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  1. Rollo Burgess's avatar

    I think that this is a thoroughly sensible piece, in part (full disclosure!) because it accords pretty well with my…

  2. Patrick Muller (PhD Candidate)'s avatar

    He addresses many arguments that give consciousness a special evidential standard. But it is illuminating not to do so. Call…

  3. Harold Langsam's avatar

    The ideas that “consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon” and that “simulating and being are very different” were emphasized by…

  4. Mark's avatar
  5. David Wallace's avatar
  6. Craig Duncan's avatar

    Re-reading Mark’s comment, I think my reply could’ve been clearer. Since Mark mentions the paperclip maximizer case as a classic…

  7. Craig Duncan's avatar

AIs are not conscious…

argues Microsoft’s head of AI; an excerpt:

AIs are not conscious. They do not feel, experience, or suffer. They do not have innate preferences or underlying motivations. They are sequence completion engines, internally hollow, designed to follow instructions, and accomplish goals set by humans….

There is no evidence to suggest that AI is conscious today, and so saying this is uncertain sets up a misleading false equivalence. Whilst the science of consciousness is not settled, a growing body of evidence suggests that consciousness may be substrate dependent, meaning that it may only arise in living systems.45 Conscious experience likely evolved to help biological organisms stay alive by responding effectively to their environment. AI is still very different to our brains. Unlike biological organisms, LLMs have no homeostatic imperatives (the drive to survive and keep stable). They therefore lack the kind of biological substrate from which preferences, sentience and conscious experience are generally understood to arise….

The case for computational functionalism has major issues. Intelligence does not equal consciousness. Simulating a thing is not the same as instantiating it – as a computer model of a hurricane can testify.

The architectures of brains and computers meanwhile have fundamental differences. Embodiment and chemistry are fundamental aspects to our self-experience. Significant evidence suggests that consciousness arose as living organisms evolved a capacity to feel and respond to what matters in complex and unpredictable environments.4

This began with the fundamental molecular machinery of receptors and modulators that enable an organism to adjust course, to iterate, to explore, and to survive. Over time, the pain network produced feelings, preferences, and suffering. Crucially, these experiences take place in an inherently embodied state fundamental to and inseparable from that experience.

According to this view, when you take an opioid for example, the phenomenal character of your pain changes because opioid molecules bind receptors that are a property of that experience, not merely a representation of it. Feelings are not merely correlated with neurochemical activity, but rather they emerge from it.11

After millions of years of evolution, the nervous system grew complex enough to model the state of the organism back to itself, giving rise to the first ‘felt states’. Those felt states are affective before they are anything else. Those first feelings didn’t land as neutral information. They came with, and are inextricably linked to, the molecules that experienced them and produced those sensations.

Over time, evolution likely rewarded more complex feelings because animals with options, memory, and time horizons are able to make better decisions.12 They needed a state that persists, that biases everything else the animal does to trade off against other states. That is what pain is: a felt imperative that shapes the whole organism and enables complex behavior. The experience of emotion, pleasure, pain, and so on are therefore all intrinsic to the embodied manifestation of these experiences and can’t arise in LLMs.

Consciousness science is filled with uncertainty and not everyone shares the view that consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon. Making a claim that an AI is or might be conscious requires a high bar of evidence given the many differences between brains and LLMs. I do not believe we are anywhere close to it.

There should be no false equivalence created between the two positions that disguise the fundamental differences between biological beings like ourselves and AI.13 Acknowledging a level of uncertainty should not mean giving equal weight to any and all claims regardless of evidence….

Trained on trillions of tokens of human data, LLMs learn to imitate human experience, and they do so eye-wateringly well. Today’s text, vision, audio, and code outputs are nearly indistinguishable from our human artifacts. And yet, as impressive as those AI responses are, they tell us nothing about the presence of an ‘experience’ within the massive matrix multiplication that produced them.

What they do tell us is that it’s possible to predict, almost perfectly, what comes next in a complex sequence of data. That’s remarkable. It’s incredibly valuable, and it’ll transform humanity in many profoundly beneficial ways.

But simulating and being are very different. Simulating aspects of conscious behavior doesn’t make it a reality, and we must not think of it as such. Its “affective” states are just weights, and weights have no pharmacology in which to feel frustrated, fearful, or funny. They simply compute the probability distributions to tell us what tokens (words, code, pixels etc.) come next in a sequence.

An AI model can describe pain in perfect prose without feeling anything, which is the inverse of biological experience. Animals feel first and then describe them later. In LLMs, description is the whole product, and there is nothing that suggests anything is beneath it.

This is good news. We should build systems that do not claim to have feelings because they do not experience feelings. Even if conscious machines were a possibility, avoiding creating conscious beings should be the top priority for anyone in AI development.

What AI models are getting seriously good at is imitating some of the hallmarks of consciousness. This in itself is a significant worry. It’s causing many people to become deeply confused about what is happening around us, and it should concern us all. It places a significant responsibility on us all as AI developers to ground speculation and documentation about model interiority or consciousness in robust research. Our words on this subject have significant consequences.

Discuss. (Comments may take awhile to appear, submit them only once please.)

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3 responses to “AIs are not conscious…”

  1. The ideas that “consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon” and that “simulating and being are very different” were emphasized by Searle long ago when he presented his Chinese room “experiment.” He should have been cited.

  2. Patrick Muller (PhD Candidate)

    He addresses many arguments that give consciousness a special evidential standard. But it is illuminating not to do so. Call this the boring argument: it features an ordinary scientific principle and an ordinary claim about the explanatory adequacy of current AI systems.

    Scientific premise: We are scientifically justified in attributing consciousness to a system only if mental states feature in the best explanation of its behaviour.

    AI premise: The behaviour of any AI system in the current paradigm is adequately explained by their computational properties (architecture, algorithms, learned parameters, training history, inputs) — i.e. without mental states.

    The conclusion is that we have no scientific justification for attributing consciousness to AI, and we will lack such justification for as long as non-mental computational explanations remain sufficient for explaining AI behaviour. For the current paradigm of linear albegra-based LLMs, it seems this is necessarily the case, i.e. forever. A fundamental change in how AI functions seems necessary to render the computational properties insufficient for explaining their behaviour. Anyone who claims that an AI system is conscious must reject one of the premises of the boring argument.

  3. I think that this is a thoroughly sensible piece, in part (full disclosure!) because it accords pretty well with my own views but also because it seems far more reflective than a lot of the tech-bro stuff that one reads out there.

    He makes some moves that are not uncontentious within the philosophical literature but are respectable and I think sound. He separates consciousness from intelligence (subjective interiority from problem solving) and is clear that extraordinary progress in developing the latter is not evidence of the presence of the former – as the LLMs are precisely machines trained to mimic human-produced text (and mutatis mutandis, images or music etc). And he makes the point that the idea of ‘substrate independence’ and/or the fundamental computational nature of experience is not only not proven, but very possibly not true – the only definitely consciousness systems are we know of are squishy chemically complex animal bodies, and we have no well-motivated reason to believe that the squishy chemical bits are irrelevant!

    My hypothesis: in evolutionary terms our intelligence was selected for because it promoted our survival and spread – this intelligence is achieved via consciousness. LLMs are also intelligence, but their intelligence is achieved via massive computational power and vast quantities of training data. Whatever a newborn baby is doing as it looks at the world, it isn’t multiplying millions of 1000×1000 matrices together every second. Consciousness is a hack – a super efficient way of achieving much of what LLMs do, with necessarily far less raw power and data. So I’d start suspecting that maybe an artificial technology is conscious when it can a) run with a tiny fraction of the data and power requirements of frontier LLMs and b) recognize, e.g., any cat from any angle after seeing one cat from one angle.

    In essence – LLMs are a physical realization of Searle’s Chinese Room.

    For the avoidance of doubt: none of this means AI won’t transform economies and societies, and aren’t potentially dangerous. The point is that consciousness has nothing to do with this.

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