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A few comments on the legal and political significance of the death of Justice Scalia

In no particular order:

1.  Justice Scalia was not, in my judgment, the most "conservative" member of the current U.S. Supreme Court.  He was out-flanked on the right by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.  (UPDATE:  I'm amused to see that the NYT has published a chart based on an 'empirical' study that confirms what was admittedly my anecdotal impression based on reading cases.)

2.  His most distinctive view–that the original public meaning (not intention of the framers) of the Constitution determines its application–has been adopted by almost no one in the judiciary, though he did succeed in making references to original meaning much more fashionable, even among liberals.  (Citations to old dictionaries, as evidence of original public meaning, are now standard in court opinions, whereas they were infrequent at best thirty years ago.) He was more consistently committed to this view than most proponents of a "theory of interpretation," though he made exceptions when it suited his moral and political commitments.  But his general commitment to the approach often belied his "conservative" reputation.  So, for example, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington (2004) (which I happened to teach just last week) was the single biggest windfall for criminal defendants since the 1960s.  Justice Scalia held that the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to "confront" the witnesses against him demands the exclusion of many kinds of out-of-court statements that, in the past, easily came into evidence under various exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay.  An extension of this ruling also now requires prosecutors to produce in court for cross-examination the forensic experts and lab technicians who conduct lab testing of all kinds related to a criminal case.  Attempts to limit the impact of Crawford on the prosecution of criminal defendants have been led by the "liberal" Justice Sotomayor, herself a former prosecutor.   (ADDENDUM:  Another notable opinion, perhaps not what one would have expected, was his dissent in Hamdi.)

3. The U.S. Supreme Court, as all "insiders" know, is not a regular court, but more akin to a super-legislature, though one of limited jurisdiction.  There are two limits on that jurisdiction:  first, it can only make law on issues that are brought to the court; and second, existing law often restricts the range of possible new laws the Court can make.  But because issues that come to the Court are usually ones where the law is quite indeterminate, and where moral and political judgment is required to resolve the case, the moral and political predilections of the super-legislators are of crucial importance in their selection.   This, of course, is why the Republicans are already threatening not to approve a nominee (in the unrealistic hope that they will win back the Presidency), and the Democrats are keen to push forward:  opportunities to add a super-legislator don't come up that often, after all, and their terms can extend for decades.  On almost every major and controversial decision in recent years–on gay marriage, on campaign finance, on affirmative action, on the right to bear arms–the actual decisions were all legally optional, and a different mix of political and moral views on the Court would have changed the outcome.

4.  Without Scalia, there are four usually "liberal" votes in the super-legislature (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor), three usually "conservative" votes (Alito, Roberts, Thomas), and one sometimes "conservative," sometimes "liberal" vote (Kennedy).   Scalia was, of course, a usually reliable "conservative" vote, and when they could get Kennedy's vote, the conservatives ruled.  This, of course, is why Scalia's replacement is of crucial political significance:  if a "liberal" super-legislator is appointed, then the Court becomes majority "liberal" for the first time in many decades.  Justice Kennedy's influence also fades dramatically.

5.  Until Scalia's seat is filled, there is a risk of tied decisions, which will leave the status quo intact wherever they occur.

Thoughts/comments from readers? 

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23 responses to “A few comments on the legal and political significance of the death of Justice Scalia”

  1. Brian, thanks for the quick and helpful thoughts on this. I have a question I hope you might be able to give your input on. It's a hypothetical question: suppose that for whatever reason McConnell and company are successful in forestalling any appointment until the 'next president' is in office. Obviously, the republican candidates are unelectable in a general election, and so contrary to what McConnell might think, this means Hillary or Bernie would in such a circumstance be in a position to nominate Scalia's replacement. Now, what I'm wondering is what the possibilities are of nominating Obama himself to the Supreme Court. He will after all have served two terms in office as president and still be very young by SCOTUS standards. He also has a legal background. So: in the off chance that Hillary or Bernie nominates Scalia's replacement, would Obama be a plausible/natural choice? Why/why not?

  2. Obama has repeatedly said that he is not interested in serving on the Supreme Court,so the occasion is unlikely to arise.

  3. Two quick comments:

    ** Brian of course is right that Scalia made exceptions to his originalism when it suited him politically. In particular, Scalia's opinions in Heller (gun control) and King v Burwell (the Affordable Care Act) were pretty nakedly partisan, in my view, and exposed originalism for the legal fiction it is. And let's not forget that Scalia joined the concurrence in Bush v Gore.

    ** As much as I usually disliked the substance of his opinions, I enjoyed reading them. He often wrote with some genuine panache.

    BL COMMENT: Bush v. Gore was certainly the most nakedly partisan. Heller was presented as an originalist decision, but the history is quite mixed, as Stevens's opinion in the same case shows. The ACA case was textualism/literalism driven by politics.

  4. A couple of weeks ago, Clinton said that she loves the idea of appointing Obama to the Supreme Court. A fantasy: At his confirmation hearings, senators ask Obama to defend his commitment to the Due Process Clause in light of his keeping people imprisoned at Guantanamo without due process, maintaining the no-fly list without due process, and executing suspected terrorists with bombs from drones without due process.

  5. Right on target. For a good example of Justice Scalia pursuing his own political predilections, accompanied by a remarkable degree of self-deception see:

  6. Though they will blame liberals for "starting it" (e.g., with Bork and Thomas confirmations), if the Republicans block any Obama nominee for a year precisely to "allow the American people to decide" with their vote for President, they will be politicizing the Court in the most blatant way in history and betraying their claims to be guided by the Constitution. Maybe Obama will appoint someone (like Srinivasan) that Mitch and his crew will accept (perhaps only with some back-room deals, if they still exist anymore).
    [I had a bizarre waking dream about RBG and her good friend Scalia making a pact that if either dies during a term, the other would not vote on any cases in which they knew they other would vote the opposite way, so the outcome would be 4-3, in the same direction it would have been 5-4.]

  7. A further comment on Heller and King v Burwell: Perhaps it was an overstatement of mine to call Scalia's opinions in these cases "nakedly partisan," since in each case there is indeed a veneer of textualist/originalist reasoning. But I feel sure it is only a veneer, and that if conservative goals had called for supporting the laws in question instead of opposing them, then Scalia would have produced textualist/originalist reasoning to support those laws. Moreover, Scalia's dissent in King v Burwell takes the most literal reading possible of the ACA text, and in doing so, flies in the face of his explicit denunciations elsewhere (e.g. his book A Matter of Interpretation) of literalism / "strict constructionism." Instead, in those sources Scalia endorses what he calls "reasonable constructionism." But although reasonable constructionism surely favored the Obama adminstration's interpretation of the ACA, we get a strict constructionist reading of the ACA in Scalia's King v Burwell dissent.

    Thus, I believe originalism/textualism is typically just a fig leaf to hide conservative activism. I guess that's what rankles me most about it. Better simply to be avowedly activist, rather than be an activist who pretends not to be.

    Perhaps, then, we can agree that even if Heller and King v Burwell are not *nakedly* partisan, then are at least "figleafedly partisan"? (Apologies for the barbarous neologism.)

  8. What of all the talk now about Scalia's "brilliant legal mind?" I don't see it, but perhaps Brian and others can help me out.

    BL COMMENT: The competition on the Supreme Court is not stiff in that regard!

  9. With regard to another facet of his legacy, I have to confess my bewilderment at the widespread claim that the late Justice was a premier stylist. His opinions were overwritten and turgid. Even his "best" lines, to my ear, are more straining than witty. (Perhaps I am an outlier here, though, given that I find most major judicial decisions to be poorly written, usually for the same or similar reasons).

  10. I agree that if Repubs block Obama nominations they will be betraying their claim to be guided by the Constitution. But why would this be "politicizing the Court" more than failing to approve Bork? I'm no expert but my understanding is that there was no doubt that Bork was qualified for the job, and that the Senate refused to nominate him for purely political reasons. That sounds pretty maximally political. Happy to learn that my understanding is incorrect though.

    BL COMMENT: Democrats finally woke up at the time of Bork to the highly political nature of Reagan's choices for the judiciary; as my colleague Richard Posner joked about when he was nominated to the 7th Circuit in 1981, "this was before people realized that Reagan was stacking the court with right-wingers like me." Franklin Roosevelt's choices for the court were also highly political, as were Nixon's. So this business about upholding the Constitution is rhetorical posturing, though there have been Presidents whose choices were less nakedly political than Reagan's or Roosevelt's. That being said, Bork was sui generis and ran into trouble even with lawyers because of his dismissive attitude towards precedent: Bork was quite prepared to declare decades worth of cases as wrong if they did not conform to the original intent of the Framers as Bork understood it. This, more than anything, did him in.

  11. Re: likely nominees, I'd bet on one of the first two on this list:
    http://www.vox.com/2016/2/13/10987836/obama-supreme-court-shortlist

    Both were confirmed unanimously not long ago. I have no informed view at this point about their politics or their merits.

  12. Laurence B. McCullough

    Craig Duncan (12:47 pm Feb 14) writes: " I feel sure it is only a veneer." The generalized form of this assertion is "I feel sure that P." I am very interested to learn the name of this (supposedly) valid philosophical argument form. Is it, shall we say, an emphatic emotivism?

  13. Reagan's highly political choices? Sandra Day OConnor? Obama would never appoint a conservative, but Reagan appointed a liberal.

    BL COMMENT: I'm not sure what planet you're on, but O'Connor was not a liberal, she just turned out to be less of a reactionary on certain issues than some might have hoped. As the Court veered to the far right, she didn't veer with it on a small range of issues (abortion and affirmative action), though her views on even those issues were far to the right of anything seen during most of the Burger Court years.

  14. Is this the first time a Senate Majority Leader has committed to dismissing a Supreme Court nominee before the pick has even been revealed? Is this the first time a nominee's fate has been sealed for the (explicitly stated) reason of (eventually) being nominated by a particular President?

    The word "unprecedented" has become ubiquitous in media coverage of this episode, but this seems to be the most unprecedented event of all (correct me if I'm wrong).

  15. I'd say the odds are extremely low if not miniscule. Republicans have spent the past seven years shouting that Obama is the worst thing to happen to this country in eons. Provided they maintain control of the Senate (a near certainty at this point) the campaign against an Obama seat on the Court would be relentless.

    Also, I'm not sure what the precedent is on this, but nominating a President so soon after his tenure in office could lead to him having to recuse himself in a large number of cases. Presumably, some of the important cases that the Court will hear over the next few years will involve legislation signed by Obama, or executive actions undertaken by him.

  16. It's a mistake to pick out particular Scalia decisions as nakedly partisan rather than to point out that his entire originalist theoretical construction is partisan. While in the interest of preserving some theoretical unity he may have had to (rarely) make some more "liberal" decisions, Scalia built a theory that allowed him to take what was generally a very conservative stance. The theory itself is no less partisan than are particular decisions. Originalism rests on substantive on substantive principles of politics that are highly conservative, even reactionary.

    We shouldn't pretend that Supreme Court justices and constitutional theorists engage in neutral theory construction and then deviate from their theories when they can't stomach their results. It's motivated reasoning, all the way down.

  17. I don't think that there is a precedent. I believe that the only President who became a Supreme Court justice was Taft, and he became one eight years after leaving the presidency.

  18. While I appreciate Craig Duncan’s decision to temper his statement on Scalia’s Heller opinion, I’m still of the opinion that it was “nakedly partisan.” Scalia’s opinion may appear credible thanks to his clever spin and pretended originalism, but a closer look at his arguments and evidence exposes its overtly political nature. To make his case Scalia ignored a great deal of the historical evidence, cherry picked the rest, and ignored the opinions of credible historians who have spent most of their careers researching the subject. There are several historians who have challenged the claims in Heller. I’ve included only a couple of them below.

    Here is the link to the brief submitted by the Pulitzer Prize winning historian Jack N. Rakove in the Heller decision: http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/07-290_amicus_historians.pdf.

    Here is a link to an essay by the prominent historian Gary Wills: “To Keep and Bear Arms” It is long, but worth it. He is not directly dealing with Heller, but with the larger body of works supporting the interpretation that the Second Amendment is an individual right. He carefully and comprehensively destroys the arguments of what he calls the “Standard Model” school (i.e. the Second Amendment dogmatists who insist that the amendment confers to them an absolute individual right).

  19. Opps! It looks like I missed the link for Wills' article: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/09/21/to-keep-and-bear-arms/

  20. Can someone explain to me how it is consistent to be both an originalist and a textualist, as Scalia was or claimed to be? I'm honestly asking. As I understand originalism, it says judges are supposed to interpret the language used in legislation so that it is consistent with the way the relevant words were used when the legislation was passed. As I understand textualism, it says judges are supposed to focus on the words on the page and pay no attention to things such as the debate that lead up to the passing of the legislation. But how is one supposed to figure out how the words were used when the legislation was passed unless one also looks at the immediate context in which the legislation was passed? A dictionary from back in the day is OK but the Federalist Papers aren't? I don't get it.

  21. Probably a bit much to sketch in a comment, and I'm not a great expert, but basically these are on two different axes it seems to me. "Textualism" stands in opposition to "intentionalism": the objective is to understand what the words mean, not what the writer meant. And those may be different things. This is not incompatible with using a wide range of material to elucidate the context, background, general use of words and so forth (including Federalist Papers for sure) — but in the end is interested in what the text would mean to the reasonably well-informed reader, not just as some rather important but ultimately defeasible evidence of what some legislator desired to achieve.

    "Originalism" stands in opposition to "living constitutionalism" (or something like that — the terms are loaded): the constitution doesn't change its "meaning". It turns out of course that meaning is ambiguous, however, and Scalia was a master of exploiting (or ignoring) that ambiguity so as to use alleged fidelity to "original meaning" as if it precluded reconsideration of the application of meaning to changed (or changed understanding) of circumstance. Originalism is not inherently committed to a textualist or an intentionalist approach, though it's easy to lapse into expressions such as "what the Framers meant" and so forth.

    Combined together (textualist originalism?) one has something like "What the judge is trying to do is to understand the meaning the words on the page would have conveyed to a reasonably informed and intelligent reader at the time they were adopted." I think Scalia would have claimed that he was attempting something along those lines.

  22. I think Paul Stanley basically has it right in answer to Brian Huss's question. Textualists in statutory and constitutional interpretation think the meaning of the words actually enacated controls the interpretation, not the intentions that of the drafters of the words that might be revealed through historical investigation. With respect to older statues and constitutions, the relevant meaning is the original one, that is, on sensitive to what those words meant at the time of enactment. The Federalist Papers, by the way, are usually out on this view, but old dictionaries, as repositories of public meaning of the words at the time are in. Scalia's best argument for this view was based on the "rule of law" value of fairness and publicity: citizens should be able to know what the law requires of them, so the meaning of the law should be available to the public, not the esoteric preserve of historians who investigate individual intentions of legislators/framers.

  23. Paul Stanley wrote, "Originalism is not inherently committed to a textualist or an intentionalist approach…" I agree with this claim; it's possible to be an originalist textualist or an originalist intentionalist. I'll note too that a textualist, in addition to being skeptical of reliance on legislators' intentions when interpreting law, is also typically skeptical of notions of "unenumerated rights," e.g. finding a right to abortion to be implicit in the Constitution (via a notion of substantive due process, say).

    I'll also note that I believe there is conceptual space for a form of "living textualism" in constitutional interpretative theory. This would be an interpretative theory that feels itself more bound by the constitution's text than most "living constitution" theories do — for example, by shunning notions of unenumerated rights. But this interpretive theory would be "living" insofar as it does not bound, when interpreting constitutional textual phrases such as (say) "the freedom of speech, and of the press," to stick to 18th Century understandings of free speech. Instead living textualism would permit our understanding of the principle of free speech to evolve over time in the usual common law method, and thereby allow judges to rule on the basis of updated understandings of key principles enumerated in the constitution's text.

    FWIW, I say a bit more about "living textualism" in the final part of an NDPR review I wrote of David A. Strauss, *The Living Constitution*: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/27225-the-living-constitution/. (Note that I don't there recommend the theory of living textualism as superior to Strauss's more flexible "living" theory. I'm agnostic as to which theory is better, though I'm quite confident some kind of living theory is preferable to originalism in its various guises.)

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