MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY:  SEE INTERESTING COMMENTS FROM DAVID WALLACE AND JOHN BOGART

Colin McGinn comments.  As I have noted in the past, tihs exclusion of a philosopher from participation in all aspects of the life of the profession is not defensible.   If I may quote from a related CHE essay awhile back:

Liberals who no doubt believe that convicted felons "deserve a second chance" sometimes sound like they think that accused or university-convicted sexual harassers should never be heard from again. But how could that be right?

Punishments should be proportional to the offense; that is a widely accepted principle of punitive justice. No one thinks that a sexual harasser should be castrated or hung. One also hopes no one thinks a sexual harasser should be prohibited from earning a living ever again. (Even convicted murderers, released from prison, are allowed to work.)

ADDENDUM:  Philosopher David Wallace writes:

A thought on your recent comment:

Yes, punishments should be proportional to the offense; but some bad consequences of an offense aren’t punishment, they’re protection of third parties. Police officers who extort money on duty should never again work in law enforcement; teachers who have (even consensual) sex with their teenage students should never again work with children; accountants who commit fraud in breach of trust should never again work in finance. In none of these cases should the person be prevented from working *at all*, but they need to find a new line of work. The financial hardship that is likely to cause the person is not in itself punishment, but is a necessary consequence of their offense.

From that perspective, if it were to be established that an academic has exploited power imbalances with graduate students to sexually harass them (without prejudice as to whether that is true in McGinn’s, or any other specific, case), then I don’t see it as unreasonable for them to permanently be excluded from student-facing university employment, and possibly also from conferences and workshops. (I can’t see any good reason not to let them publish.)

Of course there are due-process issues that need to be taken seriously, but those are somewhat separate from what’s an appropriate consequence of established offenses.

I mostly agree with this, but an awful lot turns on the details.   We would not think a bank robber who has served his sentence should be prohibited from entering stores where there is money that could be stolen, after all.  "Power imbalance" is also tricky:  sometimes the "imbalance" arises from a sustained relationship in the same institution, not a once-off like a conference or workshop.  In Professor McGinn's case, the only "official" offense was failure to disclose a romantic relationship with a graduate student, yet he lost an opportunity to be a visiting professor teaching  undergraduates.  More to the point, there has been a concerted effort to exclude philosophers like McGinn from professional activities, including publication (or even from the syllabus!).  This is not defensible.

ANOTHER:  John Bogart, a philosopher and lawyer, writes:

I am not sure that identifying some examples of limitations on employment for some criminal conduct (presumably post formal punishment) either explains or justifies much about exclusion (or cancellation) from university life….Some further (normative) cases: murderers should not work with other human beings; neither should rapists; or those guilty of battery or mayhem; embezzlers never to work in any job involving money.  Sexual abuse at university should bar the person from working with women in retail, or management, etc.  Exclusion is not the default, so why impose in the particular setting?  

Social exclusion, shunning, cancellation are forms of punishment.  Formal action by a state institution, or other legal entity, is not a condition for punishment.  What is special about abuse in a university that warrants lifetime exclusion? An answer to that question would be helpful.  ‘Protection of third parties’ isn’t helpful.