APA would be doing a fairly serious disservice to the profession (or the job-seeking part of it) by refusing to allow such institutions to advertise with them.

    So I'm inclined to think that what needs to change is the APA's policy. That's a pity – especially for anyone who's strongly committed to fighting discrimination – (and my own view is that at bottom the real problem is the existence of private religiously based colleges, but I don't suppose that view will find much support in the USA) but I think that there might be a way of changing the policy while still finding some non-tokenistic way for the profession to express their opposition to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation – and that is what people who care about this issue should do. (for example, by allowing such institutions to advertise, while making clear that their hiring policies are in conflict with APA policies)

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  35. Charles Hermes

    In the context of this discussion, I assume that it is permissible for an institution to withhold it’s benefits from an agent on the basis of that agent’s actions. So, if a university chooses to condemn homosexual practices of its employees, I will not concentrate on judging that institution. Instead, my main concern is with judging my own actions and omissions. Since I am partially responsible for the actions of groups that I belong to, I am also extremely concerned with how those institutions act. Given that I have conceded to my opponent the claim that it is permissible to withhold benefits on the basis of an agent’s actions, the next vital question is whether groups I belong to ought to exercise this right. As I see things, if it is within my power to help make our society more inclusive, and I do nothing, then I can be culpable for that omission. Since I am partially culpable for the actions and omissions of groups I belong to, the APA’s failure to enforce its anti-discrimination policy seems to be an omission that I am partially culpable for. So, living up to my own ethical standards requires that I do what I can to ensure that the APA enforces its policies. I accept that others disagree with my beliefs about ethical issues. I suggest that those who disagree act as their conscious prescribes, both individually and through the joint actions of groups they belong to. The only other thing that I request is that the rights they demand for institutions they belong to can also be exercised by institutions I belong to.

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  36. Matt Weiner

    Joseph Long wrote:

    "On the one hand, the APA claims to reject discrimination on the basis of religion; on the other, it allows religion alone to be trumped by all other criteria."

    This seems confused. In fact, the APA *privileges* the religious affiliation of the *institution*, by allowing religious institutions to require statements of faith — which has the effect of excluding applicants on the basis of their religion. (And I think this is appropriate; it also echoes practices in anti-discrimination law.) The issue is that the APA does not and should not take this religious privilege to permit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

    There is no such institutional privilege for anything else (for instance, schools that only admit women are not allowed to hire only women), so there is no question of religion being the only trumpable criterion. One might question why the APA allows the individual's religion to be trumped by the institutions' religious mission, but that won't help the defenders of Westmont.

    Given this, it is not inconsistent for the APA to treat this institutional religious privilege as trumped by the other anti-discrimination criteria. Those who point out that the ban on gay and lesbian sex is in the service of (a certain view of) a religious conception are no doubt right. But none of them has directly answered Ralph Wedgwood's question: Should analogous racist policies be exempted from the APA's anti-discrimination policy, so long as they are in the service of a sincere conception of the religious life? If not, why not? (Note that the Bob Jones policy also concerned activity, rather than banning people of a certain race.)

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  37. Alastair Norcross

    Joseph Long asks, then answers (unwittingly), his own question: "What is the principle for disfavoring the significance of religion vis-à-vis “race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.” as a criterion? Why is it that religion gets trumped by all the others?" He later states, "freedom of religion (so long as that religion does not require immoral acts of its followers such as human sacrifice) is one of the primary rights accorded men and women by the Constitution."
    The parenthetical clause says it all. The reason why religion can be trumped by the other factors is that some religions may include immoral prescriptions and proscriptions. The example of requiring human sacrifice is, of course, an extreme one, but forbidding homosexuality is also immoral (a religion that forbids all sex might not be immoral, but just self-destructively silly). The mere fact that human sacrifice is pretty much universally condemned, whereas discrimination against homosexuality is still widely accepted, doesn't change this. The APA, of all institutions, knows that morality is not determined by majority opinion.
    At this point some will raise the orientation/behavior distinction. These colleges are not trying to exclude homosexuals per se, they claim, but merely homosexual behavior. Alexander Pruss claims that a Christian college might simply believe that "Christian morality prohibits same-sex sexual activity." However, as regards what is wrong with discrimination against homosexuals, this is a distinction without a moral difference. Counterfactuals in which large numbers of heterosexuals engage in homosexual conduct (for profit, out of curiosity, on a whim, etc.) are irrelevant here. In the actual world, barring homosexual conduct has the effect of barring much greater proportions of homosexuals than heterosexuals (probably 100% to 0%). We know this, and so do the colleges in question. Even if some colleges could practice enough double effect doublethink to convince themselves that the intent of their policy was not to discriminate against homosexuals (and maybe even to make it true), what difference would that make? What's wrong with exclusory discrimination against homosexuals isn't (primarily, at least) the intent, but the effect. Saying "I have nothing against you, just the disgusting things you insist on doing" doesn't make it alright.
    And this isn't a matter of finding the Christian ethic absurd, as someone suggested on an earlier post. There is no single Christian ethic. As far as I can tell, the purported teachings of Christ are, for the most part, quite ethically acceptable. The Old Testament prohibition of homosexual conduct (along with such other abominations as wearing clothing made of mixed fabrics), and the pauline teachings along the same lines, suggest specific ethical claims that are not essential to anything that might be called a Christian ethic.

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  38. Faintly troubled

    There is a real debate going on here, though I fear the substance of it is still lurking beneath the surface. What's really at stake is whether one thinks that engaging in same-sex sexual activity has a negative impact on one's ability to be a teacher of philosophy. As I read the APA policy, it holds that it doesn't: engaging in same-sex sexual activity is like being black or being a women, it simply doesn't diminish one's ability to be an effective teacher of philosophy. The Christian colleges in question, on the other hand, clearly think that it does: engaging in same-sex sexual activity somehow diminishes one's has ability to teach philosophy effectively. I wish the apologists for the Christian colleges would own up to this commitment of theirs. As it is, it's simply beside the point for them to keep invoking the sinner/sin distinction and to argue that the colleges are only trying to motivate their employees not to sin. What's at stake is whether engaging in same-sex sexual activity negatively impacts one's ability to teach philosophy.

    Of course, reading the APA policy in this manner makes it inconsistent with a blanket tolerance of all religious beliefs, regardless of their practical implications. But I, for one, have never thought that such blanket religious tolerance is justified. Jefferson's justification for religious tolerance, remember, is that "It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God." If it does us injury, however, I think the reasonable thing to do is not tolerate it. And that's what I think the APA should do with the discriminatory practices of these colleges.

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  39. John Schwenkler

    Alasdair Norcross claims that "Counterfactuals in which large numbers of heterosexuals engage in homosexual conduct (for profit, out of curiosity, on a whim, etc.) are irrelevant here. In the actual world, barring homosexual conduct has the effect of barring much greater proportions of homosexuals than heterosexuals (probably 100% to 0%)." Perhaps it's worth pointing out a recent Atlantic Monthly article on the homosexual culture in Saudi Arabia, where huge numbers of straight men engage in homosexual affairs because of the culture's repressive attitudes toward relations between the genders (see http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200705/gay-saudi-arabia). Does this constitute a real-life instance of Pruss's imagined scenario?

    If so, then there are several appropriate questions. Could, for example, the Saudi government begin more strict enforcement of its laws against homosexual activity and consistently claim that the goal was to strengthen marriages (by cutting down on affairs) rather than disciriminate against gays? Why not? Similarly, could a Saudi academic institution refuse to hire those who openly engage in homosexual activity and consistently claim, as Westmont does, that their goal was to promote a culture where the bounds of marriage are respected? Why not?

    If the answers to these questions are that yes, these policies would not amount to discrimination against homosexuals, then is the only difference between Saudi Arabia and the US the fact that here it is much less common (though by no means unheard of, at least among curious college students) for straight persons to engage in homosexual activity, and so the /effect/ of such a policy in the US is to discriminate against gays? But then, why should the /intentions/ of such an institution, incomprehensible as they apparently are to many of the readers of this blog, be irrelevant to determining whether their policies should be permitted?

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  40. Charles Hermes

    My main concern is that the APA does something to enforce its anti-discrimination policy. Further, I believe it should do whatever is most effective. None of the institutions that I have listed were flagged by the JFP. It is important to notice that the APA flags censored institutions by placing a cross not an asterisks next to the advertisement (I also find this a bit offensive, but that’s a different issue). An asterisk denotes that the position is a ‘possible position’. This is important for two reasons. First, while Bethel College was listed as a ‘possible position’ it was not listed as a censored institution. Second, if APA members who promote the idea of censoring, instead of banning, these institutions are liable to make this mistake in reading the JFP, I doubt that censoring an institution is as effective as we would like to believe. In this particular case, however, I find it even less likely that censoring will be effective. Those individuals who are not troubled by these discriminatory practices would not see these flags as a reason to refrain from sending their applications. Further, those institutions who practice these policies are seeking candidates who are not troubled by the university’s policies. So, by censoring these institutions, we would effectively be weeding out applicants for these institutions on the basis that those applicants would be appalled by the university’s policies. This would make the hiring process easier for these institutions by reducing the number of applicants without eliminating any candidate that would not be disgusted by the university’s practices. I do not believe that it should be our goal to make life easier on these institutions.

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  41. Clayton Littlejohn

    "[T]he question whether the prohibition of same-sex sexual activity derives from a desire not to hire persons with a homosexual orientation", would appear to be a distraction. The claim that the instution had no desire or intention to discriminate against a protected group does not negate the charge that the institution is guilty of wrongful discrimination. Not, at least, under the law.

    Mark Murphy noted this quite a few posts back in response to Matt Weiner. He also noted a complication in the law. As it stands, a policy that has disparate impact that negatively affects a protected group cannot be justified unless the standard is justified, "as a matter of necessity". He suggests that the policy of refusing to hire practicing homosexuals is necessary for furthering the institutions goal, "to foster a community in which a certain way of life is supported and endorsed". I'm not sure if this would pass muster under the law. I'm not a lawyer, I just claim to be one on match.com. I am reasonably certain that this kind of defense would strike us as exceptionally lame if used in an attempt to justify, say, refusing to appoint a white man who is married to a black woman to the faculty of Bob Jones University.

    I made a bet with a friend of mine who wishes to remain anonymous. Ralph Wedgwood asked, "I wonder if all the intelligent philosophers who have written in favour of the APA's support for Westmont College would have taken a similar line if the APA had provided the same kind of support to Bob Jones University?" One of us bets that the reason no one has answered his question is that the people who write in support of Westmont would have written in support of Bob Jones University. One of us bets that the reason is that no one has the analytical skill to split the cases. Who's right?

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  42. Mark Capustin

    I suspect that many Christian colleges see things quite differently than faintly troubled. A college could agree that one's sexual orientation and behaviour does not necessarily bear on the question of whether or not one can be an effective teacher of philosophy, while denying that it would be appropriate to hire people with whose sexual orientation is at odds with institutional values. This is because faculty at Christian institutions are (from what I understand) often expected to serve as role models for students – as exemplars of the Christian life. If an institution has an overtly Chrisitan purpose – one that involves producing graduates of a certain character – then it strikes me as reasonable to say that faculty members ought not flout the instutution's values. The question then is: Is it reasonable to say that homosexuals cannot exemplify excellence in Christian character? I take it that the real problem is that a negative answer to this question implies that homosexuals are morally flawed qua their sexual orientation, and most philosophers think that there are excellent reasons to think that any morality that would embrace such a conclusion is highly untenable, if not dangerous.

    As a (I think) related point: What, in general, should the APA make of instutitions that have values that most APA members deem unreasonable? As an interesting example, consider the following statement from Palm Beach Atlantic University's statement about itself and its core committments(a Christian university – i don't know it it advertises in the APA's JFP):

    "Our dedication to conveying the value and significance of the American free enterprise system."

    http://www.pba.edu/aboutpba/index.cfm

    Suppose that the vast majority of APA members were of the view that the American free enterprise system is vicious rather than virtuous. These members would then be of the view that Palm Beach Atlantic University is making some seriously flawed value judgments. Should the APA members then oppose allowing this university to advertise in JFP? Surely, Palm Beach Atlantic University would have a problem hiring a professing socialist (after all, socialists would not be exemplifying the virtues that the institution is attempting to instill in its students). Is discrimination against socialists analagous to discrimination against homosexuals?

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  43. John Schwenkler

    My wife has pointed out to me that there are simple criteria we could use to determine whether an institution like Westmont is discriminating against homosexuals: if their conduct policies are strictly enforced only when it comes to homosexual relations but not when it comes to other practices forbidden by Scripture (such as extramarital affairs), or if they are unwilling to hire someone who openly describes himself or herself as homosexual but has made a commitment to live a chaste life, then their policies do seem to violate the APA's standards. But if not — and we have been given absolutely no evidence of practices of these sorts at Westmont, Wheaton, or Bethel — then we have no reason to believe their so-called 'statements of discrimination' are anything more than a requirement that faculty strive to model a certain sort of Christian behavior for their students, and as such they seem to fall under the 'religion exemption'.

    I wonder whether this test seems reasonable or not.

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  44. Joseph Long

    Professor Weiner wrote:

    "The issue is that the APA does not and should not take this religious privilege to permit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."

    This seems to miss the point. It is not clear that the religious institutions in question use their privilege to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. (In fact, several on here have argued otherwise.) The privilege, it seems, has been extended only to instituting a hiring criterion that excludes certain behavior. Regarding sincerity, I don't see how it is relevant to the current discussion; I don’t see anyone defending either position by appealing to sincerity.

    Professor Norcross’s claim that I parenthetically answer my own question and his corresponding argument from analogy rests upon a failure to distinguish between requiring S to A and requiring S to refrain from A-ing. This distinction becomes unimportant, perhaps, when S cannot help but A; otherwise–as in this case–the distinction is crucial. A religion that requires its followers to perform human sacrifice is an immoral religion partly because human sacrificial activities result from choosing to behave in a certain way. But it is not clear that an institution that requires its followers to refrain from performing activities which one can refrain from performing is being immoral; and it is not at all clear that refraining from engaging in certain sexual practices cannot be chosen.

    Again, so far as I can see, these religious institutions are instituting a hiring criterion that merely prohibits certain behavior–behavior that one presumably can choose to refrain from performing–that is inconsistent with their statement of faith. What I don't see is how prohibiting such a hiring criterion can be banned without simultaneously engaging in the sort of religious discrimination the APA statement rejects.

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  45. Anonymous

    Less than thirty years ago, the religion in which I was raised did not grant its black members full membership. It eventually caved in, due to enormous external and internal pressure. Today it continues to withhold full membership from homosexuals. Now, this religion also runs several major US universities, and requires its faculty to be full members. Hence, it had a rationale for excluding blacks from its universities' faculties, and continues to have one for excluding homosexuals.

    The US government had a hand in putting an end to the religion's racially discriminatory policies: it threatened to revoke the church's tax-exempt status, on the grounds that it was discriminating against a protected class of citizens. Similar pressure needs to be put on other institutions that continue their discriminatory practices against protected classes. We all have an obligation to end injustice, and if the APA can play a small role in pressuring institutions to end their unjust and immoral practices, it should do what it can. We do live in a pluralist society, but we need only tolerate reasonable pluralism. Unjust institutions are not reasonable.

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  46. Mark Murphy

    Wedgwood wants to deal with the Bob Jones case, as does Weiner, so here we go.

    First: the Bob Jones dating norm is idiotic and vicious. This stuff has never been part of the traditional Christian sexual ethic; it is a nasty growth arising within a certain ugly racist cultural context. To say that this is just one of the many versions of Christian ethics is just false to the tradition. A little test: go through the history of philosophical and theological reflection and pick out the figures who have defended the traditional Christian sexual ethic of the sort that Westmont, Wheaton, Bethel etc. are concerned to incorporate; now go through that history and pick out the figures who have defended the Bob Jones norm. Compare the lists.

    Now, I don’t think that I ever defended the view that just because a religious institution sincerely incorporates some norm, the APA should take that institution to be immune from charges of discrimination and the relevant APA sanctions. I don’t think anybody here has defended this view.

    The difficulty is that the APA is a big tent organization, incorporating a large variety of institutions, some of which have distinctive comprehensive doctrines. The APA also rightly does not want to assist institutions that are discriminatory. The question is what is the appropriate procedure to resolve disagreement among persons of good will within the APA about whether an institution’s policies are discriminatory. I’ve seen two views trotted out. One is: we’ll just fix on what the majority of us view as discriminatory, and by God, we’ll take action against folks who don’t fall in line. The other is: we’ll just have to carve out religious exceptions generally. The latter approach gives you the Bob Jones problem, so one might think that the former is the way to go.

    But it isn’t the only way to go. One can take on the messier task of asking whether certain comprehensive viewpoints can be reasonably held to be at least minimally respectful (even if not the best from the point of view of the majority of the membership). I think that the traditional Christian sexual ethic passes this test: but of course, this is the sort of thing that has to be argued for, and if rejected, argued against. If, on reflection, one takes it that the traditional Christian sexual ethic fails this test, then one should support the APA’s sanctioning the institutions that condition employment on willingness to commit to this ethic.

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  47. Anon (cleared with Leiter)

    One point may not have been made with sufficient clarity in connection with the discussion of freedom of association. Some posters seem concerned about the ability of like-minded persons to maintain cohesive communities (from which people who, for instance, engage in same-sex sexual activity are absent), and, implicitly, bemoan the potential threat strong standards targeting sexual-orientation discrimination could pose to such communities. These posters may be inclined too quickly either (a) to treat religious campuses as monolithic or (b) to privilege one set of actors on those campuses.

    I teach at a university whose board declines to tenure persons who aren't members of a particular religious community; ecclesial bureaucrats from that community dominate the board. Many (though by no means all) members of the community who aren't associated with the university also oppose non-marital sex of all kinds, as well as same-sex sexual activity.

    Perhaps two-thirds of the members of the faculty, meanwhile, believe it is a great injustice to deny tenure to people simply because of their religious affiliation. A large fraction almost certainly would have no objection to the appointment and retention of faculty members whose non-exploitative sexual activity, of whatever variety, didn't publicly embarrass the institution. And many members of the faculty would almost certainly maintain, as members of the relevant religious community, that no one else had the right to define for them what their community did and didn't believe; they would resent the claim of the ecclesial bureaucrats to define their, and the institution's, religious identity.

    For many members of the faculty, therefore, the imposition of external pressures of various kinds would be very useful. It would not interfere with the freedom of association of these faculty members: it would, if it had any effect, likely enhance their ability to make the associational decisions they would prefer to make. (And if, as I do, one favors some form of industrial democracy, one will regard the preferences of these workers as at least as significant as those of the putative legal owners.)

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  48. Joshua A. Miller

    Charles Hermes corrects my tongue-in-cheek error, for which I thank him. His larger point is well-put: weeding out applicants who find discriminatory practices abhorrent is, in a sense, assisting in those policies. But the APA is a professional organization, and I must again protest that it lacks any real power to change the deeply held beliefs of its advertising members, no matter how deplorable. As such, it should focus on making life easier for job applicants, by weeding out possible positions that they could not accept. Whether it does this through censure or banning is immaterial to me.

    In that sense, Steven Nadler's original suggestion, that a large warning be placed with each advertisement from a non-compliant institution, becomes even more promising. It would even allow the JFP to charge its advertising customers for the column-inches used by the warning, thus creating an actual justification for tiered pricing where my suggestion was merely sarcastic. If there was any way to use these institutions' own money against their discriminatory purposes, it would provide even more satisfaction than a simply principled response.

    Finally, I would like to caution the interlocutors here that they are not simply deliberating about abstractions, but actually contributing to a discussion of policy for their profession. Homosexuality is not some theoretical phantasm to be batted about to score points for wit or sophistication. You're talking about your colleagues and students and the way they should be treated. This isn't an automotive discussion board, and those who would compare automotive brands to sexual orientations should consider their own driving habits before making further comment.

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  49. kris kemtrup

    It is odd that some jobs in 'Jobs for Philosophers' are not available to all philosophers, but only straight Christian Philosophers. (Or rather, these jobs are only available to people willing to say that they are straight and Christian. I would guess that Christian colleges get alot of inauthentic dishonest "Christian" Professors. Charles Hermes deserves respect for his honesty here. Indeed, if Christian colleges are concerned with upholding traditional moral values, they should hire Charles Hermes immediately. This whole issue reminds me of Socrates discussion with Meletus– who is it that really cares for virtue and instilling virtue in our students? Is it not Mr. Hermes, who puts honesty and fairness over his own advantage?)

    Maybe the APA should put out a seperate listing, 'Jobs for Christian Philosophers'. And maybe the APA could also put out 'Jobs for White Philosophers', 'Jobs for Black Philosophers', 'Jobs for Philosophers from Rich Families', etc. But in so doing the APA would obviously be condoning, and even aiding in, discriminatory hiring practices.

    Now, I recognize that the goal Christian institutions have in hiring people who live up to their particular moral or religious code is in some sense laudable, as do many of those who have posted on this subject. And I recognize that it is debatable whether the anti-homosexual discrimination Christians practice is as immoral or unjust as racism. (Though, I would answer it is just as bad)

    But such a debate is irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is whether the APA should not publish ads for jobs that are not for all philosophers in 'Jobs for [All] Philosophers'. I think this is a nonstarter. The APA represents all philosophers, and thus should not spend its time and resources publishing entries from 'Jobs for Christian Philosophers'. If Christian philosophers want to get together and form the American Christian Philosophical Association, then let them. And let them publish 'Jobs for Christian Philosophers'.

    But the APA should only do work on behalf of all philosophers.

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  50. John Schwenkler

    Kris Kemptrup's reply misses the point. Aside from the fact that these jobs are /not/ limited to straight persons, but rather to persons willing to make a commitment to restrain their sexual desires (whether homosexual or heterosexual) in certain ways, nor in every case to Christians (not all colleges with 'lifestyle' requirements need also require a statement of faith), I wonder if he also thinks the APA should put out separate job listings for each hiring category (Jobs for Metaphysicians, Jobs for Philosophers of Language, Jobs for Ethicists, and so forth) in order not to have the title of their job listing misrepresent what it contains. /Of course/ the APA will publish advertisements for 'jobs that are not for all philosophers'; the only relevant questions are (i) whether every job listed is for at least /some/ philosophers, and (ii) whether certain restrictions on which subset the jobs are for are allowable while others are not. And it seems clear enough to me that a religious institution that takes seriously the task of helping to form the moral consciences of its students has every right to make a potential faculty member's commitment to modeling a certain lifestyle a factor in its hiring decisions, and that in the spirit of religious freedom the APA should respect this aspect of the school's mission.

    Furthermore, and I don't think this has been mentioned so far, it should be borne in mind here that the upshot of censoring institutions like Westmont, Wheaton, and Bethel would not be limited to the schools themselves, but also to potential applicants who might otherwise not learn about these jobs and so might not find employment. This is, I think, a very serious consideration.

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