What’s wrong with this analysis, if anything?
I’ve looked only quickly at the linked piece, but I did notice a factual mistake in point 5. Point 5…
4 responses to “The increasing risk of nuclear war”
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Imaginative paraphrase in King’s spirit, not an actual quotation from Dr. King:
What is missing here is not factual sobriety, but distance from the framework itself. The analysis shows, clearly enough, how deterrence becomes more fragile: arms control decays, decision times shrink, dual-use systems deepen uncertainty, and new technologies heighten the danger. But it still reasons within the assumptions of deterrence. It asks how a system of organized nuclear terror might be made less unstable, not whether reliance upon such a system is itself a sign of moral failure. And that is the deeper question. The issue is not only whether this arrangement can be managed more safely. It is whether a civilization can still call itself sane while grounding its security in permanent preparations for mass death. A society that names this peace has already surrendered too much. https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/national-committee-sane-nuclear-policy-sane
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There’s a couple of issues here:
On point 3, it’s been a long time since I looked into this, so the science may have shifted. But at the time I did look into it, my impression was that we just don’t know what the real probability of a nuclear winter is, or what the consequences would be if it occurred. I don’t mean that it *wouldn’t* be caused by a 250 warhead exchange, I mean that we just *don’t know*, even though a number of scientists were loudly claiming that we did. In particular, studies depended on unjustified assumptions about how much ash would make it into the upper atmosphere. But like I said, this was a while back, so I may be out of date.
On point 4, while this is strictly-speaking true, we actually know relatively little about nuclear decision-making. At least in the US, the force is structured to allow us to absorb a first strike and still retaliate, so the president would not need to make a decision in only 15 minutes. That’s (part of) why we have those hideously expensive ballistic missile submarines, instead of only using much cheaper silo-based ICBMs – to ensure that the president can wait until we know for sure what’s happening.
On point 5, when I looked into this, it was really unclear how close we actually came to a nuclear war in the 80s. The Russians have incentive to exaggerate on this point. But similarly to point 3, it’s been a while since I did, so I may be out of date.
So I guess my assessment is that while I overall mostly agree with the linked article, the picture is murkier and less certain than they would suggest.
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Perhaps one can quibble with this or that statement or claim, and of course speaking about probabilities or risk estimates on this topic is a perilous enterprise in many cases. That said, I don’t find anything generally wrong with the analysis in toto. It might be most useful if only to generate further debate and discussion on the particulars.Several years ago I assembled what I judged at the time to be the relevant literature (in English) that speaks to many of the issues raised here, should anyone be interested: https://www.academia.edu/4844106/Nuclear_Weapons_bibliography
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I’ve looked only quickly at the linked piece, but I did notice a factual mistake in point 5. Point 5 begins by referring to Stanislav Petrov, and then it ends by mentioning the Cuban Missile Crisis and Able Archer as two additional examples of “close calls.” However, the incident in which Petrov was involved *was* Able Archer, so calling Able Archer “another example” is not correct.
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