A propos yesterday's post, a reader sends along these quotes from "experts" about the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used–it is hardly reassuring.   This scholar warns of the dangers of using Ukraine as a "proxy war" (as the U.S. has now admitted it is doing), and also suggests that ceding Donbas is one way to minimize the risk of Armageddon:

(Thanks to S. Wallerstein for the pointer.)

UPDATE:  Here's a more optimistic take, although it involves induction over a relatively short period of time and very few incidents.  But I hope he's right!

ANOTHER:  Philosopher David Wallace (Pittsburgh) writes with a useful clarification about the Democracy Now interview:

Just narrowly on your last Ukraine post: I read the essay by Anatol Lieven that’s the basis for his interview (it’s at https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/27/the-horrible-dangers-in-pushing-a-us-proxy-war-in-ukraine/) I don’t think he’s calling on the West to actively (encourage Ukraine to) cede the Donbas to Russia. Rather, he’s arguing that (i) if Russia actually does manage to conquer the Donbas, we should then aim for a peace treaty that recognizes that rather than encouraging Ukraine to engage in a long-term struggle to recapture it, and (ii) we shouldn’t support/pressure Ukraine to try to retake the 30% of the Donbas that Russia has controlled de facto since 2014 (much less to retake Crimea).

For what it’s worth (not much!) that strikes me as the right balance. Actually retaking Russian-controlled territory (especially long-held, long-fortified territory) looks like a recipe for a long, bloody, dangerous conflict, but I think actively ceding territory that an aggressor can’t capture conventionally because they threaten to go nuclear sets a precedent that in the long run is dangerous and destabilizing. (That’s putting aside the fairly disturbing humanitarian issues involved in Russia conquering and holding Ukrainian territory, given what we’ve already seen in Bucha and elsewhere – I appreciate that a cold calculus would discount them in the context of the risk of nuclear war.)

I had only listened to the interview, so may have misunderstood his meaning in the way Professor Wallace notes.  I should say I’m not so much worried about the threats Putin is making about nuclear weapons:   their official policy is to use such weapons when facing an existential threat.  The question is, as Luce said in the earlier piece, what they perceive to be an existential threat.   That’s what really worries me.  And Donbas isn’t worth finding out.