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20 “Most Important” Philosophers of Mind since WWII

So with not quite 340 votes in our latest poll, here's the top 20:

1. Jerry Fodor  (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices)
2. Daniel Dennett  loses to Jerry Fodor by 123–93
3. Hilary Putnam  loses to Jerry Fodor by 137–85, loses to Daniel Dennett by 117–110
4. David Chalmers  loses to Jerry Fodor by 143–92, loses to Hilary Putnam by 124–112
5. Donald Davidson  loses to Jerry Fodor by 141–72, loses to David Chalmers by 132–98
6. Gilbert Ryle  loses to Jerry Fodor by 157–69, loses to Donald Davidson by 103–100
7. Thomas Nagel  loses to Jerry Fodor by 153–65, loses to Gilbert Ryle by 108–101
8. John Searle  loses to Jerry Fodor by 162–56, loses to Thomas Nagel by 109–95
9. Ned Block  loses to Jerry Fodor by 167–44, loses to John Searle by 113–93
10. Noam Chomsky  loses to Jerry Fodor by 156–55, loses to Ned Block by 102–99
11. David K. Lewis  loses to Jerry Fodor by 160–47, loses to Noam Chomsky by 101–93
12. Fred Dretske  loses to Jerry Fodor by 171–37, loses to David K. Lewis by 95–90
13. Jaegwon Kim  loses to Jerry Fodor by 170–39, loses to Fred Dretske by 92–84
14. Frank Jackson  loses to Jerry Fodor by 171–36, loses to Jaegwon Kim by 91–82
15. Tyler Burge  loses to Jerry Fodor by 173–36, loses to Frank Jackson by 90–86
16. David Armstrong  loses to Jerry Fodor by 171–36, loses to Tyler Burge by 93–75
17. Paul Churchland  loses to Jerry Fodor by 181–30, loses to David Armstrong by 88–85
18. Wilfrid Sellars  loses to Jerry Fodor by 172–37, loses to Paul Churchland by 93–83
19. G.E.M. Anscombe  loses to Jerry Fodor by 166–48, loses to Wilfrid Sellars by 93–75
20. Patricia Churchland  loses to Jerry Fodor by 179–34, loses to G.E.M. Anscombe by 99–93

The top ten still living philosophers of mind from this poll are Fodor, Dennett, Putnam, Chalmers, Nagel, Searle, Block, Chomsky, Kim, and Jackson, and Burge.

I confess to being surprised that Ruth Millikan and Stephen Stich were not in the "top 20," they were just a bit outside.  I would not have expected such a strong showing for Ryle, whose views, I thought, had aged badly.  

Thoughts from readers about what this reveals about the sociology of the profession and/or the philosophical interst of the results?

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27 responses to “20 “Most Important” Philosophers of Mind since WWII”

  1. Unless this is an indirect way of breaking a major piece of news, Dennett should also be on the "still living" list, displacing Burge from the top ten.

    BL COMMENT: Indeed, apologies to Prof. Dennett!

  2. Millikan's absence is indeed an unwelcome surprise. I would certainly place her above both Churchlands, Armstrong, Burge and Kim.

    Much less surprising, though no less unwelcome, is the high placing of John Searle. Of course The Chinese Room sparked a huge literature, but he is not a first-rate philosopher of mind! (I have witnessed many senior philosophers of mind rolling their eyes in exasperation during his talks.) He is also an example of how not to conduct philosophy in person – unreceptive and dismissive of the comments of others, needlessly combative.

    I am also surprised that McDowell didn't crack the top 20. I am not sure the influence he has had on philosophy has always been positive. (There are far too many papers published that are footnotes to McDowell, often written in a sludgy imitation of his prose style.) Nevertheless, he has had an undeniably large influence. Mind and World is clearly massively important and original and is probably the single book by anyone on this list that I would bet on as most likely to be read in 100 years time.

  3. Younger philosopher of mind

    This list may well have a certain philosophical significance (many of these figures are truly great philosophers, and we would do well to recognize their contributions), but I fear that the list might actually be a little bit misleading when it comes to the task of trying to get a sense of what philosophy of mind is up to today.

    Most of the figures on this list were concerned primarily with issues in what might be described, broadly speaking, as the metaphysics of mind. By contrast, among younger philosophers working on questions about the mind today, the dominant research program is an attempt to understand how various specific aspects of the mind actually work. Hence, many younger philosophers might admire the contributions of these figures, but it is not as though contemporary work on the topic is dominated by an attempt to continue addressing questions that lie on the same basic path these earlier philosophers originally explored.

    (The situation in the philosophy of language, of course, has been strikingly similar, with younger philosophers focusing especially on questions about how various aspects of language actually work – often in ways that are not very closely connected with the topics that dominated philosophy of language a number of decades ago.)

  4. I wonder how many of these votes come simply because people are well known rather than actually important.

  5. The correction in response to David Wallace's point is of course proper, but now it looks like an indirect way of breaking the major news of Burge's death.

  6. lowly grad student

    I basically agree with Post Doc. Surprised by the poor showing of Millikan and McDowell, although not surprised by the high placing of Searle. Intentionality is both a good and influential book, and The Rediscovery of the Mind and some of his other work is at least cited a lot. So his contribution isn't just The Chinese Room. I had also guessed Evans would have placed higher, as he seems to be one of the few people everyone in the profession can agree about.

    I was rather pleasantly surprised by the strong showing of Ryle. I think Stanley and Williamson may have inadvertently kicked off a bit of a Ryle renaissance.

    One serious omission is Richard Moran. Authority and Estrangement is one of the best books in the philosophy of mind period, and has been very influential. I'm not sure he would have made the top 20, but he should have made the list.

  7. Would it not be preferable to have a poll for the best philosophers of mind – and for the best epistemologists, etc. – rather than for the most important ones? 'Most important' seems to conflate being influential and being good.

    BL COMMENT: I take your point, and maybe I'll try that for another area.

  8. Some of the negative comments about Searle are misplaced. Some of his work lacks precision, yes, but there is very good work in several places. His book on Intentionality, The Chinese Room, Speech Acts, his reply to Kripke on reference, are all important. He has won the National Humanities Medal, and also teaching awards.

    http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/12/01_searle.shtml

  9. Where is Jack Smart?

    BL COMMENT: He was in the poll, did not make the top 20, I forget exactly where he landed–close, I think.

  10. Millikan's the most starkly inexplicable absence from this list, but I'm also weirded out badly by the absence of Andy Clark. Didn't his paper with Chalmers sort of kick off the whole "triple E" approach to these topics that's now the topic of about half the dissertations I ever hear about?

  11. Full results are at http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/results.pl?id=E_00fa106f4c4030b3 (Smart is #21, Millikan is #22, Clark is #27).

  12. I was surprised by some omissions from the poll as a whole. Kripke would probably have placed very high. Austin might have made the top 20. A number of other notable philosophers of perception are missing, e.g. Kathleen Akins, Bill Brewer, Alex Byrne, Mark Johnston, Howard Robinson. Also the list seemed light on living UK-based philosophers (e.g. Quassim Cassam, Jane Heal, Scott Sturgeon, Charles Travis) and Europeans writing in English (e.g. Thomas Metzinger, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Francois Recanati). Also Bealer and Brandom, among others.

    BL COMMENT: Some of these folks aren't over 50, and some do not seem to be primarily philosophers of mind. Some, however, were omissions, though I don't think any would have made the top 20.

  13. Isn't it fitting that Gareth Evans and John McDowell are tied at #23 …

  14. Hard to argue against the contemporary importance of these figures (with the possible exception of Gilbert Ryle). But without making a judgement about whether they should displace anybody (or who), here are some other people who have had a huge influence: Merleau-Ponty (younger than Ryle though he died young), Place, Smart, Austin (as good as Ryle and less prone to making silly mistakes), Strawson, Evans, Charles Taylor, Brian O'Shaughnessy (completely crazy, but laser sharp and very influential still, though not often acknowledged by name), Chris Peacocke, Ruth Millikan (of course!), Larry Hardin, Ronnie de Sousa (his work on emotion has been remarkably durable), Colin McGinn, Michael Tye, Andy Clark. (I feel sheepish that my list of the overlooked includes only one woman, Ruth Millikan, and she is not overlooked in the comment section. Can somebody help me out? For the record, I think Anscombe and Pat Churchland deserve to be higher in the ranking.)

    BL COMMENT: Several of these people were in the poll, but did not make the top 20. Merleau-Ponty is, of course, not an Anglophone philosopher of mind!

  15. Mohan's little helper

    To name just one overlooked woman: Lynne Baker was not in the poll, despite being an extremely important voice in the debate about folk psychology that helped propel several men (plus Patricia Churchland) to the top 20.

    BL COMMENT: That was an error of omission, good point.

  16. Yes, O'Shaughnessy is a very good shout! I have a sneaky feeling that his pair of mighty tomes will also still be read in 100 years time – perhaps because they make so few references to any other contemporary philosophers of mind!

  17. Thanks "little helper" for Lynne Baker! Good call.

    Brian, you didn't say anglophone. Is that the default assumption here?!

    BL COMMENT: The poll was explicitly limited to Anglophone philosophers of mind–see the original post and the poll itself.

  18. What a sad state philosophy of mind is in if Daniel Dennett is the second most influential person–though, he's slightly more competent than the Churchlands, but that is not saying much. Indeed, it's even more sad for philosophy of mind that the Churchlands are in the top 100 philosophers of mind.

    Finally, I was a little surprised to see that Richard Swinburne and Saul Kripke were omitted from the list. Which isn't to say I agree with them, but they are influential dualists nonetheless.

  19. Dear UG, Very good point about Kripke, less good about Swinburne whose dualism is more under the influence than influential. I'm not questioning his brilliance, merely his originality in this area.

    I have to say I am a little (OK, more than a little) shocked to hear you question the "competence" of Dennett and the Churchlands. Really??—it makes me think that UG might actually stand for what we usually think it stands for. It's appalling to dismiss these truly important and influential figures in this cavalier way. It's hard to know where to stop when I start counting up what they have contributed to contemporary discussions of the mind . . . and even if you think that each of these contributions is off the wall, they have enormously enriched the discussion and subsequent understanding of the mind.

  20. Mohan: point taken on Swinburne.

    As for the second comment: when a person denies that there is such thing as real, genuine, consciousness, we call them crazy and dismiss them. When they do this under the guise of philosophy we call them influential–or Dennett or Churchland. I don't mean to question the influence of those philosophers, but their reasoning is exceptionally poor (e.g. "neuroscience won't reveal that there are propositional attitudes, …so I guess there aren't propositional attitudes!").

  21. You can call Dennett and the Churchlands crazy if you like, UG. That's different from questioning their competence. In the first place, both Dennett and the Churchlands have contributed oodles more than the denial of consciousness. And secondly, what they say is a good bit more nuanced than you give them credit for. I don't think the Churchlands deny consciousness; they just think that neuroscience doesn't treat it as the unitary phenomenon that "folk psychology" makes of it. Dennett's heterophenomenology comes closer, I guess—he's never quite shaken free of his teacher, Ryle—but doesn't actually get there. Both the Churchlands and Dennett allow propositional attitudes, though they take a deflationary, pragmatist view of them.

    Let me just say this. If you knew and had spent time with these people, and if you are an open and generous person, you wouldn't dismiss them so lightly. They are polymaths, who have had huge influence not just in philosophy but in the sciences and in popular culture. Just take Dennett's contribution to Cheney and Seyfarth's project on monkey communication, or Paul's work on connectionism, or Pat's collaboration with people like Francis Crick and V. S. Ramachandran. Or take Dennett's magnificent argument with Lewontin. Or Pat's shrewdly undermining work on free will and morals. They are not the kind of shill who privately prints books and mails them around the world in the hope that they'll become famous. They are no nine-day wonders. Come on: show some respect for a level of achievement most of us can only aspire to.

  22. Point taken: they are incompetent in regards to consciousness. (I wouldn't say that eliminitivism is a "contribution" to philosophy. Again, if someone says this in real life, we throw them in an asylum, if they say it as a philosopher we admire their "brilliance." What a sorry state Phil. Of mind is in if those views on consciousness are taken seriously.)

  23. UG, if a random person on the street said that consciousness is fundamental we would also think they are crazy. Similarly for many prominent ethical positions (e.g. some of Singer's work). This hardly shows that these philosophers are incompetent.

  24. UG: Paul Churchland isn't an eliminativist about consciousness. He's an identity theorist.

    Point being: if you're going to dismiss someone's work based on their position concerning x, then you should at least take the time to like…you know…understand what their actual position concerning x is.

  25. I'm aware of that (though, Singer might be included on the list with Dennett and Churchland). My judgment of Dennett is (mostly) predicated on his unjustly celebrated "Consciousness Explained" it isn't merely because he has a bizarre, silly, and obviously false position.

  26. Some Other Person

    "Of course The Chinese Room sparked a huge literature, but he is not a first-rate philosopher of mind! (I have witnessed many senior philosophers of mind rolling their eyes in exasperation during his talks.)"

    Not good evidence for why someone is not "first rate", and a troubling endorsement of behaviour which is not conducive to productive and collegial discourse. The sort of behaviour and culture that makes philosophy unappealing to many.

  27. Some Other Person,

    I agree that that's not good evidence of someone's not being first rate.

    I hope your second comment isn't, as I half suspect, an endorsement of the 'New Consensus' or 'no-bullying' school of thought, whose members routinely dismiss views and specific philosophers THEY don't like by rolling their eyes at each other at conferences and then again to everyone else about it on blogs and Facebook, and who then take eye-rolling to a whole new level by boycotting or attempting to 'dispel' the people they don't like. That certainly is behavior and culture that makes philosophy unappealing to many. By contrast, I don't know of anyone who has decided to stop pursuing philosophy because some audience members at a Searle talk rolled their eyes at his making points they feel were long ago refuted.

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