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Why aren’t more philosophers writing about climate change?

MOVING TO FRONT FROM APRIL 1, SINCE IT HAS GENERATED A LIVELY DISCUSSION–MORE COMMENTS WELCOME

Philosopher Byron Williston (Wilfrid Laurier) writes:

On your blog, you supplied a link to a NYT story about the likely fate of the West Antarctic ice sheet. As the article points out, it looks as though many of the world’s coastal cities (New York, Shanghai, Miami, Vancouver, etc.) will disappear within a century or so. Because of climatic effects like this Rajendra Pachauri, former head of the IPCC, has stated that climate change poses a threat to the “very social stability of human systems.” And yet many of us working on Climate Philosophy are struck by the fact that so few philosophers seem interested enough in the problem to turn their philosophical attention more pointedly to it. The overwhelming majority of scientists seem to think that civilization is truly on the brink, so what does it say about our discipline that only a small minority of us are writing about this? Aren’t we—along with the scientists, the artists, and many others–the keepers of civilization? Or is our relative silence here evidence that we have abandoned this role? I’d be eager to hear what other philosophers have to say about this.

I think Prof. Williston raises an interesting question, and I'll state my own view, which will no doubt be thought idiosyncratic (though won't be surprising to those who periodically read the papers of mine I link to!).   First, with respect to many issues, including climate change, philosophers have almost nothing to add:  in broad outline, it's clear what ought to be done to avert catastrophe (e.g., it's not like those ignoring the issue think it would be good for civilization to end!), and to the extent the details aren't clear, the questions needing answers are technical/instrumental ones about which philosophers typically have no competence.  Second, philosophical arguments won't produce the needed action, since philosophical arguments are notoriously inefficacious in moving people, let alone governments, to moral action.  Third, it has been the norm for Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the capitalist democracies to focus on topics unoffensive to capitalist imperatives, and indeed, to focus often on moral trivia (cf. my discussion of bourgeois normative theory at pp. 9 ff. here, and especially the discussion of "moral trivia" [like promises by college students concerning sex] at 20-22).  So the fact that philosophers ignore climate change–even assuming that issue can be meaningfully discussed independent of the realities of global political economy–is hardly surprising.

I invite readers to comment on the questions raised by Prof. Williston, especially since I assume most do not share my views on these issues.

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40 responses to “Why aren’t more philosophers writing about climate change?”

  1. Dr. Leiter,

    Within your points about the limits of philosophy as a spur to action, or even to situational awareness, it appears to me that there is much to be said about the pragmatic ethics of societies' attitudes toward sustainability, viz. how the criteria of sustainability may be defined and their consequences understood. If the next two or three generations may directly witness the physical consequences of a failure of sustainability, there would be a rare opportunity to connect abstract and pragmatic viewpoints on that topic. I take Prof. Williston's "brink" in this sense, rather than as "the brink of destruction", which would tend to render many investigations moot.

  2. There has been a certain amount of philosophy-of-science work done on climate change, mostly on how to think about evidence and reliability in the context of large-scale climate modelling. There's also been some consideration in decision theory and ethics, in the context of how to handle small probabilities of large consequences: philosophers have been part of making the – to me pretty persuasive – "fat tails" case that we should worry about climate change in significant part because of the smallish risk of some absolutely cataclysmic feedback event.

    But I think in the large, Brian's right (on (1) and (2) anyway; I'll keep my milquetoast centrist liberalism to myself!) By analogy, the existence of a large box with a button on it, labelled (credibly) "END OF THE WORLD: DO NOT PRESS" would rise quite a few scientific, political, diplomatic and military questions, but precious few philosophical ones.

  3. Recognizing the occasion, this least holy of holidays, I'll point to the following work, not by a philosopher per se: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/10803281.0001.001/1:3/–impasses-of-the-post-global-theory-in-the-era-of-climate

    But then who can say precisely what a philosopher is? After all, "The logics of 'climate change' are even more counter-Hamletian since they inhabit a present that is zombified by what it knows would be now irreversible, yet which it does not see, and hence occludes," has a philosophical ring to it, doesn't it?

  4. While it's not directly about climate change, Sam Scheffler's Death and the Afterlife offers pretty convincing arguments (or at least intuition pumps) that most people care deeply about the continued existence of humanity and the "trans-individual" and "trans-generational" projects of humanity. I don't know how successfully his work, brought to a wider audience, could overcome problem #2, but it might be adapted and developed for wider audiences to help people recognize how much they value the continued existence of humanity–especially in a pre-apocalyptic state! Give people a survey: How many (good) years of your own life would you trade to add 100 (good) years of humanity's existence?

  5. Scheffler was on Philosophy Talk promoting the book late last year: http://philosophytalk.org/shows/living-through-others

  6. "Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World," by John Broome

  7. On the point about relative silence: There's a rapidly growing literature in the philosophy of science on the intersecting questions of climate modeling, the role of values in scientific practices, the place of the sciences in a democratic society, and public participation in (and understanding of) scientific practice. It seems to me that at least some of this work aims to be relevant to public debates while touching on ethical questions raised by climate change.

    Though I haven't read it yet, for a more general overview of what seems more "classic" philosophy of science work in this area, one might take a look at the open-access two part Dec. 2015 Philosophy Compass piece (pp. 953 – 977), "Philosophy of Climate Science," by Roman Frigg, Erica Thompson, and Charlotte Werndl:

    http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.v10.12/issuetoc

    Another overview (also not read yet) published in the previous issue of Philosophy Compass by Richard Bradley and Katie Steele is also available, titled "Making Climate Decisions":

    http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12259/abstract

    To name just a few other folks writing on this topic in the philosophy of science from the perspective I mention above: Gregor Betz, Heather Douglas, Kevin Elliott, Kristen Intemann, Stephen John, Elisabeth Lloyd, Wendy Parker, Daniel Steel, Eric Winsberg.

  8. Here at Ohio State, we are wrapping up a year-long set of events on sustainability and climate change, organized by the Center for Ethics and Human Values (http://compas.osu.edu/sustainability). In organizing these interdisciplinary events, we've found many philosophers working on aspects of climate change, including issues about individual vs. collective responsibility, obligations to future generations, development ethics, education, and much more. And these philosophers, it seems to me, are helping to frame issues for those working in policy. Our university gave us support for the next two years to bring in a philosophy post-doc (Corey Katz, SLU) who works on climate change and justice issues to continue the programming we've started this year. So, perhaps I misunderstood the claim, but it seems many philosophers are working on climate change already.

  9. I have often thought the same as the original correspondent. Everything in philosophy presumes a habitable planet, after all. (Now someone is thinking: well it also presumes clean water and food so why not all philosophers become water engineers or farmers?) But counters about blue sky thinking and happy accidents in the history of ideas, or overdemandingness seem not to cut mustard when faced with humanity's biggest ever threat that is now about damage limitation rather than prevention. At least, not when philosophers are, I think, supposed to be among the wisest and most rational of all the species. It's seem a bit Tree Entish, if I may.

    But for all that, I agree with Prof Leiter's reply. I think the best thing a philosopher could do, qua philosopher, would be public engagement, in the way Bertrand Russell was giving speeches on the BBC or at rallies in London, calling for civil disobedience and getting himself imprisoned, over nuclear bombs. Although that all came about, so far as I know, as he already had a lot of fame and respect as a philosopher beforehand. I don't see any philosopher even close to his level of fame these days – in the way the physicists have had a tremendous PR job done, appearing on late-night chat shows next to Hollywood celebs, or being referenced and turning up in some of the most popular shows in the history of TV.

    So I think awareness and making a cause fashionable for the end goal of policy and behaviour change – and, dare I write it, value change – will come from scientists, actors and musicians.

    Until we have a philosopher who is a celebrity, I don't think there is much to be done qua philosophers.

  10. When scientists are increasingly looking east and elsewhere for philosophical guidance (especially Buddhism and to a lesser degree Daoism in their researches on nature and nurture, mind and brain, self and agency, perception and happiness, among others – google books on neuroscience and Buddhism, for example), it is not philosophy but philosophers' fault to find themselves deprived of a voice in contemporary social discourses. As long as Kantianism or transcendentalism of various stripes still dominates the field, the irrelevance will probably continue.

    I have nothing but high respect for Dr. Leiter. Nevertheless his promotion of Anglophone philosophy, at the expense of other philosophies, helps to perpetuate the sad state of philosophy as a discipline. If PGR changes its ranking methodology and promotes departments whose faculty works are cited most often by scientists and non-philosophers, regardless their institutional fame or nature (PhD or non-PhD programs), it should make a difference to the field. It is ironic that Dr. Leiter claims to favor wissenschaftlich philosophy and has so far done absolutely nothing, even if just for the sake of following the footsteps of Nietzsche, to challenge the dominance of Kant "the theologian" and to promote philosophies that are attractive to non-philosophers and scientists.

    BL COMMENT: I've not seen much evidence that Buddhism or Daoism are having a significant influence on the sciences, but perhaps I've missed it.

  11. I think the problem is bigger than what philosophers can fix. To speak globally, America is up against multiple crises, in which government which should be the prime mover of fixing common problems is paralyzed by the Republican revolt. Call it a revolt of the masses if you will.
    Two things that may alter the equation: a saner government, which might exist after the November election and a a preponderence of overwhelming effects of global warming that only the most deranged would consign to the second coming.
    This is a sociological problem: collective conscience and mechanisms of mass action.
    Perhaps philosophy can serve as the wise vizier to somebody of power and influence

  12. Shane J. Ralston

    Not to toot my own horn, but I wrote a book on environmental philosophy/activism/communication and climate change (Pragmatic Environmentalism: Toward a Rhetoric of Eco-Justice, 2013: http://www.troubador.co.uk/book_info.asp?bookid=1966). I'm one of those wackos who thinks that geoengineering (i.e. intentionally manipulating the Earth's atmosphere to slow the warming effect) should be one of the strategies left open to us. When I used to travel to Washington DC and present on the topic, policy analysts were initially interested to hear what I had to say, but once they realized that philosophy offered few if any answers, and lots more more questions, they quickly lost attention. Aaaah, the challenge of doing public philosophy!

  13. Jesse Kirkpatrick

    I won't speak for him, but my colleague, Andrew Light (Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy), has spent a large part of his career devoted to the issue of climate change, and written much about it. In addition, he devoted two years (2013-2015) to serving as Sr. Advisor and India Counselor to the Dept. of State's Special Envoy on Climate Change.

  14. Speaking as a non-philosopher in a policy school who sometimes teaches values and ethics to policy students, I'll say that the work of Henry Shue, Stephen Gardiner, Mathias Risse, and several others has really changed the way I think about this topic. The issues involved in understanding what kind of problem climate change is (it now seems to me much more a problem of global justice than a problem of humanity's very existence) and in allocating responsibility for it aren't very carefully addressed by the economists and natural scientists who take up most of the bandwidth.

  15. Grad student in Europe

    I am slightly puzzled by Prof Leiter's remark that morally speaking it is clear what to do in the wake of climate change. While that may seem true with regard to what and how much we ought to do in terms of mitigation and adaption (although that involves quite tricky issues of intergenerational justice as well), it is less clear who ought to bear the burden. This question of how to distribute the burdens of climate change does not seem trivial or clear to me. Indeed, quite a lot of the climate negotiations are about which countries ought to contribute how much. And here it is worth pointing out that there are many moral philosophers working on climate justice including several well-known "general moral philosophers" and publications in prestigious journals. Very consistently there is Simon Caney at Oxford who now mainly works on climate justice. Caney has a 2012 article in Philosophy & Public Affairs and a 2014 article in the Journal of Political Philosophy. Stephen Gardiner has done some excellent contributions, in particular "A Perfect Moral Storm" is an excellent paper to start thinking about climate change. Then there is Dale Jamieson at NYU who recently published "Reason in a dark time" which deals with multiple moral dilemmas and issues connected to climate change. Mathias Risse has included a chapter on climate change and the atmosphere in his "On Global Justice". Among more generally known moral philosophers David Miller has delivered his Tanner Lectures on climate change, Peter Singer has written on climate change as well, and Henry Shue has a number of excellent articles on climate justice. Michael Sandel and Rob Goodin have written on the ethics of emissions trading, and so on.
    Neither does it seem true to me that philosophers have not sought out public engagement. Sandel's piece was first published in the NY Times. Last year I visited the official presentation of the "Oslo Principles" of international law with regard to climate change. The working group included Thomas Pogge (a philosopher) and the invited respondents were Simon Caney, Henry Shue, and Onora O'Neill (all philosophers). John Broome worked on the last IPCC assessment report. So it seems to me that climate justice is far from being neglected by moral philosophers, neither as a matter of scholarship nor as a matter of active involvement.

  16. PhilScienceGuy

    Stephen Gardiner (Washington) has written on the moral dimensions of climate change in several of his recent works.

    A Perfect Moral Storm:
    https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-perfect-moral-storm-9780195379440?cc=us&lang=en&

    and

    Debating Climate Ethics
    https://global.oup.com/academic/product/debating-climate-ethics-9780199996483?q=Stephen%20M.%20Gardiner&lang=en&cc=us

  17. The list of philosophers and political theorists working explicitly on climate change (as opposed to moral issues that happen to bear on climate change policy) is longer than some people seem to realize. John Broome, Peter Singer, Simon Caney, Stephen Gardiner, Dale Jamieson, Henry Shue, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Darrell Moellendorf, John O'Neill, Bryan Norton, Allen Thompson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Mark Bryant Budolfson, and Avram Hiller are just a few of the most obvious names that pop to mind as I write these words. It should also not be lost on this thread that until recently one of Secretary of State John Kerry's chief climate advisers was a leading environmental philosopher, Andrew Light (http://philosophy.gmu.edu/people/alight1 ). He was present in Paris. And the list of philosophers gets much longer when we think about the various issues that bear on climate change-related decisions, both individual and collective, and where those help to motivate part of the project. Justice to future generations, and its relationship to the non-identity problem, is a great example. I am thinking of Fiona Woollard, among others.

  18. For those interested in this area, I have a forthcoming piece that is very critical of much work on the ethics of climate change here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620647

  19. s. wallerstein

    Professor Leiter wonders above if the question of climate change can be discussed independently of the realities of global political economy. I take that to mean a globalized capitalist economy which needs to grow in order to generate profits. Marxist geographer, David Harvey, takes up that question in his book The 17 Contradictions of Capitalism (contradiction 16) with rather pessimistic conclusions. Have any philosophers discussed the contradiction between a capitalist order which needs to grow in generate profits and an environment which will collapse?

  20. Charles Pigden

    To S. Wallerstein's asks 'Have any philosophers discussed the contradiction between a capitalist order which needs to grow [to] generate profits and an environment which will collapse?'

    The answer is "yes, sort of". Edward Skidelsky in conjunction with his father, the economist/historian Robert Skidelskly, has a book 'How Much is Enough?" in which he argues a that there is something wrong with a society that emphasises ever increasing 'growth' in the production of goods and services at the expense of the leisure to to enjoy those services. But this is a Keynesian rather than a marxist polemic.

  21. My two cents: seeing as one of the two major political parties in the U.S. is in deep denial about science in general and climate change in particular; seeing as the deeply corrupt oil industry has funded pseudoscience to "disprove" climate change; seeing as the entire global economy is structured around fossil fuels in one way or another; and seeing as nothing short of a revolution can restructure the macroeconomics of the situation, then perhaps the question of "the philosophy of climate science" should give way to the philosophy and activism of global emancipatory politics. In other words, given how high the stakes are and how interconnected the issues are, then a call for less academic theory and more political organization seems to make the most sense.

  22. Surprised that nobody has mentioned Tim Mulgan's Ethics for a Broken World, which is a wonderfully well-imagined (though very depressing) piece of philosophy-cum-sci fi.

  23. Sara L. Uckelman

    My colleague at Durham, Wendy Parker, has done quite a bit on climate change and climate modeling: https://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/?id=11577

  24. Stephen Downes

    I write about these and related issues all the time. I just don't write about them *as philosophy*. (Actually, these days I think it's pretty much useless to write about anything 'as philosophy').

  25. Lawrence Torcello

    It’s good to see this question being raised, and I’m glad to see it generating a reference list. Clearly philosophers are working on the topic. My own academic research and (more so) public engagements on ethics and climate change have earned me the vitriol from right wing outlets, previously chronicled on this blog:

    http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2014/04/rit-now-issues-stronger-statement-in-support-of-professor-torcello.html

    I remain extremely grateful for the support of Brian Leiter and this site’s readers, which seems to have contributed significantly to how my own university responded to the climate denialists’ attempt to have me disciplined or fired for writing on the topic. Incidentally, the disparagement continues; just this morning, the National Review credited me with leading a campaign against free speech on college campuses. One must follow the ideological loops of the denialist movement with more detail than I will recapitulate fully here, to explain how an argument in favor of holding corporations like Exxon responsible for intentional disinformation could be equated with advocating against free speech. But much of that account is provided here: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/planet-oz/2014/mar/27/climate-science-denial-funding-criminally-negligent-philosopher-hate-campaign and here: http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/got-science/2014/got-science-april-2014.html#.VwGMCUZtwfs.

    In any case, the problems occasioned by climate change are necessarily interdisciplinary in scope. In recent years, philosophers, cognitive scientists, ecologists, and economists—to name a few—have contributed significantly to both specialized and more public understandings of the stakes of climate change, as well as the barriers to widespread action in response to it. My own experience is that climate and other scientists are eager to engage with philosophers working on the topic. In particular, my political and ethical work on corporately organized climate denial has been welcomed, encouraged, and referenced by climate researchers in other fields.

    https://lawrencetorcello.wordpress.com/articles-4/

    So obviously, I agree very much with those comments above that call for public engagement by philosophers, beyond our more narrowly academic contributions. That would be good in the public sphere and good for our discipline. So much public outreach by philosophers is of the “gee-whiz isn’t philosophy neat” kind. That has its place, but I think real public intellectualism on pressing societal issues like climate change would do more to generate public interest in philosophy—to the advantage of both philosophers and society at large. As I said in a Twitter discussion following Leiter’s initial post (Why Don’t More Philosophers Write on Climate Change?): Philosophers have long helped to form the basic moral, societal, and existential frameworks needed to address climate change, and to grasp the designs of those who aim to circumvent action. That this isn't obvious, even among some professional philosophers, is part of our collective problem. Our cultural devaluing of a humanities grounded education, in favor of allegedly practical concerns, has left most without the intellectual literacy necessary to grasp the scientific or moral urgency of the problem.

  26. Philosophers of course fairly rarely have much to contribute directly to climate science, nor are they in much position to weigh in even on its methods. But they are in a position to turn their ignorance into a virtue. They can generally bring the perspective of the intelligent layperson to the question of assessing opinions of experts in other domains.

    But here's where I always get stuck when it comes to the opinions of climate scientists on climate change. Sure, most climate scientists think that anthropogenic global warming is real and will prove very significant. But, to begin with, there are a few distinguished climate scientists – Richard Lindzen of MIT, for example — who hold the claims of catastrophic global warming in the future are vastly overblown. More importantly, the sorts of claims climate scientists make about global warming, and their consensus on it, seems hardly different to my ears from the sorts of claims scientists in other domains have made, and with like consensuses, which have proved either false or dubious. Economists declared in impressive numbers that the boom of the aughts was no bubble, only to see it burst in 2007; likewise, they asserted in near chorus that the working class in America would be better off for all the free trade deals cut in recent decades, and the working class has instead been damaged into misery. In the social sciences, we have been assured by the scientists that they have demonstrated the existence of all kinds of important phenomena, including priming and stereotype threat, which now have been thrown into doubt by further investigation. In medicine, scientists or physicians have pushed large public policy programs against, say, dietary salt, and for, say, routine PSA testing, which we are now told are quite misguided. The story of our day seems to be that science after science has been declared to be in crisis because of proclaimed certainties about things that just ain't so.

    If I look at most of these cases of scientific failure, I see two common elements: great complexity in the underlying phenomena, sufficient to enable the production of seeming evidence for either side of the issue, and an agenda that pushes steadfastly for just one of those sides.

    And yet in the face of this evidence that consensus among scientists isn't all it's cracked up to be, we are supposed to believe that the consensus among climate scientists is something only knaves or fools would doubt.

    Now I can see the point of the precautionary principle here, and how that might lead us to support measures to reduce carbon dioxide output even if the evidence is less than overwhelming that catastrophic global warming is upon us. But what I can't see is why we are wrong to harbor some real doubts as to whether what most climate scientists have proclaimed on this matter — with great certainty of course — must really be so.

    Perhaps those wiser than I can explain to me the relevant difference between the sorts of cases I described above and that of climate science. I will of course find argument more persuasive than abuse.

  27. It seems to me that the emerging work around vulnerability and resilience is one pathway to dialoguing with concerns about climate change without becoming burdened by the need to understand or evaluate particular scientific studies.

    I also am thinking about a text like Elaine Scarry's _Thinking in an Emergency_; philosophy can engage in questions of how we think about crisis, how power and social position may or may not shape deliberation and our obligations for emergency preparation and responsiveness to others in need.

  28. s. wallerstein

    Lexington,

    For all the times that you mention that the scientific consensus has been mistaken, PSA testing, etc., there are numerous instances when it has been right. So it seems that the odds are that the scientific consensus is right about global warming. That is, if I do not have sufficient scientific background to assess the claims in any given instance (which is the case), I'd bet that the scientific consensus is right.

    By the way, who, besides the some economists (not all), says that economics is a science?

  29. Shane Maxwell Wilkins

    I came here to mention this as well. I'm thinking of starting to teach Mulgan in my ethics classes. The book is quite good and it has a kind of literary hook that I think might resonate with students in mandatory classes more than the standard readings.

  30. Well, I agree with you that the existence of a consensus counts for something, though it's not clear to me what that may be.

    As I said, there remains the power of the precautionary principle to motivate us to do something about carbon dioxide emissions.

  31. Your examples aren't pertinent.
    1) Richard Lindzen and the very small group of scientific dissenters. There are numerous examples of prominent scientists who can't bring themselves to accept important, sometimes fundamental findings. The textbook example is the prominent British geophysicist Harold Jeffreys, who died denying the reality of plate tectonics. Its not hard to find other examples. This usually happens when a field is mature, initially controversial features are well established, and there is a consensus about these features. For whatever reason, there are always a few people who get left behind when major shifts occur. Consensus doesn't mean unanimity, and the existence of a few outliers doesn't tell you very much.
    2) Most of your examples are from economics, a notoriously imprecise field. Analogies with an area like climate science, which is complicated but based on well understood physical processes, are deeply misleading.
    3) There was never a scientific consensus about PSA testing or limiting dietary salt intake. These were, and are, controversial policies.

  32. Byron Williston

    As the original correspondent here I want to thank everyone for their contributions to this thread and Brian for hosting it. I think the discussion so far has been immensely illuminating. On the topic of scientific consensus about climate change I am in agreement with Roger Albrin (and a few others). It should also be noted that much of the scientific 'dissent' these days is coming from scientists who complain about the establishment's overly-conservative projections of climate effects. Much of this criticism is directed at the IPCC. As Joe Romm (and others)have noted, the IPCC's reports are instantly out of date projections that dramatically low-ball future warming and its effects. This has a good deal to do with the role that governments have in putting together the Summaries for Policy Makers as well as the perceived inability to model positive feedbacks in the climate system in an accurate way (so they are not fully accounted for). But there's also been some attempt to analyze many scientists' reluctance to talk openly in terms of looming catastrophe. This phenomenon has even acquired an acronym: Erring on the Side of Least Drama (ESLD). I have argued that if economists simply admitted that they do not understand the meaning of catastrophe, while scientists spoke more forthrightly about it, we'd be further along in addressing the issue.

    https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-anthropocene-project-9780198746713?cc=ca&lang=en&

  33. The open-access journal Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric just published its first relaunch special issue on the topic of climate justice with contributions from Elizabeth Cripps, Dale Jamieson, Anja Karnein, Darrel Moellendorf and Henry Shue.

    The issue is availbale here:
    http://theglobaljusticenetwork.org/global/index.php/gjn/issue/view/9

  34. Charles Pigden

    Michael B writes

    1) I think the best thing a philosopher could do, qua philosopher, would be public engagement, in the way Bertrand Russell was giving speeches on the BBC or at rallies in London, calling for civil disobedience and getting himself imprisoned, over nuclear bombs.

    2) Although that all came about, so far as I know, as he already had a lot of fame and respect as a philosopher beforehand.

    I think that the first sentence is partly right but that the second is relevantly wrong. Michael B is mistaken, I suggest, in supposing that philosophers have no part to play in developing detailed strategies for both mitigation and adaption. Of course a philosopher who attempts to do something in this area can’t be *just* a philosopher. She needs to be scientifically, economically and politically informed. And her work is likely to be better if she cooperates with scholars from other disciplines. But this is true to some degree of a great deal of work within academic philosophy. (A philosopher who is just a philosopher is not likely to be much good even as an academic philosopher.) So there is definitely a place for academic work in this area. However, with all due respect to the fine work done by the many public-spirited philosophers mentioned above, I think more philosophers should be using their intellectual skills to argue the case for drastic action *in public* . (I should add that many of the philosophers whose work has has been alluded to have *also* been trying hard to get the message out, so I am not trying to get at them personally. ) If your work is only read by other professional philosophers or even if it is *mostly* read by other professional philosophers, it is not likely to have much impact on public policy. If you are not doing intellectual outreach and if nobody else is doing it on your behalf, then you won’t be doing much good. But there is a problem here : effective action on climate change involves big sacrifices in the present, to avert catastrophe in the future. Hence effective action is likely to be a hard sell, especially as it often means radically downsizing, if not abolishing, whole industries. (For example the dairy industry in New Zealand, on which a substantial amount of our exports depend, will have to be drastically reduced if we are to bring our per capita GHG emissions down to a reasonable level. That is going to put a lot of people out of work. International tourism will also have to be curtailed unless we can find some method of transporting people around the globe without emitting GHGs. That’s another big source of income gone. ) It may be that something like capitalism can be combined with the necessary restrictions on fossil fuel usage, but though capitalism may survive, there are many capitalistic enterprises will have to go to the wall. And this is not just bad news for those enterprises themselves but the for the many people who work for them. Those capitalistic enterprises will not go gently into that good night. On the contrary they will rage and rage against the dying of the light, and they will be able to mobilize many of their employees to rage along with them. (There are plenty of pro-capitalist writers who talk glibly about creative destruction, but there are not many capitalists who relish being creatively destroyed.) Thus arguing publicly for policies that are going to put many people out of work is going to be a thankless and disagreeable task, especially as you can expect to be viciously attacked by the intellectual hirelings and free-booting side-kicks of the many big businesses whose profits you will be trying to undermine. (See Lawrence Torcello’s post.) Indeed, effective action is only going to be saleable at all if you *also* argue for a society in which being out of work is a lot less unpleasant, which in turn involves major changes in the way that current capitalist economies are configured, with much higher taxes on the rich. This is something that the rich tend to resist. Furthermore, *effectively* speaking truth to power (that is speaking truth to power in such a way that you might actually be heard) is not just likely to be unpleasant – it is likely to damage your career. Even if you manage to keep your job and to stay out of jail (neither of which Russell managed to do), public polemics can lead to slower promotion. Time spent speaking on public platforms or arguing with politicians is time *not* spent writing up that article for Philosophical Studies, and hence time *not* spent winning those academic brownie points. (Of course there are some very energetic and talented people can have it all. They can succeed *both* as research philosophers *and* as public polemicists, sometimes even at the same time. But such hyper-talented people are relatively few and far between.) It’s also time not spent fulfilling your heart’s desire, which for many of us, I think, is to make a contribution to philosophy as a collective enterprise, to solve or to help to solve the problems that obsess us. Furthermore, if you are to effectively talk the talk you must be seen to walk the walk. That means (usually) a lot less international jet-setting and conference-going than is compatible with a really successful academic career. John Nolt has argued (on conservative assumptions) that the average American in the course of her life is responsible for the death or suffering of two future people. The average American, however, is not a regular conference-goer. Hence she is responsible for far fewer GHG emissions than the successful globe-trotting philosopher. So if you want to be an effective polemicist on behalf of climate change action, you had better cut back on your globe-trotting for fear of being called out as a hypocrite. But if people don’t meet you they are less likely to take notice of you which means that you will probably be less successful as an academic than you might otherwise hope to be.

    Given all this, it is hardly surprising that relatively few philosophers have risen to meet the greatest moral challenge of the age. How much easier it is to write a righteous little article on some matter of much less pith and moment that will only be read by your fellow philosophers! That way you can salve your conscience and get that promotion at the same time! Indeed I suspect that one reason that climate change is less discussed than many far less important moral and political issues, is that people prefer not to think about a topic that makes them feel uncomfortable. We are all of us to some degree complicit in an economic system that is likely to lead to the deaths of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people. Surely this is a moral and political issue. And if we are moral and political philosophers surely we should be doing something effective about it. But doing something effective involves ….

    Getting back to Michael B’s second sentence, it worth pointing out that he makes a relevant mistake. He suggests that Russell *first* had a public reputation as an abstract philosopher which he *then* (in is eighties and nineties) deployed in the political arena, to protest against nuclear weapons. Not so. Russell did not *first* become a celeb, and *then* use his ‘fame and respect’ to argue about public issues. He *became* a celebrity *by* courageously taking a stand on the issues of the day, beginning with women’s suffrage and reaching an early climax with his opposition to World War I. Here’s part of the blurb from Nicholas Griffin’s recent book *A Pacifist at War*:

    “The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 dramatically changed almost everything in Bertrand Russell's life. It was the War that made him a public figure and ensured that henceforth philosophy would only occasionally prevail over politics for his attention … He had, [however], no doubts at all that it was his public duty to oppose the War … The War made him a popular figure among pacifists and those on the Left who were opposed to it, but it made him persona non grata with the Government, including many of his erstwhile allies in the Liberal establishment. The costs to Russell of opposing the War were high. The government fined him, confiscated his passport, placed him under surveillance, banned him from certain parts of the country, and eventually jailed him. He was viciously attacked in print and in person and, on at least one occasion, physically assaulted. He lost his job at Cambridge, his academic career, and many of his former friends. During the War he was dependent on his brother for providing him a place to live and when it ended he was broke, jobless, and exhausted. None of this caused him to waver for a moment in his unrelenting opposition.”

    That’s what can happen to you if you take an unpopular public stand even if you are the heir to an earldom, a distinguished philosopher, the descendant of dukes, the grandson of a prime minister and one of the co-inventors of symbolic logic. And this happened to Russell in *Britain*, an allegedly democratic society, under a supposedly liberal pair of prime ministers. But the story also shows that you don’t have to *wait* to be famous before entering the fray. With the right polemical gifts, you can make your own fame whilst arguing your case. Perhaps you will be luckier than Russell was with WW1 (a war which he did not think he had shortened by one day). But if you fail you will at least have the satisfaction he had. You won’t be complicit in the catastrophe.

    And, just in case you are wondering, have *I* argued the case publicly for climate change action? Yes, I have, though like many another, I am well aware that I have done nowhere near enough.

  35. s. wallerstein

    Charles Pigden,

    The quote of the day:

    There are plenty of pro-capitalist writers who talk glibly about creative destruction, but there are not many capitalists who relish being creatively destroyed.

    Thanks.

  36. Perhaps if philosophers were a bit more serious about the issues raised by Pigden, we'd be taken more seriously.

    "We're 95% sure that at least 50% of the warming is human caused", isn't the kind of firm ground needed to support massive economic changes. The potential human catastrophe of warming needs to be weighed against the potential human catastrophe of the enormous economic carnage associated with the kinds of unpopular policy changes mooted. A quick glance at the UN's development index shows a whole lot of capitalist-ish societies at the top. While there's merit to making being out of work, "a lot less unpleasant", the idea that this is realistically doable while transitioning to a non-capitalist society deserves at least passing reflection. There will be real costs here, and they will be borne the most by people who live lives of quiet desperation. Their anger won't need goosing by their capitalist masters.

    That's not an argument for the status quo. It's an argument that the costs and benefits need to be weighed in a clear-eyed manner – that perhaps we ought not to reduce these issues to bumper sticker quotes (pace Wallerstein).

  37. ajkreider, I wasn't trying to reduce Mr. Pigden's arguments to a bumper sticker quote. I was celebrating the excellence of his wit.

    If you inhabit a psychic universe where creative wit is no longer a virtue, that's frightening.

  38. This year's Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference is devoted to climate change.

    https://www.uidaho.edu/class/philosophy/news/inpc-2016

    In reply to Brian's suggestion that there isn't much for philosophers to add, its regrettable that our discipline has been professionalized to the point where things that aren't brilliantly original are deemed not worth saying. There are several relevant and accessible points we are well qualified to explain (the tragedy of the commons, for instance). And while we may find these obvious enough, they remain enlightening and even motivating to our students and members of the public. Climate change strikes me as perhaps the most important of a great many important issues where philosophers have by and large simply abandoned the role of public intellectual.

    BL COMMENT: My point had nothing to do with either professionalization or brilliant originality (though a conference on the topic of climate change surely looks like a sign of professionalization to me!). My point is that there aren't hard or even particularly easy philosophical issues here. The "tragedy of the commons," which is standard fare for economists, is hardly a pertinent counter-example.

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