In her contribution to Portraits of American Philosophy, she writes:

A way of understanding what philosophy is came to seem to me increasingly plausible.  I had already come to think that philosophy consists in a battery of problems; back at Barnard again, I came to think that the main, central problems consist in efforts to explain what makes certain pre-philosophical, or nonphilosophical, beliefs true. Which beliefs?  Philosophers differ in their interests, but the ones that have interested philosophers, generally, in generation after generation, are those that we rely on in ordinary life.  Not surprisingly, it was Moore, not Wittgenstein, who struck me as the leader.  (I suspect that I could have said Aristotle instead of Moore.)  I still think that way of undersanding what philosophy is roughly right.  (p. 54)

A view like this probably accounts for the generally conservative cast of most Anglophone philosophy in the past century.