…with some help from David Lay Williams (DePaul).
That AI behavior can be “adequately explained” in non-mental terms does not show that mental states don’t feature in the…
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That AI behavior can be “adequately explained” in non-mental terms does not show that mental states don’t feature in the…
The ‘boring argument’ equivocates between two uses of ‘explain’, and which premise I reject depends on how it’s disambiguated. Scenario…
I think that this is a thoroughly sensible piece, in part (full disclosure!) because it accords pretty well with my…
He addresses many arguments that give consciousness a special evidential standard. But it is illuminating not to do so. Call…
The ideas that “consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon” and that “simulating and being are very different” were emphasized by…
Okay, I think I buy it as a distinct category. I think you could fit the recent hacking incidents into…
Yeah, that’s from a (quite good) Scott Alexander blogpost.
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