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What is philosophy?

Brian Leiter

The Department at Victoria University at Wellington compiles a quite interesting set of reflections by contemporary and 20th-century figures in answer to this question.  My favorite is the one from John Campbell, now at Berkeley:

Philosophy is thinking in slow motion. It breaks down, describes and assesses moves we ordinarily make at great speed – to do with our natural motivations and beliefs. It then becomes evident that alternatives are possible.
      

My least favorite, since it makes philosophy out to be hopelessly conservative in its ambitions, is from David Lewis:

One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system. It
     succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. 
In so far as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence.   

Thomas Nagel’s account is bound to be highly contentious in certain circles:

Philosophy is different from science and from mathematics. 
Unlike science it doesnÍt rely on experiments or observation, but only
on thought. And unlike mathematics it has no formal methods of proof.
  It is done just by asking questions, arguing, trying out ideas and thinking of possible arguments against them, and wondering how our concepts really  work.

Those unhappy with Nagel, will be happier, I suspect, with Quine’s take:

I see philosophy not as f groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which f we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific
     findings, all scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere.

Sources, and more quotes, are at the Victoria site.

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29 responses to “What is philosophy?”

  1. marc moffett

    It strikes me that anyone who thinks that Lewis's characterization of philosophy is does not fully appreciate how radical both pre-philosophical conviction and/or theoretical systematization might be, especially in combination.

    To take one simple case study, Lewis's incredibly radical theory of concrete modal realism might be thought to arise (simply considerably, obviously) from the systematization of two pre-philosophical convictions, the existence of intensional entities and the non-existence of abstracta.

    And, to reach back a bit further, didn't Berkeley see his case for idealism as basically grounded in the systematization of common sense?

    Reply
  2. R. Vangala

    I don't care much for Prof. Campbell's conception of philosophy. It reinforces the view that philosophers are in some sense "deeper" thinkers than scientists or mathematicians, which I think is simply false. I do believe that there are problems that philosophers have raised which are interesting and subtle, but I think that scientists and mathematicians have raised many more such problems, and offered deep and creative solutions to them which are worthy of general acceptance, something that cannot be said for most philosophical theories. Indeed, the philosophical icon with whom I most agree, W. V. O. Quine, did not in my view make some kind of interesting discovery with respect to his naturalism. Rather, his accomplishment was to have succeeded in articulating the sentiments of those of us who are puzzled by the supposed need to respond to the epistemological skeptic, or the supposed need to take up the "challenge" posed by the cultural relativist. It is not as if scientists are too naive to realize the importance of the issues these radical thinkers raise. Instead, scientists just have not had the patience to reconcile common sense with the scientific world view, (which is where these sorts of problems stem from, I suspect), since it is obvious to them that the latter is more valuable than the former. I value the work of philosophers that strives to reconcile the scientific outlook with common sense, because as valuable as science is, it just does not sit too well with our pre-theoretic prejudices. But in doing this, philosophers are not inquiring into the deepest questions that we face as theoreticians. They are simply making the truth more palatable to our natural, all too human, way of thinking about the world we inhabit.

    Reply
  3. Kenny Easwaran

    It seems to me that Nagel's and Quine's takes are broadly consistent. Philosophy can be continuous with the natural sciences even though it normally uses different methods. In some sense this should be no more surprising than that the different sciences use different methods (though all within the broad class of empirical observations) despite being continuous with one another.

    Reply
  4. "Q" the Enchanter

    I think it was Quine who, when asked by a student what philosophy was, pointed to his office library and replied, "Philosophy is what all these books are about." That's a pretty good ostensive definition.

    Reply
  5. Christopher Gauker

    Here's a famous statement concerning the nature of philosophy. It's the first paragraph of Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (http://www.ditext.com/sellars/psim.html):

    "The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect to all these things, not in that unreflective way in which the centipede of the story knew its way around before it faced the question, 'how do I walk?', but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are barred."

    I don't know whether it's true, but I like the sound. Notice that unlike many of the others it concerns the subject matter of philosophy as well as the methods (even if the subject matter is supposed to be everything).

    Reply
  6. Colin Farrelly

    My favourite quote from the Victoria site is Russell’s:

    "Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect." [Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy]

    And Russell’s insights allows us to see philosophy as an inherently interdisciplinary endeavour. For advances in the natural and social sciences also help remove dogma and increase knowledge; and so philosophers working on related topics (from cognitive science to ethics and political philosophy) should endeavor to stay abreast of, and engage with, such empirical work lest we risk philosophy itself becoming a domain of enquiry that fosters, rather than combats, dogma.

    Cheers,
    Colin

    Reply
  7. David Howell

    Philosophy is, in my opinion, delving into the human soul to explore how we tick intellectually and emotionally. I've not read any of the authors aforementioned, but then again, I've always found formal teachings to be too constraining. I was pointed in this direction to find some intellectual peers that I can debate and learn from. I don't have a degree in anything but computer networking, but have always been told, by many, that I should have pursued philosophy, as this is where most of my arguments in debates end up going. Everyone here seems to be articulate, if not always eloquent, so I hope that I have found a new forum to expand my limited knowledge in this field.

    Reply
  8. Anon

    Some of those are good, but here are two very good essays on "What is philosophy?" by some professors at Dartmouth:

    By Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~phil/whatis/wsa.html ("Philosophy's goal is nothing less than a systematic world view.")

    By Bernard Gert:
    http://www.dartmouth.edu/~phil/whatis/gert.html ("…perhaps the most distinctive feature of philosophy, namely that it leaves nothing unquestioned."

    Reply
  9. Ralph Wedgwood

    Surely it was G.E. Moore -= not Quine — who answered the question "What is philosophy?" by gesturing towards the books in his study in Cambridge (England) and saying, "It's what these books are about."

    This is much more typical of Moore than of Quine: it's both completely true and strikingly unilluminating.

    Reply
  10. Brian Leiter

    In reply to Professor Moffett, let me just remark that there are different senses and degrees of radicalism and conservativism, and so my worry stands, notwithstanding the accuracy of Professor Moffett's examples from Lewis.

    Reply
  11. SK

    "The comprehension of the bearing of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, thus belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of science, which is my own conception of what is meant by philosophy.” —Newman, Idea of a University

    Reply
  12. Anibal

    I used to like G. E. Moore´s defniniton of philosophy quoted in Strawson´s book "Analysis and Metaphysics" where he defines philosophy in terms of conective analysis as he developed this idea in his mayor works and famous arguments such us the open-question argument or the naturalistic fallacy. According to him, Philosophy, its more or less, the study of the relation among those things we know and those things we even don´t know of its existence but are there, and their relation to the whole universe and ourselves. Philosophy its a systematic examination of all things conceible.

    Reply
  13. Sam C

    R. Vangala: ‘I don't care much for Prof. Campbell's conception of philosophy. It reinforces the view that philosophers are in some sense "deeper" thinkers than scientists or mathematicians, which I think is simply false.’

    I don’t see why you take Campbell’s remark this way: it doesn’t claim that only philosophers think in slow motion, or that scientists and mathematicians don’t also do so; it doesn’t say anything at all about depth. It just commends a practice which helps us not to be too readily bewitched by our own habits of thought. And on another point you make, I think anyone who is ‘puzzled by … the supposed need to take up the "challenge" posed by the cultural relativist’ has been so bewitched. The problem of the universality of ethical claims (for instance) is troubling and difficult in practice as well as in theory.

    Reply
  14. Varol Akman

    One of my favorite short characterizations of what philosophy is all about:

    "Don't tell me that two and two is four," Willy said to his mother when he returned to Brooklyn. "How do we know that two is two? That's the real question." (from: TIMBUKTU, by Paul Auster)

    Reply
  15. AH

    Here are some thoughts in support of Brian’s criticism of Lewis’s characterization of philosophy. This is a very important issue, since Lewis’s quote isn’t merely an idle musing; it is a strategy statement of the most influential metaphysician of the last fifty years, and if there is something wrong with the statement, then there is something wrong with contemporary metaphysics. And there is: most obviously, why should philosophers aspire to be the petty bureaucrats of common sense? Where is the argument for the premise that pre-philosophical opinions should be held to be primary, especially given the awful history of uninformed opinion in so many other domains?

    But that is not the only reason to reject Lewis’s method, which I shall refer to as the “bureaucratic method”. Marc Moffett is certainly correct that Lewis’s method takes him down some radical routes, and modal realism is a good example. But it is confounding why this is not simply a reductio of the bureaucratic method. Here’s how it goes: (1) Take claims from a certain source, such as “pre-philosophical opinions”, to be primary. For example, take, as Lewis does, at face value the thought that there are ways the world might have been. (2) Use standard philosophical argumentation to deduce further propositions on the basis of these initial claims. (3) Upon seeing that the further propositions are in direct conflict with other claims from the very source taken in (1) to be primary (for example, the commonsensical thought that the only concrete reality is the actual world), we should stop believing that claims from the original source are to be trusted, let alone taken as primary. Thus it is surprising that so much philosophical effort has been expended responding to modal realism when a simple “OK, so let’s just not take the thought ‘there are ways the world might have been’ at face value” should have sufficed.

    In my estimation, the majority of philosophers in fact share this sentiment concerning Lewis’s approach to modal realism and other areas of m&e. However, recent analytic m&e is dominated by a self-selected group, many of whom do follow Lewis in doing m&e bureaucratically. We should not take the fact that many/most metaphysicians and epistemologists today follow the method as persuasive evidence that it’s a good method for answering metaphysical and epistemological questions. Instead, we should take the fact that many talented philosophers are turned off by m&e and do not engage with it as evidence that there is a problem with the method. Lewis jokingly bemoaned the incredulous stares; what is more damning is all those who incredulously blink and turn away.

    Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the prevalence of the bureaucratic method is a reason why analytic m&e is so dominated by (well-to-do) white males, who for various reasons are less likely to have developed a distrust of "common opinions" than women and persons of color.

    In person, Lewis was absolutely generous and of course one of the sharpest minds around. Saying a negative word in a public forum about his influence on analytic m&e is akin to publicly criticizing the Pope in a medieval square. Still, there are good reasons to think that despite his brilliance and goodness, his bureaucratic approach has not served philosophy well.

    Reply
  16. George Wrisley

    In the end I don't know how helpful this characterization actually is, but I wonder if we might characterize philosophy in the following way:

    Philosophy is the only discipline in which "What is an X question?" is a question of the discipline that takes the place of the X. That is,

    "What is a philosophical question?" is itself a philosophical question. In contrast,

    "What is a mathematical question?" does not seem to me to be a question of mathematics.
    "What is an historical question?" does not seem to me to be a question of history.
    "What is a scientific question?" does not seem to me to be a question of science.

    Moreover, some sort of philosophical reflection is to be used in addressing these latter three questions as well. Thus, professional philosophers aren't the only ones doing philosophy, which shouldn't come as a surprise.

    I may have some blinders on here, so I'd love to know what others think about the idea that it is philosophy alone that, so to speak, employs itself in order to figure out what it, itself, is.

    Reply
  17. Michael Kremer

    Chris (Gauker)– as a fellow former Sellars student I immediately thought of that quote as well. It's interesting that it didn't make it onto the Victoria website list, isn't it? I still think it's quite lovely.

    Reply
  18. R. Vangala

    @ Sam C: Thanks for your response.

    On the first point, I realize that Prof. Campbell does not explicitly state that "philosophy is thinking in slow motion," while science and mathematics are not. Still, as a conception of philosophy, his fails, in my view, to distinguish philosophy from what non-philosophers conceive of as "critical thinking." If what scientists and mathematicians do is not philosophy, then on Campbell's understanding, these theoreticians are not thinking critically, or "thinking in slow motion." This is why I did not suggest that it is Campbell's view that science and mathematics do not involve "thinking in slow motion," instead suggesting that this way of thinking about philosophy merely reinforces the feeling of superiority that I suspect many philosophers have towards scientists and mathematicians, for this very reason.

    On the second point, let me say that my naturalism is a kind of Mooreanism, except that on it established science plays the role of common sense. Thus, when a piece of established science conflicts with a piece of philosophical theory (that is, the two are inconsistent), I consider that conflict to be a reductio of the philosophical theory. In the event of such a conflict, there is nothing dogmatic about giving more credence to one side. If one does not, then the conflict cannot be resolved. The reason I side with established science is because the history of successful science has no parallel in philosophy (or any other discipline, really). So there is nothing particularly dogmatic about ignoring the philosophical skeptic and the philosophical relativist, etc. Answering them is not worthless, but it is not prerequisite to the recognition that science survives the challenges they pose.

    On the other hand, should the skeptical challenge be mounted on the basis of findings in cognitive science, or should the relativism be of the historical sort advanced by Kuhn, then there is plenty to be worried about. These challenges, though, are not in the same boat as Cartesian skepticism or Protagorian relativism. Perhaps I should have been clearer when I derided "cultural relativism."

    Reply
  19. marc moffett

    Brian,

    Fair enough. Though I would add that there are some paths to radical positions not worth taking. And *if* the only way to get to those positions is by adopting approaches of dubious quality, then those positions themselves are not worth taking.

    AH,

    I really don't have time for the sort of reply your post deserves (maybe somebody else will have something to add). So do accept my apoligies for brevity and don't mistake it for dismissiveness.

    That said, I want to note, first, that to claim that the overwhelmingly white, male demographics of contemporary M&E (and, for that matter, the rest of core analytic philosophy) is due to a Lewis-style philosophical methodology is *highly* speculative. There has been a lot of discussion in the blogosphere on the subject (an important one) and there are a number of proposed contributing factors. Hard to say what is right.

    In any event, in my opinion, a lot of da*n good metaphysics has gone on in analytic philosophy since the relative dark ages of logical postivism. So I would think that the overall quality of the body of work produced in this genre speaks in favor of the methodology, not the fact that most people working the area adopt something like that methodology. [Though I don't think that contemporary analytic M&E is quite so methodologically homogeneous as you suggest, especially if we take a 50+ year perspective as would seem reasonable.]

    Second, I don't see why we should take the fact that many are "turned off" by contemporary M&E as a reason to think that there is a problem with the methodology. Very many people are turned off to abstract algebra, too. Any reason to think they are going about their business incorrectly? If I had to speculate, I would say that certain sectors of the population don't engage in M&E simply because of its degree of abstraction and relative distance from pressing practical concerns.

    Reply
  20. Aaron Preston

    G. E. Moore has been mentioned several times above. Here is a passage from Moore that I have always enjoyed. It's not a definition of philosophy, exactly, but it does indicate what Moore took to be the central philosophical project:

    "… the most important and interesting thing which philosophers have tried to do is no less than this; namely: to give a general description of the whole universe, mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it, considering how far is likely that there are in it important kinds of things which we do not absolutely know to be in it, and also considering the most important ways in which these various kinds of things are related to one another. I will call all this, for short, "giving a general description of the whole universe," and hence will say that the first and most important problem of philosophy is: to give a general description of the whole universe." (Some Main Problems of Philosophy, pp. 1 f.)

    Next time someone asks what you do as a philosopher, just say "I attempt to give a general description of the whole universe"!

    Reply
  21. Kris K.

    AH,

    I don't think your objection to what you derisively call the 'bureaucratic method' is particularly compelling.

    I suggest you take a look at the third chapter of Armstrong's Truth and Truthmakers, where Armstrong fleshes out- in some detail- something like the method for doing metaphysics and philosophy that Lewis suggests in the above quotation.

    Reply
  22. Jonny

    Seems obvious from the above comments that philosophy consists in repeating what someone else has said and backing it up with references,

    Reply
  23. Mark Couch

    That is not the right thing to say. The above comments are not intended to be doing philosophy but describing it. That is like confusing somebody who is describing the game of basketball with somebody who is actually playing it, which is a different activity. Aside from this there are many examples of philosophy that lack references. Descartes’ Meditations, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, much of Nietzsche’s work, etc.

    Reply
  24. Aaron Preston

    R. Vangala says:

    "The reason I side with established science is because the history of successful science has no parallel in philosophy (or any other discipline, really). So there is nothing particularly dogmatic about ignoring the philosophical skeptic and the philosophical relativist, etc."

    The claim that science possesses an unparalleled history of success presupposes too much to allow your strategy of accepting it as an undefended "default" position to qualify as "not particularly dogmatic".

    For instance, what do you take science to be trying to do, and what are the criteria of success relative to its aims? These are philosophical questions that must be settled before we can pronounce science to be in possession of a history of unparalleled success. And particular answers to these questions will give rise to further philosophical questions.

    For example, one might say that the aim of science is to describe (material) reality. But, given the problems of induction, empirical equivalence, the theory-ladenness of perception, and so on, along with familiar examples of error/paradigm shift in the history of science, it's hard to see how anyone could have much confidence that science has had unparalleled success relative to this aim. To simply assume that it has been successful in this way without addressing skeptical worries about your assumption is surely dogmatic.

    A more plausible claim is that science has had an unparalleled history of success in generating bodies of applied knowledge and associated technologies which together solve various practical problems (e.g., vaccines, putting up satellites to track weather systems, shooting down errant satellites with missiles, etc.). But if we’re going to make this a claim about success in solving practical problems, then it’s not clear how it supports the view that we should privilege science in debates having to do with theoretical problems (as philosophical debates usually do). In this case, to privilege science without engagng skeptical worries involves not only dogmatism, but a dogmatism that hides an otherwise glaring non-sequitur ("science has a proven track-record with practical problems, therefore it has an advantage with theoretical problems").

    Reply
  25. R. Vangala

    @ Aaron Preston: Thanks for your comments. This blog might not be the ideal place for me to sketch out my views on these issues, so I shall attempt to just offer a very rough sense of where I stand with respect to them.

    You ask, “what do you take science to be trying to do, and what are the criteria of success relative to its aims? These are philosophical questions that must be settled before we can pronounce science to be in possession of a history of unparalleled success.” I fail to see why these are “philosophical” questions, and not ordinary scientific questions. Besides, my point is just that these questions DO NOT need to be settled prior to such a pronouncement. To quote J. Fodor, “It’s one question what’s the case, and another how we know what’s the case. Very often, we’re able to answer the first sort of question even though we can’t answer the second… That being so, it’s not an argument against the proposition being true that we don’t know how we know that it is.” (LRB, 21 Sep. 2006). I might not have a satisfactory solution to the problem of induction, but the notion that I have to wait for such a solution before I can confidently state that the Schrödinger equation correctly describes the evolution of the wave function is, I think, ludicrous.

    Why, you ask? The problem of induction does not arise in some trans-theoretic manner. Nor do the other “philosophical” problems you raise. Instead, these problems occur to us because we embrace certain substantive theories, or certain conceptual schemes, which give rise to various internal conflicts. In the event of such a conflict, the theory we accept will itself be neutral with respect to which of various ways of resolving the conflict we ought to go with. I suggest that we go with the side that maximally preserves established science (I think Quine called this “conservatism”) for no other reason than that a theory whose central conclusion is “we cannot know anything about the future” is less attractive than a theory whose many conclusions include “the Schrödinger equation correctly describes the evolution of the wave function.” Again, I am not suggesting that we ignore problems like that of induction. Instead, I am simply recommending that we think of such issues as difficulties to be ironed out, rather than as all-or-nothing challenges to the scientific worldview. This kind of Quineanism has its problems, I know, but I think it is on the right track, and I think that a coherent and compelling position in this tradition can be worked out with sufficient patience. I hope this addresses your main worries.

    Reply
  26. Colin Farrelly

    Jonny said: “Seems obvious from the above comments that philosophy consists in repeating what someone else has said and backing it up with references”

    And Mark responds: “That is not the right thing to say. The above comments are not intended to be doing philosophy but describing it”.

    I actually think Jonny’s comment was very insightful (as well as funny!).

    I found it insightful because I actually believe it does accurately describe a lot of work that passes itself off as philosophy. And I guess I disagree with Mark that these comments here are not intended to be doing philosophy. Asking the question “what is philosophy?” is itself a philosophical question. And the philosophers quoted above try to bring precision and clarity to this question, or explain how it is an activity that fosters wisdom, combats dogma, etc. I wish we all engaged in this critical self-reflection of the discipline more often!

    Cheers,
    Colin

    Reply
  27. Aaron Preston

    R. Vangala:

    I agree that this may not be the ideal place to carry our discussion further, as it concerns a topic tangential to the main theme of this thread. Let me just clarify that I did not intend to imply that we have to know *how* we know something in order to know it. My point was that to feel perfectly justified in defaulting to one’s preferred position while ignoring arguments against it *is* dogmatic. I understand that you don’t really advocate ignoring these arguments, but that one line from your first post (“So there is nothing particularly dogmatic about ignoring the philosophical skeptic and the philosophical relativist, etc.”) suggested otherwise, and that’s the point that I was addressing.

    Reply
  28. Mark Couch

    As a passing comment on the discussion I can see Jonny's remarks as humorous. But I have heard it claimed in areas of the university that the problem with the humanities is that they do not provide genuine knowledge since they are not engaged with the world. They merely consists of one author commenting on another author's comments; there are just comments upon comments. In this context, the claim that "philosophy consists in repeating what someone else has said and backing it up with references" can be seen as a veiled criticism. Maybe it wasn't intended that way, but if it was I repeat my original claim. There are many examples of philosophy that lack references and consist in more than this.

    Reply
  29. Varol Akman

    Mark Couch brings up an important point re humanities, especially English Lit departments. I think the following (controversial) views of VS Naipaul are worth a close look:

    http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/article2309387.ece

    Here's an excerpt:

    “I think academics are bad. They spread ideas about things that they are determined to get one to accept.

    “They have their ideas about multiculturalism, for example, or about Africa. They distort publishing to some extent. They publish the books for these courses, and it gives an illusion for great popularity, of ideas sweeping the world. But they’re not. They’re just ideas in grubby little textbooks that are stuffed in students’ bags.”

    Now he [VS Naipaul] says that all university English departments should be closed down. “I think it would be a great fillip, a great boost to the intellectual life of the country. It would immediately have a great impact. It would release a lot of manpower. They could go and work on the buses and things like that.” Huge chuckle. In fact, he believes universities should “deal in measurable truth” and teach only science.

    Reply

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