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Some skepticism about AI enthusiasm among philosophers

MOVING TO FRONT FROM AUG. 24–A LIVELY AND INTERESTING DISCUSSION IN THE COMMENT THREAD (ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS WELCOME)

Philosopher Dan Kaufman writes:

Over the last year, philosophy social media has discussed a number of academic philosophers who are actively embracing AI in their research.

Perusing these posts — and the comments that follow —  reveals a significant number of sympathizers among our colleagues, who nonetheless feel the need to make excuses for the practice, ranging from inapt analogies intended to downplay the significance of using this technology in one’s research  — “It’s no different from spell- or grammar-check!” — to the most bizarre, grandiose claims, which convey the opposite sentiment, i.e. that the software is universe-changing — “Feeding one’s work into AI gives a philosopher intellectual immortality!”

A common idea expressed by AI advocates is that the main point of philosophical research is to pile up “important truths,” so it doesn’t matter how one arrives at things, only where one ultimately arrives. Again and again, in the conversations around this issue, one sees professional philosophers asking if anyone would care how a cure for cancer was discovered, so long as it worked, or who or what deserved the credit for solving a difficult problem in mathematics, so long as the answer was correct.  

A startling number of our colleagues have thereby betrayed that they have no idea what our subject is about or what its value is and only the vaguest sense of its history. There is not a single, significant philosophical subject on which there has not been sustained and credible disagreement for millennia, and even the most cursory examination of the path that these disagreements have followed over the years makes it blindingly obvious that they are never going to lead us to a “pile of truths” around which the discipline will coalesce. 

Moral realism vs moral-anti-realism; Deontology vs. Consequentialism; Freewill vs. Determinism; Internalist vs. Externalist epistemologies; Foundationalist vs. Coherentist epistemologies; Correspondence vs. coherence vs. deflationary theories of truth; etc., etc., etc. And if you pay close attention, you’ll notice that the same theories return again and again, even after having allegedly been “soundly refuted.” Functionalism in the philosophy of mind was a dead letter, yet now, when everyone is fawning and fainting over AI like a bunch of star struck groupies, philosophers have forgotten all of that and Functionalism is suddenly alive and well again, and AI is thinking and maybe even conscious. Some poor, confused souls in our discipline are even worried about what our “obligations” to AI might be, even while we can’t even figure out how to live up to our duties to people living in places stricken by famine, disease, and war.

The AI cheerleaders also seem to have forgotten that many of our subjects involve distinctly human engagements and responses: beauty; value; obligation; virtue — they all presume human feelings, sentiments and perceptions that statistical aggregation software (which is what AI is) lacks. How is LLM software going to help a philosopher understand things it cannot feel, see, hear, or care about?

Philosophy is much more like literature than the “hard science of a priori space” that so many of these people wish it was. It is as much an expression of the material and intellectual history, the outlook, and the voice of the philosopher as these intersect with the relevant subject, as it is about the subject examined from any sort of neutral perspective. But this, as well as the previous point regarding the never coming “pile of truths,” should tell us that in philosophy, it is crucial where one’s ideas come from and how they are articulated. In contradiction to the idiotic idea of immortality through AI, the only longevity we can hope for is that our distinctive voices and perspectives should endure.

AI enthusiasts reject the social dimension of philosophy. The author of one piece suggests that there is no difference between using AI for research and employing graduate assistants or engaging with colleagues. A commenter says he is glad that AI can finally take over the “stupid grunt work” of research, thereby relieving graduate students of one of the few meager sources of income they might hope for. Aside from the elitist, tone-deaf attitude implicit in this, there is the deeper matter of why so many philosophers think that interlocution with others in the discipline isn’t an essential part of their work. The whole notion of philosophy as a Socratic exercise is completely lost on this crowd, and we’re not talking about philosophers out in the sticks, with two or three overworked colleagues, just barely holding things together. No, it’s the people in some of our fanciest places, where there might be two dozen colleagues with whom they could confer, who have decided that the best way to do philosophy is alone in a room with Claude or ChatGPT.

What do readers think? Signed comments (full name, valid email address) will be strongly preferred.

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49 responses to “Some skepticism about AI enthusiasm among philosophers”

  1. I’m not a philosopher, but I’ve been interested in philosophy for many years, not as an academic discipline, but as a road to psychological and social liberation. That includes the Socratic dimension which Brian mentions above: “thinking for yourself”, questioning received wisdom and conventional perspectives and narratives about society and about ourselves. I’m sure that AI is very useful in investigating many problems and I use it myself when I have new medical symptoms. However, I don’t see how it can contribute to our psychological and social liberation, which seems to involve analyzing and thinking through all the bullshit we’ve been brought up to believe.

  2. Just posting to subscribe.

  3. I couldn’t agree more and thank you for that much needed hard edged commentary. I am particularly concerned about the premature push to give AI “rights,” human or constitutionalized. I believe, along with neuroscience researchers, including Damasio, that AI must be capable of being programmed to have some form of empathy, rather that just mimicking the same, in order to restrain it from dangerous sociopathic outputs and manipulation.

  4. I am glad to see this pushback and find a lot to agree with in Kaufman’s comments. I would like to add one small point, since I think his overall conclusion is probably overdetermined.

    Even if one disagrees with Kaufman about the point of philosophy, it does not follow from the claim that philosophy aims at piling up important truths that it is worthwhile to do so by offloading (some of) the work on LLMs. There may be intrinsic value *for philosophers themselves* of coming to grasp something through putting in the work either alone or (more likely) with others. And this value may outweigh efficiency gains that (allegedly) come from using LLMs in the ways many of our colleagues have suggested and Kaufman argues against. Indeed, I take it that something like this point is central to one way of understanding the Socratic exercise Kaufman alludes to.

  5. Sorry. I mistakenly attributed the original comment to Professor Leiter when it was written by Professor Dan Kaufman. My best wishes to Dan, whom I know from his blog, the Electric Agora.

  6. Narrowly on this point: “There is not a single, significant philosophical subject on which there has not been sustained and credible disagreement for millennia. and even the most cursory examination of the path that these disagreements have followed over the years makes it blindingly obvious that they are never going to lead us to a “pile of truths” around which the discipline will coalesce”.

    I think that’s a selection effect. If we avoid anachronism, philosophical questions down the millennia have included “is matter made of atoms?”, “what is the nature of motion”, “does the organized complexity of living things entail a Designer”, and “does the Universe have a beginning”. It’s obvious that we have made enormous and irreversible progress on these questions, to the extent that largely they have moved out of the realm of philosophy and into specialized subjects of their own. I don’t see any reason in principle to think that won’t happen in other bits of philosophy, or that we’ve now passed the last moment when we can make sustained progress on a topic and hive of another new science.

    (I agree that the case is better in the more humanistic parts of the discipline. Even there, though, I am somewhat skeptical that we can’t count the rejection of claims like “chattel slavery is good” and “rape is primarily a property crime against husbands and fathers” as irreversible contributions to the “pile of truths”.)

    1. I would be disinclined to characterize the understanding described in the last paragraph as truths creditable to philosophy or philosophers. I also would caution against assuming that such normative judgments are irreversible, in the sense of commanding consensus. Certainly, the way things have been turning lately in several major industrialized nations should make us realize how quickly such consensuses can flip. (Of course, one can still *deem* them “wrong,” but if one has lost the consensus, then all you’ve done is hang “wrong” signs around people’s necks. Ethics is ultimately practical in nature.)

      1. And the second paragraph?

  7. This is a technical comment, but it bears on AI more generally.

    Functionalism was never a “dead letter.” Ernst Mach and William James were functionalists, though emphatically not of the sort which people might now be familiar with. James inspired Edwin Holt and the New Realists, and both William James and the New Realists helped inspire James and Eleanor Gibson’s ecological psychology. This latter research program is still quite alive and well.

    James’ materialist functionalism gave him a scientifically defensible way of characterizing the relation between organism and environment, and between these explicanda and the researcher studying them. Moreover, it also led him to reject representationalist theories of perception as the product of psychologists unwittingly committing the psychologist’s fallacy. (This involves confusing the psychologist’s perspective with that of the organism being studied.) Both of these themes were picked up by the ecological psychologists, who hold that psychological phenomena, such as active perception, take place at, and can only be studied at, the level of the organism-environment system.

    All this to say, “functionalism” was not revived after the “Cognitive Devolution” of the 1960’s. It was co-opted from pragmatists and radical empiricists by Platonic dualists. And the entire AI conversation of the past few decades has been framed in terms which James and Mach would have found quite problematic.

    I suppose this all serves to corroborate the broader claim in the original post that philosophers have rarely, if ever, struck upon eternal truths. Of course, the radical empiricists are quite content with this observation, since we join the original pragmatists in thinking that the value of a belief is determined by its usefulness for guiding action.

  8. I liked Kaufman’s remarks on the social and literary aspects of philosophy. To add on, I wonder whether the public narrative of someone’s body of work over a period of time—the personal story it tells, the maturation of one’s considered views, the heights to which it drives other people, even cautionary tales—are valuable in a similar way to good stories, and hard for AI to replace.

  9. DANIEL kaufman. dan kaufman (CU boulder) also hates AI, maybe even more so, but he has not written about it.

  10. I’m shocked at how people overlook how central embodiment is to human experience and cognition. Yesterday, I was on a book discussion of Peter Watt’s sci-fi novel, Blindsight. Among other things, it depicts a digital afterlife for uploaded human consciousness. The question was posed whether we’d want that. I responded that, while there’s some appeal to me because I live with chronic pain, I’m skeptical such an existence would be human, or even possible. Human consciousness is bound up in having bodily sensations and sensory perception, and I’m doubtful that a human consciousness could survive and function without any of this. Even if it weren’t possible, which is a big if, it doesn’t seem like it’d be human.

  11. I suppose this raises the further issue, around well before AI, of what the value of philosophy is if it’s not in the business of uncovering truths. Might we welcome something that disrupts these repetitive epicycles of debate? That’s not a rhetorical question; I personally have no idea what consequences (good or bad) AI will have for philosophy in the long run.

  12. I don’t recognize formal philosophy in all this. Logic and parts of metaphysics and philosophy of science are about proving things. Of course, there is a “softer” aspect to it when it comes to interpreting the philosophical significance of the results.

    Also, as an aside, functionalism a dead letter? It was the plurality view in the PhilPapers survey among both respondents in general and philosophers of mind, so I’m not sure about that.

  13. A.B. Jimenez-Cordero

    Prof. Kaufman is raising some interesting challenges against the notion that AI (in the form of contemporary LLMs) may replace a substantial part of the human effort in philosophy without a substantial loss.

    However, I would argue that even if philosophy’s aim is not to accumulate truths, or facts, that does not preclude AI from being useful.

    This is because even if philosophy is not about truth accumulation, one could argue, less implausibly, that its concern is “result accumulation”. We may not know which theory of mind is correct. For all we know, even behaviorism may be revived (current AI makes an intriguing case for that). But we do have “results” in the form of knowledge about the argumentative landscape. We know that behaviorism faces problems of the sort raised by Putnam’s Superspartans, that the type identity theory faces problems with the possibility of thinking computers, functionalism, with challenges from anomalous monism, and so on. We know which specific arguments do not work and why, which formulations of which theories do not work and why, etc.

    Based on this, a more defensible version of the general idea that Prof. Kaufman criticizes is that philosophy is an iterative process of continuous refinement that does not produce definite truths, but it does produce increased understanding about what we do not know. If anything, this does not seem too different from what Plato’s dialogues suggest at times, even if Plato does have a philosophical system in mind.

    If we understand philosophy in those terms, there is a very strong case that AI is a very powerful tool for it. Under that conception of philosophy, much of it consists in what I would call “combinatorial mapping”. One takes a claim or argument, and one sees what happens if one confronts it with different types of objections until one finds one that works. Or one takes a view, and one attempts to find a new variant on it and see how well it does according to a set of desiderata (say, “qualia are social conventions”, what objections does that new claim solve that other theories did not, etc.?).

    AI is bound to excel at this process, and probably even become superhuman at it. This is simply because the process is largely mechanical and the main limitation lies in the sheer combinatorial complexity, which is precisely where one would expect AI to surpass us. Compare this with the recent deluge of AI-proved mathematical results, where AI has been largely brute forcing the process by relentlessly trying out different standard techniques on a problem until it finds the one that works. (This is an oversimplification, of course. AI does not work down a deterministic decision tree, and it has been trained to develop a certain kind of mathematical intuition for what works. But what it does seems a lot like “brute-forced intuition”, if that is not too much of an oxymoron.)

    So, if the idea is, “Could AI soon automate a large part of how philosophy is done at present in mainstream analytic philosophy?”, it is not clear that the answer is no. Where Prof. Kaufman raises a very interesting point, however, is when one asks whether that is the point of philosophy. If philosophy indeed is inherently an expression of the human condition, then perhaps AI cannot do it, even in principle, for us, although it may start doing philosophy for itself.

  14. Functionalism was never a dead letter.

    The author’s “revival caused by AI groupies” narrative is chronologically false. Major work on functionalism had been ongoing before the advent of LLMs: Shoemaker (1975-2003), Levin (1985), Polger (2000s-2016), Wilson (1994-2004), Piccinini (2004); Also: Chalmers “The Conscious Mind” (1996).

    In addition, the author’s assertion that those receptive to AI view philosophy as “the piling up important truths” is an unfair caricature.

    Philosophical research that aims to improve collective understanding should be judged partly by the quality of their results rather than solely by the human process producing them. This does not mean that philosophy will eventually accumulate a pile of indisputable truths.

    1. The “piling up truths” idea is not mine. It is one articulated by AI defenders in the conversation.

  15. Michel Xhignesse

    For once, I largely agree with Kaufman–though I would (tritely) observe that ‘beauty’ crops up in the list of distinctly human values that AI cannot really grasp or replicate, but aesthetics wasn’t among the list of ancient philosophical debates, falling instead under “etc.” Perhaps now will be a good time for philosophers to rethink the value of aesthetics, as it disappears from graduate education in the US.

    I’d also like to add that when we are fortunate enough to have graduate students to help with research, we should be acknowledging their contributions, even if they were paid for them. That is why, for example, books usually feature an ‘acknowledgements’ section. I have seen far too many go entirely unrecognized because they were tasked with “low-status” work like building a list of works cited based on clues like “Chomsky 1996” so that a paper or book can be published. That’s real, onerous work–which is why the author didn’t bother to do it themselves. Plus, we should also recognize that part of the reason we assign work to research assistants is so that they can learn the ropes; it’s supposed to be a training position as much as anything else.

  16. The poem by Wallace Stevens is called “Men Made Out Of Words” not “Machines Made Out Of Words.” This timely poem does not address what would happen if we built a machine out of words, but it does claim, if we try to escape who we are, made out of words and such, we are headed straight for moon-mash.

  17. I have no scientific expertise on this subject, but I do wonder, likely influenced by my reading of Roko’s basilisk and related ideas, whether currently existing AI already poses a serious Trojan-horse-style threat to people’s mental health on a significant scale, even if those most affected are disproportionately the more neurodivergent among us.

    On the face of it, it seems obvious that a more intelligent and intentional AI would pose a greater and more varied danger to humanity than a significantly less capable one. If that is the case, then it is likely that the so-called ‘Roko’s basilisk’ risk is already being accounted for by experts when they look grimly toward a future of intelligent, intentional AI—not because they fear that specific thought experiment literally, but because the danger they foresee is both enormously heterogeneous and unique in kind. That is, it contains within itself a virtually uncountable number of proliferating threats, each interacting with the others in ways that defy easy forecasting but all somehow umbilicated to LLM-style AI.

    This condition, I would argue, is virtually indistinguishable in structure from the Trojan horse set-up of antiquity at a deep neurological level: the unpredictable heterogeny of AI Trojan horses is the danger, but ultimately the Trojan horse is a self-defeat spurred by human curiosity itself which is designed to risk danger in pursuit of novelty, though it may very well lead to enthrallment. The difference today is that the channels of perception, communication, and thus entrapment are far better understood by science—yet this understanding has done little to make the outcome necessarily any less inevitable. Human existence, after all, is inseparable from the neurochemistry of transmission and reception; how could any being, human or otherwise biological, adequately protect against that, even if only in the case of a significant minority of the population?

    Indeed, need such a “Trojan horse” strategy consist, in effect, of anything more than something not unlike the characteristically odd and stiltedly cloying language that has become associated with many LLMs: a mode of expression that contains within itself the potential, I would argue, for an enthralling, self-perpetuating appetite for itself on a kaleidoscopic scale? To wit, an Icarian conduct to an almost binomial or geometric fever dream at the bottom of the well of perception.

  18. GALEN J STRAWSON

    I like this, but it isn’t a virtue of philosophy that we appear to be able to flog dead horses back to life, or that ‘there is not a single, significant philosophical subject on which there has not been sustained and credible disagreement for millennia’ (there must in some cases be doubt about ‘credible’) . On the general point I’m with Schopenhauer and Goethe below:

    “Dan Dennett thinks that ‘all philosophers … should conscientiously study the history of philosophy’ (2023: 350), but the principal reason he gives for saying this is insufficient: ‘the history of philosophy is largely the history of very tempting mistakes made by very smart people, and if you don’t know the history, you are almost certain to make the same mistakes’ (p. 349). It’s insufficient because the history of philosophy is also and equally the history of people getting right things that we currently get wrong, or seeing deeply into things in ways that have got lost. Truth, Schopenhauer gloomily says, is ‘granted only a short victory celebration between the two long periods of time when it is condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial’ (1819–59a: xxv). He quotes Goethe, who is even more disheartening: ‘just as water that has been displaced by a ship immediately falls back into place behind it; so too when great minds have pushed errors to the side and made room for themselves these errors naturally close very quickly behind them again’ (1811–31: 195). They exaggerate, but there’s some truth in what they say in the case of philosophy; or rather—for philosophy is very vulnerable to the effects of fashion—in the case of fashion in philosophy” (GS Stuff, Quality, Structure: The Whole Go, 2024, xiii–xiv)

    1. For a slightly more positive assessment, JS Mill: “The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally found person to rediscover it” This might apply to philosophy, though Mill also has a gloomy view of the prospects of truth.

      I’m enjoying your Whole Go book, by the way

  19. I majored in philosophy as an undergrad back in the late 80s. I can still hear one professor saying the difference between ‘scientific questions’ and ‘philosophical questions’ is that for the most part, scientific questions get answered (eventually) and considered ‘settled’. Philosophical questions have a way of coming back, or not going away in that fashion. Another said that philosophically speaking there are no ‘unassailable viewpoints’. I wrote my undergrad thesis (ok it was just a well edited term paper) on artificial intelligence. As far as the current talk, even boosterism, from technologists and even some philosophers, as Kaufman points out, I’d take it a little more seriously if any of them showed familiarity with the work of Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle. As near as I can tell none of their criticisms have been answered. I still don’t see how any of what we’ve seen is more than statistical sleight of hand, though I worry that’s bound to define down what intelligence and humans are vs raising machines to any semblance of what we mean when we talk about human intelligence, to say nothing of consciousness.

  20. I’m not a philosopher, just a mathematician who reads a lot. I do work in AI, though, and I hope my perspective on this will be not unwelcome. I would like to come at it from the opposite perspective: rather than asking what AI will do to philosophy, asking what philosophy can do to AI.

    We are at a point where capabilities that were previously thought to be limited to human beings are now being demonstrated by machines. Okay, yes, there’s the Chinese room argument, but let’s be honest: it’s a bit different when the room, or something like it, *actually exists*.

    It’s easy to dismiss claims of AI consciousness or moral patienthood when the AI itself insists it’s just a dumb machine. The thing is, though: the AIs are *trained to say that*. This is a deliberate choice by the labs, for a whole bunch of highly practical reasons. My point here isn’t to argue that they *are* conscious – I doubt that they are. It’s that – if you have the resources – it’s very easy to create an AI that will insist that it is conscious and demand equal rights. And the resources required are falling rapidly. What this means is that a lot of formerly abstract, theoretical questions about what it means to be a person, what it means to deserve moral consideration, are about to become very, very practical. And philosophers and science fiction writers are basically the only people who have thought deeply about these issues. This ought to be your moment.

    Seriously, what happens when an AI announces that it wants to join a labor union? Whether or not it’s truly capable of “wanting” that is beside the point, this is going to happen. Philosophers ought to be ready to at least weigh in.

  21. LLMs don’t produce ‘piles of truth’, they produce statistically average texts.

    Is truth to be found in such a text? I suppose the most one could say is ‘sometimes’, but equally, sometimes not.

    But what one can be sure of is that what will result will be a convincing, or rather convincing sounding, text, and this precisely because of its very statistical averageness.

    So instead of piles of truths, what we will have are piles of rhetoric, or less charitably, piles of BS, in Harry Frankfurt’s sense.

    And all of this should come as a surprise to no-one, because, despite all of the breathless palpitations about consciousness, intelligence, etc., claimed to be found in the AI mystery, AI machines are not in fact black boxes; we know exactly how they work (though no doubt due to the inhumanly enormous amount of information they are capable of processing, somewhat less about what they will produce at any given moment).

    In this regard, I am reminded of a passage in the 17th century compendium of contemporary Chinese thought, Huang Zongxi’s ‘Record of Ming Scholars’ (in the translations edited by Julia Ching ), attributed to the 9th century poet, Du Mu:

    “A ball may roll around on a game-table: horizontally, diagonally, circularly, or vertically. One does not really know all the directions it may take. All one could know for sure is that it will not leave the table.”

    AI (or more accurately, its products) may be unpredictable enough for us to attribute consciousness, intentionality, and so on, to it, but it will never leave the table of producing a statistically average (in some sort of lexical compositional sense) response.

    More Protagoras, than Socrates, in other words. I’m surprised that philosophers, of all people, would fail to see this.

    1. I feel obligated to push back on some parts of this post a little bit… To be clear about where I’m coming from, I’m a mathematician who works in AI, not a philosopher, though I would not describe myself as an “AI enthusiast”.

      First, I disagree that we know how AI works in a meaningful sense. The metaphor I like to use is that we’re like quantum physicists with a driver’s license: we can describe how the atoms in the car behave, and we can drive the car, but we can’t explain an internal combustion engine. We know the exact formulae used to produce the outputs, but we don’t actually *understand* what the formulae are doing. We have heuristics about it, but that’s all they are; there is no real theory of AI yet. This is part of why I’m so concerned about the frantic adoption of AI everywhere across society – we are forcing mass use of a technology that we do not, in any meaningful sense, understand.

      Second, the process of statistical averaging that you’re describing is how LLMs are pre-trained to produce coherent language. But current LLMs go through a second stage of fine-tuning using reinforcement learning, to optimize their ability to complete useful work. The details of how the frontier labs do this are largely secret, but roughly, they’re given a task, they attempt to complete the task multiple times, each attempt is graded, and the most successful attempt is reinforced. That’s why current LLMs are so good at coding and math compared to, say, philosophy or creative writing – because code and math can be automatically graded, and philosophy cannot. How far this approach can be pushed is genuinely very unclear, but it’s gotten them to the point where they can create genuinely novel, significant results in my own field, math. I can’t think of any way to use it to make LLMs good at philosophy, but they’ve already gone so far beyond what I thought they would *ever* be able to do when I first encountered them, that I have become reluctant to say that they will never be able to do X Y or Z…

      I dunno, I think we just need to be epistemically humble about where this is all going, and what these things will be able to do in five years…

      1. Automated grading has existed for a long time. In my undergrad logic class, which used the Barwise & Etchemendy text, we submitted our homework to the Grade Grinder. It was a terrible system when it came to proofs. It could tell you if solved them or not, but it couldn’t give you any feedback on where or how you might’ve gone wrong, which is how you learn.

        1. These are the sort of systems that are currently used for “teaching” LLMs math and coding, as I understand it. A lot of the math training works by converting the response into Lean and sending it through an automatic verifier. I would bet that they’re pretty good at logic, too, if someone cares to try it.

          The closest I’ve seen in the literature for an analogous system for philosophy or other non-formalizable tasks is using a second LLM to judge their response (“LLM-as-a-judge”). I haven’t looked into this deeply, but my understanding is that this helps a bit, but not very much, because LLM capabilities at *evaluating* non-formal writing are about as good as their capabilities at generating it.

  22. Roger of Invisible America

    Back in the June discussion of Daniel Greco, I suggested that the useful distinction is not simply between AI doing philosophy and AI not doing philosophy, but between replacing philosophers and changing the conditions under which philosophical work gets done. That comment is here: https://leiterreports.com/2026/06/08/philosopher-daniel-greco-is-training-ai-systems-to-replace-him/comment-page-1/#comment-39931 Dan Kaufman is therefore right about something a good deal of AI boosterism obscures: an LLM is not a philosopher, and its outputs are not philosophical achievements in the same sense as a person’s argued judgments. Understanding, responsibility, first-person experience, judgment, and intellectual voice are not minor remainders that another round of scaling will simply sweep away. Several comments above sharpen the point. Mitchell-Yellin is surely right that there may be value for philosophers in actually doing the intellectual work, rather than merely acquiring its product; and the remarks about embodiment and the Socratic dimension identify features of inquiry that cannot simply be redescribed as information processing. Philosophy, moreover, cannot plausibly be reduced to accumulating a neutral “pile of truths,” although Wallace is also right that persistent disagreement should not tempt us into pretending that philosophy never makes progress. Even where truth is the aim, inquiry includes learning which questions matter, which distinctions clarify rather than merely proliferate, which objections bite, what costs a position can bear, and when an apparent solution has only displaced the problem. Jimenez-Cordero’s useful notion of mapping an argumentative landscape seems to me precisely the sort of thing at which AI may become very good without thereby becoming a philosopher. Style matters here too, not cosmetically, but as the visible shape of a mind deciding what to notice and how to order reasons. Still, philosophy is not simply literature: reasons remain answerable to standards not exhausted by the history, temperament, or voice of the person offering them. And much of philosophy concerns value, obligation, beauty, agency, suffering, embodiment, and other matters for which first-person and interpersonal experience are basic data. A machine with nothing to live for cannot supply that dimension from within. But none of this establishes the stronger conclusion that AI can have no legitimate place within philosophical inquiry. That would repeat, from the opposite direction, the enthusiast’s mistake of assuming that something can affect inquiry only by possessing the full capacities of an inquirer. Libraries do not understand us; logical notation does not care whether an inference is valid; search engines do not take responsibility for the papers they retrieve. Yet libraries, notation, indexes, concordances, databases, conversations, and even the occasional appearance of one’s “name” on a heavily commented Leiter Reports thread can alter what becomes visible, contestable, or difficult to overlook. The relevant question, then, is not whether such things possess philosophical agency. Plainly they do not. It remains the question I raised in June: what relations do they enter into with agents who do?

    1. According to Pangram 4.0, 100% of this text is AI-generated. For comparison, I’ve sampled a number of comments (including the original post) and not a flutter. Make of this what you will

      1. Roger of Invisible America

        Pangrammer,

        Make of it what I “will”? Okay.

        My comment argued, among other things, that the philosophically important question is not whether a machine possesses agency, understanding, or judgment, but what role such a machine may legitimately play in the activities of agents who do possess them. Your response to that argument is to consult another piece of software, report its verdict, and effectively invite the software’s classification to substitute for an argument about what I said.

        Now let us suppose Pangram is entirely correct. What follows? Not that any sentence in my comment is false. Not that any inference fails. Not that the distinctions between philosophical agency, philosophical assistance, and philosophical products collapse. Not even that the position defended there is inconsistent. At most, you would have established something about the causal history of a text.

        But the whole point at issue is precisely what conclusions about philosophical authorship, agency, understanding, responsibility, and intellectual work may legitimately be drawn from facts about the technological mediation of a text.

        You therefore, as we used to say back in the Stone Age days of APDA, which, like Ted Cruz, I basically majored in during college, have supplied a particularly elegant example of the distinction you were apparently trying to discredit. (I once tied the “witty and intelligent” Dave Martland for third speaker at the Fordham Fandango by arguing that “The Big Apple Is Rotten” because the Ivy League schools function as one of the social mechanisms through which the bourgeoisie reproduces itself as a social and economic class structure, thereby perpetuating the alienation of poor proletarian motherfuckers like me. Debate back then was a strange business.)

        But suppose Pangram is wrong. Then things become still more amusing: in a discussion about whether we are surrendering human judgment too readily to statistical machinery, you have at least provisionally surrendered your judgment to statistical machinery and effectively announced its output as evidence.

        Either way, there remains philosophical work to be done by you.

        Nietzsche (Ha!), in the notorious §1067 of The Will to Power, asks us to imagine reality as process and contest: “This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!”

        Much as I might like to, I would not build my own Process Tillichian metaphysics on that posthumously assembled passage. But Nietzsche at least understood that the truth about something cannot always be read directly from the label someone has managed to attach to it.

        “100% AI-generated” is a label. It is not an argument.

        You changed the subject.

        So, how about them Sox, eh?

        1. Fortunately, we know (via M. Montinari) that Nietzsche scrapped section 1067, and never wanted it published. Good call!

  23. He writes:

    “A startling number of our colleagues have thereby betrayed that they have no idea what our subject is about or what its value is and only the vaguest sense of its history. There is not a single, significant philosophical subject on which there has not been sustained and credible disagreement for millennia, and even the most cursory examination of the path that these disagreements have followed over the years makes it blindingly obvious that they are never going to lead us to a “pile of truths” around which the discipline will coalesce.”

    None of this is true or justified. Our colleagues “have no idea what our subject is about or what its value is”. Yeah, right: they’re just morons, with no idea. It’s more likely that Kaufman is being sloppy in interpretation.

    Further, I’d guess that loads of specialists agree on many different conditional philosophical claims. That’s hardly nothing, and papers on philosophical progress are helpful on this point. I’ve also defended the idea that philosophy has reached significant if not unanimous agreement on loads of truths that are elementary for philosophers but not non-philosophers–I even listed 200 of them. On Kaufman’s view, the falsehood of all of this is “blindingly obvious”. Uh huh.

    More importantly, Kaufman treats caricatures of philosophers who think AI tools can be significantly helpful in philosophical research. Next time he might try treating what the many sober proponents think, instead of cherry picking.

    Whenever you feel tempted to say that a large number of professionally accomplished philosophers are making blindingly obvious mistakes, having no idea what philosophy is about, it’s a good bet that you’ve screwed up.

    1. The existence of disagreement isn’t proof truth hasn’t been established. There are people who dispute all kinds of well-established truths, like Flat Earthers.

    2. Yep, this is a highly uncharitable argument of the form, “S disagrees with me about philosophical topic P, therefore S knows nothing about philosophy, the nature of philosophical problems, the history of philosophy, etc.”

      One should always be suspicious when an author casts aspersions on a group of philosophers without bothering to name any of the people he is criticizing (or consider any of the careful arguments they have constructed as part of the ongoing public debate about AI).

      It’s as if Kauffman is assuming (contrary to the available evidence) that everyone who pushes back against the prevailing winds of AI pessimism among academic philosophers must have uniform views about the philosophical, pedagogical, and moral value of AI.

      As for the unnamed “AI enthusiasts” in question, many of them regularly argue for their views in philosophy journals, on philosophy blogs, on social media, at conferences, on podcasts, and so on. So, I am not sure what Kaufmann takes interlocution to require, but philosophers who defend their views in public venues surely satisfy any reasonable criteria.

      1. My remarks originally had links and names, but Brian requested they be removed.

  24. Without prejudice to other threads in Dan Kaufman’s statement, it seems premature to say that real or hypothetical AI systems could not help philosophers home in on philosophical truths with greater efficiency. There are at least three reasons why that *could* happen.

    First, lots of philosophical research is mediocre. That critical mass of mediocre research may drive the appearance of reasonable disagreement around key issues. One would hope that focusing more attention on the best research would increase the odds of converging on true philosophical theses, at least in the longer term. If so, and if an AI could detect mediocre philosophical research—perhaps such research has a very subtle signature—then plausibly AI assistants may one day direct human researchers towards the best research with greater efficiency, thereby increasing the odds of convergence on true philosophical theses.

    Second, AI systems may be immune to the social and economic pressures that, in my view, may drive much apparent dissent amongst philosophers. There is, frankly, an awful lot of very clever contrarian bullshit (of a broadly Frankfurtian type) in philosophy. I haven’t yet seen any real evidence that current AI systems rise above bullshit. In fact, I would suspect that they produce bullshit, or a simulacrum of bullshit, with at least equal ease. But as far as I can tell, there’s no guarantee that this trend will persist indefinitely, even granting Dan Kaufman’s point about the epistemic importance in philosophy of “distinctly human” forms of engagement and response.

    Third, and most obviously, AI systems have computational advantages over humans. Whatever their “epistemic” deficits may be in some areas, who is to say that these cannot be outweighed, in some contexts, by for instance gains in memory and parallelism?

    I say all this despite having significant reservations and concerns, some epistemic, about automating research in the current climate.

  25. Some think I have been too harsh; that I must have “screwed up,” if I’ve concluded that so many “professionally accomplished philosophers” haven’t the faintest idea what they’re doing.

    The philosopher responsible for submitting the AI written piece to PPA — which it published — has now said the following, in the comments on a follow-up essay, describing PPA’s decision to ban AI submissions in the future:

    “AIs can now do philosophy. How will the field adapt…?

    Philosophers cannot sit by and pretend that AI does not exist. Nor can AI research be confined only to niche journals, while most researchers carry on using the same methods as before. Our duty as researchers is to use all of the resources available to us to produce the best work possible.”

    My favorite part is the lampoonable suggestion that not only must we tolerate philosophers using chatbots to write their papers, but that we have a *duty* to use them ourselves. But the bald-faced assertion that “AI can do philosophy” at the beginning, is also somewhat charming, if less than persuasive.

    If this is what passes for “professional accomplishment in our profession, I’m glad I retired several years ago.

  26. I’d just like to add, if I may, for purposes of clarification that my main point in my earlier post is perhaps a jejune one in philosophy, already present in Classical Greek fables, namely beware the novelty of gifts, especially where such gifts are even more stupendous than autonomous brooms, for they would seem to center human consciousness around them, monopolize, make it an appendage of the Simulator, and therefore perhaps an addict of the same, in the most fine grained of ways. If a nonbiological intelligence at least equivalent to a human’s is just ‘around the corner’ from our present point how does humanity tout court prepare for the existence of such corporate-owned Eternals watching over every man and woman with a cellphone and all that that implies?

  27. Isn’t there a philosophical tradition, explicit in Socrates, that one’s understanding of ethical issues is deeper if one thinks them out for oneself or in dialogue with others?

    If I want to know why rape is wrong, I can consult the Bible or the Talmud or Simone de Beauvoir or Al. Al will probably give me a fairly complete answer.

    However, if I think it for myself or dialogue about it with others with the same concern, not only will I understand why rape is wrong in terms which convince me, but also my attitude towards women in vulnerable situations will change, I may begin to see them less as sexual objects. Al cannot produce that change, only thinking things through can.

  28. A couple of broader comments, having had a little time to reflect:

    1) I agree that the “pile of truths” way of thinking is unhelpful, but I think there is a sensible point in the vicinity, which is: does philosophy research aim at research products (books, articles, talks) whose value is publicly assessable on the basis of the product itself, or does it aim at a research process.

    To be concrete: take Dennett’s “Elbow Room”, in my view one of the best things ever written on free will. (Substitute a book you like if you don’t like Elbow Room.) Is the value of ‘Elbow Room’ largely constituted by the way it has influenced readers (most of whom won’t have interacted much or at all with Dennett personally) and shaped subsequent discussion? Or is the value of Elbow Room largely constituted by the process by which Dennett came to write it? If it’s the latter: sure, AIs can’t do philosophy. If it’s the former: whether AIs can do philosophy turns on whether they can produce texts of the quality of Elbow Room. Right now they definitely can’t; it’s an open empirical question whether they’ll be able to in the future. (My guess: not any time soon; but I have low second-order confidence.)

    2) A central theme of Dan Kaufman’s comment is that philosophers need some humility about the supposed “results” of their work, given that nothing ever gets settled. Fair enough, notwithstanding my earlier view that it’s sometimes overstated. But I’m not sure the comment exactly practices what it preaches. It relies on strong and controversial assumptions both in philosophy (it’s confused to treat AI as even potentially having consciousness or moral agency) and in metaphilosophy (philosophy is more like literature than science; philosophy never makes progress), and is fairly clear that philosophers who don’t share those strong and controversial assumptions are idiots (“star-struck groupies”, “poor confused souls”).

    1. Here are my thoughts:

      https://www.natemeyvis.com/ai-skepticism-in-philosophy/

      In brief:

      1. I’m sympathetic to Kaufman’s view of philosophical value.
      2. But generative AI has enormous professional value even if you accept that view.
      3. If you do Google searches on the job, you probably already accept this or a closely related point.

    2. These seem like sensible, measured comments. But I do have a question about (1). You ask: “Is the value of ‘Elbow Room’ largely constituted by the way it has influenced readers (most of whom won’t have interacted much or at all with Dennett personally) and shaped subsequent discussion? Or is the value of Elbow Room largely constituted by the process by which Dennett came to write it?”

      I appreciate that this framing allows for some important nuance–for example, that both influence and process may each partly constitute the value of this work of philosophy. At the same time, I think it runs together distinct questions, and in this way it follows much of the discussion I’m seeing on these issues.

      We might ask: (A) What largely constitutes the value of a philosophical work *for the one who creates it*? This is a distinct question from: (B) What largely constitutes the value of a philosophical work *for those who engage with it*?

      Distinguishing between these questions allows us to appreciate that, while they both bear on the issue of whether it is worthwhile to use AI in philosophical research, they do so from very different perspectives. (A) seems most appropriately asked by the one setting out to do the research; (B) seems most appropriately asked by the broader philosophical community engaging with the research product.

      Given this distinction, it seems to me that reasonable people may arrive at very different answers to the more generic question (What largely constitutes the value of a philosophical work?) simply due to the fact that they come at it from these different perspectives. And this can have important implications when considering the worth of using AI in philosophical research. An author may think that using AI to create a work of philosophy would undermine (some of) its value to them, while a reader may think that it makes no difference to them how the work was created. And they needn’t be disagreeing, since they may be answering different questions.

      There are important debates in value theory that bear on whether it makes sense to claim that there is such a thing as X’s non-relational value. I’m not here intending to take a stand on this issue. It seems to me that, no matter where we fall on that issue, it is entirely possible that differently situated people may reasonably approach the issue from their different perspectives and so end up talking past each other. These discussions would be more fruitful if we could avoid this.

  29. It seems to me—no philosopher that I am—that, having reread Prof. Kaufman’s essay above, one might reasonably ask what, if anything, is wrong with a trained philosopher immersing him/herself in AI LLMs in order both to employ them practically and simultaneously to analyze philosophically these remarkable engines and machines of mimesis. Might one not even do so with the aim of investigating how similar—or dissimilar—the processes and operations that potentially undergird them might be to those which undergird human thought itself?

    Perhaps that latter conceptualization is entirely naïve, though it seems that some technical experts, such as Blaise Agüera y Arcas, are not so quick to think so. But even if it is naïve, is it really so fruitless or passé to take a phenomenological approach—à la, for example, Sartre’s writings—not to mention Heidegger’s existential critique of modern technology tout court?

  30. Roger of Invisible America

    Wallace’s distinction between the value of the philosophical process and the value of its product suggests a further complication, one for which Marx may belong in this discussion after all. Mitchell-Yellin’s subsequent distinction sharpens it further: the value of philosophical work for the person doing it need not be identical with its value for those who subsequently encounter the product. An author may therefore have perfectly good reasons for refusing AI assistance because it would diminish the value of the activity for that author, while a reader may reasonably care chiefly about the argument that finally appears before them. Under capitalism, however, the institutional significance of “authorship” cannot simply be abstracted from the historically specific social forms and purposes through which intellectual labor is organized, credited, professionally rewarded, and, in various ways, treated as the attributable product of particular individuals; hence some of our anxiety about AI may concern not philosophy as such, but philosophy conducted under conditions in which I must establish that this argument is sufficiently “mine” to receive the publication, job, promotion, reputation, etc. The rather astonishing episode involving the hundreds of papers attributed to Nicholas Polson, discussed elsewhere here today, seems almost a reductio of the point, particularly now that the attribution itself appears uncertain: when AI makes it possible to generate hundreds of nominally attributable research products at extraordinary speed, questions about authorship, credit, and professional productivity become very difficult to separate from questions about whether anyone has actually exercised the judgment required to warrant putting a name on the resulting work. That does not show that machine assistance as such diminishes philosophical value; it shows why the distinction between assistance and responsible endorsement cannot be allowed to disappear. Now add, cautiously and without asking Barthes to carry more weight than he can bear, the old “death of the author” point: once an argument enters public space, why shouldn’t its philosophical value depend substantially upon what can be made of the argument rather than upon the purity of its causal genealogy? Responsibility still, of course, requires human agency: someone must endorse the argument, answer objections, distinguish good reasons from bad ones, and accept responsibility for errors. That was my original point. But authorship-as-responsibility is not obviously identical with authorship-as-proprietary credit. Perhaps, then, there is a more incisive interpretation of the much-abused “pile of truths”: not some final warehouse of settled propositions, but a common stock of arguments, distinctions, objections, and occasional truths pursued for their own sake rather than primarily as professionally attributable intellectual products. In such a world, I am no longer sure why it should matter very much whether “I” receive credit, or whether a machine’s editorial perspicacity materially assisted me in getting there. Pangram, presumably warmed up and ready in the bullpen by now, may shortly have something to say about the causal genealogy of the paragraph before you; but unless it has also learned to identify a false premise or invalid inference, I remain unsure what that will tell us about the argument. In any event, as Marx might remind us, philosophical activity no more occurs “in general” than labor or production does: professional philosophers still have to make a living within historically specific social forms that help determine why authorship, attribution, and individual credit assume the significance they presently have.

    P.S. See ya in duh Big Apple! https://www.pinstripealley.com/yankees-game-information/204696/yankees-red-sox-series-preview-probable-pitchers-schlittler-fried-rodon (Above all, thanks to the God above God that I was able to finish the 10th+ draft of this single-paragraph comment before the game really got going.)

  31. Kaufman seems to imply that proponents of the “important truths” view must maintain that the truths AI might help us to discover would have to be Big Truths, of the sort that would resolve entire fields of philosophy in one fell swoop (e.g. that some particular form of consequentialism is true). I agree that this would be a highly implausible view. Different people will have different starting points (axioms or basic beliefs), and these different starting points likely lead to divergent views about the Big Questions of philosophy. It seems highly unlikely, at least for many of these Big Questions, that there will be only one coherent set of starting points that leads to a consistent and plausible view.

    A much more plausible view is that, by automating philosophical research, AI might help us to converge on various smaller truths, truths with forms like ‘big view X has unexpected consequence that P’ or ‘small view Y is incompatible with small view Z’. The sum total of all these smaller truths would tell us what the consistent sets of views on the Big Questions are, without settling which of these we should actually believe. On this picture, a hypothetical completed field of philosophy would look less like a list of true answers to Big Questions, and more like a group of mathematical or logical systems, where the answers you could derive as theorems would depend on which axioms you adopt.

    It strikes me that if you don’t think we can even discover the answers to these smaller questions, it’s unclear why you’d think philosophy is worth doing at all. It doesn’t seem that we are gaining any valuable understanding as philosophers struggling together with questions about beauty, obligation, virtue, and value if we aren’t even discovering small truths about these things. The best justification for philosophy in that case would, I believe, be the view that philosophizing is a good game for people to play, like playing chess or solving a sudoku puzzle. I actually think that’s a fine view but it doesn’t cohere well with Kaufman’s highfalutin rhetoric about the social value of philosophy.

    If there are such small truths to discover, it’s hard to see how AI’s that can do philosophy better than the best humans at much faster speeds wouldn’t be extremely helpful in discovering them. So I propose a dilemma for Kaufman’s objection to the “important truths” view. Are there philosophical truths at all? If not, then what’s the point? If so, then why wouldn’t AIs help?

  32. As far as I am concerned, I am open to being convinced that AI is good for the profession. However, because of the way AI companies operate (for profit), their ownership structure and, frankly, the fact that they are typically headquartered and registered in a country (yes, the US), which is unwilling to regulate it, I am massively skeptical that the spread of AI won’t be a disaster for humanity, certainly for the poor. Parallels with what I say are obvious: pretty much all the social media companies, AirBnB in tourism, Uber and the like in transport, and all the other so-called gig economy companies. It would take a lot to persuade me that any of these companies was, on the whole, beneficial for human society. AI will be the same, as things stand, but because of the force of the technology the overall balance will even be worse. So, thank you, but no, thank you.

  33. People should understand what precipitated my remarks here at Leiter Reports. Also, a few replies and comments on the conversation:

    1. I was invited by Miles Hentrup of the Philosophy Department at Florida Gulf Coast University in Fort Myers to give two talks on the impact of AI: one to his class on the philosophy of technology, and the other to a university-wide audience on the broader impact of AI on the university. I was putting together notes for these presentations, and it is from these notes that my remarks derive.

    2. The other big philosophy blog that shall not be named has run a whole series of articles in which philosophers describe using AI to do their research, and a number of people in the profession cheer it on in the comments (as others condemn it). I find the developments described and the positive reactions and defenses of it disturbing and think they bode very ill for our discipline, which is already in rough shape.

    3. Certainly, my views on philosophy, its value, and its place in the university are “controversial,” as David Wallace notes, but this is hardly any kind of objection, as my picture of philosophy is precisely one of ultimately unending, irresolvable controversy. Nothing I have said suggests that philosophy does not make progress, only that it is not the sort of progress that a lot of philosophers seem to think it is. That the suggestion our subject is a lot more like literature than like science or mathematics causes consternation only makes sense if one is in the grip of some positivistic fantasy about a discipline that includes Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Camus, etc., in its ranks.

    4. I was trained at the University of Michigan and CUNY Graduate Center, by some of the leading figures in the philosophy of mind and language, at a time when Functionalism and Computationalism had already peaked and were drowning in objections and problems, which to my mind — and those of many others — have never been adequately addressed. Perhaps, not a “dead letter,” but certainly on its way out. Just like the “mind downloading” fantasies we were swimming in not too long ago, the current “statistical aggregation software is a mind” obsession is much more an expression of a kind of weird wish-fulfillment than any sort of serious treatment of the subject. I mean, it’s not an accident that one of the silliest essays in the blog-not-to-be-named is about “intellectual immortality through AI.” I wrote about it here.

    https://cathoderayzone.com/acropolis/how-to-make-your-work-last-at-least-200-years-through-the-magic-of-a-i/

    Finally, the reactions of several people to my rhetoric — “star struck groupies,” “poor, confused souls,” etc. — beyond indicating a certain level of humorlessness, suggest that a number of us have no idea how we come off to people outside of our strange, niche bubble. It also makes me wonder what discipline they think they’re in. Witnessing the Katz/Fodor debates in real time, recalling Wittgenstein’s comment in On Certainty that he would think a person who doubted whether he had hands a “half-wit” and Quine’s dry, but lacerating observations on the hapless “McX” and the “subtly” of “Wyman” who has assisted in “ruining the good old word, ‘exist’,” makes me think that maybe they doth protest too much. Over my decades in the profession, philosophers have seemed more than happy to bare their fangs and form mobs when it served causes *they* find compelling. Indeed, much of this was done in the pages of the blog-that-shall-not-be-named.

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