…from Oxford University Press.
Does this ring true to readers based on their experiences?
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Commenting to subscribe to this. Ring of Gyges thought experiment enthusiast, here.
Having reread late Dennett in the Atlantic and BBC it doesn’t seem he’s repudiating the “intentional stance” so much as…
The first thing to note about this study is that it took place in April, so five months ago. I…
How could acting *as if* something has beliefs and desire suffice to justify its moral status? That’s what’s at issue…
The latest from CHE on closely related topics: https://www.chronicle.com/article/what-even-is-an-author
This goes back to my “two approaches” comment upthread. You’re taking an epistemic attitude to consciousness: if something behaves exactly…
“[I]t is not obvious what thing we are meant to adopt an intentional stance toward. Is it just the string…
…from Oxford University Press.
Does this ring true to readers based on their experiences?
The first thing to note about this study is that it took place in April, so five months ago. I went back and read some notes and blog posts of mine from five months ago, and they feel like dispatches from a completely different era (because they are).
I’m grateful for this report, but readers should keep firmly in mind that it is badly outdated. To take just one example, I strongly suspect (based on my experience both with the tools and with academics) that fewer people are saying “I don’t use AI because its outputs simply are not useful.”
Commenting to subscribe to this. Ring of Gyges thought experiment enthusiast, here.
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