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Germany in the 1930s and America today

UPDATE (June 21, 2005):  If you are coming here via the pseudonymous Juan Non-Volokh’s childish and dishonest misrepresentation of this lengthy posting, and would like to learn something about the meaning and history of fascism, please follow the links in the extended discussion, below, and also consider reading the material here (quoting historian Robert Paxton), here (quoting historian Fritz Stern), here (political scientist Lawrence Britt’s well-known discussion of the defining characteristics of fascism) and here (Mussolini on fascism, noting, among other things, that fascism is "the complete opposite of Marxist socialism").

UPDATE: Moving to the front from Sept. 2, in order to encourage more comments. Do check out the many very interesting remarks already posted at the end.

====================

Jessica Wilson (who will be blogging here next week) has called my attention to this provocative essay. There is a bit of hyperbole, and inaccuracy, in Part III, but not enough to deprive the piece of interest.

There is a growing concern among many both inside and outside the country that the United States is gradually becoming inhospitable to freedom and democratic values; longtime readers will recall the many examples I’ve noted in the past. (Click on the Of Cultural Interest category, and scroll down for some examples.) Could it be that the U.S. is poised to be transformed the way another democratic society was transformed in to a world-historic monstrosity in the 1930s? That the current Administration has gone so far as to revive the Nazi doctrine of preventive war clearly exacerbates the concern. Does the analogy have any merit? Are there legitimate grounds for concern? The questions are timely ones, and of more than merely academic interest.

Of course, the inquiry may seem premised on an odd supposition: namely, that there are laws of historical transformation, such that if we discover the same antecedent conditions, we can predict what the consequences will be. But even if we relax that assumption, the question about historical precedents is still not without interest–for if the current situation has sufficient similarity with an earlier historical situation, then we at least have defeasible reasons for planning accordingly.

We should begin by briefly revisiting the almost banal way in which Hitler transformed democratic Germany in to a dictatorship. This libertarian writer, relying on William Shirer’s account, reviews the basic facts usefully:

"In the presidential election held on March 13, 1932, there were four candidates….[A]lmost 70 percent of the German people voted against Hitler [in this election], causing his supporter Joseph Goebbels, who would later become Hitler’s minister of propaganda, to lament in his journal, ‘We’re beaten; terrible outlook. Party circles badly depressed and dejected.’

"Since Hindenberg had not received a majority of the vote, however, a runoff election had to be held among the top three vote-getters. On April 19, 1932, the runoff results were: Hindenburg 53.0 percent; Hitler 36.8 percent; Thaelmann 10.2 percent. Thus, even though Hitler’s vote total had risen, he still had been decisively rejected by the German people….

"Even though Hitler had badly lost the presidential election, he was drawing ever-larger crowds during the congressional election [in summer 1932]….

"The July 31, 1932, election produced a major victory for Hitler’s National Socialist Party. The party won 230 seats in the Reichstag, making it Germany’s largest political party, but it still fell short of a majority in the 608-member body. "On the basis of that victory, Hitler demanded that President Hindenburg appoint him chancellor and place him in complete control of the state [Hindenburg declined]…Political deadlocks in the Reichstag soon brought a new election, this one in November 6, 1932. In that election, the Nazis lost two million votes and 34 seats. Thus, even though the National Socialist Party was still the largest political party, it had clearly lost ground among the voters.

"Attempting to remedy the chaos and the deadlocks, Hindenburg…appointed an army general named Kurt von Schleicher as the new German chancellor. Unable to secure a majority coalition in the Reichstag, however, Schleicher finally tendered his resignation to Hindenburg, 57 days after he had been appointed.

"On January 30, 1933, President Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of Germany. Although the National Socialists never captured more than 37 percent of the national vote, and even though they still held a minority of cabinet posts and fewer than 50 percent of the seats in the Reichstag, Hitler and the Nazis set out to to consolidate their power. With Hitler as chancellor, that proved to be a fairly easy task.

"On February 27, Hitler was enjoying supper at the Goebbels home when the telephone rang with an emergency message: ‘The Reichstag is on fire!’ Hitler and Goebbels rushed to the fire, where they encountered Hermann Goering, who would later become Hitler’s air minister. Goering was shouting at the top of his lungs, ‘This is the beginning of the Communist revolution! We must not wait a minute. We will show no mercy. Every Communist official must be shot, where he is found. Every Communist deputy must this very day be strung up.’

"The day after the fire, the Prussian government announced that it had found communist publications stating, ‘Government buildings, museums, mansions and essential plants were to be burned down… . Women and children were to be sent in front of terrorist groups…. The burning of the Reichstag was to be the signal for a bloody insurrection and civil war…. It has been ascertained that today was to have seen throughout Germany terrorist acts against individual persons, against private property, and against the life and limb of the peaceful population, and also the beginning of general civil war.’

"So how was Goering so certain that the fire had been set by communist terrorists? Arrested on the spot was a Dutch communist named Marinus van der Lubbe. Most historians now believe that van der Lubbe was actually duped by the Nazis into setting the fire and probably was even assisted by them, without his realizing it.

"Why would Hitler and his associates turn a blind eye to an impending terrorist attack on their national congressional building or actually assist with such a horrific deed? Because they knew what government officials have known throughout history — that during extreme national emergencies, people are most scared and thus much more willing to surrender their liberties in return for ‘security.’ And that’s exactly what happened during the Reichstag terrorist crisis.

"The day after the fire, Hitler persuaded President Hindenburg to issue a decree entitled, ‘For the Protection of the People and the State.’ Justified as a ‘defensive measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the state,’ the decree suspended the constitutional guarantees pertaining to civil liberties: ‘Restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press; on the rights of assembly and association; and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications; and warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.’

"Two weeks after the Reichstag fire, Hitler requested the Reichstag to temporarily delegate its powers to him so that he could adequately deal with the crisis. Denouncing opponents to his request, Hitler shouted, ‘Germany will be free, but not through you!’ When the vote was taken, the result was 441 for and 84 against, giving Hitler the two-thirds majority he needed to suspend the German constitution. On March 23, 1933, what has gone down in German history as the ‘Enabling Act’ made Hitler dictator of Germany, freed of all legislative and constitutional constraints.

"One of the most dramatic consequences was in the judicial arena. Shirer points out, ‘Under the Weimar Constitution judges were independent, subject only to the law, protected from arbitrary removal and bound at least in theory by Article 109 to safeguard equality before the law.’ In fact, in the Reichstag terrorist case, while the court convicted van der Lubbe of the crime (who was executed), three other defendants, all communists, were acquitted, which infuriated Hitler and Goering. Within a month, the Nazis had transferred jurisdiction over treason cases from the Supreme Court to a new People’s Court, which, as Shirer points out, ‘soon became the most dreaded tribunal in the land. It consisted of two professional judges and five others chosen from among party officials, the S.S. and the armed forces, thus giving the latter a majority vote. There was no appeal from its decisions or sentences and usually its sessions were held in camera. Occasionally, however, for propaganda purposes when relatively light sentences were to be given, the foreign correspondents were invited to attend.’

"One of the Reichstag terrorist defendants, who had angered Goering during the trial with a severe cross-examination of Goering, did not benefit from his acquittal. Shirer explains: ‘The German communist leader was immediately taken into “protective custody,” where he remained until his death during the second war.’

"In addition to the People’s Court, which handled treason cases, the Nazis also set up the Special Court, which handled cases of political crimes or ‘insidious attacks against the government.’ These courts ‘consisted of three judges, who invariably had to be trusted party members, without a jury. A Nazi prosecutor had the choice of bringing action in such cases before either an ordinary court or the Special Court, and invariably he chose the latter, for obvious reasons. Defense lawyers before this court, as before the Volksgerichtshof, had to be approved by Nazi officials….’

"The Nazis also implemented a legal concept called Schutzhaft or ‘protective custody’ which enabled them to arrest and incarcerate people without charging them with a crime….

"Oddly enough, even though his dictatorship very quickly became complete, Hitler returned to the Reichstag every four years to renew the ‘temporary’ delegation of emergency powers that it had given him to deal with the Reichstag-arson crisis. Needless to say, the Reichstag rubber-stamped each of his requests.

"For their part, the German people quickly accepted the new order of things. Keep in mind that the average non-Jewish German was pretty much unaffected by the new laws and decrees. As long as a German citizen kept his head down, worked hard, took care of his family, sent his children to the public schools and the Hitler Youth organization, and, most important, didn’t involve himself in political dissent against the government, a visit by the Gestapo was very unlikely….Describing how the average German adapted to the new order, Shirer writes, ‘The overwhelming majority of Germans did not seem to mind that their personal freedom had been taken away, that so much of culture had been destroyed and replaced with a mindless barbarism, or that their life and work had become regimented to a degree never before experienced even by a people accustomed for generations to a great deal of regimentation…. The Nazi terror in the early years affected the lives of relatively few Germans and a newly arrived observer was somewhat surprised to see that the people of this country did not seem to feel that they were being cowed…. On the contrary, they supported it with genuine enthusiasm. Somehow it imbued them with a new hope and a new confidence and an astonishing faith in the future of their country.’"

The preceding account is obviously written by our libertarian author in a way to suggest analogies with the present. Some of the analogies are fairly silly and superficial (Hitler did not receive a majority of the popular vote before assuming absolute power–and neither did Bush!), others plainly less so (both Hitler and Bush–but not only these two in the pantheon of political leaders–have exploited public fear to undertake what would have been untenable repressive measures [in the case of Bush, e.g., trying to detain citizens beyond the reach of judicial review]). But what are the significant differences and similarities between now and then? I’ve listed a few below. I’ve also opened comments, but will delete anonymous posts and off-topic postings. I know I’m fortunate to have a lot of educated and thoughtful readers, from many parts of the world, and I’d welcome their thoughts on this matter. I am particularly interested to hear how the situation in the U.S. looks from abroad.

(1) Hitler, from early on in his political career, had a clear dictatorial and racist agenda; Bush does not. Indeed, Bush, the man, is largely devoid of an agenda or ideology–he was a relatively benign, moderate Republican Governor in Texas–cutting taxes, protecting business interests, bankrupting the state–and has moved far to the right as President. Political expediency (not suprisingly) seems to dictate many of his positions. Yet if there is no reason to think he is a racist or anti-semite, it is equally clear that he is a religious extremist, a point of view that could, under certain circumstances, lend itself to equally illiberal and undemocratic results (why tolerate the ungodly, those who worship a different god, etc.?) Bush also has, in some respects, a fascist personality: all the evidence suggests he is unable to cope with being challenged, with criticism, with dissent. His oft-expressed certainty about occupying the moral high ground–together with his almost complete lack of moral judgment–also bodes ill for his conduct and policies in a crisis situation.

(2) Germany was in the throes of economic castrophe when Hitler assumed absolute power, a fact that must go some distance to explaining the ease of the transition. (See this vivid account by a Welsh journalist just six months after Hitler took power.) There is obviously potential for such an economic catastrophe in the U.S.–especially given the gross mismanagement of economic affairs, even by capitalist standards, the last few years–and that may pose the greatest threat to democratic stability. Yet there is also another route by which state power over individual lives could expand dramatically: namely, in the wake of another terrorist incident of real magnitude it is easy to imagine the same bovine legislators who approved the Patriot [sic] Act without reading it agreeing to the suspension of habeas corpus, and perhaps other drastic measures. (We already have fascist propagandists whitewashing the last American experiment with herding suspect racial groups in to concentration camps. On how the media accord attention to these lies, almost without challenge, see Professor Muller’s account here.) And while that is not the same as a suspension of the rights of free speech, assembly, etc., in practice it could obviously amount to the same thing. The combination of economic meltdown and terrorist catastrophe would probably spell the end of even nominally democratic America, would it not? Is there a more optimistic scenario?

(3) Democracy in Germany was, at the time of Hitler’s rise to power, a short-lived experiment–only two decades earlier, Germany was a non-democratic monarchy. In some respects, democratic culture is more deeply rooted here, having survived, for example, the quasi-fascistic McCarthy era, and overcome the even more heinous era of American apartheid and the police states that destroyed the lives of non-whites throughout much of the country. (Those ignorant of the actual history of American apartheid, as recently as the 1940s and 1950s, for example, are often unaware that many [most?] Southern states ran secret police forces who, like their South African counterparts decades later, maintained the racial regimes through state-sponsored terror and spying.)

(4) Sheldon Wolin and others have noted that democratic culture is vibrant on the ground in America, in a way it may not have been in Germany. Wolin dubbed our situation "inverted totalitarianism": we don’t have gangs of fascist thugs breaking heads on the streets (or not too many, anyway); we do have a vibrant popular culture of dissent and protest, though it is a minority, not majority, culture phenomenon (but it exists and isn’t, yet anyway, at risk). (Perhaps when they pull "The Daily Show" from TV it will be a sign that the end is near?) In many segments of the country–especially universities, but also in the major commercial centers on the two coasts–"live and let live" and ideological pluralism is still the order of the day (with certain limits–communists and NeoNazis are generally not welcome).

At the same time, we are witnessing alarming expansions of state power (to spy, to pry, to detain); the collapse of the rule of law in crucial areas (separation of powers, rights of habeas corpus–though with a hopeful push-back from the courts recently); and, finally, the packing of the judiciary with ideologues who exacerbate both the other tendencies. (In the 4th judicial circuit of the United States, the process is complete–there, if a 3-judge panel produces a decision deemed "too liberal," en banc panels are then convened, where the conservative majority on the circuit can overturn the remaining liberals. The rule of law is, for many purposes, effectively abolished in states like Virginia and North Carolina as a result.)

(5) While there are openly fascistic elements in the Republican Party (as even political moderates sometimes notice [and here too])–they don’t claim the label, of course, but they embrace many of the central values (read Tom DeLay’s speeches, for example, which even appropriate the Nazi metaphors of health and sickness to describe the political battles between conservative Christians and secular liberals)–even the Republicans still include a genuinely libertarian segment, genuinely opposed to state power (think Congressman Ron Paul here in Texas, or the academic sympathizers with the Republican Party, who are overwhelmingly libertarians). Still, all indications are that the fascistic elements have the upper hand within both the party’s actual power structure and in the popular culture: Ron Paul and Lew Rockwell pale in importance in comparison to Tom DeLay and Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Michael Savage, etc. (I sometimes wonder whether libertarian academics who dismiss worries about resurgent fascism have ever read, for example, Michael Savage? If you change a few of the target groups, he is literally indistinguishable from Nazi polemicists. There is reason to think Savage knows it, given his favorite rhetorical trope.)

(5) Much may turn on what is meant, of course, by "fascism," which is why I started by alluding to the erosion of freedom and democratic values. As this article reminds us (thanks to this site for the link), one might well think that "some provisions of Bush’s PATRIOT Act, his detention of American citizens without charges, his willingness to let corporations write legislation, and the so-called ‘Free Speech Zones’ around his public appearances are all steps on the road to American fascism." The author then recalls Vice-President Henry Wallace’s 1944 New York Times essay on fascism:

"The dangerous American fascist is the man who wants to do in the United States in an American way what Hitler did in Germany in a Prussian way. The American fascist would prefer not to use violence. His method is to poison the channels of public information. With a fascist the problem is never how best to present the truth to the public but how best to use the news to deceive the public into giving the fascist and his group more money or more power."

Or as the Italian philosopher, and Mussolini contemporary, Giovanni Gentile put it, in a definition Mussolini subsequently claimed credit for: "Fascism should more appropriately be called corporatism because it is a merger of state and corporate power." And herewith a modern American Heritage Dictionary definition of "fascism": "A system of government that exercises a dictatorship of the extreme right, typically through the merging of state and business leadership, together with belligerent nationalism." There is nothing unreasonable, plainly, in worrying that the Bush Administration and its policies represent the coming of fascism in the above sense to the American landscape (mainstream economists, like Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong, have documented the merger of state and corporate power during the Bush years at length)–but it is perhaps more fascism of the Italian, not Nazi, variety, since it has no racial component. Vice-President Wallace wrote:

"American fascism will not be really dangerous…until there is a purposeful coalition among the [corporate] cartelists, the deliberate poisoners of public information…

"The symptoms of fascist thinking are colored by environment and adapted to immediate circumstances. But always and everywhere they can be identified by their appeal to prejudice and by the desire to play upon the fears and vanities of different groups in order to gain power. It is no coincidence that the growth of modern tyrants has in every case been heralded by the growth of prejudice. It may be shocking to some people in this country to realize that, without meaning to do so, they hold views in common with Hitler when they preach discrimination…

"The American fascists are most easily recognized by their deliberate perversion of truth and fact. Their newspapers and propaganda carefully cultivate every fissure of disunity, every crack in the common front against fascism. They use every opportunity to impugn democracy. "They claim to be super-patriots, but they would destroy every liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. They demand free enterprise, but are the spokesmen for monopoly and vested interest. Their final objective toward which all their deceit is directed is to capture political power so that, using the power of the state and the power of the market simultaneously, they may keep the common man in eternal subjection."

As has been noted by others, one of the two major "news" sources in the United States is straight out of Hitler’s or Stalin’s playbook. Indeed, there are reasons to think that other news outlets are following that lead. If the most convenient, and most powerful, sources of "news" become propaganda arms of the extremist party in power, what could the consequences possibly be except grim? And would the media that essentially collapsed in the face of the rush to war in Iraq do any better in the face of a rush towards a police state?

Perhaps this is the most worrisome development, namely, the absence of a public, mass-media based intellectual culture in this country, with any critical distance from the interests of corporate and state power. When "liberal" National Public Radio regularly brings on two dopey journalists, E.J. Dionne and David Brooks, for some "balanced" news analysis, it is clear that the spectrum of acceptable, critical opinion is very narrow indeed. Combine that with the now mainstream militarism of the society–the Democrats try to "out-tough guy" the Republicans–and you have the ingredients for something very dangerous. It’s perhaps also worth noting that in important respects, the United States has already left the league of democratic nations. Thanks to naked and politically-motivated gerrymandering (by both Democrats and Republicans, though more, more recently, by the latter), there are almost no real electoral contests for members of the House of Representatives any longer in the U.S. And that is before we even touch the corrupting influence of legalized bribery and sound-bite elections on the remainder of the democratic process! What does the future hold? How concerned are my readers about these issues? How do you read the evidence? I am eager to hear from others. No anonymous posts, of course, and if you have particular expertise to bring to bear (e.g., historical, economic, sociological), don’t be bashful about making that known.

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29 responses to “Germany in the 1930s and America today”

  1. Professor:

    You underplay two of the most appalling stories in modern American jurisprudence: the Gitmo "trials" and the Administration's treatment of Hamdi.

    Take a spin around the right-wing blogs and the comments on the left-wing blogs, and count up the number of apparently thoughtful people who have the time, interest and inclination to post on this topic. Witness the willingness of these purported supporters of the American constitution to lock up American citizens on American soil in perpetuity without trial, and to lock up foreigners on Gitmo — which is american soil in any meaningful analysis except the most arcane of legal fictions — based on hearsay evidence, obtained thru torture.

    You also underplay, in my view, the role of religious conflict. For example, Tacitus is, or purports to be, a blog of both moderate right and hard right views. Yet even the moderate voices essentially call out for holy war, asserting that Islam is incompatible with western values.

    The president, I fear, believes that he is charged, by his christian god, with defeating Islamic religious extremism. There is a persistent message to his core evangelical constituency that he knows that his mission is a holy one.

    Credentials? I'm just a land use/water lawyer in So.Cal. and my wife's a public defender. Back in law school, though, I argued against the indefinite detention by the US Govt of Mariel Cubans who could not reasonably be deported. Then, as now, the US Govt argued that it had the inherent power to hold these persons "at the border" indefinitely, even though the border was actually a maximum security US prison. I lost at the Ninth Circuit 3-0. See Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.ed 956 (1991)

    Great post.

  2. Brian, I agree with you about the author you quoted overemphasising the fact that Hitler had lost the presidential election in a direct vote, and then that Nazis didn't achieve an majority in the Reichstag.

    One important difference between the US and Weimar Germany is that Germany, then as now, had a functioning multi-party political system. The other is that the German chancellor, not the president, is the effective head of government. So it's insignificant that Hitler failed in the race to be the figurehead head of state; and unremarkable that the chancellor should come from a party with only a third of the popular vote, provided he's supported by other parties.

    The author makes it sound as though there was a failing of the democratic process in the lead up to Hitler's takeover. On the contrary, the democratic processes were working fine. The trouble was that the other right wing parties and their supporters were willing to collude with him Perhaps the analogy with Bush should really be the way moderate republicans seem set on allowing the hard right to take control of their party.

  3. Well, when I read essays like http://www.erinoconnor.org/archives/001002.html and then compare them with the perspectives here, I'm struck by what people consider an acceptable compromise.

    Which is the problem. So many moderate Republicans who would have seen Lieberman as an acceptable compromise do not see Kerry as one, so they vote for the individual who has acted with George Bush's name.

    A lot of demonizing going on, and part of that is that people who would otherwise be approachable are lost.

    Demonizing Clinton lost the Republicans a lot of gorund. Demonizing Bush seems to be doing the same thing to Democrats.

    Whenever I heard someone say "they are Clinton lovers, you don't have to give them any respect" or "Any conservative does not deserve the courtesy of being allowed to speak" I know I am in the presence of people who will marginalize themselves.

    When you do that, what is left to you is a loss.

    It is a trend that comes and goes, but it isn't the "moderate republicans … set on allowing the hard right to take control" but rather moderate republicans who see the left as so hostile and upalatable that allowing the right to take control is the lesser of two evils.

  4. Too many typos, credentials, I'm a tired litigator.

  5. Demonizing "demons" on the basis of evidence–like the evidence cited in the original post–is not objectionable, is it? I am interested in the question whether the evidence adduced in the original post, and now also by Mr. Logan, does not warrant alarm–and if not, why not.

    By the way, I did not mean to suggest that I only wanted folks with special "credentials" of one kind or another to post. To the contrary, I am eager to hear from lawyers, philosophers, students, citizens, etc. All I wanted to emphasize is that someone who has specialized historical or economic expertise about Weimar Germany, or other relevant historical analogues, ought to say so and share their knowledge. Thanks.

  6. no relevant credentials here, but….

    two things that catch my eye are the cult of personality, and the fetish of unreasoned judgement ("gut instinct", "what's in my heart", etc.).

    Bush's personality cult–I don't think any previous president has been so assiduously lionized during his own term in office (as opposed to the post-mortem deification a la JFK, FDR, etc.) Perhaps part of the emphasis on his personality has to do with his utter failure at every concrete endeavor he has turned his hand to. Still, we are expected to love him and everything about him, and oddly enough some people do. The next move is to identify him with the country in such a way that an attack on Bush is an attack on the U.S. So the de-emphasis on law goes with the emphasis on a person.

    Connected to this is the denigration of argument, evidence, reason, etc. It's odd–feminist philosophers used to argue that logic was gendered masculine (in our culture or in fact, depending on the flavor of feminism). To judge by the last few decades of political discourse, logical argumentation is pure sissy stuff: real men have guts instead of brains. They make decisions, tho for no reasons they can articulate, explain, or defend. When real man makes real-man decision, the only appropriate real-man response is to obey, not to question.

    There was some of this under Reagan and Bush I, but it has become vastly worse under Bush II, partly because he is stupider, partly because of the invidious comparison with Clinton.

    So smart = untrustworthy, conniving, shifty, rootless cosmopolitan, etc.

    inarticulate = trustworthy, straight-talking (-grunting?), from the country, part of the soil, etc.

    Yeah, I think there's a certain fascist flavor to the Bush Regime. Not sure how useful it is to note it, either as a method of analysis or as a plan for action. If we can just vote them out, I think some of the worst excesses will die with them. (Indeed, one of the things I *like* about Kerry is that no one will ever be able to develop a cult of personality around him. We may well come to thank him as a humble civil servant, but that's all–and in a real democracy, that *ought* to be all).

  7. One could argue sensibly that there are a couple of precedents or preconditions for facism which are starting to fall into place now. One is the legal infrastructure for detention without trial. Another is a vocal minority on the Republican side who do not regard "liberals" as fellow citizens, but instead as dangerous members of a subversive conspiracy. As you point out, Michael Savage and his audience are a good example. We also have an increasingly pliable and manipulable media, and increasing mastery of "big lie" propaganda techniques by the Republicans. Finally, complete Republican control of Congress and to a lesser degree control of the judiciary are weakening the system of checks and balances that limits state power. I do believe that the *protections* against facism in this country have been noticeably weakened recently.

    But I also think it's way overreacting to say that we have a facist government or anything even really close to it. A facist government would have made damn sure to find WMDs of some sort in Iraq, right? There's been plenty of vocal dissent recently — Michael Moore, the 9/11 commission, etc. There are many other examples. The Bush administration simply does not use its powers in a "facist" sort of way within this country. They do manipulate the media, but in ways that are more Nixonian than Hitlerian.

    The truth is, I think most Republicans think of themselves as pretty well intentioned. Saddam was a nasty guy and the Clinton administration made some noises about him having WMDs. Government needs strong police powers to deal with terrorism. Budget and tax policy…well, tax cuts are a religion, and budgets work themselves out. Sliming your opponents — that's just politics…remember Bork? From their perspective, Republicans are just starting to dominate the public discourse and levers of power like the liberals did in the mid-70s, and liberals don't like being on the bottom. Calling Repubs facists makes you look hysterical.

    To me, the interesting question is whether there is what potential set of events that could tip us over into a genuinely authoritarian government. Imagine another terrorist attack, followed by an invasion of Iran, and a much more active opposition to that invasion than we had seen in the leadup to Iraq…you get the picture. Even then I think we would get a situation that would look like our homegrown anti-Communist authoritarianism of 1900-1930 and the 1950s rather than European facism. It's not like America hasn't seen authoritarian governments before.

  8. That was an excelent article. I think the comparison to Italian fascisim is much better than the German one. Dave Neiwert of Orcinus has done many excellent articles that flesh out the American fascism argument. Like him, I'd agree that while Bush himself isn't likely a fascist himself, he is certainly an enabler. He is a conduit for the projection of extremist power. He has not yet done two important things that are closely linked to fascism although it could be said we are on the virge of them happening. He has not created what I'd guess you'd call a national mystisism with himself at the center. Like I said we're dangerously close. Most people seem to think that only Bush can fight the "war on terror". He has yet to assert that personally as a message, but it is clearly THE theme of his campaign. He tries to play the part of the Strong Leader, but fails as many times as he succeeds. We also haven't heard him give a clear call out for a national rebirth, but again we are skirting dangerously close. The extremists he enables have made American rebirth a central part of their faith. America as a Christian Nation.

    Personally, the most disturbing trend has been the overt media manipulaton. The molding of perception. We have "news" who's only perpose is to enable the continued suspention of disbelief. The uniformity of message, and the exclusion of other voices from the debate. If people loose perceptual connection with reality how can they ever regain it when there aren't any mainstream sources willing to give critical analysis

    [Ed.-A sample of Niewert's analysis is here.]

  9. A very nice post. A colleague at NYU said that he was re-reading Shirer and was struck by the resemblance between then and now. One thing that has struck me is how gays are serving for Republicans the function that Jews did for the Nazis, and how their rhetoric ("girlie men" to wild applause, for example) is aimed at insinuating that their opponents are at least effeminate, if not gay.

    One of my more sober colleauges has actually looked into the price of houses in Canada, and I've been saying (less as a joke than it was when I started to do so) that I might end up calling my friends at the University of British Columbia, University of Victoria, and University of Toronto law schools to see what might be available after November. (Fortunately, I've developed some expertise in comparative constitutional law, and actually know something about Canadian constitutional law as well.)

  10. I'd be interested in hearing more from Professor Stanley on how he understands the differences between "authoritarianism" American-style in the early decades of the last century and European fascism.

    And Professor Tushnet's and Professor Brennan's comments bring to mind another issue: namely, would a Kerry victory really be sufficient to turn the tide on many of the worrisome developments? Should we be confident that a Kerry Administration, in the current cultural environment, would not respond to another terrorist incident with police state measures, from which it would be hard to recover? Obviously, democratic nations have survived, more or less, as democratic nations in the face of terrorist onslaughts (Israel, Britain, France, Germany). While it must surely be more likely that the U.S. would too under Kerry/Edwards rather than Bush/Cheney, I wonder whether readers have thoughts on this issue as well. To what extent do the quasi-fascistic developments in the public culture transcend the political parties?

  11. Growing up in Austria, I always wondered how the majority of Austrians, Germans, and Italians could accept, indeed welcome, their respective fascist regimes. The developments in the US in the last 4 years have made that seem a little more comprehensible. The conversion to authoritarian and later fascist regimes in the 1930s in Europe was a long process. I think the comparison between the present-day US and Europe around 1933 is quite interesting. Then and there, as now and in the US, a large number of important changes took place, some overt and radical, and some "behind the scenes," little things like financially starving organizations which were considered hotbeds of opposition, stacking offices, courts, etc., with political sympathizers, etc.

    It might be interesting to also make the comparison to Austria's "Ständestaat" [corporate state] of 1933-38. On difference to Germany an Italy was the role of religion: The ruling Christian-Socialist Party was fervently catholic (and the Church had great influence with the governments of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg). One of the first things that happened after the dissolution of parliament in 1933 was a drastic reduction in social welfare. NSDAP and communist party were outlawed immediately. The Socialist Party was not outlawed until 1934, but it and its constitutency was attacked in many ways during 1933: May Day parades were prohibited, as well as other rallies, "Red Vienna" was financially starved, socialists were removed from their posts in the social security administration and elsewhere. For several years, Austria lived under an authoritarian regime before the annexation to Germany in 1938.

    All this happened, of course, during depression, and in a country that enjoyed all of 13 years of democracy in its history. People were used to living in an authoritarian regime, and they longed for the old days before the depression and WWI. This goes a long way toward explaining how it could happen, and how it could happen so quickly. But if even in the US in a time of relative prosperity a staggering 50% of the populace support (and probably another 20% aren't particularly concerned about) Bush's policies, that's frightening.

  12. Thank you, Prof. Leiter, for a very balanced and timely post. I asked myself the same alarming question yesterday while disucssing the new revisions of the Patriot Act with a few friends. In response to a poster's reply, I do believe that "authoriatrianism" is an inadequte term to describe the present political developments in the US. Specifically, it would fail to explain how the centralization of power, the violation of basic rights, the exclusion of minority voices, and the project to reinstitutionalize religion are believed by the majority of the population to be legitimate and compliant with past American political discourse. We seem to be on the verge of a big shift in use of basic terms which have sustained democracy in America, and this shift seems to me more ominous than a prospective overt violation of democracy.

    You rightly ask whether the problem could possibly persist even with the election of Kerry for president. My belief is that in order to answer such a question, we need a critical theory of the present American society. One of the question that needs to be addressed (and I think Moore dwelt on it towards the end of F 911)is how the present social arrangement has made it possible for the most underprivileged to identify their interests with the policies of the most exploitative and irrational political group rather than with any rational policy that would benefit them. Another is how come the concept of "freedom", fundamental to the political views of Americans, has lent itself to such a blatant misuse; and furthermore, has it become necessary to make it more determinate through the legal and political system? Bush's office term has uncovered those real social and political problems and his departure won't make them disappear. Simply going back to a more liberal agenda cannot recover the abuse liberal ideals such as "liberty" have suffered-for a great part of the population, "freedom" has turned into a particularist term.

    We haven't witnessed the creation of national mysticism yet (to steal the phrase from an another poster), but it might well be that fascism manifests itself in different ways at different places, and then it would not be so surprising that the rising form in the states would be puritan rather than mystical. This would make for an explanation of why Bush has managed to retain his popularity against all common sense: his supporters perceive him as embodying the most basic, visceral and particularist values that they hold and it's very hard to even conceive the possibility of questioning those values.

  13. On the contrary, they supported it with genuine enthusiasm. Somehow it imbued them with a new hope and a new confidence and an astonishing faith in the future of their country seems to really capture the times we have now.

    One point that is missed is that the opposition was ineffective in Germany, and that seems to be the case now.

    GWB's basic management style is to take the majority position or the strong position and push it to wherever it will go. When it stalls, rather than push any further, he reaches compromise and declares a victory.

    That was very successful in Texas and one of the reasons he was seen as a unifier. When push came to shove, he declared victory at that point.

    In business that works very well, because you never push hard enough to create bad feelings, only enough to test the commitment or desire for the movement.

    In the national government it has led to real surprises because the push back has not been very successful or strong, and the stridency of some merely means they are marginalized.

    So, do I see a connection between the social forces involved between then and now, with trends that are alarming? Yes, the two most significant being the level of satisfaction felt by the electorate in the issues that are of most concern and the diminished function of the opposition.

    The biggest surprise is the way these two trends work with what is basically a leadership style of compromise to create what we have now.

  14. By Maimon Schwarzschild at
    http://therightcoast.blogspot.com/2004_09_01_therightcoast_archive.html#109426073450501807

    seems to find less to worry about, though she is beginning to see the shrillness and the means as ending up in a place that may not end well.

    This is an American election. It is not (yet, anyway) a civil war. The Democratic nominee, at least on alternate Tuesdays, says he agrees with Bush about the basic policy in Iraq, i.e. with the basic policy of the past three years. And still, there is this cloud of apocalyptic fury — not just on the hard core left, but evidently among millions of otherwise-mildly-leftish people.

    It's a little hard to see how all this will end well.

    Which makes me think that there is one other congruence — the description of the conflict we are in between the political parties as a civil war.

    That image leads a lot of bad places. When Schwarzschild said that this is an election, not a civil war, it hit me that one more bad sign is that many see it as a civil war and not an election, which changes many things for the worse.

    Please feel free to pull or edit this post. But I think the image of treason and war that is circulating is a bad one. To be a Democrat is not to be a traitor, we have a culture conflict, not a culture war, and it should be an election, not a civil war.

    To the extent we talk in the other terms we begin to think in the other terms and then we go on to act in the terms we think. A real civil war against "traitors" would, indeed, push us into the path that swallowed Germany.

    Fury may we be only a sign, not a cause.

  15. Well, the specific instance of authoritarian government from the last century I was thinking of was the imprisonment of prominent opponents of World War I (e.g. Debs), followed post-war by the "red scares" and judicial/police strongarming of socialist and communist groups in the early 20s. But frankly there is a long tradition of various sorts of authoritarianism in U.S. history, which is not worth going through here. That doesn't make us too different from many other western governments.

    The interesting question is where authoriarianism transforms into German-style facism. A key distinction is that authoritarian government is usually meant to support groups currently in power against a threat from below. German facism, on the other hand, was a radical and revolutionary movement that in fact transformed the power structure in Germany. It was able to do so only because it allied with current elites — the industrial, military, and political elite decided to in some cases actively ally with Hitler's radical right movement, and in other cases not oppose it. Without that cover he could not have seized power so completely.

    Why did they do that? One answer is that the elite right felt under such extreme threat from the left (Communists and left socialists) that they were willing to ally with radical forces on the right that they felt could give them more effective protection against the left than the established Weimar government could. The presence of a powerful threat from the radical left, in a situation of social chaos and demoralization due to the Depression and mass unemployment, is IMO critical to understanding the rise of facism in Germany.

    It should go without saying that there is no current radical left threat in America. Absent a real leftist threat, why would conservative elites give real power to radical facist forces? Facism in Germany was quite disruptive and obviously had an element of fanatical insanity to it. You don't give facists real power unless there is a good reason; they disrupt established ways of doing business, which are generally serving you just fine already if you are in the elite. It is only when you fear that established structures will no longer serve your needs that you give facists permission to blow them up. Where is the evidence that our current institutional setup might not serve the conservative establishment well?

    It is true that conservative political elites have discovered that there are certain advantages to encouraging some facist strains of rhetoric and thinking among some of their political supporters. It helps them maintain power, intimidates opponents, and gives political cover for various forms of corruption in DC. But that is quite different from the real facist revolution in a country that we saw in Germany. We have not even seen a real reversion to authoritarian methods of suppressing dissent that we've seen before — like the House Un-American Activities Committee, implicit censorship of the press, abuse of the legal system against political opponents, Cointelpro, etc. Although as I said above the *protections* against those sorts of authoritarian tactics have been weakened.

    My analysis above is admittedly somewhat simplistic — I do believe that government has autonomy and is not simply the "executive committee" of some ruling class. But I think the basic points hold.

  16. I cannot think what conception a person could have of a 'democratic election' which would allow them to say that the elections in question were democratic. Hitler had a private army, the SA, which had as many as a million men in it at its height. They intimidated and killed people who they thought might vote against Hitler. This happened, as I recall, mainly in Bavaria and other areas that were already pro-nazi enough that the police wouldn't interfere (though one wonders what could have been done). It is one of those really annoying myths that Hitler was elected democratically. Yes in a multi-party system 30% can be enough to win you the prime minister or chancellorship legitimately. But when you got that 30% by killing people, the election is not democratic.

    As for citations for this, it is all found in 'Rise and Fall of the Third Reich', which was already mentioned I beleive.

    As for the parallels between Bush and Hitler, I don't think they are necessary to draw. All the amunition one needs can be found by simply perusing the reports that the government itself makes available. I know that they, especially DOD, censor the really bad reports, but, for example, you can find out at IRS.gov that Bush is the first president since at least the 70's to preside over an overall decrease in tax revenue. This ought to change votes on its own. Even Reagan's tax cuts, because of population growth and economic growth, didn't decrease the amount taken in (though it did decrease the rate of revenue increase, but Clinton fixed that, luckily). The budget will collapse and soon, and the Republicans will have their reason to eliminate welfare, public education, social security, and other such things that conservatives in this country have been railing against since their inception. We don't need to call them Nazi's or invent nightmare scenarios (which will never convince the hordes of uninformed Americans who vote for these people, but are not at all facists themselves, to change their vote) when we have the record.

  17. I certainly wouldn't dispute Mr. Mayer's point that there are many tangible, economic reasons for voting against Bush, nor was the point of this whole exericse to suggest that if we could show Bush to be at the base of a nascent fascist movement, then we would change how people vote. I really just want to know how others understand our current historical situation and its dangers.

    In that regard, I am persuaded by Professor Stanley's analysis that there are substantial dissimilarities between now and the conditions under which Nazi-style fascism arose. But Professor Stanley's analysis, I take it, is not meant to cast doubt on the possibility that other authoritarian and fascist (perhaps in the Italian sense, or Henry Wallace's sense) tendencies which are in evidence in the culture might yet come to awful fruition.

    Thanks to all who have contributed so far; I hope to hear from others.

  18. Plausible American Fascism is peculiarly American, just as plausible Fascism in another nation will be peculiar to that nation. For example, Bertram Gross, FRIENDLY FASCISM, 1980, South End Press; IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE, by Sinclair Lewis, or any other account based on Huey Long's movement. These Fascisms didn't involve mass murder of any subset of Americans, but did involve mass destruction of important parts of the U.S.Constitution. It is not hysteria to characterize what is going on now as verging on "peculiarly American Fascism."

    Robert Wolfson, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Syracuse University

  19. Having read "It Can't Happen Here" recently, Prof. Wolfson's comments really resonate with me. Fascism in its dictionary sense doesn't require mass murder, or anything that the word fascism triggers these days — merely an aggressive putting of corporate interests over those of the people. It's hardly arguable that that is where we are now in American politics — the only arguable point is when it really took hold.

    Other resonances with Lewis's text include the gradual takeover of power using wholly legitimate channels influenced by perhaps illegitimate use and takeover of media. I have only recently taken notice of politics seriously, and it is simply astounding how much groundwork has been laid at this point that allows the seemingly astonishing changes Bush is able to push through. The radical right has claimed language (See B. Lakoff, he was on Frontline a few weeks ago), the "center" (by shifting it heftily to the right), all kinds of minor offices of power, and the "high ground" on nearly every cultural issue. Once those things are taken over, it takes an astounding amount of digging (well, unless you know where to look) to get the information that allows us to have this kind of debate.

    I am very glad to read and participate in a discussion about this topic — there seems to be a general vibe that even mentioning Germany and Bush in the same sentence is off limits, but after reading an enormous Hitler bio (Hubris: 18something to 1937), many of the things that NSDAP leaders discussed doing to gain power are so similar to the techniques that I see being used by the right in the US. I'd elaborate on request, but I had to take the book back to the library, and it was *enormous* so I don't recall specifics offhand.

    I shudder to think what will happen in the world should, come Nov. 2, Americans endorse this path. Sure, it sounds apocalyptic, but when I put all of Prof. Leiter's arguments together and think about them, it's hard to remain optimistic, as much as I'd like. So that's the stream of consciousness response from an English BA who found politics in July (or so) 2001.

  20. Speaking from theory, with some assumptions, I think that if you are correct on facts, then there is a real danger of a fascist state — though a particularly American one.

    American Fascism, if it is to arise, is more likely to be a return to a combination of internal stability and external activity.

    Internally it means a consensus of expression and discussion where the opposition is marginalized and where both parties are debating over implimentation of policy rather than what the policy should be. The vote authorizing war in Iraq echos that.

    The result would be an internal electorate that is concerned with everything but what is really going on *outside* of the country, with inside being focused on keeping internal security and peace. Not kept in place by internal violence, but by internal media perspectives.

    Reprising, in some ways, South Africa, as the essay you linked to notes:

    The consequence of these changes, which happened with startling speed, was that the white South African electorate found itself by the mid-1960s locked into either supporting apartheid—an essentially endless war against the non-white majority—or pursuing opposition outside of electoral politics. That captures a key element of what I see well.

    The real danger if you are correct about what is really going on is that politically it could evolve to the place that either one supports the underlying foriegn policy or is outside the electorial politic.

    That would be the natural result of an ineffective opposition that merges with that which it opposes, which has been an ongoing political trend of sorts, that sometimes works and sometimes robs a party of strength.

    Bill Clinton did it well when he embraced free trade, low energy costs and reform — stealing the Republican issues from them. Democrats have not been able to steal military competence from the Republicans in spite of the differences in personal experience.

    Regardless of what one thinks of Bush, he has engaged in massive social spending (not necessarily wise spending, but massive) and deficit policies. Implementation differences more than sharp policy differences in much of what he has done as far as internal policies go.

    Can he keep up the most dangerous of the policies (e.g. running massive deficits) — without sharp repercussions? That will be an interesting question, if he gets the chance.

    Though the alternative, massive social and economic problems caused by government policies (and requiring a successful silencing of the Federal Reserve) as a lead in to traditional fascism seems unlikely.

    I'm just rambling, but if you are correct on facts, I can see a real danger. If you are wrong, then the current tone of news reporting make sense. If you are right, then it is a key to a uniquely American way of creating a strong central state.

    I need to look more at the facts and think about them, since my conclusions about possible danger and the type of the danger depends on facts, not processes. You've made points worth spending time and thought on.

  21. I can't claim to be any kind of expert on fascism. I was a political science major in college but my focus was on American electoral politics.

    I'm just going with my gut feeling here.

    And my gut is still very disturbed by the Republican National Convention, particularly the Zell Miller speech. I've joked about the fascism thing before, but that was the first time I truly felt: it could happen here.

    What I found so disturbing about the speech was its strident militarism, especially in the context of a week of glorifying the Great Leader and showing fawning video clips of American military hardware in action. They reminded me of things like this. I was, frankly, alarmed by the way the crowd reacted with the rhytmic incantation of the glorious weapons systems that Kerry apparently either voted against or wants to give to the terrorists.

    The concept of rights as "given" by soldiers rather than protected by them strikes me as fundamentally at odds with the nature of the American project.

    Now, Zell's speech may be standard southern populism, but I just can't recall anything else like it in my lifetime. Especially not as the official — fully vetted — expression of the GOP.

    I'm also disturbed at the emergence of FOX News not as a conservative network — which would be fine — but rather as an outright propaganda arm of the Republican Party. And I've seen the digital brownshirts in action — here Hugh Hewitt brags about them — and found them to be utterly incapable of doubting in Dear Leader except to excoriate him for failing to hew further to the right. I'm bothered by moves like the conference committee that allowed greater media concentration in spite of overwhelming nationwide opposition as well as voting along those lines in both houses of Congress. I don't like the widespread corporate takeover of our regulatory apparatus.

    The moderate in me sees that the Democrats were fairly undemocratic themselves at times in our nation's history, especially during times of crisis, and yet the nation survived and even flourished. Defense spending was far higher during the Cold War than it is now, and the number of active duty troops was far higher. And perhaps a sharp shift to the right was inevitable and natural for a nation that had been attacked. Once the memory of 9/11 fades, the public will return its focus on bread and butter issues. (although the shift to the right has been going on for some time now and may have been inevitable, it has never truly alarmed me until now)

    Yet if it's true that the terrorist threat will be with us for a long time, how can the pendulum swing back? The external enemy will always be there to use as cudgel against the internal opposition. And while there doesn't seem to be much real threat to, say, freedom of speech (other than a loosening of the institutional protections thereof), I do think it's possible that a determined GOP could make free speech irrelevant. They are certainly trying.

    However, it seems likely that as the more democratic internet subsumes television, the ability of a few corporations to dominate the media landscape will greatly diminish. That's a good thing.

  22. Blake, you make a good point about militant nationalism, a critical component of a true fascist/authoritarian takeover.

    On this front, it seems that another terrorist attack could cause an even greater intervention in the Middle East, and even greater restrictions on freedom here. The sentiment, "just nuke them all", will gain – and militancy will grow.

    The big lie is already in place. Namely, that they attacked us because of our freedom. The media spoon fed this to the public, rather than trying to explain to most Americans (who are woefully ignorant of foreign policy) the history of US policy in the region and how we are perceived. Until this country honestly evaluates how it came to this point, how can anything but the Bush policy be prescribed to an increasingly fearful public. Kerry is hardly calling for a radical shift in our foreign policy, yet he has already been successfully portrayed as "weak" on terrorism.

    While freedom of speech is still alive, coporate restrictions on speech (by increasingly consolidated media interests) is certainly occurring (Clear Channel comes immediately to mind). In a fascist system, does it really matter who restricts the speech, large corporate interests or the government itself?

  23. In a fascist system, does it really matter who restricts the speech, large corporate interests or the government itself?

    Not if said large corporate interests are aligned with the government …

  24. Outstanding essay, Brian. It was recommended to me by hansomdevil and Simbaud.

    I think you understimate the damage of Bush's governorship if Texas. He was painted as a moderate, and the press have given his record very little examination, but his Texas administration was a scene of an unprecedented assault on public education, record numbers of executions (including children and the mentally disabled), corruption of the adoption system, breakdowns in relations with Mexico over the trial and execution of Mexican nationals without (legally-mandated) notification of their consulate…the list goes on. Please don't promote the meme that Bush has been harmless, whereas in fact he has been extremely dangerous and damaging. (In fairness, due to the silence of the press, most people outside of Texas don't have a clue about his record. I'm not trying to give you a slap; just share the information.)

    I have been giving the rise of facism some though myself these days. (I can't find trackbacks for your site.) FYI, I've quoted you here:
    Rule of Law
    If the Jackboot Fits (BOP)
    If the Jackboot Fits (C101)

    My question is, if there is even the most remote possibility that the ideas you put forth are true (and I believe the possibility is more than remote), what do we do?

  25. Interesting post, though for a number of reasons (several mentioned by Prof. Leiter), a comparison with Germany in the 1930s should lead to cautious optimism that the U.S. will not go fascist.

    The U.S. MAY suffer an economic disaster (as Professor Leiter has noted), but nothing has happened yet that remotely resembles the ruinous combination of World War I-induced inflation in the 20s, followed by the Great Depression. As the distinguished historian Alan Bullock has written: "It was no accident that Hitler began to attract mass support only with the onset of the Depression" (HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVES, 1993 ed., p. 219). For an indicator of the suffering and insecurity involved: in 1931-32, registered unemployment in Germany exceeded 6 million (Bullock again, p. 229)–this in a country of about 50 million people.

    Democracy in Germany was both weak and recent (as Professor Leiter has said). I would add that the supersession of parliamentary government by so-called "presidential" government in 1930 gave Hitler an opportunity that wouldn't (I think) be afforded to a would-be dictator by our system. (From 1930 on, the German government was run by a chancellor and ministers appointed directly by the President, Hindenburg, rather than representing a majority in Parliament. Without ever having an outright parliamentary majority, Hitler was able, with a mixture of luck and astute maneuver, to gain the chancellorship in January, 1933.)

    It should also be added that we don't have anything like the spectacle of SA thugs and their Communist Party counterparts brawling in the streets. (Parties of the hard right and hard left have just never done very well in the U.S., for reasons it would take too long to go into here.) Professor Stanley is quite right about the absence of a left-wing threat that would induce American conservatives to flirt (a la von Papen) with real fascists.

    It's been suggested by Professor Tushnet that gays play for Republicans something like the role played by Jews as demonized other in the mythology of German-style fascism. (A race enemy or something like a race enemy, as I believe has already been noted, isn't essential to fascism; Mussolini adopted anti-Jewish policies only under Hitler's influence.) I don't think the gay-Jewish comparison takes us very far. The official Republican position is anti-gay, but not virulently, violently so (we wouldn't be hearing about Dick Cheney's daughter if it were).

    A pronouncedly militaristic nationalism (common to both the German and Italian models of fascism); now that is more troubling, because we really are seeing more of it here in the States than pre-9-11. Still, we would have to go down a very ugly road before comparisons to Germany in '38 and '39 would be warranted. (I would differ from Prof. Leiter, by the way, in asserting that I see nothing specifically "Nazi" about a doctrine of preemption. Preemption MAY be the responsible course of action, if the threat is grave enough. It is clear now that such was not the case with Iraq. But the question remains whether all the official justifications for going to war in Iraq were simply made up out of whole cloth, or whether there was a genuine, but as it turned out, unfounded belief in Iraqi nukes and other WMD. If the latter, we need to think more in terms of gross incompetence than of nascent fascism.)

    In short, it seems likely (to me) that an awful lot more would have to go terribly wrong for the U.S. to become fascist

  26. I see, on rereading, that in my haste I didn't really address very well the possibility of the US slipping into Italian-style fascism, the kind Prof. Leiter thinks there's some reason to worry about. I still think it's a stretch, but more on that perhaps later.

  27. Wow. Great post. I have mentioned before the resemblance between USA 2000 and Germany 1933., but more I think (and read) about it, more I am convinced that it is more similar to Italy. Of course, the place and time are different and the US version of fascism will inevitably have its own characteristics.

  28. "He has not created what I'd guess you'd call a national mystisism with himself at the center."

    Im not sure that this statement is necessarly true, It may be true as in he has not succeeded but I belive he is deffinetly trying.

    I recall a campaign ad for Bush that simply stated.

    "10 out of 10 Terrorists agree, Anybody But Bush" This seems to say if your not for bush your are agianst this country. While at the same time is playing it safe and alowing him to simply say that it means Terrorists dont like him. Yet Terrorists arent campainging aginst him with the phrase "Anybody But Bush"

  29. A very nice post. A colleague at NYU said that he was re-reading Shirer and was struck by the resemblance between then and now. One thing that has struck me is how gays are serving for Republicans the function that Jews did for the Nazis, and how their rhetoric ("girlie men" to wild applause, for example) is aimed at insinuating that their opponents are at least effeminate, if not gay.

    Brian, and other esteemed contributors and readers, I would like to make a case for a slightly different perspective and approach to assessing the probability of fascism taking hold in America and what to do about it.

    Fascism begins as a state of mind. It develops from an attitude of political and personal superiority that disrespects others, from an “ends justify the means” morality, and from a world view focused by a lust for power and control and a willingness to use force to gain both. If one waits until the SA or Brown Shirts (artifacts of fascism that belong to another time and place, which may or may not be relevant to the USA today) are in the streets before deciding that there is something to worry about, then one will have waited too long to do anything about the problem — other than personally keeping a low profile. Looking for unambiguous artifacts and structural comparisons between European fascism in the early 1930s and American political events since 2000 IS important because of its inherently evidential nature, but looking for parallels in attitude, morality, and worldview are more likely to expose the root problem and sound an alarm in time to do something constructive about it.

    Because precision is not important, please use whatever constitutes your ethical, moral, or religious values to surmise what I mean by the word “quality” in the following discussion. The application of fascism (personal or political) reflects a low quality of being. People of sufficient quality, no matter what side of the right/left political spectrum they occupy, will find fascism repugnant. Likewise, people of sufficiently low quality will be able to find excuses to employ fascism (personally as well as politically) or stand by while others employ fascism in their name — no matter what country or time period they happen to live in. Fascism is fundamentally a human quality problem, which under certain cultural, political, and economic conditions leads to a political problem. To focus on the conditions leading to the political problem because of its horrendous potential for destruction, rather than the human problem that lies at its root is a mistake that leads us to ineffectual remedies (Too little too late). As Professor Zimbardo (Google the “Zimbardo experiment”) and world history have conclusively demonstrated, a widely out of balance power relationship encourages fascistic behavior. Also, it is likewise well known that polite civilization constitutes a thin veneer that can easily be disrupted by a pervasive fear, whether real or imagined (e.g., Communist conspiracy, liberal conspiracy, Jewish conspiracy, Islamic conspiracy, gay conspiracy, terrorist conspiracy, democratic conspiracy, UN conspiracy). In this age of ONE (i.e., largely unbalanced) political and military super power, Dr. Zimbardo and history will tell us that the American system is being pushed by a pervasively low quality (the relatively uneducated and unaware masses) of human behavior (as clearly evidenced by our politicians, and the US electorate) toward fascism. This pressure is real. Our political system has been drifting to the right for a reason.

    I do NOT believe that some form of American fascism in the near future is inevitable. However, I do believe that if we are to avoid that fate as a nation we need to focus on the fundamental human quality problem instead of identifying the conditions that uncover the political problem. The long term solution is one of education and capacity for critical thinking more that one of catching them red handed or clever politics counter-moves. As long as fear manipulated by propaganda is able to trump truth, we will remain at risk. Without a change in the quality of the electorate, the politicians that electorate produces will sooner or later give way to the pressure to apply the unbalanced American force to achieve control and influence that reforms the world to their advantage and in their own image – or die trying. History is perfectly clear on this point, fascism puts America on a path toward eventual self destruction. There can be no other outcome. Blogs are all about sharing and spreading ideas – the root and heart of education. Perhaps this is the blog that will initiate the solution. Its off to a good start and has collected a very thoughtful readership.

    Tom Campbell

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