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Anglophone departments aren’t “Departments of European and American Philosophy”…

Brian Leiter

…and I'm sure at least Professor Van Norden knows that all too well.  Huge stretches of European philosophy–from Hegel to the present, say, or in the 12th through 14th-centuries–are also neglected in many of the top 50 PhD programs.  Most of the top 50 PhD programs do not have any faculty teaching American philosophy of the 19th-century.  What unites the curricula at these programs is not a commitment to "European and American philosophy" but a commitment to a style of doing philosophy, that derives from some British philosophers, some Continental European ones, and some American ones (it's also a style that is increasingly popular in parts of Asia, by the way)–and it's a style whose leading practitioners now include Asian-Americans, Hispanics, and African-Americans.  I empathize with the desires of Professors Garfield and van Norden to see their fields less neglected–I'd like to see my own fields less neglected too!  But playing the "diversity card" in this context is a dangerous game to play, that will lead to changes in the field that I'm quite sure Prof. Van Norden won't welcome (I know Prof. Garfield less well, so can offer no opinion about how he might view the ramifications).

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50 responses to “Anglophone departments aren’t “Departments of European and American Philosophy”…”

  1. Daniel

    I think you're right to emphasize that what unifies most top PhD programs is practicing a certain style of philosophy. The study of figures like Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant belongs to such departments in part because scholars have spent decades, and sometimes centuries rendering their philosophy partly continuous with that methodology.

    There is then, I think, an open question whether similar reconstructive work on non-canon European figures, like Cudworth, or figures from further outside the canon could produce interesting new additions to our philosophical understanding. I think we should encourage such work, and I think we often do. (Historians are always looking for fresh ground to till.) But we also should be willing to accept that some philosophers really do belong to the B team.

    I also worry that prior to the development of such scholarship, we should be careful about how we try to diversify the canon in teaching. When we teach the average early modern survey course, we often present Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, etc. as if they were analytic philosophers, carefully presenting their arguments with numbered premises. The vast majority of teachers don't have the time or skill to do the same with the non-canon figures they try to toss into their classes. The effect is that it really looks like tokenism – like you're throwing in a class or two on these crazy ladies who don't seem to make as good arguments as the traditional white men. The same holds, in spades, for people further beyond the canon.

    Reply
  2. LK McPherson

    What Garfield and Van Norden wrote is: "We therefore suggest that any department that regularly offers courses only on Western philosophy should rename itself 'Department of European and American Philosophy.' This simple change would make the domain and mission of these departments clear, and would signal their true intellectual commitments to students and colleagues."

    This proposal appears to have nothing to do with playing any "diversity card" (whatever might be meant by that). But perhaps a simpler renaming to "Department of Western Philosophy" would do.

    One could maintain that "what unites the curricula" at "most of the top 50 PhD programs" is not a commitment to Western philosophy but "a style of doing philosophy." In the present context, at least, this would be a distinction without much of a difference and somewhat misleading.

    The headline for this "Department of Philosophy" homepage tells an honest story, for example: "The Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago offers exceptionally broad and deep programs in western philosophy at the doctoral and baccalaureate levels…." The story goes on to affirm Chicago's status as a "department in the western philosophical tradition, with its center of gravity in the analytic tradition of philosophy."

    In such spirit, most departments could and probably should, for the sake of perspicuity, add "Western" to their name.

    Reply
  3. anon grad student coward

    These kinds of pieces are really "all the rage" now, aren't they? I'm doing my PhD in Chinese philosophy and I personally can't stand this rhetoric. (Many grad students I meet in the field don't like it either.) It's massively unproductive. People work in all sorts of fields that don't attract the attention that those working within them would like to see. It's just that world philosophy specialists are allowed to use the rhetoric of Eurocentrism and play the diversity card to complain about their particular case. It's a domain-specific complaint lodged against a domain-neutral problem in any "specialty" philosophy that's underrepresented.

    In terms of Chinese philosophy being taken more seriously, there are real issues that worry me, but I think this kind of rhetoric exacerbates it. I want my work to be respected because it's philosophy. Not because it's Chinese. I want my work in top journals because it's philosophically rigorous and relevant. Not for diversity's sake. That said, philosophers hardly ever ask, "Why study Kant?" but I can't tell you how many times philosophers ask me, "Why study Chinese philosophy?" as if the latter needs an extra reason to be taken seriously that the former doesn't. This general perception is a problem, but guilt-inducing rhetoric about Eurocentrism isn't the right response. Careful and persuasive thought on the subject is, and that's strictly a function of how seriously people who actually study Chinese philosophy take it, not how seriously people who don't study it do.

    It's in this respect that I think Chinese philosophy ought to be taken more seriously, and that will only happen as more people take it seriously. And this goes for people who work on it too. Comparative philosophy won't cut it. (I wish we'd drop that business altogether.) Nor will it suffice as something one person in a dept "knows a thing or two about" to get students adequate exposure or supervision. (There are lots of people who publish in specialty journals on Chinese philosophy but whose main interests lie elsewhere.) Thinking clearly, rigorously, and expertly about the history of ideas and philosophical insight in ancient China, however, is something that only people in Chinese philosophy can do, and it is the only thing they can do to improve the status of Chinese philosophy in US academies. Do work that demands attention. Don't demand attention for your work. That's silly.

    Wherein lies the ethical issue of a lack of Chinese philosophy in US universities? I'd say in so far as it drastically decreases students' chances of taking it seriously. In that respect, sure. Depts should have more Chinese philosophy folk because Chinese philosophy is worth studying and therefore worth teaching to undergrads. I'd never study this stuff at the graduate level if I didn't go to an undergraduate institution with a Chinese philosophy scholar, and statistically speaking it's pretty unlikely that my dept had such a person. Furthermore, it would be better if there were more options for programs students could apply to and study Chinese philosophy *with adequate supervision* (i.e., with supervisors with deep linguistic understanding and historical knowledge of the canon). As Chinese philosophy work gets better though I think it will only naturally demand more attention, as it has been.

    That progress isn't being made fast enough though seems to be a misguided complaint, since in the western academy, Chinese philosophy, especially of the philosophical, textual, historical, and linguistic caliper that it is done at currently, is quite young. Those who make lots of noise about the process not happening faster remind me a lot of the man from Song of *Mencius* 2A2.

    Reply
  4. Brian Leiter

    I agree that "Western" would be a lot less misleading than "European and American."

    Re: "diversity card": racial, ethnic and cultural diversity has a positive valence these days, lack of diversity a negative valence. By associating the neglect of their fields of study with a lack of diversity, they hope to enlist the valence on behalf of their subjects. But their subjects are not the only ones that are neglected, though not all can avail themselves of the "diversity" valence.

    Reply
  5. Akilesh Ayyar

    'What unites the curricula at these programs is not a commitment to "European and American philosophy" but a commitment to a style of doing philosophy'

    This is acutely put. There is a disjunct between philosophy in this style and philosophy in the more popular sense of the term: a more general wrestling with how to live life.

    It seems to me that many of the ignored branches of philosophy, European or otherwise, have in common that they emphasize this second conception or style of philosophy. The American transcendentalists, the Stoics, the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers — so much of their work concerns philosophy as the investigation of how to live. They seek to generate practical, bottom-line conclusions that change one's day-to-day actions and mindset.

    Is it sensible for there to be a space — in the academy or elsewhere — for an intelligent and collaborative investigation in this second style, an investigation that admitted ideas from all schools of thought, all spans of time and all cultural traditions? Is there enough common ground to speak coherently of collective endeavor?

    Could one ever prevent such a space from degenerating into shallowness, misunderstanding, and projection? Is the latter style of philosophy something that necessarily advances not through group endeavor but only through the private, idiosyncratic engagement of thinkers with their own questions?

    Reply
  6. Brian Leiter

    I'm a bit more skeptical that #5 about whether "wrestling with how to live life" is going to demarcate the philosophres who figure in the curriculum of the Anglophone curricula and those who don't. I take it that lots of canonical Western figures, starting with Plato, are centrally interested in "how to live life." Conversely, much neglected European philosophy–say, phenomenology–is not obviously concerned with "how to live life" at all or, at best, very indirectly.

    Reply
  7. Daniel Kaufman

    Pretty embarrassing article. As if anyone who isn't already convinced listens to these sorts of SJW dog whistles anymore.

    Philosophy as it is taught in American is overwhelmingly Analytic. While one can lament this for all sorts of reasons, what one cannot do is claim that this is some sort of "diversity" — with its implicit correlate, "racism" — problem. 'Cause it ain't just Indian and African philosophy that are left out, but huge swathes of good old, white, European philosophy as well.

    The authors are thus either (a) being disingenuous or (b) woefully ignorant about how philosophy is actually taught in the US.

    Reply
  8. ArgumentsMatter

    I grade my students’ papers by the quality of the arguments. So, it is presumed by me that quality of philosophy depends on quality of arguments.
    It is an observable fact, moreover, that the argumentation in non-Western (and Continental) philosophy is more enthymematic. (Not always, but typically.) Moreover, enthymemes are normally poorer quality arguments.
    So normally, non-Western philosophy comes out as poorer in quality.
    And poorer quality philosophy deserves less attention in the philosophy curriculum.

    Having said that, however, I think it would be good to distinguish between “dialectics” as a discipline (where quality of argumentation is supreme).–versus a broader notion of philosophy, where “philosophy” means something like “worldview.” Philosophy, on this broader conception, SHOULD be more inclusive. But this is not to say that “dialectics” has no place as an academic discipline.

    It would be unsurprising, by the way, if dialectics currently ended up more “white.” Becoming skilled in argument requires education, and educational opportunities are diminished for those who are not white. But the solution is not to devalue argumentative skill. The solution is to ensure more educational opportunities.

    So let a thousand flowers bloom in “philosophy.” Just make sure that one of the flowers is dialectics.

    Reply
  9. Tom Hurka

    I often ask "Why study Kant?" and never get a decent answer.

    Reply
  10. Steven Levine

    ArgumentsMatter shows how silly those who supposedly take arguments seriously can be. If we read between the lines just a little bit their argument is this: I assert that argument is what philosophy is about. People who don't do analytic philosophy in the way I was taught it in graduate school don't argue well. So all philosophy that goes beyond the boundaries of what I was taught in graduate school is basically stupid. The ignorance displayed here is so massive (in light of all of the dialectical philosophy done in non-western traditions even by people not lucky enough to have the awe-inspiring and never before to be seen educational opportunities that we have) that one gets the idea that the comment is not meant seriously. If it is meant seriously, then what we have here the classical argument from ignorantio: If I don't know something then it must not exist.

    Reply
  11. anon

    The push-back I'm seeing here to what I take to be a rather uncontroversial thesis (the thesis that philosophy departments tend to neglect non-western philosophy) is both predictable and disheartening.

    After all, Garfield and van Norden are explicitly not arguing for more diversity in the standard curriculum of philosophy departments, but rather arguing for the far more modest claim that departments should at least admit where their emphasis lies.

    Yet as to the question of whether or not the mainstream academic "style" alluded to here would be better served by working to engage thinkers outside the narrow confines of the Western canon, do people really want to argue that the rather obvious neglect of these figures is somehow a virtue?

    Especially frustrating to me is the claim that the Garfield/van Norden thesis is somehow "dangerous." Dangerous to whom, exactly? And if all it takes to become dangerous is to suggest that departments be more honest about their neglect of non-western thinkers, then perhaps the real problem lies in the reflexive defensiveness of those who want merely to maintain the status quo.

    BL COMMENT: My objection was to (1) the suggestion that departments should be remained departments of "American and European philosophy" when the vast majority do not cover five hundred years or more of European philosophy and an entire century of American; and (2) framing this in terms of diversity, as though geography were the explanation for the shape of the curriculum.

    Reply
  12. anon

    I can't say I'm tremendously sympathetic to the linked article, but claiming that non-Western and "continental" philosophy, which together comprise hundreds of figures over thousands of years, are "more enthymematic" and therefore of poorer quality strikes me as a great example of a type of ignorant dismissiveness that we ought to shun. I'm happy to be corrected however.

    Reply
  13. anon

    BL COMMENT: My objection was to (1) the suggestion that departments should be remained departments of "American and European philosophy" when the vast majority do not cover five hundred years or more of European philosophy and an entire century of American; and (2) framing this in terms of diversity, as though geography were the explanation for the shape of the curriculum.

    **

    OK but this seems a somewhat pedantic and uncharitable response to the spirit of what Garfield/van Norden are saying, since what they are saying is that even major non-western thinkers are routinely neglected in many/most departments, while none of those same departments would see fit to neglect canonical figures such as Plato or Kant. The fact that many branches and eras of western philosophy (and many minor western thinkers) are also neglected does not seem to refute their larger point here.

    BL COMMENT: I suppose it could only seem "pedantic and uncharitable" to someone uninterested in the centuries of American and European philosophy regularly neglected by the departments that Garfield & Van Norden propose renaming, quite misleadingly, "Departments of European and American Philosophy"!

    Reply
  14. Daniel Kaufman

    Really? It's hard to explain why perhaps the single most important epistemologist and ethicist of the modern era should be studied by philosophers?

    BL COMMENT: Dan, I think Tom disagrees with that assessment! He was also, I suspect, making a joke.

    Reply
  15. Daniel Kaufman

    anon wrote:

    The fact that many branches and eras of western philosophy (and many minor western thinkers) are also neglected does not seem to refute their larger point here.

    KEYWORDS:
    Primary Blog

    Reply
  16. johnny_thunder

    I agree with Brian's and Daniel (#1)'s explanations of the make-up of the canon. I would add that much recent African American philosophy is continuous with the methodology and concerns of contemporary analytic philosophy and merits more coverage in undergraduate courses. I'm thinking of the excellent literature centering around work by Mills, Shelby, Bloom, Zack, Garcia, and others. Not only is this work of the highest philosophical caliber, but it's on problems that are of obvious and central importance; while I disagree with much in Mills's _The Racial Contract_, one thing I think he's right about is that racism is too fundamental to western societies to receive as little philosophical attention as it does. Compare its prevalence on undergraduate syllabi to that of abortion, the death penalty, and animal rights.

    More emphasis on racism would lead to more racial diversity in syllabi, but the argument for it, which I just sketched, doesn't depend at all on the positive valence of diversity.

    Two related points:

    – "European and American" doesn't at all capture Van Norden and Garfield's intended meaning–Lame Deer is an American philosopher, as are many excellent African American philosophers. I take it more philosophers from these groups would help with diversity, though they wouldn't make it less European-or-American.

    – The IEP entry on Wiredu that Van Norden and Garfield link to is symptomatic of the ineffective attempts to get people to read him that are common on the internet. Halfway through the IEP entry, I've encountered nothing of any real philosophical sophistication or importance (and very little that's philosophical at all–there are paragraphs and paragraphs about "the discipline" that go nowhere). Here is one of the first discussions of the substance of Wiredu's philosophy:

    "It would be appropriate to examine more closely his article “The Akan Concept of Mind”. Here, Wiredu enumerates the ways in which the English conception of mind differs markedly from that of the Akan, due in a large part to certain fundamental linguistic dissimilarities. He also makes the point that “the Akans most certainly do not regard mind as one of the entities that go to constitute a person” (Ibid. 121). It is significant to note this, but at the same time, it is difficult to imagine the ultimate viability of this approach. Indeed after reformulating traditional Western philosophical problems to suit African conditions, it remains to be seen how African epistemological claims can be substantiated using the natural and logical procedures available to African systems of thought. As such, it is possible to argue that this conceptual manoeuvre would eventually degenerate into a dead-end of epistemic nativism. These are the kinds of issues raised by Wiredu’s project."

    What on earth is "the English conception of mind"? And what is "epistemic nativism"? Why is it a "dead end"? Neither term is explained at all. Cavalier use of undefined technical jargon is, of course, a major turn off for a lot of philosophers nowadays.

    Some deep thinkers say interesting things by means of undefined technical jargon. But in this case, no motivation or argument is given for the main thesis that's introduced (that the mind doesn't constitute a person); rather, it's difficult to imagine that the approach is viable–though we're not told why this is so either. So we're supposed to accept without argument that a claim that we had no reason to countenance is the first place is probably wrong.

    The reason I'm criticizing the entry is that it's offered in all seriousness as a reason to put Wiredu in the canon, alongside Hume. And it's representative of these kinds of attempts, within discussions of diversity, to push him as the African member of the canon (there has to be one!).

    So for those who think Wiredu is worth reading: most of us need evidence that a work outside of our specialty will be good before we devote a lot of time to reading it. I'm not asking for a journal article on him; a sketch of one of his more interesting arguments, of the kind that can be given in a blog comment thread, would do.

    Reply
  17. anon

    Daniel Kaufman wrote:

    Their point is ultimately a diversity — code for racism — complaint. That Analytic oriented departments equally neglect plenty of white European philosophers reveals this line of critique to be bogus

    ***

    Their claim is that all or most major non-western thinkers are neglected; your claim is that some or many minor western thinkers are neglected. There is an obvious asymmetry here in that your claim of neglect can charitably be explained by the fact that the constraints of time and focus necessitate that some lesser figures be left out, but their claim of neglect is more likely explained by the historically self-evident leftover legacy of tacit Eurocentrism.

    Reply
  18. Jdrabinski

    Managing to take a critique about the unbearable whiteness of the profession and turn it into the imperative to teach even more white people = the whitest thing to happen in a long time. Amazing.

    Reply
  19. Derek Bowman

    "As if anyone who isn't already convinced listens to these sorts of SJW dog whistles anymore."

    But of course this sort of resort to the SWJ ad hominem is itself just a dog whistle. Which group are you whistling to, I wonder.

    Reply
  20. Brian Leiter

    For those who lose track of my cyber-stalkers, #18, John Drabinski, is a white guy from Idaho (as he told me once) with a PhD in philosophy from the University of Memphis who is a Professor of Black Studies at Amherst. He also loves to shut down adult conversation with reckless accusations of "racism" (though I admire his restraint this time!), and is an all-around awful person and serial defamer of many academics, including me. I debated whether to approve his comment, but what the heck, it's instructive, though not in the way he intends.

    Reply
  21. Daniel Kaufman

    It is not credible to suggest that someone is motivated by racism, when it turns out that he not only neglects non-European authors, but an entire tradition of European authors. And no, you can't "charitably" claim that the reason for ignoring all of phenomenology is because Husserl and Heidegger are "lesser figures." The much more "likely" explanation is that there is an overwhelming Analytic bias in American philosophical education. Something which … er … we knew already.

    The effort to turn it instead into an exercise in racism is depressingly predictable, given the quarters this sort of charge comes from, but not credible in any serious sense. I'm sure these sorts of bogus accusations will continue to be levied, given the current political demographics of the liberal arts and humanities, and they will continue to give the general public the impression that we are a bunch of left-wing crazies, which, as we know, is doing the liberal arts and humanities a great deal of harm already.

    BL COMMENT: As an actual "left-wing crazy," I resent that! But I know what you mean–you're talking about the identity politics crowd.

    Reply
  22. Daniel Kaufman

    Your non-substantive reply reminds me of that old third-grade classic: "I know you are, but what am I?"

    Reply
  23. Daniel Kaufman

    Yes, Brian, that's what I meant.

    Reply
  24. anon

    Daniel Kaufman wrote:

    "the reason for ignoring all of phenomenology is because Husserl and Heidegger are "lesser figures." The much more "likely" explanation is that there is an overwhelming Analytic bias in American philosophical education."

    **

    Who is ignoring phenomenology? Most departments, even analytically inclined ones, in the anglophone world have specialists who work on one or both of the figures you mention; compared to various non-western philosophical traditions (such as classical Indian philosophy or even the western tradition of Islamic philosophy), continental phenomenology is not only not ignored it's quite clearly mainstream (perhaps under-represented or not as central as analytic philosophy but hardly invisible).

    As to your point about racism, I was speaking about a historical legacy of Eurocentricism as an explanation for the overall neglect of non-western thinkers, which is perhaps more implicit and subtle (understood as a cultural legacy) than what you are characterizing as explicit racism.

    BL COMMENT: The comment about phenomenology is not accurate, Most "top 50" PhD programs (the benchmark used) do not have anyone working on Husserl and Heidegger, for example: Rutgers, Princeton, Michigan, Southern California, MIT, Arizona, North Carolina, UCLA, Texas, Wisconsin, Cornell, Brown, Duke, Penn, Maryland, UC Santa Barbara, UC Davis, Rochester, Illinois/Chicago, Virginia, Minnesota, Colorado, Indiana, Ohio State, and that's off the top of my head.

    Reply
  25. Jonardon Ganeri

    It has been well known for several decades that much philosophy written in Sanskrit is highly analytical in style (one need only consult B. K. Matilal's *The Doctrine of Negation in Navya-Nyāya* to see this). So the argument from style itself favours a diversification of the curriculum and the canon.

    Reply
  26. Peter Smith

    And the same argument could be made that Christianity is not a part of the curriculum, Dianetics, and whatever else "should" be included. As I see it Garfield and his partner have confused religion and philosophy. There is no shortage of discussions and courses in religion departments of Buddhism, animism of various forms, folklore…blah…blah…

    Where they have not made this confusion, there is an issue of quality. Why would we include bad philosophy that is unintelligible and cannot withstand critical analysis? It is the same reason Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, and the rest see minimal engagement at most English speaking universities.

    Reply
  27. Philippe Lemoine

    The claim that American departments of philosophy are really committed to Western philosophy, as opposed to a particular style of philosophy, strikes me as plainly false. As others have pointed out above, there is also a large part of Western philosophy which is systematically ignored in those departments (which, to be clear, I think is mostly a good thing), because it doesn't fit with that style. That being said, it's also true that, among philosophers who fit with that style, non-Western authors are more likely to be ignored than Western ones. I think it's very unfortunate and that we should try to change that, but it's also clear to me that it has little or nothing to do with the fact that philosophers in American departments of philosophy do not think that non-Western philosophers can be interesting. I have no doubt that, when they come in contact with objectively good non-Western philosophy, philosophers in American departments have no problem recognizing the worth of that work. The problem is that, for obvious historical/cultural/linguistic reasons, they are just less likely to encounter non-Western philosophy, which is why non-Western philosophers are more often ignored than Western philosophers even when their work fit with the style of philosophy to which American departments of philosophy are committed. I'm sure that, to some extent, that is inevitable, though I agree that we should try to reduce that phenomenon. But we should also recognize that, for various reasons, that is not easy.

    Reply
  28. LK McPherson

    Please let the University of Chicago's "Department of Philosophy" know that their self-understanding as "really committed to Western philosophy" is "plainly false."

    As for the recurring notion that because some "large part of Western philosophy…is systematically ignored" by, say, many PGR-ranked departments, those departments can't more accurately be described as purveyors of "Western philosophy" — this is ridiculous, diversionary, and embarrassing.

    I can't figure out whether those pushing this notion are desperately self-deceived or, rather, simply gaslighting. Both possibilities are bizarre — as if, starting as undergrads, people in and around academic philosophy aren't aware of the profile of who teaches in research-oriented departments, curricular priorities, and a familiar disdain for non-Western and other non-"core" areas qua "real" philosophy. But no one needs to take my word for it: just go to the University of Chicago department's homepage. They have the honesty to spell out what they are, namely, a "department in the western philosophical tradition, with its center of gravity in the analytic tradition of philosophy."

    Why deny the obvious, and to what ends, other than to attempt to shut down "dissent" — as if demographics and sensibilities in academic philosophy aren't still on the side of the status quo? Come on, now.

    BL COMMENT: Lionel, I confess you've lost me! There's a lot of things misleading about the Chicago Department's self-description, but I agreed with you that saying it was "western" philosophy wasn't one of them.

    Reply
  29. Roger Eichorn

    Does the designation "Department of American and European Philosophy" imply "Department of *All* American and European Philosophy"? I don't think so, any more than "Department of Philosophy" implies "Department of *All* Philosophy." So, Brian, I find myself unmoved by your argument against narrowing the scope of the field covered (i.e., from "Philosophy" to, let's say, "Western Philosophy"). Why should "Department of Western Philosophy" imply universal coverage of Western philosophy any more than "Department of Philosophy" implies universal coverage of philosophy?

    This line of thought could, of course, be turned against Garfield and van Norden in turn. For given the lack of any implication to 'universality' (not the mention the practical impossibility of universal coverage), it might seem unobjectionable that any particular department of philosophy neglects certain areas. Fair enough. But I take it that Garfield and von Norden are suggesting (reasonably, it seems to me) that the nearly ubiquitous failure to cover *entire* philosophical traditions ('entire' meaning 'root and branch,' not just this or that branch) is a phenomenon importantly different from a failure to cover *parts* of a particular philosophical tradition (where 'tradition' is being used broadly, as in, 'the Western tradition,' 'the Indian tradition,' etc.).

    I'm also unmoved, in the context of Garfield and von Norden's article, by your claim, however correct it may be, that the "philosophy" referred to in departmental titles refers to a "style of philosophizing," rather than to an historical, geographically situated tradition. That "style" — let's call it, and this shouldn't be terribly controversial, "analytic" — is itself an historical tradition that arose in a particular place in the world, namely, Europe. If that's the "style of philosophizing" a commitment to which "unites the curricula at these programs," then it is surely, I would think, more accurate to refer to such programs as programs in "Western Philosophy" than in "Philosophy" as such, even if we grant that those programs exclude a great deal of philosophy that falls under the category of "Western."

    This would be true, it seems to me, *even if* it turned out that the nebulous concept of "analytic-style philosophizing" turned out to be an apt description of much non-Western philosophizing, insofar as the philosophy actually taught in these programs was exclusively (or near enough) Western.

    Also, it strikes me as irrelevant to this discussion that "analytic"-style philosophy has caught on outside of the West.

    And it strikes me as an example of viciously circular reasoning to suggest that "analytic-style philosophizing" (which is, more or less, the only kind taught in Western philosophy departments) is equated with "good, high-quality philosophy" and is thereby used as the yardstick with which to judge the quality of work done in philosophical traditions that virtually *no one* in Western philosophy departments know *anything* about. This is the same fallacious reasoning that leads many people not trained in Western academic philosophy to dismiss the entirety of analytic philosophy as hopelessly mired in inbred, Scholastic-style angel-counting.

    Finally, I can't refrain from commenting on Peter Smith's remark that "the same argument [as Garfield and von Norden's] could be made that Christianity is not a part of the curriculum, Dianetics, and whatever else 'should' be included. As I see it Garfield and his partner have confused religion and philosophy." This is utter nonsense. No halfway intelligent person could hold this view if he or she had *any* familiarity with the traditions referred to by Garfield and von Norden (not to mention a decent familiarity with *our own*, Western philosophical tradition, which cannot be so neatly divorced from the influence of Western religions as Peter Smith seems to think).

    BL COMMENT: I know only a bit of this was in response to me, but let me just comment on two points. First, a proposed narrowing of the departmental description does, indeed, imply something that is false. The philosophy department might not cover all or even most of the world's philosophical traditions, but surely a department of "European philosophy" ought not to neglect five centuries or more of European philosophy. Second, that analytic philosophy has an origin (as it obviously does) doesn't mean that it's illuminating to equate it with its place of origin, for its not the geography, but originally the substance, and now what remains of a style and a canon of authors, that defines it.

    Reply
  30. Allen Hazen

    Surely there are distinctions to be made. Jewish (hmm.. does Spinoza count?), Islamic (which, since many of the classic Islamic philosophers were commentators on Aristotle, might perhaps be seen as a branch of "Western" philosophy), Indian and Chinese philosophy are all recognizably philosophy. In each culture there was a tradition of philosophical debate, with later philosophers responding to earlier, with views therefore becoming better articulated and better defended. Philosophical writings from these cultures can, therefore, be approached and studied in the same way that philosophical writings of the western tradition can. The article, however, mentions, in the same list, American Indian and "Africana" philosophy. If there WAS(*) anything like a philosophical tradition, with arguments and responses to arguments, in the largely non-literate cultures of the new world and subsaharan Africa, I doubt we are in a position to know anything about them. So a call for their inclusion in the philosophical curriculum seems far less plausible than a call for more study of the others.
    —
    (*) Hmmm. Somewhere I have seen an account of LEGAL practice in some subsaharan culture, in which disputes would be argued before a panel of judges who would deliver opinions in some order– later ones responding to the arguments of earlier — until the last (and most senior?) one delivered the final judgment. A culture used to this would, I think, be one in which recognizably philosophical traditions could start. On another side, I know that not all pre-Columbian American Indian cultures were illiterate. But to the best of my knowledge we have nothing like a Mayan analogue of Plato's dialogues or Aristotle's treatises. So: this was a culture that MAY have had an interesting philosophical tradition, but one that is entirely lost.

    Reply
  31. anon phd (anon #12)

    I just don't have much faith in those who are most vocally championing diversity these days. Take a look at the Daily Nous threads on diversity. In one post on "deep diversity"(?) it was suggested that we expand philosophy to include dance, poetry, ideological commitments, and reports of one's feelings. In the most recent post it was suggested that critics of the Van Norden piece are comparable to the "all lives matter" reaction to those protesting police violence against black Americans (the tastelessness of this analogy seems not to have occurred to its author).

    Pardon my tone, but give me a fucking break. I, like others in this thread, welcome high quality work in non-western philosophy; in fact, I'd like to encounter more of it. But it is foolish to think that there is some morally "appropriate" balance we have to strike between "western" and "non-western" traditions, just as it is foolish to think that a resistance to diversifying the field for the sake of diversity is simply cultural chauvinism. It's downright idiotic to think we should change the standards and methods of contemporary philosophy in the ways described above.

    Per my own interests, there is plenty of western philosophy I'd like to see less of; but, for the same reasons, there is plenty of non-western philosophy that I think is historically and culturally interesting but philosophically moribund. I have no strictly philosophical interest in Islamic philosophy, for instance, for the same reason that I have no strictly philosophical interest in Christian philosophy, namely, because religious approaches to philosophical and empirical questions are intellectual dead ends. There, are, no doubt, brilliant figures in both fields, whose insights may be relevant to current debates, but time is short and resources are limited.

    These are, to be sure, merely my own preferences. We all have our own rank orderings of which traditions, figures, and questions matter more than others, and I am happy to let others show me, through their work, why I should pay more attention to their chosen topic. That being said, I see no moral imperative to champion others' work simply because it takes up figures from one geographical area or another.

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  32. Hsin-wen Lee

    I think we need to make a distinction between the topics and the methods of philosophy. My understanding is that analytic philosophy is a method of doing philosophy, and as such it can be applied to many topics– concepts, principles, etc. Thus, analytic philosophers can study Western as well as non-Western philosophy because they are just different topics. I take the authors' point to be that, if we look at the actual curriculum at the top 50 programs, it is clear that nonWestern philosophy is under-studied. This may have to do with the simple fact that analytic philosophy originates from Anglo-american societies.

    Analytic philosophy is not the same as Western philosophy. From what I understand analytic philosophy comes into existence maybe in late 19th century. Thus, one can engage in Western philosophy (the same topic) in an analytic or a non-analytic manner way (two different methods).

    If so, then one can study Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, etc. in both analytic and nonanalytic ways.

    I suspect that some might think that Chinese Philosophy is not an appropriate part of analytic philosophy because these philosophers did not engage in philosophical reasoning in the same way analytic philosophers do today. However, this does not mean that we cannot analytically study their philosophy. I personally think that there are many Western philosophers (Hegel, Nietzsche, etc.) who did not intend their philosophy to be analytical, but that did not prevent us analytic philosophers from studying them analytically.

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  33. anon grad student coward

    I have to disagree with your comment.

    Both Chinese philosophy and Buddhist philosophy are turning into respectable points of reference precisely because of the rigorous philosophical tools *now* being used in analyzing, critiquing, and reconstructing intellectual positions that were the result of deep ethical, political, and metaphysical disagreements that arose within the culture. That Chinese or Buddhist philosophy "cannot withstand critical analysis," or is more like religion is not really a plausible view to take up nowadays. People's work on these areas are showing up more and more in non-specialty journals not for the sake of diversity, but because the ideas being discussed are strong enough and the work on them is rigorous enough. This work is unfortunately rare though, for now. It's up to people in the field to make good on the promise that Chinese or Buddhist philosophy deserves a seat at the table. Given the state of research though I think it's more epistemically irresponsible to assume that these areas don't, but instead belong somewhere else.

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  34. Craig Larson

    I am a philosophically-interested mathematician who is very surprised by the bulk of comments here, in the NYTimes and in Daily Nous. Most readers seem sympathetic to Garfield and van Norden.

    It seems to me that the central parts of philosophy are timeless and *entirely independent* from traditions—and must be assumed to be. What is truth, and how do we know it, etc?

    Where the best approaches and who is responsible is no more relevant than it is in mathematics. It doesn't matter if the pythagorian theorem is due to the greeks, hindus, or chinese. The only thing that really matters is the theorem itself. Similarly, it doesn't matter that "Kant's explanation for mathematical truth" is due to a german. Maybe Kant found a hindu text, and rewrote it for a contemporary german audience. That part is for the historians. The important part is the *ideas*, whether its Kant himself, of hindu origin, or whatever.

    The majority of respondents seem more interested in talking about traditions and diversity rather than ideas. I think that's really bad, and don't understand it.

    I am intensely interested in the philosophy of mathematics. What is mathematical truth, and how can we know it? What exactly are the ideas that address these questions that the white european power-brokers in philosophy departments are keeping me from knowing. Do these exist? Are there are hindu, chinese, or other responses to Benecerraf's questions that are being withheld from me? The origins of the responses don't actually matter (maybe they stole them from Kant's unpublished notebooks!), just the *ideas*.

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  35. Anonymous

    I would like to look at this issue from a different perspective. I think the comparison between Philosophy and other humanities programs is misleading. I work in a department with 8 lines in it. At my university, History has 12, English 15. The truth is that these other programs just have more lines to work with.

    The department tries to offer a traditional program in philosophy. This means we're responsible for teaching students at the university about the major philosophical traditions of our society going back to the Greeks (nobody has argued that Western Philosophy shouldn't make up the focus, just whether it should be exclusive). So what do we need to cover? We cover Ancient, Medieval, Modern, Political, Ethics-1, Ethics-2, Phil. of Religion, Mind & Science. There are very good reasons for each of these (you need ancient to teach Plato and Socrates who are central; you need ethics for obvious reasons; etc.) The problem is that our tradition is more than 2000 years old and there's a lot to represent, and we can't even do that with our faculty.

    So it is not that I don't want to add some Chinese Philosophy or think there's no value there. It's that in a program like mine (which is not uncommon) there's not really room. Shall we replace our Ancient person? Our Ethicist? The problem only gets worse if we're to hire people in African, Islamic, and Eastern Philosophy. So I think the comparison with English and History is bogus (they have 30-40% more faculty). If you can convince our Dean to give us more lines I'm fine covering more.

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  36. Philippe Lemoine

    I never disputed that American departments of philosophy were primarily dealing in Western philosophy. I'm disputing what seems to be a common explanation of that fact, namely that it's because analytic philosophers think only work originating from a particular cultural area have a place in their departments. Rather, I think that analytic philosophers think only work that is done in a particular style or that is amenable to that style has a place in their departments, regardless of what cultural area it originates from. The fact that American departments of philosophy also ignore a large part of Western philosophy, such as contemporary French continental philosophy, which happens not to have a very different style even though it clearly originates from the West, obviously support that hypothesis whether you find it ridiculous or not. (By the way, I for one think that it's exactly as it should be, because I think much of contemporary French continental philosophy is completely worthless and shouldn't be taught in any department, even though I'm French.) Of course, as I noted in my previous comment, even among people who produce work in the style that analytic philosophers favor or that is amenable to it, non-Western philosophers are more likely to be ignored than Western philosophers, but there are obvious historical, cultural and linguistic reasons for that. Those reasons are compatible with and indeed probably explain to a large extent the fact, which I'm also not denying, that a lot of people in American departments of philosophy, though by no mean everyone, think that no work that originates in a non-Western philosophical tradition is philosophy of the kind they like. I have no doubt that a lot of people, because they are ignorant, believe something like that. But I have also no doubt that, if they went to a talk about, for example, Shankara's philosophy, they would recognize that it's the kind of things which has a place in their departments.

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  37. ananymous

    Non-philosopher here. It seems to me that the writers of the Times piece would say, were they to argue for more inclusivity, that there's no excuse for being unacquainted with how non-Western thinkers have dealt with the questions within fields such as Ethics and Philosophy of Mind. The next time one of these lines opens up, hire someone who knows more about the field.

    Reply
  38. Philippe Lemoine

    In my previous comment, "which happens not to have a very different style even though it clearly originates from the West" should of course read "which happens to have a very different style even though it clearly originates from the West", I just realized there was a typo.

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  39. BryanVanNorden

    I am grateful to the support Brian has given to the field of Chinese philosophy by including it in the Philosophical Gourmet Report (PGR) from very early on. Full Disclosure: I am a member of the Advisory Board for the PRG and was recruited for this position by Brian. However, I must respectfully disagree with him on this topic.

    The Comparison to Continental Coverage

    I agree completely that there are many Continental figures who are understudied in US philosophy departments. However, consider the following figures. The PRG ranks 13 schools that have expertise in "20th Century Continental philosophy." An additional 11 schools are unranked but "recommended for consideration by the Advisory Board," for a total of 24. (http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/breakdown/breakdown29.asp)

    In the area of "19th Century Continental Philosophy," the PRG ranks 20 programs, and lists an additional 4 programs as "recommended," for a total of 24. (http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/breakdown/breakdown27.asp)

    Now let's turn to Chinese philosophy: the programs are not ranked but simply grouped, "due to the small number of evaluators." Eight programs are "grouped," and an additional 5 are "recommended," for a total of 13. (http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/breakdown/breakdown33.asp) If the numerical disparity between the coverage of Continental and Chinese philosophy is not immediately obvious, consider these additional facts. Chinese philosophy is a tradition that is over two millennia long, and is as diverse as all of the Western tradition. So the PRG lists 24 doctoral programs as at least recommended in 19th century Continental philosophy, 24 at least recommended in 20th century Continental philosophy, and 13 at least recommended in all two thousand five hundred years of Chinese philosophy. Hmm.

    When we consider Indian philosophy…oh, there is no ranking for that at all.

    So, yes, Continental philosophy is understudied in the US. But it is worse in Chinese and Indian philosophy.

    The Quality Argument

    In an interview done by Skye Cleary and forthcoming in the APA Blog I make the following point. If someone tells me that Chinese philosophy (for example) is "not really philosophy" or is not sufficiently argumentative or "rational," I like to ask him: why he thinks that the Mohist state-of-nature argument to justify government authority is not philosophy? What does he make of Mengzi’s reductio ad absurdum against the claim that human nature is reducible to desires for food and sex? Why does he dismiss Zhuangzi’s version of the problem of the criterion? What is his opinion of Han Feizi’s argument that political institutions must be designed so that they do not depend upon the virtue of political agents? What does he think of Zongmi’s argument that reality must fundamentally be mental, because it is inexplicable how consciousness could arise from matter that was nonconscious? Why does he regard the Platonic dialogues as philosophical, yet dismiss Fazang’s dialogue in which he argues for and responds to objections against the claim that individuals are defined by their relationships to others? What is his opinion of Wang Yangming’s arguments for the claim that it is impossible to know what is good yet fail to do what is good? What does he make of Mou Zongsan’s critique of Kant, or Liu Shaoqi’s argument that Marxism is incoherent unless supplemented with a theory of individual ethical transformation?

    Of course, the answer to each question is that those who suggest that Chinese philosophies are irrational have never heard of any of these arguments because they do not bother to actually read them. Or, if they do bother to glance at them, they hold them to a higher standard of explicitness and clarity than they do Aristotle or Kant. (We are so used to reading Aristotle and Kant that we forget how unclear and unmotivated their claims will seem to someone who has not studied them in context, or with the guide of secondary sources and teachers.)

    Other arguments on this topic can be found in the excellent essays by
    *Eric Schwitzgebel, "Why Don't We Know Our Chinese Philosophy?" http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/NotKnowChinese.htm
    *Justin Tiwald, "A Case for Chinese Philosophy," http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/2EAF6689-4B0D-4CCB-9DC6-FB926D8FF530/v08n1Asian.pdf

    The Diversity Card

    If anyone has any doubts about the role of implicit racism in maintaining the status quo in philosophy, I would invite her to read Eugene Park's essay, "Why I Left Academia: Philosophy’s Homogeneity Needs Rethinking" (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hippo-reads/why-i-left-academia_b_5735320.html). Park was a doctoral student in a top-ranked philosophy department who was passionate about Western philosophy but also interested in exploring insights from non-Western philosophy. He was told that he should transfer to a program in "ethnic studies," where this approach would be more welcome. In the face of ethnocentrism like this, Park eventually dropped out. As Myisha Cherry and Eric Schwitgebel point out, philosophy has a diversity problem that is actually worse than that in other fields in the humanities, and it shows no signs of getting better. We must address issues of diversity if we wish for our field to survive in the future. (http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-schwitzgebel-cherry-philosophy-so-white-20160306-story.html)

    I agree that linking the call to study non-Western philosophy to issues of diversity will politicize it in ways that may lead to outcomes I would not prefer in an ideal world. Sadly, we are not in an ideal world. I and many others have been fighting with rational arguments for decades to try to get greater acceptance of non-Western philosophy into the curriculum. The rate of change has been glacial. Consequently, I increasingly think that the only way to effect change in philosophy is by appealing to students to mobilize and demand changes.

    For Moderate Change

    If philosophers want moderate, rational change, they can take simple steps. For one thing, the next time you have an opening, consider whether you need yet another person studying the philosophical traditions that grow out of Plato and Aristotle (both of whom I deeply, almost reverentially, admire). Wouldn't the field, and your students, be better served by someone teaching Indian, Chinese, or some other non-mainstream form of philosophy?

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  40. Anonymous in reply to ananymous

    I don't find this response very moving. You say "there's no excuse for being unacquainted with how non-Western thinkers have dealt with the questions…." I think this is worrying for a couple of reasons. First, the original suggestion was that we hire someone in (say) Chinese Philosophy as one position; that's why my comment focused on whom to "replace" in our department. Second, professors are hired into university positions because they are "experts", and don't just have "an acquaintance", with an area. You don't hire someone who teaches Ethics because they know a little about everything ever written on ethics around the world. People do dissertations on "Kant" and then come work for you, and they generally focus on an area. Finally, from your comment I'm not sure you appreciate how large the field of Ethics is. The field of Western Ethics itself has a 2000 year history and nobody knows everything about the subject. We need two ethicists at my school just to cover undergraduate courses in this area. So your suggestion to (merely?) hire a broader person isn't realistic to me. I appreciate your point but it's more complicated.

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  41. Brian

    Thanks to Bryan for his detailed reply. I'll just note that Mr. Park's essay was the subject of some critical discussion by me way back when: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/11/blast-from-the-past-ignorance-of-philosophy-identity-politics-and-the-cosmopolitan-ideal.html

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  42. anon phd

    While I am not entirely in agreement, I find your response helpful. A few questions:

    First, I wonder if you could say more about which areas, topics, or figures we ought to de-emphasize in order to focus on non-western philosophy. I do not mean to ask this in bad faith. I ask because, given that resources are already fairly constrained, it is something that needs addressing, particularly given that there are plenty of "Western" areas (e.g. contemporary analytic philosophy of race) that are, at least in my view, not getting enough play as it is.

    Second, you mention a variety of "non-Western" thinkers whose arguments are relevant to perennial and/or contemporary "Western" philosophical debates. If those thinkers' views are being overlooked (and it seems likely to me that they are), and their views can valuably contribute to these debates (as is likely the case), then by all means, bring these arguments to the table. As you suggest, perhaps Kantians should engage with Mou Zongsan and Marxists with Liu Shaoqi. It does not follow from these observations, however, that we ought to promote certain projects merely based on the place of origin of the thinkers involved.

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  43. Brian Leiter

    One other observation regarding the part of Prof. Van Norden's comments replying to me. I agree with him that "Continental philosophy is understudied in the US. But it is worse in Chinese and Indian philosophy." However, the PGR data quoted actually makes it look better for the study of the Continental traditions than it really is, since many of the ranked program are not among the top 50 PhD programs. Although the situation for the study of the Continental traditions, not to mention mediedval philosophy, is not as bad in the top 50 as it is for Chinese and Indian philosophy, it is still bad enough that labeling existing departments "Departments of European Philosophy" would be highly misleading.

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  44. Leslie glazer

    good point. my own sense is that it might be better to think of this in terms of the sort of analysis MacIntyre started to lay out in his 'whose justice? which rationality?' where reasoning and arguments are considered in the context of traditions of reasoning and arguments developed over time, with their own sets of assumptions, questions, solutions, and residual problems. in this sense modern analytic departments have their own histories and lineages emerging perhaps out of the enlightenment and scientific revolutions. from the standpoint of this tradition even the study of the history of philosophy is sometimes relegated to a sideline. western individuals and traditions tangential to this line of arguement are as many here noted also neglected. and non western traditions as we find in india, tibet, and china are not even on the radar— seen as too religious or poetical. the problem is of course that neither the professors or students have the time to master all that many traditions.

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  45. Leslie glazer

    If philosophy departments were organized as conversations of the great minds or as great books then for sure the gita would be taught alongside the bible, Confucius alongside aristotle, and dharmakhirti alongside kant. but that really isn't how things are for the most part taught. people teach what is familiar to them and what they believe are the works that set the ground for their sets of problems and questions. some people stretch beyond this of course in the hope of transcending the limits of their own frame, but that is unfortunately not as common as one might hope. it is enough work for most of us to read deeper into the tradition we are a part of. the way to begin to have figures included may be to begin to make the argument or enter an extant debate and demonstrate the power of the unfamiliar thinker or tradition, creating a conversation between traditions of sorts. can shantideva contribute something to contemporary ethical debate? or dharmakhirti help add a new twist to an epistemological one? thats the challenge that would make an argument for including them in a philosophy department. thats the real argument, not include them for diversity's sake, but because they actually can deepen and push forward our understanding. The same holds for continental philosophy— why read nietzsche or hegel or heidegger? or the philosophers of the middle ages— why read aquinas?

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  46. Barry Lam

    In reply to Anon phd 42 regarding which areas to "de-emphasize," there are most likely no rules we appeal to since departments vary much in their coverage and everyone thinks some area is underrepresented in their department. But one thing I haven't seen in all of the blog and NYtimes comments is a reversal of perspective. More humans are Chinese than any other nationality, more humans are asian than any other ethnicity. As these countries develop into the future superpowers and have more people attending college than there are people in all of America and Western Europe, which areas of "Eastern" philosophy should they de-emphasize in their curriculum in order to bring Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, let alone work on the grounding of epistemic modality in the sleeping beauty problem to their philosophy students? Judging from many comments everywhere, my sense is that some people are committed to the claim that these countries should teach no Chinese-Indian, etc. philosophy, since they're incredibly confident that certain methodology arising from one strand of Western philosophy is the sole reliable guide to truth.

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  47. JC

    @Bryan Van Norden on "the quality argument."

    I think to some extent this call for inclusion overlaps historians' of philosophy calls for the inclusion of their AOSs (renaissance, medieval, Vico studies, etc.). The argument goes something like this: the current debate about x (or some currently relevant view in whatever determines what currently relevant views are–is it the "Anglo American" philosophy journals?) covers territory already covered by Ibn Basha, among other figures. Trouble is, however, Ibn Basha's views are largely inaccessible to those not trained as experts (in the texts, the language, etc.) so they tragically get ignored. It needn't be racism (though some of it may be); it might be a form of availability bias.

    In the face of this ignorance, one option is to show, as you do with that imagined encounter with the ignoramus greater than which none can be conceived, that there exist ideas in area x that apply to things currently under discussion. A substantial amount of literature on the history of philosophy (in particular medieval philosophy) makes this move. Having a debate about philosophy of language? Well, let me tell you about my friend William of Baskerville. This one still leaves standing the idea that whatever currently gets published is what is worthwhile (and therefore determines what counts as quality stuff I guess). So, on this view, you're still proving that area x is as good as this stuff. Nonetheless, it seems like it's an opportunity to write articles for Phil Studies or the Journal of Phil.

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  48. anon phd

    I agree that the comments you describe are foolish. That type of intellectual chauvinism has no part in the profession

    But as I see it, this debate concerns the soundness of including or promoting research based merely on the fact that it takes up thinkers from particular geographic origins. It is this idea that I find silly, especially when it is combined with the dubious claim that Chinese students need to see Chinese folks on the syllabus, Hispanic students need to see Hispanic folks, etc.

    As per your question, I would hope that foreign universities include whatever western philosophy they think intellectually warrants inclusion. What they should not do is include "Western" figures simply for the sake of representation.

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  49. Bennett Gilbert

    Summarizing this discussion—and taking no sides in it—philosophy dept.s ought to be called:
    The Department of That Certain Style of Philosophy Developed in the Anglophone Academy Since Kant With Additional Instruction in Other Styles of Philosophy From the Western End of the Eurasian Landmass and Parts of North America Plus Occasional Interest in the Rest of the World as Material Constraints and Good Will Allow.
    I am sure others can do better.

    BL COMMENT: I think that's the strongest argument for leaving the status quo on names alone, and fighting the actual battle over diversity of curricular content.

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  50. thefinegameofnil

    If the conversation is to be about "diversity of curricular content", then we should ask: why is such diversity sought? While it is not the case that "non-European philosophy belongs only in 'area studies' departments, like Asian Studies, African Studies or Latin American Studies", neither is it true that non-European philosophy (which is not an apt term) should be included in the canon as a matter of course; it is actually false.

    I have no problem with including, say, discussions of Confucius and those in dialogue with him alongside those of virtue ethicists like Aristotle and Philippa Foot. Whether or not anything is ever just, the onus is on, e.g., in that case, those working in Chinese Philosophy to show the canonical connections, which have, I think, been made. But in many so-called "non-European" areas of philosophy, little or no such quality work has been done. There is already a wonderful canon in philosophy, which we do well to not abandon for whatever ideological causes that are en vogue on campuses, which are increasingly filled with mewling millennial requests for "safe spaces" and validation, from Oberlin to Yale. (Are we really to believe that the most important racial problems in this country concern whether a dormitory at one of the wealthiest universities in the world is named after an alumnus who owned slaves (take your pick from Calhoun or Franklin, since privileged priggish Yale students evidently have a problem with either: http://news.yale.edu/2016/04/29/salovey-listens-student-disappointment-over-naming-decisions)? Academics are so out of touch with the reality of chronic unemployment and inferior education in our country's many ghettos, so we are continually fed the story that this is *the* story to be concerned with, all too often by privileged, priggish and well-heeled academics.)

    People like Hubert Dreyfus have done serious work in attempting to bring figures like Martin Heidegger, who are outside of the so-called analytic style of doing philosophy, into dialogue with that tradition. Those who feel that philosophers they study are neglected should undertake similar work.

    Like others I have spoken with, I am very distressed by the attention that this piece by Garfield and Van Norden is getting, when they call, among other things, for favorably comparing David Hume and Hilary Putnam to Frantz Fanon, Maria Lugones and Lame Deer. I do not know the latter three individuals' work very well, but it does not at all seem to be of the philosophical quality of what Hume and Putnam put out. Lugones is a living figure (https://www.binghamton.edu/comparative-literature/people/faculty/lugones-m.html), so perhaps we should compare her to living philosophers of great philosophical aptitude, like Saul Kripke, Robert Stalnaker and Timothy Williamson. I should like to hear the case made that Lugones' work has just as much philosophical merit as those philosophers' wonderful work. If that case is made, I am prepared to start including Lugones in my courses and calling for her to be included in the canon. But I am rather sure that it is much easier to get a camel through the eye of a needle.

    Garfield and Van Norden hope that "Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Kwazi Wiredu (1931- ), Lame Deer (1903-1976) and Maria Lugones will be as familiar to our students as their equally profound colleagues in the contemporary philosophical canon." They call for departments of philosophy to "face reality". Let us face the reality that it is not on account of racism or a racialised canon that Fanon, Wiredu and Deer are not taken to be as profound as Kripke, Stalnaker and Williamson.

    BL COMMENT: Just one personal observation: I think Fanon is quite a bit more significant than Stalnaker or Williamson, though I don't think it obvious why he belongs in a "philosophy department" rather than elsewhere. But this may also be to his credit.

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