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I'm opening comments here, in the event that some in attendance want to post about what takes place, either as it happens or afterwards. (I'm opening the thread now, several hours before the business meeting, so those who might attend are more likely to know of its existence.)
(this has to do with preps for the mtg, so Brian, I hope you don't mind my using this blog entry in this fashion)
As Alastair mentioned in the last thread, from the bylaws of the Pacific it looks likely that what (should) happen next/as a result of the mtg today is that the motion should be put to the membership of the Pacific by mail ballot. I am myself, however, a bit unclear from the Pacific rules as to just how much discretion the EC of the Pacific has in deciding whether to forward the motion to the membership for a vote (I have every confidence the vote will go our way if that does happen).
What does seem clear to me is that if at least 20 members of the Pacific division sign a petition asking that the motion be put to a mail ballot vote, the EC loses such discretion as it has in deciding whether to forward the motion to a mail ballot vote of the membership. (I have no reason to think the EC would of their own accord hesitate in so the motion to the membership– I do, however, have long and first hand familiarity with the opposition in this territory)
The bylaws of the Pacific include the following:
"Amendments or additions to these by-laws may be proposed only by the Executive Committee, by the national Board of Officers, or by a petition signed by at least twenty members of the Association with voting affiliations with the Pacific Division."
That's where you all come in. I copied and pasted the motion at issue on to a piece of paper with a single line to the effect that "we, the undersigned, ask that the following motion be put to a mail ballot of the membership". I am in Vancouver. If any of you reading this now are members of the Pacific, here at the Pacific APA, and willing to sign your name to the motion (in fact, at this point it's even weaker than that– it's just signing your name to a petition that says 'put this motion to a vote'!) please come find me in the lobby. I'll be down in the lobby (only got room internet) by 10am Vancouver time, and expect to be there–or in Starbucks– until at least 11am. Twenty signatures–that's it! C'mon, at least 20 of you are reading this, right? (I'm short, long red hair, enormous ears, and wearing a vaguely purple-ish shirt)
Many thanks.
The meeting has now occurred, and the motion presented by Alastair Norcross passed. Norcross had slightly amended the motion from what appeared online so that its passage would force a particular kind of action to occur. As best I can tell (and those who know more about the parliamentary procedures are welcome to correct me!), the action is that the Pacific APA's executive committee will now have consideration of the matter placed on the agenda of the board of the APA. Since the policies the motion concerns are policies of the APA, the Pacific APA has no ability to change or enforce them. So the best the Pacific can do is get the APA to consider enforcing or changing its policies. (For that reason, I'm not sure a vote of the entire membership of the Pacific APA would have any greater effect than what's already occurred today.)
(have to run, so please excuse if this isn't entirely clear)
In fact, I think what happened today is much better–in practical terms– than the Pacific APA membership voting. For one, the amended version of the motion obviated the need (in terms of the bylaws) to have the membership vote. And for another, what happened today will actually force the National office to take a stand. What should happen now is that the National board will have to actually take a position, one way or another, about both what is the content of the current policy, and in terms of whether the present policy is to be enforced [w/re content: ought it be understood in such a way as distinguishes 'sexual orientation' from –as was said today "practicing homosexual" (OY-both about the 'distinction' and the moronic, insulting phrase 'practicing homosexual')]
Should the National board vote in favor of discrimination against folks like myself, or take the Murphy et al stand that racism differs from heterosexism just insofar as the former, but not the latter, is beyond the pale of decent behavior– well, we nearly 1500 who think otherwise will just have to take it from there.
I'll let Alastair speak more to this when he gets a chance, since he really should be the one to do so (in the sense that it should be his prerogative). I wasn't going to say anything about the meeting until he did except that I wanted to be clear in light of Michael's comment above that, having spoken of a vote of the membership, I too think what happened today was better.
Who exactly are the members of the National board? Is it everyone listed on this page?
http://www.apaonline.org/governance/boardmem.aspx
I think I would enjoy being present at a meeting listening to the nine Division officers (the Presidents, VPs, Past Presidents) hash this one out.
Oh, and "practicing homosexual" is priceless. I guess it contrasts with "retired", or maybe "lapsed". Yes, I used to be a practicing heterosexual, but you know, who has time nowadays?
I remember being told, when I was an intern on Capitol Hill (and this was 1986 and therefore before he had come out publicly), that when Barney Frank came out, off the record, as gay to journalists, one of them asked him whether he was, in fact, a "practicing homosexual". His immediate response: "Oh no. I don't need to practice anymore. I'm quite good at it by now."
The page Jamie links was last revised in June of last year. So it might be relevant when terms of office expire even if the page is currently up to date. I do know that last Spring/Summer the webpage listing for the program committee was out of date by May or June.
I believe the following is correct, though someone will probably correct me if my memory is wrong here.
During the business session, David Hoekema of Calvin College spoke up about what the original meaning and intent of the APA anti-discrimination policy was. He claimed the following (this text is from a letter he circulated):
"It is alleged in a recent petition directed to the Board of Officers of the APA…that any such directives [forbidding homosexual sex] regarding faculty conduct violate the APA's nondiscrimination policy. This allegation is unfounded. The APA's policy barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was adopted by the Board of Officers in October 1989, during my term as Executive Director of the APA. Taking up a matter that had been considered at the Board's previous meeting and postponed for further discussion and redrafting, the Board adopted a policy that, it was explicitly acknowledged, would demand changes in hiring practices at some institutions but would have no bearing on rules of conduct for heterosexual or homosexual faculty during their terms of employment. More restrictive policies of various kinds were considered and rejected by the Board."
David said that the point of the APA's policy was that such institutions could not use homosexuality as a basis for rejecting a candidate, but this did not mean they could not forbid homosexual sex among faculty once hired.
Anita Silvers said she was at that meeting and remembers the intended meaning as being different.
Alastair argued that David should support his petition, because it would require the National Board to take a stance, including, possibly, David's stance.
Is originalism the correct way to decide what the APA policy means?
For the record, here is the amended motion that was passed at the Pacific Division business meeting:
Whereas the American Philosophical Association has a clear policy opposing discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age; and whereas several institutions that explicitly violate that policy with respect to sexual orientation have recently placed advertisements in Jobs for Philosophers; and whereas more than 1400 members of the American Philosophical Association have signed a petition calling on the APA either to enforce its nondiscrimination policy or to change it; the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division is directed to request that the APA Board of Officers and National Office consider whether the APA (1) enforce its policy and prohibit institutions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation from advertising in Jobs for Philosophers, or (2) clearly mark institutions with these policies as institutions that violate our anti-discrimination policy, or (3) publicly inform its members that it will not protect gay philosophers and remove its anti-discrimination policy to end the illusion that a primary function of the APA is to protect the rights of its members.
The motion passed unanimously. Only Pacific division members had standing to vote, so I don't know how many present who were members of other divisions would have voted against the motion. The effect of the motion is as Kate and Michael have said. The APA Board will consider the interpretation and enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy at their next meeting. I am confident that they will interpret the policy in the same way that the overwhelming majority of APA members apparently do. That is, that they will interpret the policy as opposing the kind of behavioral restrictions that forbid homosexual sex but allow heterosexual sex, at least within the confines of "traditional" marriage. If they interpret the nondiscrimination policy in the more narrow fashion urged by Mark Murphy, it is open to us to put a change of wording to the APA membership in order to clarify the position. I don't think it will come to that. The APA policy is clear as it stands.
I would like to thank the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division, especially Dominic Lopes, for helpful suggestions concerning the workings of the APA. They indicated to me that they would have placed the matter before the Board and National Office, even without passage of the motion. The unanimous passage of the motion was, therefore, largely symbolic. But it was, I think, an important symbol. I would also like to thank everyone who came to the meeting to support the motion, and especially Kate Abramson. I would also like to thank those who came to oppose the motion (there was at least one). Respectful disagreement is important to the functioning of the APA.
If there are 'practising homosexuals,' are there also 'observant homosexuals'? I used to be an observant heterosexual but now I don't notice anything.
That's a shame Tom. According to how I understand your axiology, if you were to be more observant, you could generate more value (assuming that what you were observing was good, and that you took pleasure in it).
Hi Jason,
Either your memory about what was said at the business meeting (including by me) is correct, or mine is as defective as yours, and in the same way.
I don't think that originalism is the correct way to decide what the APA policy means. I would suggest something like the "reasonable APA member" interpretation. Perhaps that's too normatively loaded for some people, who would prefer the "average or typical APA member" interpretation. In this case, I don't think it would make a difference.
w/re: 'originalism'; I too don't think that's the right way to decide what this policy, as it stands, means. But it's also worth remembering, as Jason notes, that what here would even count as 'original' is in dispute.
I really like the thought of 'practicing' as opposed to 'lapsed', retired, or unobservant. Also an oldy but a goody: practicing? every chance I get.
I confess, though, that my actual response (whispered at the time) was a version of the tried and true one that Mike reports Barney Frank having said. [I wonder if going to college in the Boston area around that time is why I know that one as an old cliche] To which my compatriot responded with a smirk, "yes, Katy, that's your problem. You're an unskilled…" Right. If I were just better at it, THEN discrimination would be off the table.
FWIW, if we're talking about what a reasonable APA member in *1989* (as opposed to one today) would understand the text to express, that seems like a form of originalism to me.
How about just taking the policy to mean what the policy says?
Thanks for doing this, Alastair.
In his letter quoted above, David Hoekema states that the officials who enacted the APA’s anti-discrimination policy maintained, in 1989, that it “would have no bearing on rules of conduct for heterosexual or homosexual faculty during their terms of employment.”
In his petition, Mark Murphy appeals, as grounds for interpreting the APA’s anti-discrimination policy as having no such bearing, to the fact that “the very officers of the APA that adopted this policy” did not think to ban ads from places that imposed such codes of conduct barring gay sex “even when the adoption of the policy was fresh” in their minds.
These claims bring to mind the well-known difficulties originalists encounter when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment and the segregation of schools:
‘The Brown [v. Board of Education] case is a potential embarrassment to any theory that emphasizes the importance of the framers’ intentions. For there is no evidence that any substantial number of the congressmen who proposed the Fourteenth Amendment thought or hoped that it would be understood as making racially segregated education illegal. In fact, there is the strongest possible evidence to the contrary. The floor manager of the bill that preceded the amendment told the House of Representatives that “civil rights do not mean that all children shall attend the same school,” and the same Congress continued the racial segregation of the schools of the District of Columbia, which it then administered.’ (Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, p. 268.)
I should note that Murphy’s petition doesn’t commit him to the view that the particular intentions of the enactors of a policy regarding its application settle the matter of the interpretation of that policy. It appears, however, that Hoekema’s letter presupposes such a view that is discredited by such counterexamples as the above involving segregated schools.
Chris (not Swoyer), I'm talking about what a reasonable APA member today would interpret the nondiscrimination policy to mean.
I'm not sure that we want (or Prof. Leiter wants) to have a debate about forms of originalism and textualism here, but at any rate, here's some follow-up on that, FWIW. My "Chris" link will take you to my papers on the subject–I think the historic textually-expressed sense of a constitutional provision is interpretively binding, but not the historically-intended or historically-understood referent/application; founders' analytic judgments of constitutionality are interpretively binding, but not synthetic ones. Even if the founders' original expected applications aren't binding, though, as under my view, they're still worth something. Other things being equal, we would think the people who wrote a policy would know what it does & doesn't apply to. I think Hoekema's letter only presupposes that the original intended application is relevant, not that it settles the issue indefeasibly.
My St. Louis piece talks about the Brown counterexample at length, dealing with James Wilson's statement and D.C. school segregation at 606-08. Since Wilson based his conclusion about the effect of a draft of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on his assessment that schooling wasn't a right given to all citizens, his judgment about the extent of "civil rights and immunities" was synthetic, not analytic. Dworkin's "strongest possible evidence" label is certainly a bit strong, since these two bits of evidence don't involve actual discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
Of course, maybe we should interpret the Constitution and an APA policy differently–e.g., if we think of the APA's policies as implicitly authored by the members who retain them today, rather than the committees that initially composed them, then a what-a-reasonable-APA-member-at-the-time-of-interpretation-would-think standard would make sense. See the Notre Dame piece for why I think otherwise for the Constitution.
I don't want to strawman Hoekema's position, but it seemed like his claim was that the APA policy protected homosexuals up until the moment of hiring, but not afterwards. On Hoekema's interpretation, Wheaton College of Illinois may not discriminate against a so-called *practicing* gay man when choosing candidates. But if it hires said practicing gay man, it may require him to become a non-practicing gay man.
I lost Hoekema's letter, so I don't recall if he made recourse to the supposed act/orientation distinction. If not, I worry his view suggests some strange possibilities. Could KKK University abide by the APA's anti-discrimination policy by hiring a black man, then fire him after he's hired on grounds that he didn't abide by their "transform into a white person upon hiring" policy?
Chris,
David Hoekema rejects the claim that a ban on gay sex is inconsistent with the APA's anti-discrimination policy. He maintains that this claim is 'unfounded' because those who enacted the policy believed that such a ban was consistent with the policy.
It's on account of the above that I drew the conclusion that Hoekema's letter presupposes that the beliefs of the enactors of a policy regarding its application settle the matter of the interpretation of that policy.
You maintain that Hoekema's letter merely commits him to the weaker claim that such beliefs are relevant to the interpretation of the policy, and not that they settle the matter.
But if such beliefs are merely relevant to, rather than settling the matter of, interpretation, how does an appeal to such beliefs license Hoekema's conclusion that an interpretation contrary to such beliefs is 'unfounded'?
So according to this line of thought…. Suppose Wheaton of Illinois hires a gay man, who agrees not to "practice" while he's employed there (and keeps his word). But he begins to openly defend gay rights, opens a web site under his name advocating for gay marriage (using non-college computers), marches in the local GLBT parade, etc. Do they seriously maintain that would be ok?
Mike,
It's possible to read Hoekema's letter as making a stronger claim, of course. It depends on how much implicit connection we read between the sentence "This allegation is unfounded" and the following history. I suppose the fact that I think that original expected applications are relevant but not dispositive in the context of the Constitution, plus interpretive charity, leads me to infer a weaker connection than you do. I wouldn't use the term "unfounded" myself unless I thought I had undermined someone else's entire basis for thinking something, and even the stronger original-expected-applications-are-conclusive view wouldn't establish *that*; finding out that someone is wrong doesn't mean he lacks any reason to believe what he does. So I read Hoekema to be saying (a) these folks are wrong; (b) I've got good reason to think they're wrong, based on what I know from what happened in 1989. But I'll admit he could be read to say (a) these folks are *demonstrably* wrong; (b) I've got compelling, demonstrative proof that they're wrong, based on what I know from what happened in 1989. Again, charity in interpretation.
Perhaps someone from the 1989 board of officers can clarify and say whether the intent was to address the very serious problem of discrimination against celibate homosexuals.
It seems to me that the wording of the policy contradicts the Hoekema interpretation of the Board's intent in adopting it, according to which the non-discrimination policy was not meant to apply to restrictions on faculty conduct post-hire. The policy explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation not just with respect to hiring practices, but (and here I quote from the statement on non-discrimination on the front cover of the Feb. 20, 2009 issue of JFP) "…in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate."
If the Board had intended for the policy to have no bearing on rules of conduct for heterosexual or homosexual faculty during their terms of employment, I don't see why they would have adopted language that specifically extends protection from discrimination to events that, by definition, occur during one's term of employment. Whoever adopted the policy clearly intended its protections to be career-spanning.
I've stayed away from the on-line discussions on these issues. Life is short, and I don't want to spend it in the blogosphere. But a colleague directed me to this thread, and it raises some questions I may be able to address.
What's said above about the Pacific Division business meeting is exactly right: Alastair Norcross and a few others spoke in favor of the motion, I spoke against it, a few questions were raised about protocol, and it passed unanimously. It appeared to me that about 2/3 of those present were Pacific affiliates and hence eligible to vote. That doesn't in itself put the matter on the national board agenda, but it was clear that the Pacific Executive Committee will do so, which is its prerogative under APA bylaws.
My letter to Kwame Anthony Appiah, APA board chair, disputing the claims of the petition, is posted on the Calvin Philosophy Department website (under News and Events) if anybody who hasn't read it would like to do so.
As for originalism: I'm not a fan, either in constitutional interpretation or in APA policy interpretation. My point is simply that the policy of the APA mandates nondiscrimination in hiring. That's what was understood when it was adopted, and that's what it says. Calvin complies with this policy, as do (I believe) most of the other institutions named in the petition. (The motion leaves the names out.) The petition claims incorrectly, and the motion implies, that we are in violation.
In the future the APA may decide to adopt new rules about what sorts of expectations colleges may set for faculty conduct. I think that would be a bad idea, in this area and others. Diversity among institutions is a source of strength, not weakness, in American higher education, and it is silly to imagine that 25 eminent philosophers could decide, after a few hours' discussion, just what should be the campus ethos of all academic institutions in the US and Canada. Catholic and Protestant and Jewish and Mormon universities and colleges are not wannabe state universities; they pursue distinctive ends by distinctive means, including expectations for both student and faculty conduct.
Moreover, the APA lacks any realistic means of adjudication or enforcement of such a new policy. If the AAUP, by contrast, were to prohibit behavioral rules for faculty (it hasn't, and indeed takes great care when enforcing its tenure standards to honor institutional mission and ethos), it could apply and enforce this policy through its investigative committees and censure procedures. The APA lacks any such capacity.
It was said at the Pacific meeting that "all rational persons" must surely support the motion. I demur. Many (if not all) of my Calvin colleagues are rational persons; many (but not all) of them believe rules of conduct regarding behavior of various sorts, including same-sex intimacy, are appropriate for a college such as ours. Ditto for Catholic and Muslim colleagues, as well as some nonreligious natural-law advocates, at similar institutions. I do not pretend to know who has the right answers here, and there is much to be gained by thoughtful debate and dialogue (cf. many of the posts on this thread). Asking the APA board to settle the matter by fiat, however, seems to me foolish and misguided.
I, too, have stayed away from discussion of this issue, but only because I believe very firmly that (a) no rational person could possibly endorse what Prof. Hoekema euphemistically terms "behavioral rules for faculty" and (b) that by extension "all rational persons" must support Professor Norcross' motion. I'm sorry, but I simply do not understand how "rational" people – according to any conventional definiton of "rationality" – could possibly consider consensual same-sex relations between adults "immoral," "wrong," "evil," etc. That such relations are perfectly "moral" is so plainly and self-evidently true to me, moreover, that I cannot even imagine subjecting the matter to serious scrutiny or debate. Now, if this is thought and behavior unbecoming a philosopher – i.e., if I sound close-minded, dogmatic, fundamentalist, etc. – then I'm perfectly okay with that! After all, there was a time when slavery remained "open to debate," and I imagine there were quite a few philosophers who stayed stubbornly behind the curve on that issue as well. I imagine they accused their anti-slavery colleagues – the ones who, like me, had come to insist that the slavery issue was closed, that slavery was self-evidently evil, that the matter was no longer open to serious , etc. – of being bad philosophers. 20 years from now – maybe sooner, hopefully – we will surely look back at all the homophobic philosophers and remember when they were struggling to keep this travesty a live topic of moral inquiry in the name of "faith," "natural law," etc. All I have to say is that I hope the APA stays true to the so-called "thoughhtful profession" and does the right thing in this situation.
"Truth, it is supposed, may bear *all* lights, and one of those principal lights, or natural mediums, by which things are to be viewed, in order to a thorough recognition, is ridicule itself, or that manner of proof by which we discern whatever is liable to just raillery in any subject. So much, at least, is allowed by all who at any time appeal to this criterion. The gravest gentlemen, even in the gravest subjects, are supposed to acknowledge this and can have no right, it is thought, to deny others the freedom of this appeal, while they are free to censure like other men and in their gravest arguments make no scruple to ask, 'Is it not ridiculous?' "
Shaftesbury, Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour
In his comment above, Justin Klocksiem raises what struck me (and I suspect others) as a compelling objection to what David Hoekema says in his letter. As far as I can tell, this objection goes unanswered in Hoekema's comment directly below, which was posted three days later. Has anyone who supports the conduct codes in question got a good answer to Klocksiem's objection? Or is it, as I suspect, unanswerable?
I too would like Prof. Hoekema to respond to the issue Justin Kloeksiem raises. In fact I'll put it more strongly: It is perfectly obvious that this claim — "My point is simply that the policy of the APA mandates nondiscrimination in hiring. That's what was understood when it was adopted, and that's what it says." — is false. It is obviously false. The policy explicitly forbids discrimination, for example, in retention, which Prof. Hoekema's own letter explicitly agrees Calvin College engages in. When a policy explicitly says that it forbids discrimination in retention, and a professor says that it only forbids discrimination in hiring but allows discrimination in retention, what does one conclude? I'm trying my best not to draw an unflattering conclusion here, but no altenratives come to mind.
Again, as I have in the past, I'd like to ask for those who support the right of schools to discriminate to just be a bit more honest. If you think it is ok to fire gays for having sex, just say so, and admit that you want to dump the APA policy. I think this view is irrational – please could we all stop uttering the embarrassing inference from "so-and-so is overall a rational person and they believe P" to "P is a rational belief" – that it is immoral, and even that it is unChristian though I won't presume to wade into that debate. But despite this, I'd have more respect for someone who was willing to simply defend it directly rather than going through these ridiculous logical contortions to find a way to read discrimination as consistent with a policy of non-discrimination.
Klocksiem, Lance, and Otsuka want to know how Hoekema defends the view that they take to be expressed in his letter that the APA nondiscrimination policy applies with respect to hiring but not with respect to retention, etc. Of course this position is absurd, much more absurd than even Klocksiem, Lance, and Otsuka say. For it would not only entail the view that while it would be discrimination to refuse to hire someone homosexually oriented, it would not be discrimination to refuse to retain someone for engaging in homosexual conduct; it would also entail the view that while it would be discrimination to refuse to hire someone who is homosexually oriented, it would not be discrimination to refuse to retain someone simply for being homosexually oriented. This is such an obviously absurd position that one would think that to ascribe it to someone would take some very clear textual evidence that this is indeed his or her view.
But there is no such evidence in Hoekema’s letter. He says that the APA’s norm precludes using homosexual orientation as a basis for hiring, but that it does not preclude using nonacademic conduct constraints — including those regarding sexual conduct — as a basis for retention. This is an appeal to the orientation/act distinction, not to the hiring/retention distinction.
Lance would like Hoekema to respond to the criticisms of his view. But I imagine that he will not return to engage on this issue. Why would he return to engage with those who would just offer the lament, if only all of us who oppose the petition would just ‘be honest’ — that is, stop being dishonest — and admit that we’re pro-discrimination? As for ‘ridiculous logical contortions’ — well, this charge might carry more weight if those in favor the petition would bother to carry out the positive task of offering an informative account of how to understand ‘discrimination’ that (a) is plausible as reading of the norm, (b) yields their desired result, and (c) does not generate obviously erroneous implications. It is easy to avoid anything that might strike one’s opponent as a logical contortion if one offers no positive view on one’s own account.
Mark: Numerous people have responded to these points of yours numerous times in these threads. Among the many points you have never responded to, they have pointed out that putting more onerous conditions of employment – have no sex – on those of homosexual orientation, than on those of heterosexual – be married to have sex – is discrimination against homosexuals. Many have also pointed out that the demand for a theory of discrimination as a precondition on recognizing a case of it is as reasonable as demanding an adequte theory of time to notice that WWI occurred before the moon landing.
But I am really not interested in running around that circle again, and leave it up to those who have followed this discussion to decide whether I am accurate in claiming logical contortions. What I will do is point out that it is YOUR critique of the petition to insist on the act-orientation distinction and to claim that we all lack an adequate theory of discrimination. It is not Hoekema's.
You ask for "clear textual evidence". OK. Hoekema says: "The Calvin College Philosophy Department has been characterized in recent on-line petitions and blog postings as refusing to honor the nondiscrimination policy of the American Philosophical Association …" [from letter] and "My point is simply that the policy of the APA mandates nondiscrimination in hiring. That's what was understood when it was adopted, and that's what it says. Calvin complies with this policy, as do (I believe) most of the other institutions named in the petition." [From defense of the letter above] Also from letter: "Those who accept an invitation to join the Calvin College faculty are expected, in light of the mission of the college as a Christian liberal arts institution affiliated with the Christian Reformed Church in North America, to adhere to standards of conduct consistent with that church's expectations of its members. These standards include refraining from extramarital sexual relations … We are aware that our policy imposes a much greater burden on gays and lesbians than on heterosexuals, since marriage is a possibility open to the latter but not the former."
So, as I said, he claims that following the policy in hiring is sufficient for following the policy despite the explicit rejection of discrimination in retention in the policy. Further, unlike you, he explicitly acknowledges the fact that his college imposes a "much greater burden" on homosexual philosophers as a condition of employment. There is no invocation of the act/orientation distinction in anything he says. You may wish he had taken your line – and maybe he does too, which is why I asked him to respond – but he did not. I'm perfectly happy to accept a revision if Prof. Hoekema meant to endorse a different position, but I accurately characterized what he wrote.
Let me add to what Lance said, above. Paragraph 4 of Hoekema's letter reads as follows:
"It is alleged in a recent petition directed to the Board of Officers of the APA . . . that any such directives regarding faculty conduct violate the APA's nondiscrimination policy. This allegation is unfounded. The APA's policy barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was adopted by the Board of Officers in October 1989, during my term as Executive Director of the APA. Taking up a matter that had been considered at the Board's previous meeting and postponed for further discussion and redrafting, the Board adopted a policy that, it was explicitly acknowledged, would demand changes in hiring practices at some institutions but would have no bearing on rules of conduct for heterosexual or homosexual faculty during their term of employment. More restrictive policies of various kinds were considered and rejected by the Board."
It seems to me that the language claiming that the policy "would demand changes in hiring practices at some institutions but *would have no bearing on rules of conduct for heterosexual or homosexual faculty during their term of employment*" makes it clear that Hoekema holds a view with all of the peculiar consequences that Murphy notes. Perhaps Hoekema would like to offer an explanation, but that is what the letter actually says.
One more try. Let me leave aside issues raised here but irrelevant to the matter at issue, such as whether all consensual sexual relations are ipso facto moral (are all consensual economic transactions ipso facto moral? Bernie Madoff would say so but I wouldn't) or whether context matters. I will try simply to answer the question put directly to me: why condone discrimination in retention but not in hiring?
I don't. Or rather–my own views are irrelevant–my institution doesn't. The inference follows only if "gay person" means by definition "man who has sex with men on a regular schedule." (Once a week? a month? a year? on major holidays? Let's leave it undefined.)
A nondiscrimination policy concerning hiring does not explicitly address issues of retention, but I agree that it would be duplicitous to hire, let us say, a single lesbian philosopher and require her to submit proof before reappointment review that she is no longer a lesbian. (Whatever that might be.)
It is not duplicitous or irrational to hire a lesbian philosopher and inform her that, were she to become involved in a relationship with a partner while serving on the faculty, her reappointment eligibility would be jeopardized. One could say this gleefully, or regretfully; in saying it one might even harbor the hope that a strong test case is just what is needed to lead to a change in policy. True, this isn't very welcoming. And it's grounded in moral standards that are rejected by many ("spat upon" would be more apt) in the academy. But the disposition vs. act distinction Mark Murphy has carefully set out in his letter is indeed essential.
It isn't my intent to offer a defense of these moral standards. I have far more questions than answers concerning whether the churches' (and my college's) stance is an adequate account of Scriptural principles, occasional remarks by Biblical writers, and how we should live in a physical and human world that exists by intent and not by chance. I am grateful to be in a community where these issues are debated, mostly with mutual respect, and we all learn from the exchange.
But the APA's policy addresses the much narrower issue of discrimination against GLBT persons in hiring. The policy the petition seeks to "enforce" would be a new one, one that is inappropriately intrusive in matters outside both the APA's proper function and its regulatory capacity. That's why I oppose it.
Prof. Hoekema:
I"m honestly confused. I'll list the issues I'm confused about, and perhaps you will further clarify.
1. Why do you raise – in the mode of saying you will "leave [it] aside" — the question of whether all sexual/monetary relations are moral, since no one has discussed that in the hundreds of comments now on this list?
2. Why do you characterize the many careful arguments that dozens of people have spent time putting forward here as moral standards being "spat upon"?
More to the point:
3. Why do you still say "A nondiscrimination policy concerning hiring does not explicitly address issues of retention," and "the APA's policy addresses the much narrower issue of discrimination against GLBT persons in hiring" when the APA policy explicitly forbids discrimination in retention and nothing in the resolution you are responding to mentions hiring specifically?
4. Why does the issue in your crucial paragraph change from discrimination to "duplicity". You say: "It is not duplicitous or irrational to hire a lesbian philosopher and inform her that, were she to become involved in a relationship with a partner while serving on the faculty, her reappointment eligibility would be jeopardized." Of course it is not duplicitous since this is the explicit policy of the college. What people are claiming is that it is discriminatory. As you said in your earlier post the colleges in question make celibacy a condition of retention for gay folks – since they do not recognize marriage and don't accept sex outside marriage. You yourself say that this is a "much greater burden". So please, explain why this isn't discrimination in retention, and if it is, why you think the college isn't violating the policy against such.
Since the colleges in question consider homosexual sex to be immoral, restricting someone with an orientation toward it from practicing it ought not, on their lights, function as a burden, but rather a benefit. I don't know whether Hoekema overlooked this point, or if he meant by 'burden' simply that receiving the benefit might be arduous or difficult. One way or another, it is clear that the key disagreement is not about what counts as discrimination but about sexual morality.
Since the APA Board of Officers and National Office will consider this issue at their next meeting, as specified by the motion, lets be clear on what issue they will consider. Since it's by now clear that the overwhelming majority of APA members (and indeed people in general) regard policies that forbid employees from engaging in gay sex, even in the context of a committed monogamous relationship, but allow them to have straight sex in the context of marriage, as discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, the APA needs a clear rationale for departing from this common-sense reading of its policy.
Given that policies that forbid gay sex, but allow straight sex, impose, by the admission of one of their defenders, a "much greater burden" on gay than on straight employees, it seems to me that a rationale for the narrower Murphy/Hoekema interpretation of the APA policy would have to, at least, consist in a pretty convincing argument for the immorality of gay sex (even in the context of a committed monogamous relationship). I have no doubt that at least one member of the National Board thinks s/he has such an argument, but I doubt whether it will appear to be any more than sophistry to most of the Board. I have read (and heard) many arguments for the immorality of gay sex. None of them is the least bit convincing, let alone convincing enough to justify imposing a "much greater burden" on gay employees than on straight ones. I don't need to rehearse the criticisms of such arguments here. John Corvino's excellent work is available for all to read.
This is not the only issue that the Board will have to consider, of course. If they interpret the APA policy in the common-sense way that most APA members do, they will still have to consider which of the three options specified by the motion to follow.
Alastair Norcross's posting is clear and to the point, but in error, I think, in saying the APA needs to resolve whether a moral distinction can be made between gay sex and straight sex. The APA is not a moral arbiter; it's a professional organization serving the needs of philosophers and philosophy departments. Several hundred philosophy departments in the US are located in institutions which draw such a moral distinction in their expectations of faculty. What the APA needs to decide (and will now decide, since the Pacific Executive Committee will place it on the National Board agenda) is whether that fact should disqualify them from full participation in APA programs.
Many opposed to the petition see it as an attack on Christian belief. It sounds that way at times, but it's not; the moral position under attack is one held by Christians, Muslims, Jews, and followers of traditional indigenous religions, as well as some whose grounds are independent of any religious tradition. And in each of these groups others take a different view. Among all these groups, only Christians (Catholic and Protestant) support significant numbers of colleges and universities in North America. In practical terms, then, the petition is asking the APA to instruct several hundred philosophy departments: unless you overturn your institution's policies in this matter you don't belong in the APA. This seems to me an inappropriate, and possibly counterproductive, way of dealing with the issue.
Quick response to Mark Lance on points he raises:
(1) Excerpt from an earlier posting: "I simply do not understand how "rational" people – according to any conventional definiton of "rationality" – could possibly consider consensual same-sex relations between adults "immoral," "wrong," "evil," etc. That such relations are perfectly "moral" is so plainly and self-evidently true to me, moreover, that I cannot even imagine subjecting the matter to serious scrutiny or debate." That's what I was responding to.
(2) My parenthetical reference ("spat upon") was flippant, and I'm sorry I didn't edit it out before posting. (I actually tried to retract my posting to soften the sarcasm but was not quick enough to catch it.) Much of the discussion here has been thoughtful and respectful.
(3) and (4) You're entirely right: recent postings about hiring vs. retention make a distinction not made in the APA policy, which refers broadly to "employment policies". I regret my imprecision. All the same, the policies under discussion (both hiring and retention) are discriminatory only on the assumption that gays in active relationships are a protected class (morally if not legally), and that's exactly the issue the APA is simply not authorized, or able, to resolve for every institution in American higher ed.
David,
A policy doesn't get a free pass just because it's associated with a religion, or even with many religions. To use an example from an earlier thread, consider a college that was open to hiring black faculty members, but insisted that they cover their skin at all times (even at home), but made no such demands on white faculty. Further, suppose that the college justified this demand by claiming that it was part of their religious tradition. This would clearly impose a much greater burden on black faculty than on white faculty. It would just as clearly involve the kind of discrimination that the APA policy labels "unethical". The only way to justify the claim that the APA shouldn't regard this discrimination as contravening its policy would involve defending the claim that it's immoral to have uncovered black skin (but not uncovered white skin).
If the APA says that policies forbidding employees from having gay sex (but not forbidding straight sex) don't constitute unethical discrimination, it is acting as a moral arbiter. It is saying that it's OK to impose a much greater burden on gay faculty than on straight faculty, or at least that it's not clearly not OK. It can't be OK simply because a religion says so. Gay sex would have to be immoral, or at least it would have to be reasonable to think that it's immoral. Interpreting the policy in the way you suggest doesn't get the APA out of taking a moral stance. It involves taking a stance, and, in my view (and that of most other APA members), a bad stance.
Professor Hoekema writes:
"All the same, the policies under discussion (both hiring and retention) are discriminatory only on the assumption that gays in active relationships are a protected class (morally if not legally), and that's exactly the issue the APA is simply not authorized, or able, to resolve for every institution in American higher ed."
I, along with Mark Lance, `simply do not understand how "rational" people – according to any conventional definiton of "rationality" – could possibly consider consensual same-sex relations between adults "immoral," "wrong," "evil," etc.'. Professor Hoekema seems to think that the APA is "not authorized, or able," to reach the same conclusion and act on it simply because… why? Certain religious groups hold these beliefs?
That Professor Hoekema includes "followers of traditional indigenous religions" among his list of dissenters is very telling, as many of them are also wildly and frighteningly sexist. Contrary to what is implied by the list, a great many Christians and Jews reject the view that homosexual activity is immoral. In fact, there is seemingly *no* disagreement about this issue among people minimally competent in logic, morality, honesty, and the questioning of their own beliefs. None. Zero. Nada. That *some* dogmatic religious groups hold the view that homosexual sex is immoral is irrelevant.
The beliefs of these groups towards homosexual activity are as ludicrously wrong as the beliefs that certain races are inherently superior, that a certain sex is inherently superior, or that there is nothing morally problematic with treating humans as property. Professor Hoekema doesn't seem to have a problem when the APA takes a stance on those issues, but suddenly he does when it comes to homosexual activity. I honestly cannot take that seriously for even a moment. Religious leaders are frequently anything but experts on morality, only dogma, and their opinions and those of their followers should not be brought to bear to this issue without their arguments, which, as Professor Norcross reminds us, are uniformly weak.
"[T]he moral position under attack is one held by Christians, Muslims, Jews, and followers of traditional indigenous religions, as well as some whose grounds are independent of any religious tradition."
With all due respect, the above comment about "Jews" is somewhat misleading. It goes without saying that many Jewish people believe that consensual homosexual relations are "immoral" and that such beliefs are consistent with more traditional midrashim. However, I suspect that most religious Jews in this country are either Reformed or on the liberal end of Conservative, and for this reason most either do not, or else are are very unlikely to, hold to such beliefs. (Granted, I do not have any statistics to back up this claim, but it seems much more intuitive than the notion that most religious Jews believe homosexual activity is immoral. This is simply not a 'mainstream' Jewish belief in the way that it is for Christians.)
It would be much more honest to say this position is held by Orthodox Jews rather than Jews simpliciter, if only because the Orthodox claim is more or less as a rule rather than as an exception. Even then, however, I don't think Professor Hoekema gains much by noting this. Because the Orthodox hold to a rigorously literal view of tanakh, halakah, etc., we should not be surprised that they condemn homosexuality as an "abomination" and the like. (Recall, also, that the hasidic movement began in part as a reaction AGAINST midrashic interpretation, the scholarly study of the Torah, etc.) The same is true of Christians who read the Bible literally – "according to the letter rather than the spirit" (i.e., without midrash). Not only will they inevitably condemn homosexuality; they will also literally believe that Yonah was swallowed by a whale, the Moishe literally parted the Red Sea, etc. There is is a Pharisaic, fundamentalist, anti-rationalist tradition in Islam as well and probably in every other religion. The results always seem to be the same.
But why ought we to be impressed or surprised by this? How does this lend any credibility to Prof. Hoekema's position at all? I don't think it does.
Are there non-religious / secular / humanist / naturalist / atheist people who take up this position? I suppose, but my guess is that these people are extremely few and far between, especially in the philosophical world. At least in that world, the position defended almost exclusively by self-identified Christians. Outside the Ivory Tower, matters become somewhat more complicated, but not much. After all, when was the last time you encountered a non-Christian person vocally condemning homosexuality, gay marriage, etc. in a public forum? Sure – once in awhile, a Jewish 'conservative' will speak out on this issue. But let's just be honest: this is, at the end of the day, a topic of concern for, by, and of Christian conservatives. I think most everyone else, whether religious or non-religious, would prefer to live and let live.
[Closing thought: Judaism, from which Christianity (allegedly) came, places an enormously emphasis on refraining from morally judging the conduct of others. This is one reason why Reformed Judaism, at least, stresses freedom, personal responsibility and the conscience rather than moral policing, moral hygiene, rigorous adherence to "rules," etc. (What you do is between you and G-d; it's no one else's business.) In certain strands of evangelical Christianity, by comparison, it seems like judging others is the very name of the game. And if you ask me, these "faculty behavior" rules are nothing if they are not the worst kinds of judgments of other people.]
I keep resolving to drop out of this debate, but find myself drawn in again out of a bizarre fascination with the ability of philosophers to immerse themselves in argument in a way that utterly obscures the salient elements of reality. So to try once again to end my involvement in this debate, by returning to my very first post a few months ago, I want to try to develop what Alastair says above in more full-blooded terms.
Of course deciding to "remain neutral" on this issue – to fully associate with those who think it permissible to fire gays for having sex – is to take a moral stance. But this formal point, correct as it is, does little to capture the particular salience of this stance at this moment in this place.
In most states of the US, it is perfectly legal to fire someone from any job for the simple fact of being, or being perceived to be, gay. I started a chapter of PFLAG in Fredericksburg, Virginia about 10 years ago. Hardly the most conservative place in VA, but these meetings were the only out space in the town. Many teachers showed up and all reported that it was inconceivable for anyone to be out and gay in that job as they would immediately be fired. Others spoke of being rejected by families, beaten by strangers, rejected by churches and communities. The general sentiment was simple amazement that there actually could be a group of people who would be open and accepting.
Gays generally, in most parts of the US, have no right to visit their partner in the hospital. Gays are routinely denied the chance to adopt, or even foster, children. My daughter, growing up in probably the second most lgbtq tolerant town in the country, with two parents who have supported equal rights for decades, with numerous gay family friends, took to cutting herself out of fear of what it would mean to her place in society if she admitted to being attracted to women.
Gays are assaulted, murdered, dragged behind trucks, bound with barbed wire, denounced daily in the media in the most vile terms.
That is the context in which we consider the question of whether the APA should embrace colleges that explicitly state their intention to fire someone for engaging in gay sex. No matter how closely we stick to our academic focus, that context is there, and it is real. It is the context in which we consider whether to "remain neutral" on a matter "about which reasonable philosophers disagree".
So many here speak as if we were considering philosophical disagreements about meriological essentialism, or deciding whether a professional organization should officially pronounce on relevance logic, rather than considering whether to engage in symbolic solidarity with an oppressed and often despised class of people. I grant that some of my religious colleagues – some who are generally good people, generally rational philosophers, and people I value and respect – will be offended and hurt if the APA clearly states that it does not approve of the policies in question. I am genuinely sorry to be advocating actions that will lead to such hurt.
But that does not change my sense of what is right here, a sense that was captured perfectly by King: there comes a time when silence is betrayal.
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