50 responses to “Things are about to get much worse when it comes to Ukraine”

1. David Wallace

   September 21, 2022 at 8:17 am

   Completely agree that it's alarming. That said, it's worth noting that nuclear weapons aren't an "I win" button, even against a non-nuclear opponent. Ukraine's military are pretty dispersed, mobile, and in close proximity to Russian forces; you'd need to use a large number of weapons to seriously damage them, which would mean a large number of explosions on nominally-Russian soil, to say nothing of the fallout (I think the wind in Ukraine often comes from the west, so Russia proper would likely be exposed too).

   The alternative would be to destroy Ukrainian cities to coerce a surrender. (I don't think a simple threat to do so would work – the bluff would be called, even if it wasn't a bluff.) I don't want to rule that out, but it would be an extraordinary risk for Putin (even leaving aside fallout issues). The optimistic scenario would be likely collapse of Russia's relations with India and China. The pessimistic scenario would be NATO retaliation, escalation, and the end of the world. And it's not even clear it would work: it's debatable, as I understand it, whether even Hiroshima and Nagasaki coerced a Japanese surrender.

   (Usual disclaimer that this isn't my area of expertise.)

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2. Nick Drew

   September 21, 2022 at 9:06 am

   Yes, it's alarming: but I see it somewhat differently to Stanovaya.

   Firstly, Putin's specific language is actually quite nuanced (though deliberately bellicose for the consumption of his local nationalist audience) – his nuclear threat is explicitly in the specific context of what he called western talk "about the possibility and permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction against Russia: nuclear weapons." And since no nuclear-armed government in the west (US, UK, France) will threaten him with nukes, his premise will go unfulfilled. In other words, he hasn't (yet) raised the nuclear spectre in respect of the ongoing Ukrainian conventional campaign of recapturing territory within the old borders. (Crimea might be a grey area.)

   I suggest the following likely sequence:

   1. The hasty referenda will indeed deliver the "votes" for annexation.
   2. The world will not recognize this as legitimate.
   3. Putin's mobilization will not quickly boost his effective forces on the ground: maybe in 2023.
   4. So Ukraine will continue taking back territorial ground: for them, nothing changes (and with every graveyard they exhume, they remember ever more clearly why they fight).

   By next month, Putin will be looking at yet further Russian retreats, and wondering anew what to do. The nationalists back home think they've heard him say he'll go nuclear at that point – but that's not correct, see above – and will be baying for a new response.

   That's when things might take a serious turn for the worse. But not tomorrow or the next day (if that's any comfort).

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3. Henry Cohen

   September 21, 2022 at 9:20 am

   The Washington Post has a column with the headline, "Chris Murphy’s warning: A GOP House would defund the Ukraine struggle." https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/20/chris-murphy-ukraine-republcan-house-defund/

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4. Preston Stovall

   September 21, 2022 at 9:21 am

   Thank you for sharing the Stanovaya analysis. It's remarkably perceptive, as the last six months have illustrated. I've lived in the Czech Republic since 2017, and attitudes toward Russia vary considerably. But the war has reinforced a view here of Russia as unfit for contemporary geopolitics. I'm not sure how well that's understood.

   From what I've seen, western media tends to treat Putin's claims about Russian separatist movements in the lands of Ukraine as propaganda meant to justify the war. It's true they are at least that, and there's no doubt local governments have been propped up to support Putin's annexation. But when he says he's protecting Mother Russia, this is something the man genuinely believes. In his mind, the Rus have a right to work the levers of power in Kyiv, not only because it is in the interest of Russia as a modern nation-state, but also because the lands of Ukraine are (in Putin's medieval view of history) the lands of the Russian people.

   Hitler thought much the same thing about the Sudetenland, of course, and appealed to the same sort of shared familial and land-owning ties as a basis for annexing Czechoslovakian lands. This highlights the absurdity in Putin's claims about Naziism in the west. He's castigating the west as Nazis while making a play for the Russian Sudetenland, complete with putative justification through racial identity and right to the land. I can see the rationale behind the referenda on joining Russia; it's abhorrent, but I understand it. The harping about fighting Nazis looks to be pure propaganda to me, unmoored from anything the man could give a sound reason for.

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5. Ludovic

   September 21, 2022 at 9:38 am

   The initiation of the "Special Operation" by Russia, besides being obviously a gross violation of international law, was a gamble often ascribed to an overly optimistic assessment by it regarding the strength of popular support for the Ukrainian government, etc.

   Moralistically, propagandistically, and of course legally, if perhaps not strategically, an Ukrainian initiation of "aggression" into the would-be "republics" and/or Crimea itself would have been far preferable for Russia. But after its reversals in Izium, and advances by Ukraine further into Luhansk (plus its claims to retake Crimea in a not too distant future), Russia faces the diametricization (an assessment abetted by the reporting of the Western MSM) of its entire operation.

   To wit, no longer a "precise, measured and quite restrained" "special operation" into a recalcitrant foreign state, but rather the likelihood or indeed eventuality of an aggressive war against it and its vital national interests, beginning with Crimea, but not limited to that.

   This diametricization is, in one strategic scenario, precisely the event that should have been the casus belli for Russia to begin with. The Ukrainian government and NATO, seconded by the Western MSM, themselves now state its not a question of if, but when Ukraine will invade Crimea.

   Moreover, the Ukrainian government, Western think tanks, and MSM journalists have all suggested not stopping at Luhansk and Donbass, or even Crimea, but of transforming the mission of Western support for Ukraine into the much vaster (which would be a true and incontrovertible aggressive escalation) project of dismantling Russia itself.

   Are these aforecited developments and transformations not precisely what allow, arguably "require," Russia to call for partial mobilization in preparation for a true defensive war against what it has for centuries claimed were its vital national interests: Crimea; Black Sea litoral; Russian border regions and ethnic enclaves and exclaves.

   Perhaps this diametricization of the conflict in Ukraine now offers Putin the war he always sought, not least of all morally, propagandistically, and legally: a defensive war in which the most foundational elements of what have been vital Russian national interests for centuries are manifestly at stake.

   In short, no longer an optional and aggressive war against Ukraine, but rather a defensive, indeed existentially defensive, war against NATO aggression spearheaded by Ukraine and directed at the multiple hearts of its national core interests and responsibilities: Crimea; Black Sea litoral; ethnic Russian exclaves and enclaves; the entire Western and Caucasian limes of the present Russia state.

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6. Mike P.

   September 21, 2022 at 9:42 am

   "Annexing" occupied parts of Ukraine makes it easier for the Kremlin to deploy conscripts to the war zone, on the grounds that such deployment is to destinations "within Russia." The Kremlin has already deployed conscripts to Ukraine illegally, but if future deployments are to nominally Russian territory, the authorities don't even have to pretend not to be using conscripts. It seems doubtful that the "referenda" are meant to draw a nuclear red line around Russian-occupied territory (though if Western leaders take it that way, so much the better, from Putin's standpoint). The Ukrainians have repeatedly attacked Crimea, not to mention strikes within Russia proper, without eliciting an unconventional response. Consider also that the calls for referenda and annexation were well-choreographed with a simultaneous call for (partial) mobilization of Russian reservists. Taken all together, it looks more like a bid to drum up some badly needed manpower than a sincere threat of nuclear escalation.

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7. Christopher Morris

   September 21, 2022 at 12:10 pm

   It is hard to take seriously a threat to use nuclear weapons, certainly strategic ones. What use would they have? The Russians are well aware that they could lose everything, starting with their fleet and military installations. (See also Nick Drew's first point above.) The 300,000 troops aren't going to do much. They will be hard to train, to deploy (by trains), to feed, etc — what is now well known by all. What Putin can hope to accomplish is to continue the war at a low level, putting pressure on the coalition (that is, Germany). But of course continuing the war would suit the US and many of its allies; we would continue the destruction of the Russian military, expecting the Chinese and others to take note.

   And there are serious demographic constraints on Russia, as well as logistical. See
   
   

   CM

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8. Peaceful IR Realist

   September 21, 2022 at 1:45 pm

   I'm not persuaded that the annexation-referendums are properly interpreted as an "ultimatum" in which Russia is threatening the West with nuclear war, as Stanovaya says. Alternatively, these referendums could be interpreted as (1) an expression of Russia's will to keep fighting, which Russia naturally feels compelled to display in light of its recent setbacks on the battlefield; or (2) a signal to the West about Russia's current demands and objectives (ie, Russia is telling us that what it wants now is to acquire strategicly valuable territory in the east and south). I don't really know why Russia is doing this, but there are plausible explanations for Russia's behavior that don't revolve around nuclear sabre-rattling.

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9. Steve Gerrard

   September 21, 2022 at 2:21 pm

   Uh oh, the Russians are going to try harder now.

   Which would you rather have, 6000 Russian tanks or 5000 American tanks? Same for 6000 Russian nuclear missiles versus 5000 American ones. It's not just how many, but also how good are they.

   The days of marching around with armies and conquering other countries is over, as the US has found out the hard way and the Russians are still finding out now. It's all about the economies these days, and Russia is not much of a player, falling in behind Brazil as it does.

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10. David Wallace

    September 21, 2022 at 4:34 pm

    "Which would you rather have, 6000 Russian tanks or 5000 American tanks? Same for 6000 Russian nuclear missiles versus 5000 American ones. It's not just how many, but also how good are they."

    If I have thousands of tanks, and you have thousands of tanks, but my tanks are better, then we can have a big armored battle and I will win. Go me.

    If I have thousands of nuclear missiles, and you have thousands of nuclear missiles, but my missiles are better, then you can destroy hundreds of my cities and kill tens of millions of my people, and I can do the same to your cities and your people, and if I do it in a more technologically elegant way than you, still it is not much consolation.

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11. Matt Lister

    September 21, 2022 at 6:45 pm

    It's hard to know how seriously to take what politicians (and perhaps especially ones like Putin) say, but it's worth reiterating that Nick Drew's account of what Putin actually said about nuclear weapons is correct, and what's said in the post is speculation or inference. We should, of course, take this very seriously, but taking things seriously also means not saying more than is supported.

    It's maybe also worth nothing that these moves don't seem especially popular. Lots of people are trying to leave right now, and there have been significant protests (in the face of actual and very serious danger – these are not like, say, protests against the Gulf War in the US)in several places in Russia, including in the center of Moscow. What the effect of this will be is something I can't say. A lot of actions of the Russian state have to be understood as attempts to keep those in power in power, and this often leads to actions that are not rational for "the state" as a whole. (See, this whole war.) These reaction may cause even more paranoia and lashing out on the part of Putin and those close to him, and of course many people will support the moves or be passive in relation to them. But, we should not think that this is a change in policy that will go smoothly.

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12. Jonathan Surovell

    September 21, 2022 at 8:52 pm

    Here’s Putin’s exact wording:

    “[Washington, London, and Brussels] have even resorted to the nuclear blackmail. I am referring not only to the Western-encouraged shelling of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant, which poses a threat of a nuclear disaster, but also to the statements made by some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries on the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia.

    “I would like to remind those who make such statements regarding Russia that our country has different types of weapons as well, and some of them are more modern than the weapons NATO countries have. In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.

    “The citizens of Russia can rest assured that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be defended – I repeat – by all the systems available to us. Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around.
    “It is our historical tradition and the destiny of our nation to stop those who are keen on global domination and threaten to split up and enslave our Motherland. Rest assured that we will do it this time as well.”

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/69390

    I agree with Nick Drew that the “spirit” of these paragraphs, taken together, seems to be just that Russia would use nuclear weapons in response to a *nuclear* attack on its territory. However, the part about using “all systems available” to defend Russia's “territorial integrity,” in isolation, does seem to literally imply Stanoyava’s interpretation, once the annexations go through. Suppose Putin goes through with annexing Luhansk and Donetsk. And suppose that Ukraine doesn't withdraw its troops from the region (indeed, it might liberate Lyman and then Severodonetsk) but Putin doesn’t respond with a nuclear attack. Could he really claim to have used “all systems available” to defend Russian territory, as he said he would?

    And if he doesn't make good on what can reasonably be interpreted as a threat to defend "Russian territory" with nukes (whether he meant it that way or not), might the Ukrainians and their allies infer that he won't do so for Crimea either? In other words, Putin has just committed the unforced error of giving himself the choice between nuclear escalation and degrading his nuclear deterrent.

    He'll have to decide soon. The annexations are, what, a week away? And as David Wallace and Nick Drew say, Ukraine and its allies will presumably call this bluff (whether it’s a bluff or not) and continuing the offensives in the Donbas and the South. It would be unreasonable to expect them to cave in response to this threat (if that’s what it is).

    This is just the latest example of Putin’s historic shortsightedness in his biggest decisions. He puts out one fire and, in so doing, starts another one; annexing Luhansk and Donetsk gives state media something to talk about for a few days but then comes the decision what to do about a Ukrainian offensive in them. Putin has never had a realistic plan to win or end the conflict, and since his fantasy of taking Kyiv in three days ran up against reality, he’s been in survival mode, trying to find something to take home and show the Russian public, to keep them happy for one more day. It's conceivable to me that he has blundered, or will at some point blunder, into a set of options that's so bad he finds himself seriously considering nuclear war.

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13. YAAGS

    September 22, 2022 at 2:17 am

    I don't see any reason why Russia would use nukes on Ukraine when it has extremely deadly nerve gas. Not unless we've supplied all the Ukrainians with full-body hazmat suits. (Though maybe we have!) More likely, the nuclear threat might be read as a reminder that if they use nerve gas on Ukraine and we retaliate by nuking them or launching a full scale invasion of Russia, they'll launch everything at us. Though I feel that's a bit obvious.

    Also, nerve gassing Ukrainians would obviously be diplomatic and political suicide. Kinda goes against the grain of the whole 'we're the same people' schtick. Putin would spend the next decade fighting insurgents and terrorists in his own country. If he has a decade. I doubt he wants that to be his legacy, though I'm hardly in a position to speculate about his motives.

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14. Balazs

    September 22, 2022 at 2:31 am

    I naively hope that instead of doubling down, Putin is seeking a way out with these referenda. In this scenario the desired official "results" of the sham referenda would be that a majority of Donetsk and Luhansk DON'T want to join Russia. (To achieve this desired result, the only thing Russians would need to do is to NOT stuff the ballot boxes…) Putin then could use this referenda "results" as an alibi to withdraw Russian forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk area – probably all the way to Crimea, where they would dig down deep at the administrative border -, while minimizing face loss, to the extent it can be minimized in the current losing situation. "No, no, we are not running away – but if people of Donetsk and Luhansk decided that they would rather not join Russia, we are not going to force them to, and so we are leaving the areas on our own will".

    Of course, this would probably be too smart, hence it won't happen.

    Re the use of nuclear weapons, current Russian military doctrine states that, aside from retaliation to a WMD attack, nuclear weapons can only be used "when the very existence of the state is threatened". Arguably mere fighting on a recently annexed territory does not qualify as an existential threat to the Russian state, but of course this is up to Putin's interpretation.

    If Russia uses nuclear weapons, I don't think it is going to be in the territory of Ukraine (which is too close, and where they would want to live afterwards). Sadly, I think it's more likely that Putin would drop the bomb on Berlin, with issuing an immediate threat that the next targets, shall any retaliation of further interference on the part of NATO happen, would be London, Paris, and New York. Only wiping out a city like Berlin would make such threat credible and would really force rethinking on the part of NATO whether they indeed wanted to send in the heavy bombers. Putin knows this, and is sufficiently amoral to give it a try if his own survival is threatened.

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15. David Wallace

    September 22, 2022 at 8:15 am

    @YAAGS: Ukraine was in discussion with the US about hazmat gear as far back as April. (https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/01/u-s-providing-ukraine-with-equipment-to-protect-against-chemical-attacks-00022355). I don't know what the result is (for obvious reasons the US is coy about the details of its weapon provision) but hazmat suits only cost a few hundred dollars each, so it wouldn't have been difficult to supply a large number. In general my understanding is that chemical weapons just aren't that effective against modern armies (compared to high explosives, say).

    @Balazs:

    "I think it's more likely that Putin would drop the bomb on Berlin, with issuing an immediate threat that the next targets, shall any retaliation of further interference on the part of NATO happen, would be London, Paris, and New York."

    I find it hard to imagine that not leading to an immediate retaliation in kind; putting western Europe under a nuclear umbrella is the original defining purpose of NATO, after all. Attacking a city in Ukraine would be horrifically risky but much less risky (I don't think fallout on that scale would be a serious consideration if Russia decided to escalate to that degree: that kind of weapon is relatively clean, or at any rate can be used in a relatively clean way).

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16. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 22, 2022 at 9:08 am

    You're right that Putin is threatening to use nuclear weapons in the passages you quoted. I am just skeptical that making this nuclear threat was the only or even the main reason why Putin decided to annex the territories in which he's holding referendums. Here is one guess as to what Putin may be thinking: (1) many countries in the Western camp are weary about continuing to support Ukraine in this war, especially in light of the imminent energy crisis; but (2) Ukraine's recent battlefield successes may naturally be expected to prop up support among those in Western Europe who were otherwise ready to throw in the towel; so (3) the annexation-referendums may be a rational attempt to blunt any PR momentum Ukraine has gained through its recent battlefield successes. One way the referendums may serve this end is by signaling Russia's view that Ukraine's battlefield successes will likely be limited in scope (ie, Russia may be saying, sure they've retaken some territory, but here are the territories that we think we can keep, and that we will fight hard to keep). As I said previously, the referendums may also be a signal that Russia's war-aims have changed. Its original war aims seem to have been removing the Zelensky government (I suspect this is what Russia meant when it said its invasion was a "special operation" to "de-Nazify" Ukraine) and to help the eastern breakaway regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) gain increased autonomy vis-a-vis Kiev [there was always uncertainty about whether Russia's end goal was to (a) help these regions gain more autonomy but stay within the Ukrainian state; (b) leave Ukraine and become independent states that were not formally part of Russia; or (c) formally join Russia]. Now that battlefield developments (ie, Russia's failure to take Kiev) have made it look highly unlikely that Russia will achieve its original war aim of toppling the Zelensky government, it makes sense that Russia would reevaluate its goals. Thus, the annexation-referendums may be an announcement of Russia's new war aims (ie, now Russia wants to annex the eastern breakaway regions as well as strategic territory in the south that connects the eastern breakaway regions to the Crimea – this map illustrates how these territories are linked: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/21/mapping-the-ukraine-regions-voting-on-joining-russia). Again, I don't know that this is what Putin is thinking, but I suspect that it is something like this, and I think these kinds of considerations are more illuminating as to what is really going on in the war than the nuclear-brinkmanship angle. These considerations also undermine the claim that these annexation-referendums necessarily highlight Putin's supposed "shortsightedness." For all we know, Putin may well succeed in eventually securing a resolution of the conflict that leaves him with control of the territories in which he is now holding the referendums. Time will tell.

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17. Jonathan Surovell

    September 22, 2022 at 12:31 pm

    Sure, annexation is now part of Putin's strategy for holding on to occupied territory and things "may" work out for him, time will tell. I'm not sure why you think this conflicts with anything I or Stanovaya have said.

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18. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 22, 2022 at 2:21 pm

    I’m providing a totally different explanation for Russia’s behavior than the one Stanovaya provides. In the first paragraph of his that is quoted above, Stanovaya says Putin is annexing these territories so that he can avoid having to “win this war on the battlefield” by using the nuclear threat to deter Ukrainian forces from making incursions into the soon-to-be annexed territories. The first explanation I gave was very different: these annexation-referendums are a way for Russia to plant its flag on the territory it still controls in order to convey the message that Ukraine’s recent victories in the north are not as significant as they may seem. In other words, it’s a way for Russia to say that Russia is the one who’s really winning the war right now, because Russia has captured a huge chunk of Ukraine’s territory, and Ukrainian has recaptured only little pieces of what Russia has gobbled up. The different interpretations have different implications for how seriously to take Putin’s nuclear rhetoric. If nuclear coercion is the main reason Russia is doing this, as Stanovaya says, then obviously we need to take this rhetoric very seriously. If I am right, and Russia is pursing these referendums for other reasons, then we can treat Putin’s current nuclear rhetoric the same way we treated his nuclear rhetoric earlier in the war – ie, we can treat them as bluff and bluster.

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19. YAAGS

    September 22, 2022 at 4:33 pm

    @Davis Wallace They might not be that effective against modern armies, but I imagine they would be quite effective against cities if you wanted to force someone to capitulate. Just touching something that has traces of novichok on it is lethal. Not to mention, modern armies also have decontamination procedures. If a big armored column gets attacked it's going to get sprayed down. I'm not sure how well that fits into Ukraine's fighting strategy. I'm not sure how someone who is just out fighting in a forest in an affected area could safely remove their equipment to eat, even supposing they got the warning to put their equipment on in time. I suspect they would have to retreat to decontaminate.

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20. Jonathan Surovell

    September 22, 2022 at 4:58 pm

    I understand you now and agree that we can't say for sure whether Stanovaya is right about Putin's motives. That is, I don't know whether his stated commitment to defend Russian territory with nuclear weapons will turn out to be bluster, should the Donbas become Russian territory.

    However, your explanation of the referenda makes no sense to me. I'm not aware of anyone who interpreted it as per your guess: I haven't seen anyone infer from the referenda that the Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv was less significant than they'd originally thought. I have seen multiple people, like Stavoya, taking it, along with mobilization, as yet another indication that Russia is losing.

    I'd also say that the idea that Russia is "winning the war right now, because Russia has captured a huge chunk of Ukraine's territory, and Ukraine has [liberated] only little pieces of what Russia has gobbled up" isn't a sensible way to evaluate the trajectory of a war. Putin couldn't have reasonably expected it to help with an information operation in NATO countries.

    Your previous comment provides background views of the conflict from which your interpretation of the referenda would be more intelligible.

    You write that Putin's initial aims were regime change in "Kiev" [sic] and "to help the eastern breakaway regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) gain increased autonomy vis-a-vis Kiev [sic] [there was always uncertainty about whether Russia's end goal was to (a) help these regions gain more autonomy but stay within the Ukrainian state; (b) leave Ukraine and become independent states that were not formally part of Russia; or (c) formally join Russia].

    But Putin couldn't have aimed to "help" the "breakaway" states "gain increased autonomy" for a few reasons. i) The breakaway republics were already independent of Ukraine and so couldn't "gain" autonomy. The parts of the Donbas that Russia invaded in 2022 weren't breakaway states, they were simply parts of Ukraine. ii) the invasion couldn't possibly have "helped" these regions gain autonomy because you can't "help" someone get something they expressly don't want; it wouldn't be helpful. And Donetsk and Luhansk didn't and don't want to be independent or part of Russia (your b and c, respectively). Many want autonomy within Ukraine, but if they're living under a puppet dictatorship established through war and Russian occupation, they wouldn't be autonomous in a meaningful sense, nor is this something they want. So the idea that the Russian invasion could have helped Luhansk or Donetsk is misguided.

    https://theconversation.com/most-people-in-separatist-held-areas-of-donbas-prefer-reintegration-with-ukraine-new-survey-124849

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21. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 22, 2022 at 7:16 pm

    Only a buffoon would insinuate—as you do—that the way I spelled Kiev indicates any pro-Putin sentiment on my part (if you respond to this with some NPR article explaining why we’re now being told to spell it differently, I’ll reply with a quote about newspeak from 1984). And I never suggested that the population of the Donbas welcomes or desires Russia’s “help.” That’s a straw-man argument.

    Turning to the serious point, a country’s ability to capture and control a major portion of its adversary’s territory is indeed an important indication of the trajectory of a war, especially if the territory that was captured is strategically significant. That should be obvious.

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22. Boris Dagaev

    September 22, 2022 at 11:23 pm

    > I never suggested that the population of the Donbas welcomes or desires Russia’s “help.”

    I've just realized that it might be helpful to give you an idea of what's going on on a human level…

    This is from a discussion in a telegram channel where Russians and Ukrainians debate various aspects of the current situation. It’s a story from a person whom I can’t in all honesty suspect of being a plant. She’s anonymous (I don’t even know her name). And what she’s telling fits no convenient narrative, and I’ve read a lot of similar stories. The conversation is colloquial and rough, I’ve tried to preserve that as much as I can (my minor clarifications and omissions are in square brackets).

    > then why the fuck are you trying to cancel me? ([by saying] get ready for a similar fate and so on)? I am just your random interlocutor, who has not been on the side of this government for a single second in his life – to the best of my ability. Not a day goes by that i’m not horrified by the hell that my country is doing in MY name. It's real: after Bucha, for some reason, I would just wake up at night from cadaveric nightmares – and start smoking, smoking, smoking … This is my personal hell.
    And here’s another hell […] on Wednesday, our relatives from Volchansk (purebred Ukrainians – and if we are talking visible signs here, they can’t be more purebred) fled under fire in their underwear across the border, taking only phones and hryvnias with them – all those who fled to Shebekino would be sent in different directions (holding centers?), but because they [our relatives] declared that they had relatives, us, in my city (my paternal sister is Ukrainian), they to us travelled on their own.
    And here they are—and from the very beginning of this war — they are cursing the Ukrainian authorities. And what should I do about it? They are waiting for Russia to "win" so they could return to their home, where the graves of their relatives and their whole life had passed… And this is that very second hell… I don't understand how to talk to Ukrainians, who are in favour of Russia freeing them. Imagine what it's like….
    It is with my compatriots that I can argue and insist that this is a crime both against one's own country (Article 353) and against humanity. But when they tell me: “I'm Ukrainian – you just can't judge…” – the curtain.

    P.S. FYI.
    Article 353 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression
    1. Planning, preparation or initiation of an aggressive war is punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years.
    2. Waging a war of aggression is punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of ten to twenty years.

    P.P.S. If you are comfortable watching a documentary with subtitles, you may find this informative: Broken Ties | A film by Andrey Loshak (
    
    

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23. David Wallace

    September 23, 2022 at 8:04 am

    FWiW I don’t see any ‘newspeak’ issue in Kyiv vs Kiev, just the fairly standard norm in modern English that one defers to the pronunciation that matches the current inhabitants’ use. So Kyiv rather than Kiev, just as Beijing rather than Peking or Mumbai rather than Bombay.

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24. Jonathan Surovell

    September 23, 2022 at 8:47 am

    "A country's ability to capture and control a major portion of its adversary’s territory is indeed an important indication of the trajectory of a war, especially if the territory that was captured is strategically significant."

    And Russia currently lacks this ability: it tried and failed to capture a major portion of Ukraine during its Donbas offensive over the summer and is unable to mount a significant counter-attack after Ukraine's Kharkiv offensive. Ukraine, by contrast has just captured significant and strategically important territory in Kharkiv. The last major territorial gain before Ukraine's Kharkiv offensive was when Ukraine liberated the northern part of the country. So by this metric, Ukraine is winning. Is that what Putin wanted to communicate?

    Your previously suggested indicator was different: it said that a country is winning if it *has* captured a lot of territory and *still* holds most of what it captured. Russia can be said to meet this condition but, of course, this is a poor indicator of the *current trajectory* of the war. And your point was that the "referenda" were meant to somehow communicate to the West that Russia has captured and still holds a lot of territory. If your idea is rather that announcing "referenda" conveys anything about Russia's current ability to capture territory, then, I'm sorry, but you're hearing things.

    I accept your clarification about Russia "helping" the Donbas. I think your use of the phrase "breakaway region" to refer to the whole Donbas contributed to the impression I got. There's a sense in which Russia really was helping the breakaway regions (the separatist states) and not just claiming to "help."

    Since you're already aware of the 'Kyiv' vs. 'Kiev' issue, and so your resistance to 'Kyiv' is deliberate and, it seems, principled; and since you've decided in advance to dismiss the totalitarians "telling" you to spell it differently, there's no need for me to share an article. Anyone who doesn't already know can easily look up the names' significance. I didn't mean to insinuate, specifically, that you support Putin.

    I really have to bow out of this conversation now. It's good to hear that, as much as we disagree, we at least have some common ground on Putin and Russia's occupation of the Donbas. Have a good day.

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25. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 23, 2022 at 9:41 am

    The 'newspeak' angle is that we're now being instructed to spell it "Kyiv" because that transliteration is said to accord with the way the city's name is pronounced in the Ukrainian language, whereas the old transliteration–"Kiev–is said to accord with the way the city's name is pronounced in the Russian language. The switch from the old transliteration to the new transliteration has been promoted in the English-language media as a way of showing political solidarity with the Ukrainian government in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KyivNotKiev). I don't see how anyone who regularly reads English-language news sources could seriously dispute that. If you want to spell it the new way, go ahead, but to question my loyalty because I used the old spelling is indeed Orwellian.

    Boris Dagaev – I did not mean for my use of the word "help" to downplay the suffering of the people of the Donbas. I was simply trying to illustrate the different possibilities that have been in play for the future of the Donbas region (ie, Donetsk and Luhansk) in various stages of the conflict. As I understand it, before the 2022 invasion, there were basically two options for the Donbas's future: (1) the Donbas would gain autonomy but stay within the Ukrainian state, with elections for new leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk to be held after Russian forces left [Ukranian-preferred version]; and (2) the Donbas would gain autonomy but stay within the Russian state, with elections for new leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk to be held while Russian forces were still there [Russian-preferred version]. Obviously Russia wanted its forces on the ground while elections were occurring so that it could ensure that the new leaders of the Donbas were Russian puppets, which would enable Russia to exert political influence over the Ukranian state via its control of the Donbas region. Before the 2022 invasion, this seemed to be Russia's end-goal with regard to the status of the Donbas. After the 2022 invasion, it seemed that there could be two new alternative endgames that Russia was seeking: (3) the Donetsk and Luhansk become independent states; or (4) the Donetsk and Luhansk get annexed by Russia. Although Russia announced "liberation" of the Donbas as its stated war objective in March of 2022, after its atempt to seize Kieve was rebuffed, it wasn't clear whether "liberation" meant options 2, 3, or 4. The annexation-referendums can be seen as an announcement that "liberation" now means option 4, supplemented by annexation of Kherson as well.

    It is plausible that Russia's preference between options 2, 3, and 4 changed when battlefield conditions changed because these 3 different options present different strategeic advantages and disadvanges for Russia. For example, as discussed above, option 2 turns the Donbas into a lever with which Russia can influence the Ukranian state; but the Donbas can't serve as such a lever if it is formally independent of Ukraine under options 3 or 4. And one significant difference between options 3 and 4 relates to the nuclear-deterrence angle: under option 3, an attack on the Donbas does not constitute an attack on Russian territory, but under option 4 it does. Thus, the fact that Russia may have been pursuing option 2 or 3 at an earlier stage in the war does not mean that Russia had benevolent intentions toward the Donbas population. I never meant to imply that it did.

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26. Ludovic

    September 23, 2022 at 10:45 am

    Based on Obama's own comments to the Atlantic in 2016 it seems the present Russo-Ukrainian war (obviously the result of a flagrant invasion by the former) was exceedingly predictable and not one devoid of rationality–coupled with urgency (from the Russian perspective). Obama certainly seemed to predict so at the time.

    All of which creates, at least in my eyes, the impression that there was a certain willful perversity on the part of the neocons in goading Russia into a thoroughly predictable and–based on my reading of Obama–indeed rational war by Russia, in light of just how vital even Obama believed Crimea/Black Sea Litoral and Eastern Ukrainian border region was/is to Russia.

    Within this context, including Obama's assessment in 2016, it would appear that the neocons, but also, more to the point, NATO, isn't blameless of aggression against Russia by vying for control of an area that is as vital to Russia's basic strategic security as Mexico is the US.

    The relevant statements by Obama in his 2016 Atlantic interview are highlighted by Greenwald in the following post: https://mobile.twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/1573031237274697730

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27. Boris Dagaev

    September 23, 2022 at 11:20 am

    FYI. Here is the latest analytical post by the Russian political scientist Maria Snegovaya (you can find out more about her work here: https://mariasnegovaya.com/academic-journals-book-chapters/; the Russian original is here: https://t.me/mariasnegovaya/1862)

    ===

    Maria Snegovaya:

    It is not obvious to me that the announcement of mobilization brings closer the risks of the use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin. So far, the Kremlin's logic can be traced quite clearly.

    It became clear to Putin that with the current resources he could not win the war, nor "liberate the Donbass", especially after the defeat near Kharkov and the surrender of territories – there simply was not enough cannon fodder even to keep what had been looted already. Putin is not yet ready to retreat, he has repeatedly stated that "we have not yet begun in full force." Hence, mobilization – to achieve the stated goal of "liberation of Donbass". They want to throw bodies at it hoping that Ukraine will run out of people. This is not the logic of a madman, but the usual logic of a Russian ruler (even relatively liberal ones, such as Nicholas II).

    Is mobilization unpopular? Yes, but probably the risks are assessed as less significant than the loss (which I'm not sure about, but this is the Kremlin's calculations).

    The "political culture" of Russia, the tradition of subordination to the authorities, has not yet been reversed. And now the gloomy chains of the serfs have already started to trudge to the military registration and enlistment offices.

    One of the most comparable examples is raising the retirement age. The same (and even more) wildly unpopular decision, where 80% of the population was against it, which directly hit Putin's nuclear electorate, passed with a temporary downgrade of his ratings of about 15% (down to 60+ percent). Unpleasant, but not catastrophic, especially if this drop can be compensated for by a new rating growth due to the “Victory”.

    On the other hand, regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. There is little doubt that the Russian population will support him to a large extent. And I just think that in the command chain to the nuclear button, Putin is unlikely to meet resistance. It can be seen that his most insane commands do not meet any resistance at the top. The most loyal, narrow-minded and weak-willed have probably been placed there for a long time. But the psychological and reputational costs in the world are enormous. There is a definite red line in this respect in the world. Probably even China and certainly a huge number of other countries in the non-Western world – Turkey, India – will turn away. Even they don't need an insane neighbor that sets off a chain of potential nuclear conflicts around the world. Putin is holding on to them. No one will buy Russian oil. There will be no one to supply ammunition, drones and so on. Russia will remain in complete global isolation for decades (and not as it is now, only in isolation from the Western world), and membership in the UN Security Council will be under threat (as Biden recently hinted at in his speech). At the same time, what will Russia gain? One dead region of Ukraine.”

    This cost/benefit ratio makes, in my opinion, the use of tactical nuclear weapons not very likely. Although, of course, these are such times that, alas, any scenarios have to be considered.

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28. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 24, 2022 at 7:21 am

    “And your point was that the ‘referenda’ were meant to somehow communicate to the West that Russia has captured and still holds a lot of territory. If your idea is rather that announcing ‘referenda’ conveys anything about Russia's current ability to capture territory, then, I'm sorry, but you're hearing things.“

    My point is that the referenda could be an effort to convey two different things to two different audiences: (1) to the West, the referenda convey Russia’s will to fight for the territories that are covered by the referenda, and it also conveys the message that recapturing these territories is going to require a long, hard struggle; (2) to Putin’s domestic audience, the referenda convey the message that Russia has won the war because Russia has accomplished its military goals (of course, Russia’s initial goal was to topple Zelensky’s government, which Russia failed to do, thereby humiliating itself, so what Putin may be doing now is reformulating his objectives in narrower terms so he can save face by claiming to have achieved his goals even though he didn’t).

    Here’s how I see the trajectory of the war (as related to the referenda): (1) in February 2022, Putin launches a “special operation” to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, which basically means he is trying to topple the Zelensky’s government so he can install a Russian puppet regime; in response, the West imposes sanctions on Russia; (2) Ukraine humiliates Russia by blocking its attempt to take Kiev; (3) in response, in March 2022, Russia announced a reformulated version of its war objectives in which Russia is seeking not to topple the Zelensky’s government but merely to “liberate” the Donbas; (4) the sanctions backfire because India and China keep doing business with Russia, so the increase in energy prices largely offsets the decrease in European demand for Russian energy, but the loss of Russian energy imposes a lot of pain on Europe, with an imminent energy crisis on the horizon; meanwhile, Ukraine makes some significant gains on the battlefield, pushing Russian forces back, although Ukraine’s ability to retake all its territory is far from assured, but the battlefield victories earn Ukraine a lot of good press in the West; so (5) Russia announces the annexation-referendums as a way of saying that “liberation of the Donbas” is now complete (and it’s also “liberated” Kherson too); this is an attempt to blunt Ukraine’s PR momentum and tell war-weary countries in Western Europe, who are feeling the pain of an imminent energy crisis, that if they remain committed to retaking all of Ukraine, they are going to be in this for a long time yet, but they can end the war now if they are willing to let Russia have the territories in which it is holding the sham referenda.

    With regard to the question of who is winning the war, I’m not saying Russia is actually winning the war right now. What I am saying is that each side in a war is always going to claim that it is the one that is winning, and it is going to highlight any facts about battlefield conditions that help it make this claim, even if that claim is dubious. Ukraine will point to its unexpected success in preventing Russian from taking Kiev (which humiliated Russia) and its many battlefield successes. Russia will point to the territory it has seized. The “background view” leading me to see things this way is my acceptance of Thomas Schelling’s theory that war is essentially a negotiation: each side is trying to persuade the other to submit to its will, and the function of military force is essentially to showcase one’s strength and thereby persuade the enemy to submit. Thus, just like any used car salesman points to any facts about the junky car that he thinks he can use to persuade the customer that it’s worth the price he’s asking, a country engaged in a war will always issue war propaganda highlighting battlefield developments purporting to show that its side is winning, so the other wise would cave if it knew what was good for it.

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29. Nick

    September 26, 2022 at 9:23 pm

    Good interview with Lawrence Wilkerson, in which the explicit concern of the discussion throughout is the paramount one of avoiding nuclear war. (There's also a chilling short film at the end showing the 1939 Nazi rally in Madison Square garden.)
    
    
    

    Strong (appropriate in my view) words from Wilkerson: "I understand their [Ukrainians who don't want to negotiate a settlement with Russia right now] feelings, but I'm not going to sacrifice Europe, and certainly not the world, for them!! It's that simple. So let's get to the table and talk. And I don't give a hay if you don't want to give up some of your country…. The rest of the world does not need to sacrifice its existence because of you."

    —–
    Some thoughts on how we should be considering the risk of nuclear war:

    I recognize that there is value in trying to follow and unpack the more day-to-day/week-to-week geopolitical maneuvering that is going on, and the nuance with which people on these comment sections can do this is impressive. I learn a lot from the discussion here. But it continues to strike me, more than anything else has about this conflict, how inadequately the prospect of general thermonuclear war is "factored in" to all discussions of it (excepting interviews with people like Chomsky, Wilkerson, and Freeman, who essential never stop warning about it in its full, terrifying generality).

    I assume these facts known more or less to everyone reading, but somehow they seem necessary to state: if Russia (or the US) uses a single nuclear weapon, there is a fair chance things will eventually escalate into a general thermonuclear exchange between the US and Russia. If that happens, maybe a hundred million people in the US, Europe, Russia, and wherever else is on current US/Russian targeting lists, will die instantaneously, and hundreds of millions more within weeks. Almost all of them bear almost no responsibility for this conflict. Then within a few of years, BILLIONS OF THE POOREST PEOPLE ON EARTH WHO BEAR ABSOLUTELY NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CONFLICT will have died an even worse death, mainly of starvation, after having witnessed widespread cannibalism and other unspeakable horrors.

    We talk a lot about how the Ukrainians do not deserve what is happening to them, and how Putin's invasion of Ukraine is a war crime, all of which is true and important. But other truths are more important. Surely the US's support of the Ukrainians should not be as unconditional and "morally" uncompromising as it has been, considering that this stupid self-indulgent position entails refusing to adequately think about the billions of innocent people who will starve to death in the global south if we (the US) do our part to fuck this up. At every point in this conflict, the US has had the power to force the Ukrainians and persuade the Russians to come to the negotiating table. Now seems like an especially good time to use that ill-gotten power, when the US/Ukraine would be negotiating from a position of strength and Russia's general mobilization is still just a plan.

    I think thermonuclear war and nuclear winter (how few people in the US even know what that is/how it works because we almost never talk about it?) should loom over essentially all discussions of Ukraine at every point, and the concern to reduce the chances of it happening, literally at all costs, should be the number one priority that guides those discussions. We should spend less time dissecting geopolitical maneuvering, interesting and valuable as it is, and more time dissecting current and past nuclear planning (US as well as Russian, the illusions of control it fosters), relevant weapons and detection systems (the illusions of control they foster, how they can malfunction), command-and-control structures (the illusions of safety/control they foster, how they are vulnerable to human error/recklessness), likely patterns of escalation should a nuclear weapon be used, etc.

    In a different interview, Lawrence Wilkerson said that in every war game he has participated in, if a single nuclear weapon was used, the end result was a general thermonuclear exchange–every single time! I have no idea, but I would hope/guess that in the real world rather than a war game, there'd be more like a 25% chance of such escalation, rather than the 100% chance that Wilkerson (who is much more qualified to speak on this than all of us) implies. But it is absurd to even be talking about this. If right now there is a 1% probability overall of a general thermonuclear exchange happening in the next year, then right now our "expected value" for how many people are going to die in the next few years as a result of nuclear war is about 40 million (assuming 4 billion deaths if the terrible event happened). This is insane, and we should focus on reducing it by orders of magnitude, by doing everything we can to lower the probability of any use of nuclear weapons.

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30. David Wallace

    September 27, 2022 at 9:42 am

    I agree that a strategic nuclear exchange is horrifying and that even a small probability of it dwarfs almost any other moral considerations. And I think that leads to a perfectly defensible case that we ought to be forcing Ukraine to negotiate a settlement and accept loss of large parts of its territory. But I don't think it is at all clear that in the longer term doing so would reduce the risk of nuclear war.

    Consider: it is 77 years since anyone has used a nuclear weapon in anger, and the last time was 48 hours after the first. We have basically managed to make these things into taboo weapons of terror: they deter direct conflict between nuclear powers but do not otherwise figure into war-making. (Notice that they are absolutely playing that deterrent role in Ukraine: there is no direct NATO participation even though there would pretty clearly be elite and popular support for it and even though it has become obvious that NATO forces would quickly and decisively win in conventional combat against Russian air and land forces in Ukraine.)

    That taboo status is threatened here. At the moment, Russia has used conventional forces to seize a large chunk of territory from a non-nuclear state, but looks unlikely (let's stipulate) to be able to hold that territory against conventional counterattack. The 'avoid nuclear war' argument is that we should force Ukraine to halt its counteroffensive and negotiate to prevent Russia using nuclear weapons on Ukrainian forces or regime targets.

    But if we do so, we establish the precedent that a nuclear power can take territory conventionally and then use nuclear threats to hold it, even when it lacks the conventional power to do so and even when its opponents' allies also have nuclear weapons. That precedent dramatically increases the utility of nuclear weapons for countries that lack the military power to sustainedly oppose the west, and will be noticed, and that noticing is profoundly destabilizing.

    Case study: Russia absolutely hates that the Baltics are in NATO and the EU. We can debate whether the Putin regime sees the Baltics as *as* strategically important as (post-Crimea) Ukraine, and/or *as* historically-part-of-the-Russian-empire as Ukraine, but they clearly care a lot about it. And on geographical grounds it is not easy for NATO to defend the Baltics against initial attack: Russia could quite likely occupy at least a big chunk of the Baltics fairly quickly, and could mass forces on the border more quickly than NATO could reinforce its own forces.

    (Would NATO's nuclear deterrent prevent them? Touch and go. NATO doesn't have a lot of battlefield nuclear weapons and would be loath to use them on allied soil anyway; is the US president going to risk Armageddon by attacking strategic targets in Russia to coerce withdrawal? Nobody knows. That very risk might deter the Russians, but again it might not. Notice that if we could guarantee that people believed our deterrent threats we could just have extended the NATO nuclear umbrella over Ukraine last year and prevented the war. We couldn't do that because a US president who threatened nuclear war over Ukraine would obviously be bluffing. I think we would probably be bluffing over the Baltics too.)

    What Russia couldn't do is *hold* the Baltics against a NATO counteroffensive. That was fairly obvious a year ago and completely obvious now: within a few months a NATO military buildup would decisively push Russia out. But if Russia could credibly threaten nuclear war to hold its conquered territory – repeating the Ukraine playbook – then the whole thing becomes a lot more attractive to them, and exactly the same logic we're discussing would imply that NATO should surrender and cede the Baltics to Russia.

    You could say: Russian conquest of the Baltics (or any similar scenario one comes up with) is less bad than nuclear war; indeed, pretty much any mischief a nuclear great power can cause is less bad than nuclear war. And that's hard to argue with. The logical conclusion is that the West just shouldn't have nuclear weapons at all, and that too is pretty defensible morally. But it's implausible politically. NATO and the US are not indefinitely going to allow their great power rivals to use nuclear weapons coercively. If things carry on along those lines, eventually there will be a miscalculation: someone will call the bluff of someone else who is not bluffing. And then the sky will fall.

    These are not easy calls to make and I certainly see the force of the argument for forcing the Ukrainians to the table. But in the longer term I think our odds of avoiding cataclysm are better if we try now to hold the line that nuclear weapons are an existential deterrent and not a coercive tool in offensive warfare.

    (I also think, for what it's worth, that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine is very unlikely to lead to a *nuclear* response from NATO. They are more likely to want to keep the moral upper hand and avoid escalation. The risk of escalation is still terrifying given the stakes, but nothing like what it would be if nuclear weapons were used against NATO or Russian forces.)

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31. Christopher Morris

    September 27, 2022 at 10:34 am

    The US has been informing Russian officials about our response to nuclear attacks on Ukraine. The specifics have not, unsurprisingly, been announced publicly. There is no reason to think they would involve US/NATO nuclear strikes. Even if Russia attacked NATO forces I doubt we would respond with nuclear weapons, though Russia would expect we’d respond strongly (e.g., bomb select bases in Russia, invade Belarus). Both sides will be very careful not to escalate to a nuclear conflict.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/23/little-military-sense-for-nuclear-weapons-ex-russian-general

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32. Nick

    September 27, 2022 at 11:27 am

    Thanks for the thoughtful reply. I broadly agree with all of this, except your central point/judgment that forcing negotiations to end the war now would serve to SO dramatically normalize the use of nuclear weapons as a coercive operational tool in offensive warfare, that that normalization in and of itself would create a greater net risk of nuclear war in the future than we currently are facing, with our policy of giving Ukrainians weapons to defend themselves (which is good) while systematically refusing to pursue diplomatic options (which is bad, insane in my view). I strongly disagree with that assessment, though I agree these are not easy calls to make. I don't think there would be much normalization at all, beyond the significant damage to norms that has already been done by Putin's threats.

    Also, recall that in 2003 THE US THREATENED IMPLICITLY BUT UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINS IRAQ, under very similar conditions ("weapons of mass destruction") to what Putin is talking about above (excepting the fact that the US invasion of Iraq was more criminal, unreasonable, strategically stupid even than Putin's criminal invasion of Ukraine)

    Putin quoted above: "…using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia"

    From Baltimore Sun article "U.S. threatens nuclear force in warning to Iraq", Jan. 27 2003
    Asked if that included the possible use of nuclear weapons, Card [White House Chief of Staff] replied: "I'm not going to put anything on the table or off the table, but we have a responsibility to make sure Saddam Hussein and his generals do not use weapons of mass destruction."

    What do you make of this threat by the US? It was a reckless, immoral, stupid thing to do for sure, and it chipped away at the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons–but did it damage that taboo as severely as you're suggesting would happen if we were to urgently prioritize ending this conflict? What in your view would constitute a minimally acceptable (in terms of doing our best to avoid a strategic nuclear exchange at any point in the future) outcome to this conflict? Is it that Russia be pushed all the way out of Ukraine (minus Crimea maybe)? Or how much of Ukraine do the Ukrainians have to recover for you to judge that nuclear coercion has been normalized? What would the role of DIPLOMACY be in that outcome? I don't see where this is supposed to end. Also, (Colonel) Lawrence Wilkerson does not see it your way at all. What do you make of that?

    We are facing a very real, tangible risk of nuclear war right now. The hundreds of times people have said "a general nuclear exchange is very unlikely" should not give any consolation, unless by "very unlikely" is meant something like "at most 1 in a million". The chances are higher than that by orders of magnitude. "Very unlikely" is a dangerously misleading phrase when it is used this way, as if we are talking about the probability that I currently have some sort of cancer, and not the probability of the annihilation of billions of people.

    And we are at a turning point of the war. Negotiations should be forced because:
    (1) The current Ukrainian counteroffensive is not likely to see further dramatic successes–so they would be negotiating from a position of relative strength. Judging from the evidence that any of us have access too, they are not currently poised to retake more territory.

    (2) Russia/Putin has just enacted wartime measures and a semi-general mobilization that are both without precedent in Russia/USSR since WWII. Russian military experts (like Michael Kofman in his latest interview on the War on the Rocks podcast) say this is a big deal, it's not something they know very well how to think about, and that it marks a major escalation in the conflict making it much more likely to drag on for years (assuming we don't all die in a nuclear holocaust sooner). Surely we should stop this in its tracks, using forceful diplomacy among other things.

    WHY HAS THERE BEEN NO INTELLIGENT, ASSERTIVE DIPLOMACY FROM THE US AT ANY POINT SINCE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFLICT? By comparison with what we/Blinken has done (nothing), Nixon, Kissinger, and Reagan look like paragons of statesmanship and diplomacy.

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33. Nick

    September 27, 2022 at 11:30 am

    (correction)
    "Or how much of Ukraine do the Ukrainians have to recover for you to judge that nuclear coercion has been normalized?"

    should read

    "Or how much of Ukraine do the Ukrainians have to recover for you to judge that nuclear coercion has not been normalized?"

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34. Nick

    September 27, 2022 at 11:41 am

    You say: "The US has been informing Russian officials about our response to nuclear attacks on Ukraine. The specifics have not, unsurprisingly, been announced publicly."

    What is your source for this?

    You say: "Even if Russia attacked NATO forces I doubt we would respond with nuclear weapons, though Russia would expect we’d respond strongly (e.g., bomb select bases in Russia, invade Belarus). Both sides will be very careful not to escalate to a nuclear conflict."

    Yeah, I also think it's unlikely that the US/NATO would immediately use nuclear weapons in this scenario. But you are making a strawman argument (about arguably the most consequential issue possible), by focusing exclusively and arbitrarily on the short-term. The question is, once the US/NATO start bombing "select bases in Russia", and we have entered into the first direct conflict between great powers since WWII (i.e. the first direct conflict between nuclear powers ever), what do you think the likelihood of a strategic nuclear exchange within the following year or two would be?

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35. David Wallace

    September 27, 2022 at 12:18 pm

    Replying piecemeal to Nick:

    "What do you make of this threat [to use nuclear weapons in Iraq] by the US?"

    Reckless and unhelpful, but not really very consequential, since it didn't actually alter the military situation (which was one where the US had overwhelming conventional advantage). I think it's fairly analogous to all the nuclear saber-rattling by various Russian politicians. What matters isn't the verbal threats, it's the extent to which they actually coerce action. (I also think there's a slightly blurry area as to whether nuclear deterrence includes other WMD – I think the context of the WH CoS's comment was about supposed Iraqi WMD deployment.)

    "Or how much of Ukraine do the Ukrainians have to recover for you to judge that nuclear coercion has not been normalized?"

    It's not a matter of how much of Ukraine, it's a matter of whether the nuclear threat (or battlefield nuclear use) changes the conventional military situation. Right now Ukraine has no (conventional) need to negotiate, since they're retaking territory at a pretty rapid clip. If their counteroffensive bogs down over winter and by the spring Russia has mobilized enough that the conflict deadlocks, they'd probably be well advised to negotiate even absent the threat of nuclear weapons. That's very different from if their offensive is proceeding apace and they're clearly en route to retake all the territory occupied by Russia (except maybe Crimea) but the West forces them to stop and accept partial Russian occupation because of the fear of nuclear war.

    "Also, (Colonel) Lawrence Wilkerson does not see it your way at all. What do you make of that?"

    There are lots of highly-informed people writing on this topic and they disagree among themselves. Some think we should be forcing a ceasefire now, most don't. The sensible thing for non-experts to do is to read widely and exercise a certain tentativeness and humility in their overall judgements; that's what I'm trying to do.

    "The current Ukrainian counteroffensive is not likely to see further dramatic successes–so they would be negotiating from a position of relative strength. Judging from the evidence that any of us have access too, they are not currently poised to retake more territory."

    That's not my impression, FWIW (more accurately: it's not the impression I've synthesised from the various military experts I read), though it depends on the implied timing of 'poised' – my sense, averaging over sources, is that there's a realistic prospect of further Russian collapse this year and, failing that, quite a good chance following a renewed offensive in the spring. (I note that people were saying, back in the summer, that we ought to force a negotiation because the Ukrainians weren't going to take any more territory – then the Kharkiv offensive happened.)

    But if you're right, then I don't think there's much need to force the Ukrainians to negotiate. A situation where the Ukrainian advance is stalled out and the Russians are solidly securing their remaining conquests isn't one where Putin needs to escalate. The scary scenario for nuclear weapons use is the militarily optimistic scenario where Russia's land forces carry on collapsing. (I'm largely channelling Caitlin Talmadge here.)

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36. Boris Dagaev

    September 27, 2022 at 1:44 pm

    Nick> WHY HAS THERE BEEN NO INTELLIGENT, ASSERTIVE DIPLOMACY FROM THE US AT ANY POINT SINCE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFLICT?

    Because 1) to follow the American long-established institutionalized approach to Russia since Putin's speech in Munich to its logical end and 2) to achieve the objective of total isolation of Putin's regime in the world, it is reasonable to force his hand to use a tactical nuclear weapon.

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37. Nick Drew

    September 27, 2022 at 3:46 pm

    If I (different Nick, from earlier in the thread) may rejoin here:

    As I see it, a couple of weeks from now, Putin will have made his annexation announcement (we needn't guess: there isn't have long to wait), so not only Crimea but 4 more Ukranian oblasts (or large parts thereof) will likely be 'Russia'. This won't impress anyone outside Russia, and in particular it won't impress the Ukrainians, who are as motivated as ever, if not more so, to keep up the counter-offensive. So then all 5 new 'Russian' oblasts will be under active and indeed successful attack, which Putin characterises as "attack by the forces of NATO".

    How does he respond? It's a massive problem for him because the ultras back home think they've heard the nuclear sabre being rattled now. But he's already swallowed many weeks of successful counter-attacks INCLUDING attacks on Crimea – his biggest problem, because (a) he's not nuked anyone for that, and (b) although 'the rest of the world' has thus far acquiesced de facto to his annexation of Crimea, when it becomes just one new annexed territory among five, it moves back into 'contested' status.

    (Crimea is far more strategically important for him than the other 4 – the Sevastopol naval base – but these annexation categories are not particularly discriminating as deployed in the popular worldview.)

    We can all make our own assessments: but my view is that China / Xi will not allow him to go nuclear in response only to Ukrainian counter-attacks, however successful. Such attacks, provided that they call a halt at the Russian border (as has been the case east and north of Kharkiv), manifestly haven't crossed any nuclear red line for Putin. Again, Crimea could be the grey area. But frankly, a Ukrainian land assault on Crimea doesn't look like a 2022 contingency.

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38. Nick

    September 27, 2022 at 5:10 pm

    On the basis of the evidence I've seen/heard about, I disagree with your assessment of Ukraine's potential to continue taking substantially more territory, though I am talking only on the time-scale of weeks/a couple of months. In principle I do not think it is possible to project out beyond a couple months with the level of confidence and concreteness that seems necessary to support most of your policy judgments. I'm sure you disagree, so please let me know where you think I'm going wrong. As I understand it, your assessment weighs the very abstract and vague consideration of accepting risks now so as to preserve a certain kind of taboo around nuclear weapons use into the indefinite future (motivated by the even less definite/predictable goal of avoiding nuclear war for decades), against the very concrete and alarmingly probable risk of nuclear weapons vaporizing many particular human beings (and if there is a strategic exchange, leading to nuclear winter) within, say, a year or two. I don't see how these extremely different kinds of risk can be weighed against one another with the level of confidence or clarity necessary to support the idea that we should "hold the line" (until when, is still not clear to me), rather than take the straightest reasonable path imaginable toward not having a nuclear war resulting from this particular conflict. If we mess this up, nothing else matters.

    The only military commentator I have been closely following throughout this conflict has been Michael Kofman (in his interviews on the War on the Rocks podcast). I have not been averaging over other sources, as you have, so I may be mistaken. Could you suggest some recent analyses suggesting that Ukrainians are nowhere near done recovering territory in this current counteroffensive? If there is clear evidence for that, then I agree, now would not be the time to force them to negotiate–the right time would be whenever they're not obviously poised to retake a lot more territory, subject only to the restriction that the Ukrainians not be allowed by their US planners/suppliers to so thoroughly rout the Russians that it makes the use of nuclear weapons "reasonable".

    If there is clear enough evidence for this to support your arguments, then it is puzzling that someone as informed as Michael Kofman is so clearly wrong. But if he just turns out to be wrong because the situation is intrinsically uncertain, and knowledgeable commentators disagree, then this does not seem like strong enough evidence to support your "hold the line for the sake of protecting the taboo/deterrence effect of nuclear weapons"–because, again, what's at stake and more urgent than the longevity of a particular taboo, is the actual use of nuclear weapons in the near future. And as a side note, it's not like the taboo about nuclear weapons that existed prior to Feb 2022 is a model of safety and sanity. With probability approaching 1, we WILL have a general thermonuclear exchange at some point in the not-so-distant future if we don't evolve a much stronger taboo than we've ever had around nuclear weapons. We need changes on this issue at the deepest levels of human thought and feeling, not just military planning or foreign policy. Before we can think about that, we need to be reasonably confident we have any future at all.

    You say: "There are lots of highly-informed people writing on this topic and they disagree among themselves. Some think we should be forcing a ceasefire now, most don't. The sensible thing for non-experts to do is to read widely and exercise a certain tentativeness and humility in their overall judgements."

    I agree with the spirit of this completely, but I would add the following condition: given that any sensible human (expert or non-expert) should exercise more tentativeness, humility, and caution about nuclear war than about literally anything else, an "expert" (at military strategy, foreign policy, whatever) who fails to do so should not be taken seriously when they are advising on issues that bear on nuclear war. As I tried to indicate before, I am concerned that, from the beginning of this conflict until today, many people talking about it (and a high proportion of the most authoritative and influential people) do not meet that condition of being sensible. Hence my desire to see more people spending more time talking about nuclear war in brutal, well-informed concreteness, and about all the tragically absurd, unplanned ways it could happen, and less time talking about extremely abstract and vague considerations like the sovereignty of Ukraine and preserving a certain style of taboo/international norm surrounding nuclear weapons.

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39. David Wallace

    September 27, 2022 at 7:12 pm

    I won’t reply in detail, partly because I think we’re approaching diminishing returns given neither of us is an expert, mostly just because I’m short of time. But I do want to resist the idea that there’s something “extremely abstract and vague” about worrying how to preserve nuclear deterrence in the medium term. It’s not great, but it’s given us 74 years when we could have had nuclear war and didn’t. If nuclear war is the worst of all disasters (and it is) then preserving nuclear deterrence is the most important priority we have.

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40. Nick

    September 27, 2022 at 7:57 pm

    If you don't have time to reply, I fully understand. Thanks for your comments so far. But if you have a moment, I'd appreciate it if you could throw up some links to the expert commentary that is informing your judgments about how much more territory the Ukrainians could likely retake in the near future. I have not come across any clear evidence for that, but I have not spent much time searching.

    Also, I really do not understand the following statement of yours: "If nuclear war is the worst of all disasters (and it is) then preserving nuclear deterrence is the most important priority we have."

    I would say rather: "If nuclear war is the worst of all disasters, then preventing any nuclear war, and especially the most likely/imminent one, is the most important priority we have; and every day we survive under deterrence, rather than disarmament, is a lucky day."

    74 years is not a very long time.

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41. Peaceful IR Realist

    September 27, 2022 at 10:28 pm

    In an earlier comment, you write that Putin's latest nuclear rhetoric undermines the "taboo status" of nuclear weapons, remarking that nucclear weapons currently "deter direct conflict between nuclear powers but do not otherwise figure into war-making." But the history of nuclear sabre-rattling shows that Putin's latest nuclear threats are not unusual. Daniel Ellsburg, in The Doomsday Machine, lists a number of incidents in which the United States used the threat of nuclear first-use to persuade an adversary to do our bidding. Here are some of the notable incidents (recounted in Chapter 20, titled "First-Use Threats: Using our Nuclear Weapons"): (1) in 1948, Truman sends B-29 bombers that are described as "atomic capable" to Britain and Germany in an effort to dissuade the Soviets from challenging the Berlin blockade; (2) in 1953, Eisenhower secretly threatens China with nuclear-first use in order to coerce China into settling the Korean War; (3) in 1962, Kennedy effectively threatens to start a nuclear war if the USSR does not remove its missiles from Cuba; (4) in August 1980, the Carter administration tells the USSR that the US will nuke the USSR if the USSR invades Iran; (5) in 1995, Clinton threatens to nuke North Korea over its nuclear program; (6) in 2006, Bush II announces that "all options are on the table," explicitly including nuclear first-use, if Iran doesn't give up its efforts to develop a nuclear bomb; (7) in the 2008 Democratic Primary, Obama confirms that a first-use nuclear strike against Iran is on the table if Iran persists in its effots to develop a nuclear bomb. Although Ellsberg oddly doesn't mention it, afetr Obama entered the Oval Office, he publicly and explicitly kept nuclear first-use against Iran on the table.

    What these examples show, in my mind, is that Putin's latest rhetoric doesn't meaningfully alter any preexisting international norms about the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. Nor does formal annexation of territory in Ukraine meaningfully alter any nuclear red lines, since Ukraine has already conducted several military strikes deep inside Russian territory during this war. The greater danger with regard to nuclear weapons stems from the mere persistence of the war. As long as the war continues, there will be a latent risk of inadvertant escalation (ie, something happens that leads to direct clashes between Russia and NATO forces, which in turn leads to a nuclear exchange) or error (eg, a US military computer glitch generates an erroneous alert warning that a nuclear missile is flying toward the US, similar to the warning that was recently broadcast in Hawaii, and because there is a war going on and rhetoric is getting heated, US decision-makers, who must act immediately, fail to recognize that the nuclear alert has been caused by a computer error).

    Thus, if we must choose between ending the war now (and thus eliminating the possibility that the current war leads to a nuclear exchange) or continuing the war in order to preserve some preexisting nuclear taboo (and thus reducing the possiblity that nuclear weapons will be used in some other future conflict), we should choose the former.

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42. David Wallace

    September 28, 2022 at 12:11 am

    "I'd appreciate it if you could throw up some links to the expert commentary that is informing your judgments about how much more territory the Ukrainians could likely retake in the near future."

    Unfortunately what I normally do is just follow people on Twitter who seem sensible and informed and then read the articles they link to. I don't keep a systematic list of what I read. But as a quick response: (i) yesterday the Institute for the Study of War was reporting that Ukrainian forces were making gains on the outskirts of Lyman (https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1574937191452577792) and today admittedly-unconfirmed reports suggest the Russian forces in Lyman are going to need to withdraw or be cut off; (ii) Michael Kofman, who you mentioned you follow, noted last week that "these coming months remain an important window of opportunity for UA to retake territory." (https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1572573116060291076).

    "Also, I really do not understand the following statement of yours: 'If nuclear war is the worst of all disasters (and it is) then preserving nuclear deterrence is the most important priority we have.'

    I would say rather: "If nuclear war is the worst of all disasters, then preventing any nuclear war, and especially the most likely/imminent one, is the most important priority we have; and every day we survive under deterrence, rather than disarmament, is a lucky day."

    As long as we have nuclear weapons (which is not going to change any time soon) then preserving nuclear deterrence is synonymous with preventing nuclear war. And 74 years may not be a long time, but it's a lot longer than the next few months; it is dangerous if at any moment our only focus is reducing the risk of imminent war even at the cost of eroding deterrence in the medium term.

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43. V. Alan White

    September 28, 2022 at 12:37 am

    In regard to nuclear deterrence right now: if Putin is closer to the mindset of Trump or Xi is the crucial question, given who might be/is in charge of huge arsenals of WOMD. I would wager Xi. That favors deterrence. And BTW thank god Trump is out of office in this situation and may finally face the prison term he richly deserves.

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44. Nick Drew

    September 28, 2022 at 1:58 am

    "… judgments about how much more territory the Ukrainians could likely retake in the near future." ('Other Nick')

    Shan't bore you with too much of my own superannuated armchair-general views, but (i) the September Kharkiv left hook has amply demonstrated that a very large part of the strange rag-bag of soldiery Russia has assembled is a rabble, prone always to rout and collapse. After some Ukrainian consolidation, there's scope for a continuation of that hook. No likely short-term 'Russian' reinforcements, garnered from jails etc, will alter that. (ii) Although comprising better-quality units and much better dug in, 'Russian' forces on the right bank of the Dnipro north of Kherson are uncomfortably placed with ever-worsening logistical prospects, hoping only to hold out through the coming winter. Watch that space.

    Can I offer a more optimistic view on likely use of nukes? Most of the regimes that hold / have held nukes are apt to be viewed as potentially or actually desperate in some circumstances, and potentially prone to extreme ideological and chauvinistic drivers (Russia, China, White South Africa, Israel, N.Korea, Pakistan; some would include India; some, evidently, would include the USA! I'm exempting only UK and France, if you'll pardon me.)

    Yet since 1945, nukes have never been used, despite many a flashpoint. I suggest this speaks well for the tendency of even some fairly crazed specimens of mankind's leadership classes to be duly sobered by the prospects of a nuclear exchange and the responsibilities they hold. I put Putin in this class (and most categorically, Xi, whose importance in this should not be underestimated) – despite plentiful ongoing evidence of the former's shockingly bad judgement, strategical and tactical.

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45. Horrified to my core

    September 28, 2022 at 5:00 am

    The the survival reports from the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be required reading and form the backdrop of any conversation on nuclear weapons:

    https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

    "Then, at 11:02am, the sky turned bright white. My siblings and I were knocked off our feet and violently slammed back into the bomb shelter. We had no idea what had happened.

    As we sat there shell-shocked and confused, heavily injured burn victims came stumbling into the bomb shelter en masse. Their skin had peeled off their bodies and faces and hung limply down on the ground, in ribbons. Their hair was burnt down to a few measly centimeters from the scalp. Many of the victims collapsed as soon as they reached the bomb shelter entrance, forming a massive pile of contorted bodies. The stench and heat were unbearable.

    My siblings and I were trapped in there for three days.

    Finally, my grandfather found us and we made our way back to our home. I will never forget the hellscape that awaited us. Half burnt bodies lay stiff on the ground, eye balls gleaming from their sockets. Cattle lay dead along the side of the road, their abdomens grotesquely large and swollen. Thousands of bodies bopped up and down the river, bloated and purplish from soak- ing up the water. ‘Wait! Wait!’ I pleaded, as my grandfather treaded a couple paces ahead of me. I was terrified of being left behind.”

    ***

    "I too was affected by the radiation and vomited profusely after the bomb attack.My hair fell out, my gums bled, and I was too ill to attend school. My grandmother lamented the suffering of her children and grandchildren and prayed. “How cruel, how so very cruel, if only it weren’t for the pika-don (phonetic name for the atomic bomb)…” This was a stock phrase of hers until the day that she died."

    ***

    "Nuclear weapons should, under no circumstances, be used against humans. However, nuclear powers such as the US and Russia own stockpiles of well over 15,000 nuclear weapons. Not only that, technological advances have given way to a new kind of bomb that can deliver a blast over 1,000 times that of the Hiroshima bombing."

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46. Dave Baker

    September 28, 2022 at 10:17 am

    Great discussion here, glad I stumbled upon it.

    To add another perspective, I think I am a bit closer to Nick than to David W. I agree with David in principle that strengthening deterrence needs to be taken into account. Rank capitulation to Russian threats is not a good option given the broader context, especially given that China is watching.

    I would frame things in terms of giving Russia "off-ramps" (this is the terminology native to deterrence specialists). Probably the war is going to end in one of two ways:

    (1) Ignominious Russian defeat that threatens the Putin regime's existence, and hence Putin's life as well
    (2) A situation that Putin can sell to his people, or at least his elites, as some sort of Russian success.

    Option (1) brings a dangerous likelihood of nuclear war, as I think everyone here will agree. So we need to have our eyes on what might be a relatively favorable situation, for Ukraine and the world, that meets condition (2).

    It seems to me from what's publicly known that the US is not looking out for off-ramps that could be made salient to Russia. My general impression of Tony Blinken is that he's no John Kerry–witness the way he's dropped the ball on reinstating the Iran nuclear deal, which is now essentially dead. And unless they're lying in public (which they might be), the US State Department took some of Russia's most reasonable key demands, like Ukraine staying out of NATO, off the negotiating table in the lead-up to the war. Blinken doesn't seem to be sufficiently interested in peaceful solutions.

    Right now we're at a juncture where Russia has made some territorial gains, but has also been humiliated and shown to be a paper tiger. (The display of the weakness of their conventional forces certainly strengthens deterrence!) I think that this is a juncture when an end to the war might be possible on terms that Putin could sell domestically as a victory, but which would be understood by the world as a defeat.

    I don't think we should do anything that would look (to Russia, China and North Korea) as if we were hastily brokering a deal just because we're afraid of nuclear war. I agree with David that that creates nasty incentives. But it seems to me that a good diplomat (which Blinken and his people seem not to be) could find a way to make that happen without making it look like that's what's happening. I don't know, perhaps it's too hard to keep plans and agreements secret in the present day.

    Another consideration that I've been bringing up whenever I talk about these issues. Russia's mobilization suggests that they're willing to carry on the war for years. In a little over two years, Donald Trump could be president of the US again. Having Trump in charge of a dangerous situation like this would be incredibly risky. He's unhinged, for one thing, as his Jan 6 behavior proved. In addition, he's questioned whether the US should be so dedicated to our NATO allies. The war needs to end well in advance of 2025. If we don't try to stop it now, I'm not sure another good opportunity will present itself soon enough.

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47. Dave Baker

    September 28, 2022 at 11:26 am

    Oh yeah, one more thing on this. I don't necessarily agree with Stanovaya's reading of Putin's address from the OP.

    After talking about the referendums, Putin then says that the West has been engaging in nuclear blackmail against Russia. ( https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/sep/21/not-bluffing-putin-accuses-west-nuclear-blackmail-video ) Then after that he moves to talking about using nuclear weapons to protect the territorial integrity of Russia. It seems to me the speech may have been intended to be ambiguous between the following two readings:

    Scary Reading: Nuclear weapons will be used to defend all Russian territory, including Ukrainian territory claimed by Russia.

    Sane Reading: Nuclear blackmail is the sort of violation of Russian territorial integrity that would be met with nuclear retaliation.

    This way Putin can make it look like he was threatening to use nuclear weapons to "protect" the occupied regions of Ukraine, if he wants to do that, but he can also make it look like he was simply intending to deter Western nuclear use, if he decides he doesn't want to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He gets the benefits of making a nuclear threat without the costs of binding himself to an unwise course of action.

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48. Nick

    September 28, 2022 at 3:26 pm

    (Replying mainly to David Wallace, Peaceful IR Realist, Dave Baker, but hoping others are interested)

    Three parting thoughts for now, and thanks to all for the helpful discussion.

    (1) I hope everyone will watch and share with friends/family the following 18 minute talk (timestamped, from 34:20 to 52:54) by Dr. Ira Helfand, co-President of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize (https://gbpsr.org/speakers-bureau/ira-helfand/). It is the most adequate, concise description I've come across of what's ultimately at stake, both in the war in Ukraine and in general as long as strategic nuclear arsenals exist:

    https://youtu.be/UJKQu8bmwPs?t=2032

    KEYWORDS:
    Primary Blog

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49. David Wallace

    September 28, 2022 at 3:42 pm

    @Peaceful IR Realist:

    The issue I'm raising isn't threats of nuclear use, which I agree are thrown around by nuclear powers including the US with some frequency; it's actually-successful coercion through nuclear threats. I don't think there are any very clear cases of that in the deterrence era: I don't, for instance, see evidence that the USSR actually altered its strategy in Iran (though I admit that's not a history I know well), or that Iran or North Korea were deterred from their weapons programs. (I also think the US likes to maintain strategic ambiguity, and so always pointedly refuses to rule out first use even in situations where no-one seriously thinks they're going to; I think that's probably unwise given the magnitude of US conventional military superiority in most current contexts, but in any case I don't think it does much practical harm.)

    It plausibly is true that in the early cold war the US successfully coerced behavior with nuclear threats, but I think that's before deterrence was properly established. (To be fair this is partly my fault by talking about '74 years', which is the time in which more than one nation has had nuclear weapons but not really the time since we've been in a proper deterrence situation.) In 1948 the USSR had tested a bomb but had no meaningful nuclear capacity; in 1953 China had no nuclear weapons and was not meaningfully under any Soviet nuclear umbrella. Even in 1962 the USSR had very little capacity to strike the US homeland (the point of deploying missiles to Cuba, after all, was to gain that capacity) but in any case what ended the standoff was not Kennedy's threats but the secret deal where the US also withdrew weapons from Turkey. In the deterrence era, at least as I understand it, nuclear weapons have played an existential-deterrence role but not really been practical tools of statecraft.

    @Horrified to my core:

    "the survival reports from the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should… form the backdrop of any conversation on nuclear weapons"

    This is going to sound unavoidably callous but I don't agree. They are horrific, but so are the accounts from victims of other mass killings, whether by conventional heavy weapons or via intentional individual murder (as appears to be happening in parts of occupied Ukraine). What makes large-scale nuclear war so singularly frightening is not the manner of its victims' deaths but the sheer number of them: tens or hundreds of millions; billions, if the worst-case scenarios about nuclear winter are correct.

    "nuclear powers such as the US and Russia own stockpiles of well over 15,000 nuclear weapons. Not only that, technological advances have given way to a new kind of bomb that can deliver a blast over 1,000 times that of the Hiroshima bombing"

    This is a bit out of date: the US has around 3,700 weapons ( https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2062943) with about half of those actively deployed, and I think Russia is fairly similar. (To be clear, this is still a terrifying number.) And while it's true that it's technically possible to build weapons 1,000 times as powerful as Hiroshima (indeed, there's no real technical upper limit in the size of hydrogen bomb you can build) the US's strategic weapons are mostly in the range of 3-30x Hiroshima, and Russia's are similar (https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2038907).

    @Dave Baker:

    I mostly agree with this (especially the bit about a second Trump term). The only thing I'd add is that I don't think a peace deal is realistic as long as Ukraine's counteroffensive is still proceeding apace (Ukraine has no incentive to stop right now, especially given the plentiful evidence of war crimes). When Ukraine's counteroffensive culminates and/or the winter stops high-intensity fighting, there might be more prospect.

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50. Nick

    September 28, 2022 at 5:27 pm

    Just a last comment (from me at least), on the issue of whether it's indeed the case as David implies that "Ukraine's counteroffensive is still proceeding apace".

    Thanks for the two references David. I acknowledge these things are very uncertain, but I still don't think you are portraying the situation quite accurately. Anything can happen at any moment, but there does not seem to be any particular reason to think that the counteroffensive is going to take much more territory; and there are number of reasons to think it won't. Initially the Ukrainians ran blitzkrieg-style through a bunch of supirsed bottom-of-the-barrel Russian forces, and captured a lot of materiel. It was a great success, well-planned and executed (as far as I know, which is very little). Now they are in a different situation, fighting better prepared, more numerous, and more entrenched Russian forces. This interview with Michael Kofman (posted Sep 26th, more recent than that tweet) is a helpful summary:

    https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/russias-plan-to-stay-in-the-war/

    He cautions against being dismissive/derisive toward short-term dysfunctions we might observe (as always selectively, through our media filters) in the Russian mobilization, and urges people to keep in mind the bigger picture–Russia is mobilizing troops in they haven't since WWII. Russia!! Russia has extremely formidable latent power, even if their society, politics, and military have shown themselves to be even more dysfunctional and unattractive than many of us thought before.

    This seems like one, among several, very good reasons for the US to stop just letting this conflict play out, and instead shift into "aggressive diplomacy" mode (basically do what Wilkerson suggests in the interview I linked). And of course we should continue materially supporting the Ukrainian forces' defensive efforts (within reason). The US has explicitly refused meaningful diplomatic engagement with Russia, by any reasonable definition of the term, since before Feb. 2022 (https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/14/biden-official-admits-us-refused-to-address-ukraine-and-nato-before-russian-invasion/). In the past we have been capable of pursuing very effective diplomacy, especially on nuclear issues, under the watch of otherwise very mediocre leaders (backed up as always by our unparalleled military strength). We could do that again now. That is all I am advocating for policy-wise.

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