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Thoughts on Templeton Foundation Funding?

Bence Nanay (Antwerp & Cambridge) writes:

I know you ran a piece on the Templeton Foundation, but as I know that a lot of philosophers in the current crunch for external funding consider applying or have applied, it may be a good idea to see what people think of accepting funding from them. I know that some very good and respected philosophers want to hear nothing of them and some other very good and respected philosophers took their money, so it should be a lively exchange that could help some of us about whether we should consider them as an acceptable funding source…

My view is unchanged from before:  while the Templeton Foundation undoubtedly devotes resources to muddying certain intellectual waters, it has, to my knowledge, funded substantial philosophical research projects, without unsavory strings attached.  But I invite signed comments from readers with views about this.

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31 responses to “Thoughts on Templeton Foundation Funding?”

  1. What is the main payoff of action theory research?

    Is it pure coincidence that Mele (so far as I've understood him from reading his earlier work) seems to give the best current arguments for a perspective that preserves "free will" in a form that reinforces traditional (i.e. Kantian) morality (justice, punishment, responsibility, etc.) against the encroachment of an alternative (e.g. broadly utilitarian, see Pereboom) perspective that–so far as I can tell–appears far less preferable to the express demands of conservative christian ideology..?

  2. Far from simply being some kind of conduit for religion in academia, it seems to me that the Templeton Foundation generally funds philosophical projects that have the potential to make trouble for strong naturalism, or perhaps just for 'mechanistic' metaphysics in general. For example, they'll fund theologians, but they'll also fund Charles Taylor's work on "strongly valued goods" and Al Mele's attack on neuroscientific studies of free will.

    Philosophers who criticize Templeton funding are flirting with a very hypocritical position. We're supposed to be confident of the power of sound argument, of the pursuit of reason over persuasion. Yet, some seem to think that the mere mention of Templeton is enough to discredit a thinker entirely. Not only is this a fallacy in and of itself, it speaks to a secret mistrust of the very values we're supposed to be upholding.

  3. I concur with Brian's statement. I've never sought Templeton funding myself, but I know of some perfectly respectable projects that have been funded in part from that source.

  4. The previous comments are mistaken about Mele; the first almost libelously so. Mele has defended the existence of free will for decades; this fact makes the innuendo that his views might be influenced by the Templeton foundation extremely implausible. There is also nothing incompatible with strong naturalism in his criticisms of Libet. If anything, the reverse, given that Libet believed in a spooky veto power.

    BL COMMENT: Let me just say that I did not read either comment as suggesting that any philosopher had adopted a particular view in order to get funding, but rather that Templeton prefers to fund certain projects partly on ideological grounds, which must surely be right.

  5. Mark S: Is there really any evidence that Mele's project was selected because it underwrites conservative Christian ideology rather than (or in addition to) because it was a first-rate project that meets the stated aims of the grant? There is certainly evidence against this claim. When it comes to assessing proposals under 'Science & the Big Questions', the foundation is to "stand apart from any consideration of dogma or personal religious belief and to seek out grantees who, in their approach to the Big Questions, were 'innovative, creative, enthusiastic, and open to competition and new ideas.'" Under Phil & Theology, it says that they are especially interested in projects that relate to science, and elsewhere they state especial interest in projects on free will. (See: http://www.templeton.org/sites/default/files/overview-cfa_0.pdf).

    Yes, I know that the foundation supports some right-wing organizations and its president seems to support conservative Christian ideals on his own dime; but when it supports academic research, it doesn't seem especially supportive of the conservative Christian ideas, at least not according to the article that Prof. Leiter referenced in a previous post.

    Off the top of my head, over the last 5 years or so, Templeton has poured more than 10 million dollars into timely projects, led by first-rate people. These projects often involve fellowships, thereby creating jobs. As far as I know, in recent history no second rate projects in philosophy have been funded. Do we really need to have a discussion about whether taking money from them is somehow inappropriate? Am I missing something? (Maybe I am; until an hour ago, I only knew of some of the recent grants to philosophers and that they had especial interest in the connection between science and religion.)

  6. Templeton has also funded some excellent projects in the foundations of physics, with no religious aspects whatsoever.

  7. There is a long (though somewhat dated) discussion about getting in bed with the Templeton Foundation at http://www.edge.org/discourse/templeton_index.html .

    I think Dan Sperber has it right in the discussion when he says "let's, as I suggested, be cynical — or if you don't like the word, lucid — about it rather than pretend that all is well and that Templeton money smells of hallowed roses. Let's be cynical however with some sophistication, and not pretend that all money is impure and that all sources of funding stinks equally: some stinks more than Templeton, and other less."

    In addition to recommending the discussion at Edge, I think it is worth pointing out a major concern relevant to the discussion here. Many comments have referenced good work that Templeton has supported, indicating that of course we should be comfortable with them based on this track record. A more cynical interpretation, however, is that Templeton is buying credibility with many of these projects, and we are collaborators in selling it to them. Put differently, we are falling for the beginning stages of a "Wedge Strategy" that is being implemented far more skillfully than the blundering Discovery Institute (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wedge_strategy if this reference is unfamiliar).

    A deeper, though tangential and perhaps less practically important matter: To what extent should you collaborate with someone whose goal is not truth, but advocation of a particular conclusion? Adversarial collaboration can be useful, but it seems necessary that both sides have the goal of finding the truth and attempt to keep their expectations of what that truth may be way off to the side.

    BL COMMENT: Note that the "wedge" strategy was aimed at promoting Intelligent Design creationism, which the Templeton Foundation opposes.

  8. Somehow the html on my previous comment was screwy. Hopefully, the link will work this time: http://www.templeton.org/sites/default/files/overview-cfa_0.pdf

    Also, the 10 million figure was for projects *in philosophy*.

  9. "Hosted by Columbia's Center for the Study of Science and Religion, the lecture series, "Experiencing the Mysterious," has brought together world class scholars to promote dialogue between the humanistic disciplines and the physical, biological and human sciences. This spring's series and others to follow over the next two years are supported by a $100,000 grant from the John Templeton Foundation."

    I know that one of the four speakers in 2001 was Philip Kitcher.

  10. Regarding the suggestion that what Templeton is doing amounts to a "wedge strategy" aimed at "buying credibility" by promoting good work: I guess that's possible, but couldn't one say that of *any* organisation whose track record thus far is respectable? It seems strange to me to be nervous about accepting their funding now out of fear that they might switch to backing less worthwhile or more tightly restricted projects later. I suppose adding to the nervousness in this case is Templeton's religious affiliations (à la the Discovery Institute), but oughtn't we to judge Templeton on its record rather than that of other groups?

  11. The question raised by the post is a good one, but I have to say that some of the comments strike me as silly.

    Disclosure: I’ve refereed grant proposals for Big Questions in Free Will. My criterion for evaluation is whether the proposed project looks likely to contribute to a better understanding of human agency. If there’s some further ideological filter that I’m supposed to employ, someone forgot to tell me.

    Is the Templeton Foundation pursuing a clever strategy of “buying credibility” in pursuit of some dark purpose? Are recipients of their grants collaborators? Am I a tool in this dastardly plot? I’m listening.

    In the meantime, back to work.

    BL COMMENT: While I basically agree with Professor Clarke's take on this, let me clarify that the Templeton ideology manifests itself in what it ultimately chooses to fund, not in the criteria, presumably, that evaluators employ.

  12. Deisidaimon.wordpress.com

    I think that Nicholas Smyth has the crux of the issue but is grasping it somewhat too roughly. Belief in the power of argument it pragmatically implicit in being a philosopher. That belief, however, has to be tempered by a fallibilist attitude regarding human abilities, including one's own. Anything else is hubris. What I mean by this is that I always start to feel very uncomfortable when scientists claim that being funded by Templeton does not affect their and, what is more, their results. This may well be the case, of course. However, psychological research upon the unconscious effects of subtle social influence is far too well developed to be able to just turn around and say, "Well, that's alright then." We know that the behaviour of even the most intelligent people is profoundly affected by a number of factors, such as advertising, that they would disavow. We also know that scientific methodology is nowhere near as impersonal and purely logical as the logical positivists dreamed. This makes it highly plausible that being funded by Templeton can and does affect the work done by philosophers and others in ways that they are not aware of. Not that I can provide a single clear-cut example of this.

    Not wanting to take Templeton funds has placed me in a particularly difficult situation. The Fund is the best source of support in the area I have been working in, i.e cognitive science of religion. So, I am shooting myslef in the foot by not seeking their support. On a population-wide scale, such individual choices and their effects are bound to skew the research that gets done. Furthermore, since Templeton funds so much in this area, many of those that I would wish to collaborate with do get Templeton funding. This means that even if I do not personally seek Templeton funding I must, nonetheless, accept it indirectly or else cut myself off from the whole field. Even doing that, however, leaves me open to: 1) accusations of hypocricy and 2) the subtle influence I mentioned in the previous paragraph.

    Philosophers, psychologists, physicists and all others who accept funding are just human. To presume that such funding will not influence us in some way when we do accept it is to deny scientific research that appears to show the exact opposite. Of course, it is that very hubristic denial that Templeton is counting on.

    Konrad Talmont-Kaminski

  13. Templeton's record is far from spotless. Although they have moved away from Intelligent Design and the Discovery Institute, they have been supporters of both. They have recently become more careful in their associations, decreasing the tendency to set off automatic alarms in scientists' heads.

    Nevertheless, it still seems like a core goal of the Templeton Foundation is that it (in the words of BL above) "devotes resources to muddying certain intellectual waters." Perhaps the good of getting certain research done outweighs the costs of having it be Templeton-supported, but we should still acknowledge the costs.

    Also see: Descriptions from Anthony Grayling and Daniel Dennett for why they won't be associated with Templeton. http://richarddawkins.net/articles/3973-correspondence-regarding-the-templeton-foundation

    (Final side note: I am not the "Mark S" who posted the very fist comment.)

  14. I did an article on this subject for The Philosophers' Magazine about a year ago, and found myself more ambivalent than I'd expected. I talked to (exchanged emails with) several people who valued things like the funding of interdisciplinary conferences that no one else would fund.

  15. In reference to Konrad Talmont-Kaminski's post, it seems to me that the psychological evidence about the subtle influence of all kinds of factors on research outcomes, while no doubt compelling, shouldn't be taken too seriously as a basis on which to accept or not accept funding from Templeton or any other ideologically motivated backer.

    Suppose I am a researcher in just the quandary you've been in, wondering whether or not to accept the funding. It's true that if I accept it, I might subconsciously cultivate results preferred by my backer. On the other hand, owing to my nervousness about falling into just that trap, I equally well might drift too far in the opposite direction, subconsciously cultivating results that distance me from the ideological stance of my backer for fear of the appearance of bias. In either case, provided one conducts and presents one's research carefully and in good faith, errors will be spotted, and the research will be a serious and positive contribution to scholarship even if its conclusions are proven false.

    Perhaps the latter view reflects my ignorance of the specifics of the psychological research to which Talmont-Kaminski adverts. But the psychological factors at work in the subconscious of any given researcher strike me as so various, unpredictable, and inscrutable as to be a pretty weak basis on which to decide whether or not to accept funding.

  16. I'd like to get clearer on the proposition under consideration. Is it this?

    P: Accepting funds from the Templeton is morally wrong.

    If so, then I'd like to get clearer on what the reasons for and against P are. Here's one for P:

    R: "the Templeton Foundation undoubtedly devotes resources to muddying certain intellectual waters"

    Of course, R isn't a very strong reason for P. (To be clear, I'm not suggesting that Leiter, whom I'm quoting, was saying that R is a strong reason.) Most of us are employed by a university that pours money into academic endeavors that we consider to be muddying certain intellectual waters. Many analytic philosophers think very lowly of postmodern thought (perhaps as lowly as Daniel Dennett thinks of Christian thought) and are still okay with being funded by (or at least paid by) their universities. Perhaps it is because our universities fund good projects as well; but then so does the Templeton. So, I don't see R as a very good reason.

    Actually, most of the reasons I see in this thread, if used in support of P, also seemed to me to be equally good reasons to think that being funding by my own university is wrong.

    BL COMMENT: I would have thought the relevant analogy would have been a university that *only* funds research that somehow supports postmodernism. Though perhaps even that isn't quite right: the real worry about Templeton, if I understand the concern, is that it funds research for the *wrong* reasons: so, e.g., it funds good philosophical work, but it *only* does so because such work is taken to be hostile to naturalism, or supportive of religion, and so on.

  17. Just so it's clear, I was not suggesting that Mele's research was influenced in any way by Templeton funding.

    I was suggesting that Templeton's "especial interest in projects on free will" is a reflection of their broader ideological aims/worldview. "Free will" is a huge linchpin in supporting concepts like "evil" and "moral responsibility" and "justice" and "punishment" and so on.

  18. I have to say, quite honestly, that this conversation is rather disturbing.

    Templeton is, yes, a generally religious organization. Are we nontheistic philosophers afraid of all such organizations? If so, this means we believe that the efforts of Templeton and other foundations to get theists and nontheists to engage in open discourse with one another is inherently suspect.

    Wouldn't that be sort of the death of philosophy?

  19. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski says:
    "To presume that such funding will not influence us in some way when we do accept it is to deny scientific research that appears to show the exact opposite. Of course, it is that very hubristic denial that Templeton is counting on."
    Hakwan Lau (a Columbia cognitive neuroscientist) and I just got a Templeton grant for trying to decide between the following theories of perceptual consciousness:
    1. The theory that perceptual consciousness depends on "higher order" representations in the front of the brain
    2. The theory that perceptual consciousness depends not on these "higher order" representations but on first order sensory representations in sensory cortices (and supporting sub-cortical structures)
    The proposal was entirely physicalistic in its approach with no hinting at anything dualistic or spiritual, and not even any discussion of free will. I agree with Talmont-Kaminski that influence can be subtle and hard to detect but (maybe because I am a victim of that hubristic denial of which he speaks) I can't see any possible influence. I can’t see that either outcome would be better for getting the next grant. A number of comments suggest that Templeton is pursuing a "wedge strategy" of "buying credibility" by funding work within a physicalistic framework. I don't know enough to judge that, but what I see is that Templeton is willing to fund collaboration between a philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist, something you would have a hard time getting NSF or NIH or NEH to do.

  20. Brian,
    Thanks for the response. I didn't know that the Templeton *only* supports projects that are supportive (directly or indirectly) of religion (if we want the analogy to go as you suggest). I guess that's partly under debate here.

    But suppose that were the case. Is that bad? Suppose X is a strong proponent of presentism. X starts the Presentism Foundation, which pours money into projects that support presentism, and hence, are hostile to eternalism. This doesn't sound bad so far. Suppose Tom want to provide a defense of presentism. Tom receives money from the Presentism Foundation. This doesn't seem wrong for him to do. I'd have to reflect on these intuitions though.

    (On your other point, I suppose that if it's not bad for the Templeton to support only projects supportive of religion, then it's not bad that that's also their only reason.)

  21. Just to report one experience: An interdisciplinary group of us at Johns Hopkins received some Templeton funding for an evolution, cognition, and culture project. There were no strings attached, and there was no interference of any kind. I heard back informally that they were very pleased with our project's use of their funding. Our "Templeton Research Lecturers" were Paul Bloom, Dan Sperber, and Martin Nowak. (In a previous year, Dan was a Templeton Research Lecturer at Vanderbilt as well, which I mention in light of an earlier post in this thread.) Other speakers and visitors included Steve Stich, Pascal Boyer, Shaun Nichols, Adina Roskies, Brian Skyrms, Ned Block … well, too many to list really. As far as I know, no one felt constrained by or aware of any agenda.

  22. There are anti-Templeton arguments that I do not find convincing, and I want to distinguish them from the anti-Templeton argument that does concern me. Here are some unconvincing arguments for not taking Templeton money:

    (1) Templeton funding might influence the results of studies.
    (2) Working with any religious organization is bad.
    (3) Templeton disproportionately funds certain areas because of how they think those areas relate to religious thought.
    (4) Templeton funds some really bad research, due to the religious appeal of some bad research projects. (see, for example, http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2010/08/templeton_prayer_study_meets_e.php )

    I think (1) and (2) are false, and that (3) and (4) are true but do not constitute arguments against taking Templeton money for good research. What I take to be the major concern with the Templeton Foundation is that their primary goal is to be a propaganda machine for religion and a (false) claim that religion is compatible with modern science. If you think that the methods/goals of rationalism/empiricism and religion are at odds, then you should be concerned about helping the Templeton Foundation with its primary goal.

    For an example of what makes Templeton different from other funding organizations, consider the Templeton-Cambridge Journalism Programme in Science and Religion: http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2010/02/27/the-templeton-bribe/

    I should mention that I would be very pleased to be convinced that getting in bed with Templeton is fine. There are certainly many grants, workshops, and conferences I would love to apply to but that I currently stay away from.

  23. I agree with Mark Sheskin's assessment of four unconvincing objections to the acceptance of Templeton funding, but I don't fathom his own favored objection. Sheskin maintains that the primary goal of Templeton "is to be a propaganda machine for religion and [for the] claim that religion is compatible with modern science," and he admonishes us that we "should be concerned about helping the Templeton Foundation with its primary goal." I agree with Sheskin's attribution of an underlying goal to Templeton, but I fail to see how the scholars who accepted the grants recounted by Ned Block and Steven Gross were in any way helping the Templeton Foundation with its pursuit of that goal. I know of a few other Templeton-funded projects that likewise could not plausibly be characterized as "helping the Templeton Foundation with its primary goal." Thus, unlike Sheskin, I don't regard the sheer fact that a project has been funded by Templeton as a reason for shunning or impugning the project. Everything depends on the specifics.

  24. Having been involved a bit both in getting Templeton funding and in advising Templeton on applications, I'm reasonably positive about them, at least in philosophy of physics. They want to support research in certain areas (philosophy of cosmology, for instance), and to some extent they want to support certain kinds of interdisciplinary work, but they don't seem to have any particular agenda as regards the outcome of that work.

    A couple of examples:

    – Templeton is the major funder of the the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi), which funds various physics projects (including ones that overlap with philosophy of physics), which seldom if ever have any science-and-religion theme. (From their website FAQS: Q:Is "reconciling science and religion" part of the FQXi mission? A:No.)

    – Templeton organised a meeting on foundations of quantum mechanics in Oxford last October in honour of John Polkinghorne. The speakers were exactly the kind of people you'd expect to be at a high-profile meeting of that kind, and I don't think any of them other than Polkinghorne himself mentioned religion.

    Whether this positive description is applicable to other areas of philosophy or of science, or to their funding of outreach as opposed to primary research, I don't know.

  25. I was a recipient of a grant from Templeton's Defining Wisdom grant(administered through University of Chicago's Arete Initiative). I was also involved in the creation of the proposal for Al Mele's Big Questions in Free Will grant. In both of these endeavors I have seen no evidence that Templeton advanced a religious agenda or was aiming to use the programs as "a propaganda machine for religion." I believe both of these programs had (and have) professional academics in charge of reviewing the grants and running the programs. I will let them speak for themselves, but I certainly do not think they were handpicked for their religious views or their willingness to advance a particular agenda (I think the suggestion that Mele was picked for such purposes is ridiculous).

    What Templeton does do is provide funding for research that, in many cases, would not be funded by any other organization. Now, I admit I have not done substantial research on any purportedly nefarious techniques Templeton may have used in the past to advance a religious or non-naturalistic agenda. So far, the only evidence anyone has advanced is the payment of journalists to cover events and the funding of some bad research. Is there other evidence?

    BL COMMENT: I have no doubt about Al Mele's seriousness of purpose, but do you really think a projec ttitled "Free Will: Human and Divine?" is neutral as to religion?

  26. The shorter version: Matthew Kramer asks how accepting Templeton money helps them in a propaganda goal to advocate for certain religious claims, including the (supposed) compatibility between religion and modern science. Consider an analogy with why many biologists won't debate creationists: Doing so may seem innocuous and in fact helpful, since you get paid to educate an audience, but it includes a component of harm in that your mere participation in the debate can suggest that there is a worthwhile debate to be had. If the (or at least a major) motivation of the person paying you is simply to parasitize off of your respectability, this is something to be very aware of.

    —-

    The spelled out version, with bits applicable to other arguments that have come up:

    I think this case is equivalent, in certain important respects, to why many biologists decline to debate with creationists. Here are some arguments, pro and con for debating with a creationist:

    Pro: "No one else will pay me to go out and educate an audience about the process of evolution by natural selection and the evidence supporting it. There are no strings attached to the money I am being paid, and in fact the organizers wish me to make the strongest case possible for what I take to be true. Are we so afraid of debate that we won't engage with it? Are we so opposed to religious claims that contradict reason and evidence that we must stay away from them?"

    Con: "There is good to be done by educating an audience about evolution, but the debate may also have the unfortunate side effect of convincing a lay audience that this is a real issue. In fact, many people leave such debates less sure of evolution than they entered merely because a serious scientist was bothering to debate it. It is true that, if you are debating with a very knowledgable opponent, you might engage with some deep issues (such as levels of selection), but if the only reason your opponent wants to engage in the debate is for the psychological effects the debate will have on the audience (see previous sentence), then you really should think twice."

    To be clear, there are ways in which this case is different from accepting money from the Templeton Foundation. The important similarity is the mismatch between motivations for giving the money and taking the money. If the Templeton Foundation's goal is to muddy the water by getting serious academics involved, then this is a strong negative. That your component of the endeavor (advocating evolution in my analogy, or a particular Templeton activity in the case at hand) is good does not eliminate the problem. The problem is that your good activity is being used only to raise the stock of something you do not support. If the (or at least a major) motivation of the person paying you is simply to parasitize your respectability, this is something to be very aware of.

  27. For the record, the name of the project is Big Questions in Free Will. (It had another name at the time of the earliest press releases.) There are three main components: science of free will, theoretical underpinnings of free will, and theology of free will. Regarding sub-granting: $2.8 million goes to science of free will, and the other two branches split about $600,000. All this info is on the project website: http://www.freewillandscience.com/wp/

    I've enjoyed working with the John Templeton Foundation in general and with Mike Murray in particular. JTF has a very supportive attitude toward interdisciplinary research, which I definitely appreciate. (Much of my own work in philosophy is linked to science.) I certainly haven't felt any pressure to act contrary to my better judgment.

  28. In his response to Andrew Moon, Professor Leiter talks as though Templeton funds research in philosophy *only if* the research supports religion in some way. Other comments (e.g., Ned Block's) provide some reason to reject such a strong claim. In any event, below is some further evidence that Templeton's interest extends well beyond research that supports religion.

    Their only funding priority for 2011 listed (so far?) is neutral toward religion: Can GM crops help to feed the world? ( http://www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/funding-priorities/can-gm-crops-help-to-feed-the-world ).

    At times Templeton even supports studies that might be considered unfriendly to religion: "the foundation will have to stand up for tough answers, too, as it did when announcing the findings of a major study that intercessory prayer doesn't improve medical outcomes, or when rebuking intelligent design." ( http://www.thenation.com/article/god-science-and-philanthropy?page=full )

    Two final points: First, even if Templeton supports studies that are neutral or negative toward religion only because of some elaborate conspiracy to gain credibility, it's not true that they only support research that is in some way supportive of religion.

    Second, maybe they would have funded more research neutral or negative toward religion, but those who would write such research tend not to apply, perhaps because they think the Templeton money "smells too bad" or is "given for the wrong reasons", etc. I certainly don't know whether this self-selection hypothesis is true or false; but I'm guessing that many of those with negative attitudes toward Templeton don't either.

    BL COMMENT: I was trying to articulate the objection to Templeton, I was not speaking in my own voice. I would have hoped that woudl have been clear from the initial post.

  29. If I understand the concluding paragraph of Mark Sheskin's latest message correctly, Sheskin is claiming that the involvement of eminent philosophers (and other scholars) in Templeton-funded projects may serve to enhance the Templeton Foundation's reputation in the medium or long term and may thereby serve to promote the Foundation's underlying objective. That underlying objective might be fulfilled to an extent greater than would be the case if such people had not become involved at all. As an account of what *might* happen, Sheskin's conjecture can't really be gainsaid; however, as an account of what *will* happen, it strikes me as implausible. At least as plausible is that the involvement of eminent philosophers (and other scholars) in fully respectable projects funded by the Templeton Foundation will gradually lead to a blurring of the Foundation's focus. The need to maintain academic respectability carries its own impetus, which may lead the Templeton Foundation more and more in the direction of acting as a general academic grant-awarding body. I'm speculating, of course, but I don't see any reason to prefer Sheskin's surmises to mine.

    At any rate, even if Sheskin is correct in thinking that the involvement of high-quality scholars in Templeton-funded research will somehow serve in the long run to bolster Templeton's attainment of its propagandizing aims, that outcome has to be set against the fact that some excellent philosophical and interdisciplinary work is gaining funding that wouldn't be readily available from other sources. When people engaged in such work weigh the reality of that funding against the highly conjectural long-term outcome to which Sheskin adverts, they can rightly conclude that they should go ahead with their projects.

  30. I do agree with one (new) important element of Matthew Kramer's recent (Dec 13 4:47PM) evaluation of my position. I wholeheartedly agree that engagement with legitimate scholars is moving the Templeton Foundation in the correct direction (e.g., disavowing Intelligent Design). Furthermore, it may be the case that the measurable damages of increasing the Foundation's perceived respectability are underwhelming. Importantly, to the extent that their engagement with legitimate scholars moves them in the right direction, the problem of them gaining perceived respectability disappears (because they will be, in fact, increasingly worthy of respect).

    I do, however, think that we should be wary of increasing the respectability of Templeton beyond what it (as of yet) deserves. I have nothing to add to my analogy of biologists debating with creationists, and that remains the appropriate example.

    Here is a brief summary of what I take to be the current status of this discussion (at least the part of it I'm engaged with):

    (1) One goal of the Templeton Foundation is to muddy certain intellectual waters.
    (2) This is a bad goal.
    (3) This goal is advanced by directing some funds to work with good scholars on good projects.
    (4) The real benefits of accepting Templeton funds is large.
    (5) The real (not symbolic or "taking a stand") costs of taking Templeton funds are non-zero (though they may be quite small).

    I think there is general agreement on the truth of (1), (2), and (4). I think many people think that (3) is false, but I think (3) is true based on analogy with biologists debating creationists. I assume people who think (3) is false also think that (5) is false, since if (3) is false then the cost of taking Templeton funds is zero. Those who agree with (3) and (5) might still think that taking Templeton funds is okay because (4) >> (5).

    A position I don't think anyone (including me) has advocated, but that I think deserves attention is: We should not take Templeton funds if (5) is true, even if (4) >> (5).

  31. I suspect that attitudes toward the propriety of “taking Templeton money” are being thrown a bit by the sheer scale of their grant-making. Think of a parallel case on a much smaller scale, namely, the Ammonius Foundation (http://www.ammonius.org/index.php ). The same questions can be asked, and the answers seem to me pretty obvious, and the issues quite simple.

    Like Templeton, the foundation has a distinctive mission (http://www.ammonius.org/mission.php ), which includes commitment to systematic metaphysics, opposition to all sorts of “anti-realism”, preference for a kind of metaphysical monism and a very philosophical, Spinozistic sort of deity, etc. (The founder, Marc Sanders, aka “Ammonius”, reveals all his cards in a carefully worked out system at: http://www.comingtounderstanding.com/ ; his a deity turns out to be quite like “the Highest One” of Mark Johnston’s recent book, Saving God; like Johnston, he’s quite critical of organized religion). Ammonius has funded research by Derek Parfit, Jonathan Schaffer, Mark Johnston, John Hawthorne, Alvin Plantinga, George Bealer, Jan Cover, and others — they’ve written things that, to some degree, support one or another part of the Ammonius mission; but they’re obviously not all on board, 100%. And much of what the Foundation does has no goal other than to promote serious work in metaphysics and philosophical theology, no matter the conclusions reached. The Foundation gives out two $8,000 prizes for essays on metaphysics and philosophical theology by “younger scholars” (they’re then published in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics or Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion). This money has been absolutely “no strings attached”; in the case of OSM, there is a committee of three judges, culled from editorial board members of OSM, and they make the call, not me and certainly not anyone at the foundation (Karen Bennett, Hud Hudson, Trenton Merricks, Ted Sider, Andrew Cortens, Yuri Balashov, and John Hawthorne have served as judges, among others). Sometimes the winning essay supports nominalism or some other view that wouldn’t sit well with Ammonius’s mission statement. But there’s never been any intimation to me that, if the winning essays are too hostile to Ammonius’s mission, funding might end…

    Now, should people be taking these prizes, if they do not agree with all of Ammonius’s principles? Should they worry that Marc Sanders is really just trying to “buy credibility”? Sure, there’s no direct link from the Foundation website to Sanders’s book, but the connection is bound to help.

    I think the answer depends upon whether you think the kind of scholarship Ammonius wants, ideally, to promote with some of its grants (and the kind of metaphysical system Sanders himself is promoting in his book) is evil or pernicious or in some way seriously bad. Most nominalists or anti-realists (about metaphysics) will probably be glad to learn that some of their opponents are getting a little money to write up their views. Most traditionally religious Christian philosophers (like myself) will think it’s kind of cool that someone is working out the details of a very non-Christian version of neo-Platonism, and won’t mind if Sanders’s book gets a little attention because of the Foundation’s grants. Only the nominalist or anti-realist who thinks that her metaphysical opponents are defending an evil view, something that really ought to have been eliminated long ago, should agonize over accepting an essay prize from Ammonius. Only the Christian who thinks Sanders’s book should be suppressed should worry about drawing people’s attention to it.

    Isn’t exactly the same thing true about Templeton — at least with respect to issues about “muddying the waters” of pure science with religious beliefs? (Their “free market” initiatives are a different matter, one that deserves a thread of its own.) They think or at least hope that science and various kinds of religious belief (and they’re quite ecumenical about what counts, though Christianity gets most attention) can be harmonized. They think there, is ultimately, no battle-to-the-death between the two. Often, they give money to people who also think this way; at least as often, they give money to people who don’t but who are interested in some of the other “Big Questions” they care about. Like Ammonius, they have a pretty good track record for giving money, and then letting the results turn out as they may.

    Now, if you think science and religion are ultimately at war, and that religion is a bad thing that should have gone away a long time ago, then you probably should at least feel a little bit guilty about taking Templeton money. But if you think reasonable people can disagree about this, and that there’s no harm in someone’s trying to harmonize contemporary science and some forms of religious belief; then, even if you are highly skeptical about religion, personally, you shouldn’t feel too badly about taking Templeton money.

    In other words, Dan Dennett should have qualms (and of course he does), and Thomas Nagel shouldn’t (and, I think, he doesn’t).

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