Here.  This I found particularly striking and interesting:

AR: You were part of a discussion group of maybe 10 to 12 people back in your Princeton days, with luminaries such as Tom Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, Nozick, and many others. In an interview with The Utopian, you called this the most important thing in your philosophical development. What made it so important? 

TS: Well, it was like having this gang of great teachers, for one thing. In my career, I was mainly doing logic, philosophy, mathematics, things like that, although I was interested in moral and political philosophy, and I got more drawn into it because I was doing a lot of teaching in that area. So this was partly a way of developing more expertise in the field because I was just in the process of getting into it. Second, it was something that provided me with confidence in two ways: One, there really was a subject matter there that you could learn more about because in the 1950s, moral philosophy had a kind of skeptical air to it. It was sort of conventionalist or emotivist, non-cognitivist, and so on, and so we were drawn together by the fact that most of us in the group tended to think that there were real facts about right and wrong, and that just by thinking really hard and clearly about them, you could make progress, and that wasn’t what was going on in most of philosophy at the time. It wasn’t where the action was in philosophy; it was mostly in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, things like that.

So the group gave me confidence that there were other people who think that we’re not just banging things up, that there’s something there. And second, that gave me confidence in myself, because these people were willing to talk to me, and so I could be a member of this group, which was amazingly flattering. I was kind of a junior partner in the group, so I felt, wow, this is amazing. So it really was important in my philosophical development in those ways, giving me confidence in the subject, and, to some degree, confidence in myself.

Two things struck me here.  First, it's always hard to imagine extremely accomplished philosophers lacking confidence, so it's refreshing to be reminded that even the "greats" may have lacked confidence at one time!  Second, it's interesting how the discussion group–which was mostly about first-order normative issues–was united by a rejection of the moral skepticism that dominated Anglophone philosophy in the prior decades.  Nagel, Dworkin and, of course, Scanlon later became explicit defenders of non-naturalism moral realism, or realism about reasons (as Scanlon develops it, in what I think is the best book on the subject), but it sounds like the roots of this meta-ethical position (which would have been regarded as metaphysically extravagant and preposterous in the 1970s and even 1980s) were to be found in this discussion among like-minded philosophers.  This, of course, raises the interesting (and controversial) sociological or psychological question about the role of group polarization in the development of philosophical views.