34 responses to “Gender balance on APA committees”

1. Steven

   June 29, 2015 at 8:18 am

   This is, I take it, just more evidence of the "new justice," no?

   As always, it will be amusing to watch its supporters predictably circle the wagons and try to rationalize this as they do everything else(e.g., gender-biased hiring practices, quotas for conferences and book anthologies, now maybe quotas at peer-reviewed journals too, etc.)

   This is what happens to philosophy when fascistic types rise to power: tyrannical oversight committees, ideological task forces, silly thought and discourse policing, self-serving quota systems, and so forth.

   Is there still any room left for actual philosophy and genuine meritocracy? Doesn't look like it…

   Loading…

   Reply
2. harry b

   June 29, 2015 at 10:08 am

   Am I wrong that the Board is elected? And the committees are appointed by the board? If the board is elected what is the complaint? Vote them out and replace them with people who's judgement you prefer.

   Would anybody raise the question if the ratios were reversed?

   FWIW I have served on many committees, on all of which women are overrepresented relative to their proportions in the populations from which they are drawn and on all of which (in my opinion) the average quality of their contributions exceeds that of the men (which is, in many casescommittees, already pretty high) on the committees — more diligent and (not unrelatedly) more perspicuous, on average. This just looks like the rather familiar experience that women are more willing to take on, and take seriously, additional and essential, but unglamorous and unrewarded, burdens within organizations.

   Loading…

   Reply
3. Steven

   June 29, 2015 at 10:44 am

   Just to clarify something important (since I failed to do so in my initial comment): I didn't mean to object to the way in which the Board was elected. For all I know, that was done perfectly above board. Indeed, I don't really have any reason to think it wasn't.

   What I do object to is the very existence of these sorts of committees, and the type of policies they invariably enact, and the way in which they implement them. I also object to the sort of vilification, intimidation, and coercion they and their supporters deploy the moment anyone dares to express any misgivings or opposition.

   I think there are a lot of people in the profession who are tired of being steam-rolled by initiatives like these, and I'm glad that Mr Leiter is trying to open a genuine dialogue about whether these sorts of practices deserve to continue.

   Loading…

   Reply
4. Marcus Arvan

   June 29, 2015 at 10:51 am

   I think it is a mistake to simply invoke or defer to intuitions about what is or is not fair, as Tooley and Steven (above) appear to. For a person's intuitions about what is fair may be corrupted by their own interests and/or biases. In contrast, some of us have developed rigorous, systematic analyses of fairness. For instance, I have published work arguing that a systematic extension of Rawls' conception of justice as fairness to injustices in modern democracies *entails* that members of populations who suffer historic injustice *should* have a larger say over how those injustices are rectified than bystanders or members of historically privileged populations. (http://philpapers.org/rec/ARVFST ).

   This is not "circling the wagons" to rationalize anything. It is philosophical argument, something which I wish readers like Steven would engage with rather than dismiss.

   Loading…

   Reply
5. Unremarkable Anon Grad Student

   June 29, 2015 at 11:58 am

   When one flips a coin X times, it may be the case that heads show up a many number of times in a row: 12, 20, 50 times, and so on. But as we approach infinity flips, the average result from flipping is 50% heads and 50% tails–probably much sooner than infinity!

   It might be more useful to look at the gender numbers for committees for the history of the APA to extrapolate a general trend and determine if the general trend is fair or not or within the bounds of tolerable bias, i.e., +/- a few percent.

   Barring any evidence of particular conspiracy (bias) at work and given that APA Committees were likely all male for a time in the past–I'm presuming, I don't know the history of APA committee appointments (elections?)–the current trend of a female committee member majority does not seem worrisome.

   Loading…

   Reply
6. anonymous

   June 29, 2015 at 1:15 pm

   Marcus,

   Could you please present the argument nite clearly? Take any controversial decision made by these people recently: the site visit in Colorado, together with the decision to hand the report over to the hostile administration despite the assurance that was made to the contrary; the release of documents to the CHE and the mass media that create the unsubstantiated belief that philosophy has a particular problem with sexual harassment or sexism; the pressure, employing incoherent mobs and apparently deceptive affidavits, on Northwestern to end Ludlow's career; etc. How do you argue that those decisions are just, or that we ought to allow these same people to remain in positions where they can make further decisions like this? Or are you arguing for something else (and if so, then what is it)?

   Loading…

   Reply
7. Frederick

   June 29, 2015 at 1:44 pm

   We hear many calls for gender-balance in philosophy. Does the make-up of these committees constitute such gender-balance? If yes, then gender-balance does not require numerical equivalence (or even its approximation). If no, then should we seek to make these committees gender-balanced?

   Loading…

   Reply
8. Marcus Arvan

   June 29, 2015 at 1:57 pm

   Anonymous: You would be best-served by reading the paper. All of your questions are about the justice of particular actions/decisions, something which my theory–and I think all plausible theories of justice–entail need to be settled on a case-by-case basis (though, for reasons I explain below, my theory can help identify potential problems with how decisions are made–more on this shortly).

   I was responding not to the justice of particular decisions, but to Tooley's concerns about the *composition* of APA committees–and here my theory has very clear implications. On my analysis, justice/fairness in a nonideal context is comprised by *all* individuals affected deliberating in a collective, grass-roots fashion to determine and distribute costs of rectifying past or present injustices. The short story for this is that all individuals under unjust conditions (those who suffer injustices, bystanders, and beneficiaries) of injustice all have legitimate interests, and so should have the right and opportunity to influence how the system as a whole distributes costs. However, the second, crucial part is that because past or present deviations from justice (i.e. injustices) have conferred (1) unjust benefits on some (those who have benefitted from injustice), and (2) unjust costs on others (those who have been harmed by it), it is rational from a standpoint of fairness (a "nonideal original position") to confer greater bargaining power in the collective deliberation about costs over the former (compensating those who have suffered injustice by taking some bargaining power *away* from those who have benefitted). Finally, however, this differential bargaining power needs to be proportional to the injustices received, and not exclude bystanders or beneficiaries of injustice from having some (albeit lesser) bargaining power.

   Long story short, justice in nonideal conditions requires affording those causally harmed by injustice with greater bargaining power in responding to it. Next, if you believe–as I, and many others, do–that women have historically (and still presently) faced a variety of occupational injustices (I, for one, have seen some of these injustices firsthand–it follows that women in the profession should have greater bargaining power in rectifying those injustices.

   That's the theory in a nutshell, and I think it's right. I think it is based in rigorous argument, and coheres with everyday intuitions about rectification (viz. "sorry, if you were handed too many cookies last time, you get fewer cookies this time"). Perhaps your concerns are that the power differential has been skewed *too* far in the direction of compensating women in the discipline for the injustices they have faced–and indeed, this seems to be what your remarks suggest. But that, my theory holds, is a conversation to *have* (viz. "has the profession over-compensated for injustice?", not one to simply assert. You are entirely free, on my theory, to argue that over-compensation has occurred. But what you are not entitled to say, on my theory, is that it is straightforwardly unfair or unjust to provide bargaining power to those who have suffered injustice…and this was what Tooley's and Steven's remarks appear to me to do.

   Loading…

   Reply
9. Anonymous

   June 29, 2015 at 2:04 pm

   I presume that Marcus Arvan appreciates that the narrative of 'social injustice' concerning women in philosophy is under dispute. Is it true that the Philosophers' Cocoon recently asked his readers to submit data on job market experience and, despite the requests of those contributing, refused to collect data on gender? If so, one wonders about the value of research that both plumps for a political cause and refuses to collect some of the data needed to justify that cause. I hope it is clear I mean to assign no malicious intent to Arvan. But I find it genuinely puzzling that we seem to be told both that there's 'social injustice' afoot, and that we don't need to worry about collecting data to evaluate that claim.

   Loading…

   Reply
10. anonymous

    June 29, 2015 at 2:39 pm

    Hi, Marcus. I'm commenter 6, but not commenter 9.

    I agree with commenter 9 that the application of your theory to this case depends on contended empirical and comparative questions about past injustice. But that's not the point I want to press here.

    Instead, I want to examine your cookie analogy. I agree that, if someone gets less than her fair share of cookies one time, then she should (ceteris paribus) get more cookies next time to even up the overall distribution. But that's not what's happening in this case.

    Let's look at three modifications.

    Modification 1: your mother got fewer cookies when she was your age. So now you get more cookies than your neighbor's father.

    This is trickier, but it seems pretty fair if the disadvantages and advantages of having cookies passes to the next generation.

    But not this:

    Modification 2: your mother got fewer cookies than your neighbor's father. So your female neighbor gets more cookies than you, since people of your sex were in an advantageous position in your parents' day.

    But what you're proposing seems even more implausible.

    Modification 3: your mother got screwed over in the cookie distribution, while your female neighbor's father profited unfairly and passed some benefits on to you. So let's rectify things by giving your neighbor more of a voice in the redistribution discussions than you have. You missed your turn, which never happened in your lifetime. Your neighbor's father took your turn for you, and now you have to pay the price by losing your otherwise due influence.

    That's fairness?

    Loading…

    Reply
11. anonymous

    June 29, 2015 at 2:41 pm

    Sorry, #3 should read that your neighbor's father passed on the benefits to your neighbor, so that your neighbor gets an even greater benefit now.

    Loading…

    Reply
12. David Mathers

    June 29, 2015 at 3:00 pm

    Well said Marcus Arvan: I'm not sure whether or not I'd agree with your view, not having time to read your paper in detail, but your right to call out people's lazy assumption that your view is obviously beyond the pale.

    Loading…

    Reply
13. Yet Another Anon Grad Student

    June 29, 2015 at 3:04 pm

    I second BL's sentiment that it is not the gender disparity itself that should concern us, but the track records and questionable decisions of the individuals on the committee. For instance, there was some discussion over at PMMB about how the use of number of schools that avail themselves of the APA site visit as a measure for success in combating sexual harassment being "little more than a power grab"(http://philosophymetametablog.blogspot.com/2015/06/june-mugs.html). I was wondering if people can identify the specific individuals with questionable track records that we should be worried about.

    BL COMMENT: If anyone is going to name names, then they will have to sign their name to it; there will not be anonymous or pseudonymous criticisms of named individuals.

    Loading…

    Reply
14. Marcus Arvan

    June 29, 2015 at 6:09 pm

    Anonymous #10: Thanks for your query. However, I do not think the kinds of toy cases you raise are apt, and for two reasons.

    First, as a few commenters have noted, it is a matter of dispute whether the situation of women in philosophy satisfy any of the cases, or whether women continue to face injustices today. I am among those who believe that injustices in the discipline did not just happen to the "mothers" of women philosophers today, but indeed, continue to happen today. But again, this is a complex empirical issue we cannot settle here.

    Second, and more importantly, I think toy cases are a bad methodology for social and political philosophy, and *especially* here, as real-world injustices are nowhere near as self-contained as toy cases. Rather, real-world injustices are causally diffuse, imposing all kinds of costs on people, including bystanders and the descendants of past injustices. Allow me to explain using one example. Suppose injustices against women occurred in philosophy in the past, and that those injustices explain at least in part the underrepresentation of women in the discipline today (another empirical issue we cannot settle here, but bear with me). Might that underrepresentation–caused by earlier injustices–still impose costs on women in the discipline today, costs which are the *fruit* of injustice and therefore warranting rectification? Although again this is a fraught empirical issue, there are all kinds of plausible costs that might be the fruit of those earlier injustices–costs that cannot be rectified without imposing costs on others (which is why, I argue, fairness requires us all to deliberate together on the right way to distribute them). Allow me to give one plausible cost.

    Kieran Healy has compiled citation data (http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2015/02/healey-and-blooms-citation-data.html ) indicating that top-cited articles by men in four top-ranked journals are cited far more than top-cited articles by women. Why might this be? We can only speculate–but here's a prima facie plausible explanation: the work of superstar men gets cited far more than the work of superstar women because we are still (as a result of past and/or present injustice) a male-dominated discipline. If that's the case, then even though the (blatant) injustice occurred in the past, its unjust effects are still felt today, requiring rectification. And this is just one example. There are many other plausible downstream costs of past injustices (including, indeed, costs like this very blog thread, setting up committees and programs to rectify injustice, having to defend them against people–like Tooley, and Steven–who regard them as unfair. These are all costs, and plausibly the causal result of earlier injustices, if not–as I suspect–present ones as well).

    This is why I don't think toy cases are helpful. In toy cases, one can specify precisely who is wronged, what it would take to rectify the wrong, and rectify it without any costs on third-parties (i.e. externalities). Real world justice just ain't like this. It's far more complex–and a good theory of how to fairly, and justly, respond to injustice should deal with the complexities, not abstract away from them.

    Loading…

    Reply
15. still more random grad students

    June 29, 2015 at 7:05 pm

    Marcus, please note that you have not given an explanation where you say you have. The discipline being male-dominated does not actually explain why superstar men would be cited more than superstar women unless you build a lot into your concept of "domination" (more, e.g., than mere statistics). Note also that many of the *actual* explanations given rely on empirical theories (often from highly politicized fields like social psychology) that are just as contested as the "facts on the ground" in professional philosophy.

    Loading…

    Reply
16. Marcus Arvan

    June 29, 2015 at 7:55 pm

    still more graduate students: I did not purport to give an "explanation" of anything. Rather, I noted that the question of whether and to what extent injustice has occurred is a complex issue, as are the causal effects thereof. My point in this thread was *not* to assert the existence of injustice, it's downstream effects, etc. Quite the contrary, I have noted throughout that these are controversial issues. My argument has merely been that one cannot validly assert or infer–as Tooley, Steven, and others assert/infer–that the disproportionate composition of APA committees is unfair from the mere fact that they are disproportionately comprised. Indeed, my point is that a lot more empirical and normative work needs to be done before one can confidently make such assertions.

    Loading…

    Reply
17. cheshire calhoun

    June 29, 2015 at 8:05 pm

    I would like to take this opportunity to clarify how APA governance works and to encourage those interested in serving on APA committees or as the at-large board member to self nominate.

    All members are annually invited to nominate (including self-nominate) individuals to serve on the APA committees. The nomination process is from September 15 to October 31. The committees are also strongly encouraged to submit nominations for their open positions. Those nominees and their supporting documents are then reviewed by the committee on committees, which compiles a slate of recommended individuals to fill committee vacancies. The Board votes on the slate at its November board meeting. In my limited experience, the Board approves the slate as recommended by the committee on committees. I strongly encourage anyone interested in serving to self-nominate. As you might imagine, finding a sufficient number of individuals willing to devote their time and energy to serving the APA is sometimes difficult. Information about the nominations process may be found here: http://www.apaonline.org/?page=nominations

    Some task forces are the result of petitions signed by members of the APA to create a taskforce. That was the case with the committee on a code of conduct. For task forces, the selection of the membership is up to the chair of the board of officers. For the code of conduct task force, I consulted both the board vice-chair and the appointed chair of the taskforce and took into consideration such things as—involvement in the original petition for such a code, higher administrative experience (and thus familiarity with professional conduct issues at university/college level), racial and gender diversity, experience on the site visit team, legal training, philosophical work on related issues, service on the committee on the status and future of the profession.

    Membership on the board of officers is determined by the APA bylaws. As Michael Tooley’s helpful chart indicates many of these positions are a matter of divisional elections; the members-at-large are elected by APA members generally. The chairs of the standing committees are appointed from those who have gone through the regular nomination process which is open to all members.

    In short, if you are unhappy with those individuals currently serving you, I encourage you to get involved in the APA process: nominate individuals for president and vice-president, nominate individuals for committee service, vote in elections. You have many ways of having your voice heard. Speak with your divisional representative, who is empowered to put issues on the board agenda. Petition the APA to take up an issue (you will need the signatures of at least 50 APA regular members), seek out service and leadership positions in the APA. I am grateful to all of those members who have been willing to donate their time and energy—sometimes a great deal of time and energy—to the many important activities of our professional society.

    Loading…

    Reply
18. anonymous

    June 29, 2015 at 9:08 pm

    This is lowercase a anonymous again.

    @Marcus Arvan: you began by wondering why people aren't addressing your argument. That argument, it now seems, is as follows: While there are scraps of evidence pointing in all kinds of directions, you have chosen to be moved by evidence that points toward systematic inequality against women, though you admit this is contentious. You then move from that controversial starting assumption to the conclusion that, notwithstanding their prior actions, we should allow some of the most powerful women in the profession to have a disproportionately high influence in policymaking. And the logic that gets you from your controversial premise to the conclusion is so abstruse that you cannot articulate it other than to say that it trades on an understanding of inequality so refined that we must dispense with analogous reasoning in coming to grips with it: examples and thought experiments simply cannot do it justice. One must simply grasp it without the aid of mere, vulgar analytic reasoning from familiar cases.

    I think your question now answers itself. The reason people are not addressing your argument, to the extent that it is an argument, is that such arguments are only effective with those antecedently convinced of your conclusion.

    @Cheshire Calhoun: thank you for your thoughtful and helpful comment. Like your recent press release in which you made clear that we really have no idea whether there's a comparatively serious sexual harassment problem in philosophy but ought to take the prospect seriously, I found your comment here a breath of fresh air. It's comforting to know that a prominent member of the APA is interested in proceeding sensibly, openly, and reasonably with all these issues. Perhaps, next year, it well be possible to say the same for many more of the APA board members. At present, you seem to stand out as a non-alarmist with your eye to a powerful future for the APA, while so many others seem ready to burn our house down on the off chance there's a cockroach infestation.

    BL COMMENT: I also appreciate Prof. Calhoun's informative contribution to this thread. But may I observe that the "comparative" question about sexual harassment is not really relevant: academic philosophy has a sexual harassment problem, and whether it is worse or better than other fields is neither here nor there.

    Loading…

    Reply
19. Marcus Arvan

    June 29, 2015 at 9:36 pm

    lowercase anonymous: I have not made any of the argumentative claims you just listed. I have not claimed that we should be moved by any particular strands of evidence for or against systematic, unjust inequality. Although I personally believe such inequality exists, it in no way factors into my argument, which was simply that one cannot derive the conclusion that X is unfair from the proposition that X is disproportionate. I merely gave *possible* examples of the way in which past injustices can give rise to diffuse costs to illustrate the argument that one cannot derive unfairness from disproportionate composition of APA committees alone–and I admitted throughout that it is a complex empirical issue whether and to what extent unjust inequality exists or past inequality has causally downstream effects on the present exist. The argument, again, does not presuppose that these things exist. It is that one must know whether or not they exist *before* one can validly infer that the disproportionate numbers Tooley points to are unfair. It would be nice to have the argument taken as it has been presented, rather than distorted.

    Loading…

    Reply
20. still more random grad students

    June 29, 2015 at 9:36 pm

    Marcus: the explanation which I took you to be giving, and which I was talking about, came after the phrase "here's a prima facie plausible explanation". What I wrote above was, I think, a fairly clear summary of why I felt that, even if it was prima facie plausible, it was not an explanation.

    Loading…

    Reply
21. John Gardner

    June 30, 2015 at 7:34 am

    Marcus Arvan goes on a lot about complex empirical questions. But the empirical questions arise only because of the norms of justice that make them relevant. And on this front it is not clear what Marcus is offering us. He says that his position is 'based in rigorous argument' but is also 'a systematic extension of Rawls' conception of justice as fairness'. I will be interested to see how he makes a rigorous argument for favouring that particular conception, rife as it is with instability. I will also be interested to see how he navigates his way rigorously through the complexity of the data if he is not willing to say, in response to anonymous 02:39's hypotheticals, what some of the relevant norms of justice are. I agree with his suspicious attitude towards what he calls 'toy cases'. But notice that anonymous 02:39's 'toy cases' were only used as an invitation to Marcus to say what relevant norms of justice he favours, and why any of us should be inclined to follow him in favouring them. Marcus declined the invitation. So should I sign up for his various announced positions (e.g. those about the suitability for compensation of some underspecified institutional disadvantages) just on the basis of his implicit claim that he is more expert about justice than the rest of us? I read his paper via the link he supplied, and couldn't see why anyone who laughs at Rawls's original position should not also laugh at Marcus's clever and interesting development of it, which mainly helps to show how unstable the Rawlsian conception of justice is, and why we should not try to extend it so much as abandon it.

    Getting back on the original topic: Three cheers for Cheshire Calhoun. She patiently gives reasonable answers to Michael Tooley's rather tendentious questions. She gets my vote.

    Loading…

    Reply
22. anonymous

    June 30, 2015 at 8:13 am

    @Marcus:

    If all you're arguing for is that there are logically possible circumstances in which a committee consists of more As than Bs and in which the Bs have not thereby been treated unfairly, then I think all just grant your conclusion.

    But in that case, your remark on your initial comment (4) that Steven (3) ought to have engaged with your argument is very weird. Steven, as you can see, never contested what you now say was your claim. Instead, Steven only spoke against the existence of such committees themselves, whatever their composition, the policies they enact, their methods, and the way their supporters vilify, intimidate and coerce others.

    I don't see how Steven can be said to have dismissed the argument you now say you were referring to.

    Loading…

    Reply
23. Onionymous

    June 30, 2015 at 10:44 am

    Marcus Arvan, from the premise "…. that top-cited articles by men in four top-ranked journals are cited far more than top-cited articles by women", you infer "… even though the (blatant) injustice occurred in the past, its unjust effects are still felt today, requiring rectification".

    Call this (A): Disproportionate composition implies unfairness.

    Next, you also say, "one cannot validly assert or infer–as Tooley, Steven, and others assert/infer–that the disproportionate composition of APA committees is unfair from the mere fact that they are disproportionately comprised".

    Call this (B): Disproportionate composition does not imply unfairness.

    Do you agree that the claims (A) and (B) are inconsistent?

    Loading…

    Reply
24. Marcus Arvan

    June 30, 2015 at 11:14 am

    John Gardner: One can of course laugh at Rawls' conception and theory of justice, and claim (without argument) that it is rife with instability. However, it happens to be the single most influential theory of justice in contemporary political philosophy–one that a very large number of people take very seriously and have defended at great length. And, if my extension of it to the nonideal realm is correct, that means that the most influential conception of justice in contemporary philosophy has implications you may not like. I leave it to readers to decide. In any case, I'm glad you found my development of it clever and interesting.

    Loading…

    Reply
25. Marcus Arvan

    June 30, 2015 at 12:17 pm

    Oniononymous: Your write, "Marcus Arvan, from the premise "…. that top-cited articles by men in four top-ranked journals are cited far more than top-cited articles by women", you infer "… even though the (blatant) injustice occurred in the past, its unjust effects are still felt today, requiring rectification".

    Call this (A): Disproportionate composition implies unfairness."

    I *never* inferred this. I said, "One can only speculate…", and then noted that it *possible* that the right explanation of differential citation-rates is explained by previous injustice. This is not inferring that disproportionate composition implies unfairness. It is holding that disproportionate composition caused by *injustice* implies unfairness, which is obviously true. I then left it an open empirical issue whether injustice indeed occurred in the past, and whether it is responsible for differential citation-rates. As such, I never affirmed (A), and frankly, it is a bit frustrating to repeatedly see my arguments misconstrued.

    Loading…

    Reply
26. anonymous

    June 30, 2015 at 1:58 pm

    @Marcus:

    All due respect, but your repeated insistence that you're presenting cogent arguments that we're misconstruing is wearing pretty thin at this point. We're trying our damnedest to find an argument in what you're saying that's both plausible and relevant.you just aren't being very helpful. If you've got an argument here that we're missing, please just give us the premises and the conclusion. Thanks.

    By the way, Oniononymous is making an objection that deserves more serious attention. If you can speculate meaningfully about the injustice in the more citations of men's articles, then Tooley can speculate just as meaningfully about injustice in having women on these committees in a far higher proportion than their relative numbers in the profession, particularly given the track record of many of them. If you think there's a non-question-begging distinction between those cases, great. Let's discuss that. But it really adds nothing to your case for your to keep insisting that we are ducking your amazing but mysterious argument and deliberately misconstruing you. Lay out your premises clearly and tell us what your conclusion actually is, and we'll see who gets it wrong then. We're trying our best here.

    Loading…

    Reply
27. p

    July 1, 2015 at 9:24 pm

    I am not sure what exactly is problematic here. I have a feeling that if the ratios were inverted, nobody would care. But that seems irrelevant anyway. Assuming that these are all adult human beings, equally capable of exercising their own agency and all qualified philosophers with deep interested and commitment to the issues that are in the committee's purview – why should I care if they are male or female? I can imagine I would but it's not the case that there are no male or no females (which would be a bit odd given that we have two genders). And it's not the case that either gender is represented only in a token way. The fact that the ratios do not track the ratios in the philosophy as a field is not so bad given that that ratio itself is not desirable and we all want it to be more reflective of the gender ratio in population at large.

    Loading…

    Reply
28. Frank O'File

    July 2, 2015 at 6:20 am

    Isn't the least extravagant explanation of the lack of men in these roles that there's simply a pipeline problem?

    Loading…

    Reply
29. Marcus Arvan

    July 2, 2015 at 11:41 am

    anonymous: You say, "your repeated insistence that you're presenting cogent arguments that we're misconstruing is wearing pretty thin at this point." Alas, I have not insisted upon anything. I have shown, in clear and no uncertain terms, how my arguments have been misconstrued.

    My arguments have never been that Tooley or anyone else cannot "speculate meaningfully" about injustice. My argument has simply been a negative one: that one cannot derive the conclusion that 'X is unjust' from the proposition that 'X is disproportionate.' My argument is that one must first know whether injustice has occurred, for if it has, then those who have suffered it are owed disproportionate representation (at least, according to my analysis of fairness in nonideal conditions). Tooley's remarks imply that he thinks we can infer from the mere fact that APA committees are disproportionate that there is something wrong with it. This is all I have denied, and I have done so consistently from the beginning. Whether or not there is injustice is one direction or the other is another issue, and, although I have speculated on injustices I believe exist, it has no bearing on the negative point, which (again) is that one cannot validly infer unfairness from mere disproportionalism. One must know (A) whether injustice has occured, and (B) if it has, then disproportionate composition is not wrong.

    Loading…

    Reply
30. John Gardner

    July 2, 2015 at 12:34 pm

    Look Marcus, you're making an unfortunate impression on many people here, and I'm not the first to try and point that out to you. You repeatedly make it sound like you think your work is the breakthrough, the key to revealing some hitherto unnoticed truth about justice. Well maybe it is. But not THIS point about justice. We don't need your work to teach us that the balance of women v men on a committee, or in citations, or anywhere else, does not per se constitute an injustice. Whether it constitutes an injustice depends, obviously, on how the balance came about. We all know that. But we also know that when such imbalances are conspicuous, it is reasonable to ASK WHETHER there has been an injustice. That's why Cheshire's clear answer to Michael Tooley is just what we needed to clear the matter up adequately: it explains why the gender balances on APA committees are as they are in a way that is consistent with there having been no injustice. As I said before, the problem with Michael's questions is not that they are misplaced but that they are tendentiously expressed, i.e. they are expressed in such a way as to invite us to draw the conclusion that they has been an injustice without waiting for Cheshire's justice-consistent explanation. Again, we don't need your work – fine though it is from my brief acquaintance with it – to explain what is wrong with tendentiousness.

    Loading…

    Reply
31. still more random grad students

    July 2, 2015 at 2:04 pm

    Wait, did people think Tooley was seriously suggesting this breakdown was unjust? I must not have been reading closely enough. Surely Tooley's intent was entirely satirical (of e.g. the GCC and the site visit to which he and his department were subjected – note that some of the names listed here crop up in that story as well). I think it's possible Tooley was suggesting, as Steven in the first comment did, that this breakdown was scary given what we know about these individuals, but their (largely) being women is not one of the pertinent facts in that regard, and I don't think Tooley thought it was either.

    Loading…

    Reply
32. anonymous

    July 2, 2015 at 5:10 pm

    Agreed, still more random grad student. It seemed to be a funny dig at the seemingly hypocritical tension between the GCC and the composition of these committees, relative to the proportion of women in the profession (and hence from the pool from which members were drawn).

    Brian Leiter himself, in the OP, made clear that the worrisome issue is not the gender distribution but rather the track record of the particular members. I certainly don't think anyone in this thread or elsewhere was *seriously* suggesting that the makeup of the committees itself entails that the board members who appointed the committee members are sexist (though that might of course follow from other things we know about them).

    Loading…

    Reply
33. anon

    July 4, 2015 at 9:33 am

    I would like to point out the silence at the Feminist Philosophers blog on the issue debated in this thread. They must realise that their power grab is indefensible.

    BL COMMENT: In general, I think inferences from this kind of silence are not particularly warranted.

    Loading…

    Reply
34. tired

    July 4, 2015 at 9:37 am

    "Assuming that these are all adult human beings, equally capable of exercising their own agency and all qualified philosophers with deep interested and commitment to the issues that are in the committee's purview – why should I care if they are male or female?"

    Amen. Except that such a view is now beyond the pale. We must give quotas to whoever complains the loudest and can file the highest number of bogus harassment accusations.

    Loading…

    Reply