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Tenure and Academic Evaluation

[Full disclosure: I’ve benefited immensely from the current system of evaluating academics]

Evaluating philosophers is fun (indeed, stay tuned this week for my list of ‘top ten most overrated New York Area philosophers’). But I’m increasingly suspicious of the way philosophers are evaluated in the field, and I’m sure my concerns here hold for many other disciplines besides philosophy. Academic evaluation in philosophy (e.g. tenure review) is performed by the most senior members of our profession. The views of the most senior figures carry enormous weight. I guess the natural thought here is that the most senior figures in an area are the most likely reliable and fair minded judges of who among younger participants is doing the best work. But I think there are a lot of reasons to think this natural thought is incorrect.

First, and most obviously, conflict of interest. It is in the interest of the most senior members of the profession to support the careers of those younger scholars who share their views, or at the very least their conception of what is important in the field.  Supporting scholars who disagree with one’s views is dangerous; it may ensure a shorter lifespan for one’s work. Even more clearly, supporting scholars who have an alternative conception of the discipline is an even more reliable way to undermine one’s own interests. A system that expects senior scholars to make objective evaluations of younger scholars that obviously involve conflicts with the older statesperson’s public statements and stated views places an unfair burden on those senior scholars. Finally, and most worryingly, a number of academics possess what one might call “the limited attention space” conception of the field. They think that there is a limited amount of attention in the field, and any attention that is drawn to someone else is attention that is taken away from them. I myself am convinced that the limited attention space conception of the field is incorrect; my work has clearly been made better by engaging directly and openly with the work of many others. But whether it is right or wrong, the limited attention space conception of the field is widely assumed, often tacitly, and sometimes explicitly. If “the underlying dynamic is a struggle over intellectual territory of limited size”, as Randall Collins has maintained (p. 81 of his The Sociology of Philosophies), then the very fact that a younger scholar is particularly promising should lead a rational, self-interested senior figure to try to subvert her career, whether that younger scholar’s work conflicts with the senior figure’s work or not. A system that is predicated on the irrationality of its members is not a very good system.

Secondly (and I’m more hesitant here, since there are many exceptions) it is my experience that (generally) the more senior one becomes, the more one loses contact with (broadly speaking) the profession at large. My peers in the profession and their juniors have quite a good sense not only of what others around their career stage and younger are working on, but also have read a good deal of their work. When I meet a philosopher, if she has published a few articles in Metaphysics and Epistemology, broadly construed, I generally am aware of some paper she has written. But my sense is that this isn’t true of most very eminent philosophers over a certain age (I don’t hit the journals as much as I did three years ago, and I’m just 36). I don’t know what accounts for this, and certainly there are notable exceptions. But by and large, I encounter a lot of very distinguished philosophers who have only a dim sense at one is happening outside their sub-disciplines. Yet these are the people many administrations rely upon to give them a sense of “what is happening” (e.g. it is the most senior philosophers who make up the constituency of visiting committees). In my experience, the best way to find out “what’s happening” in the profession is to ask advanced graduate students.

It seems to me that the system of having the most eminent and distinguished scholars be the gatekeepers for advancement has failed in Europe. In most European countries, a few grand eminences control distribution of the jobs in that country. This has been very good for American academia, because they often choose their students or followers for distinguished chairs rather than the younger scholars doing the most innovative work, and the latter migrate to us. My suspicion is that the American system thrives because it is so large, relative to the systems of individual European countries. If one publishes work that attracts a lot of attention, then even if some senior figures think you are “getting too much attention”, some department will hire you anyway. But that suggests that what is guides advancement in the long run is doing work that attracts a great deal of interest, and the system of evaluation by the most senior members of the profession is only an impediment.

Now, what can be done about it? Obviously, evaluation of philosophers isn’t a science. But I have never encountered people appealing to citation indices in discussing whether to hire someone, or any other kind of measure along that dimension. I am not suggesting that this sort of data should be relied upon in a definitive way. Nothing is a substitute for close reading of work (and for the reasons given above, certainly “getting more letters” from senior figures isn’t either!). But the fact that someone has published a good deal of work, and it has generated a substantive literature among people who are not personally connected to them is a measure of objective evidence of some kind. Since there are good independent reasons to think that high-status academics are going to be particularly resistant to promising younger scholars (whether knowingly or not), we probably should have such evidence available in contexts of evaluation. Of course, one concern here is that the aforementioned measures are not a reliable guide to future productivity, given the short tenure clock. Perhaps this is an argument for extending that clock, then.

                                                                    -Jason

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15 responses to “Tenure and Academic Evaluation”

  1. Interesting post. But I'm a little puzzled: what are "rational, self-interested" senior philosophers supposed to gain by attempting (successfully or not) to "subvert" the career of a "promising younger scholar?"

  2. Jason,

    You say:

    '*if* “the underlying dynamic is a struggle over intellectual territory of limited size”,… then the very fact that a younger scholar is particularly promising should lead a rational, self-interested senior figure to try to subvert her career.'

    I suppose that's right. But then you add,

    'A system that is predicated on the irrationality of its members is not a very good system.'

    Well, that's also right. But are you endorsing Randall Collins' view about the underlying dynamic? Or what's your point?
    I've seen quite a few letters from distinguished philosophers praising and touting younger philosophers whose views do not agree with their own. I find it pretty hard to believe that those letter-writers are irrational, or even that their writing those letters was irrational.

    Using citations doesn't seem like a bad idea. I've checked some people's citations recently and was surprised at how few there were for some articles I think of as incredibly influential. This makes me wonder about my judgments of influence, but also about how to interpret the citation numbers.

    {Damn, I can't use any html tags in comments. Brian, can't you get those turned on?}

  3. Jason mentioned citation indices and I think this raises some interesting questions about the ranking of philosophy journals (and thus the evaluation of published work for hiring, promotion, etc.). Having held positions in both philosophy and political science departments this is an issue I have given some thought to so I will note some of my concerns here, for what they are worth. One obvious difference between political science and philosophy journals is that a number of the most prestigious “general” philosophy journals are edited “in house”, with the editors and reviewers (either some or possibly all) consisting of faculty from one particular department. Compare, for example, the highest impact Political Science journal- American Political Science Review- with the Journal of Philosophy or Phil Review. The American Political Science Review is the highest impact journal and considered the “flagship” journal of the discipline. It publishes articles in all areas of the discipline and has a rigorous external (double—sometimes triple) blind review process. This contrasts in important ways with flagship journals in philosophy that have an “in-house” vetting process (which they utilise either exclusively or as a major component of the evaluation process). I think this is troubling for a number of reasons. It might disadvantage people who do certain areas of philosophy that no faculty member at the institution in question does (or if they do, they might not be sympathetic to the position/methodology you advocate). Relying on the practice of in-house reviewing from one particular dept. is no doubt going to have an unjustified limiting impact on the papers accepted for publication. This has perverse consequences— in effect it makes it the case that a necessary condition of publishing a paper in one of these two flagship philosophy journals is that someone at one of these two institutions likes your work. I don’t think this ought to be the case. The flagship journals of a discipline should rely on blind external assessors, much like the reviewing process of Ethics. If the Journal of Philosophy and Phil Review could shift their editorial practice to be more in-line with Ethics then I think the process of publishing in the flagship “general” philosophy journals would be more inclusive and representative of the discipline.

  4. Jason, I agree with almost everything you say here and I applaud you for saying it. I am not so sure that relying on citation indexes will be very helpful, though, especially for hiring below the most senior level, and merely getting a rise out of people is not such a good measure either. Sometimes one can get attention by saying something really stupid. One thing that bothers me—I'm not at all sure that I am right about this, and I don't expect anyone to be able to tell me whether I am—but I have to wonder whether the top departments (or formerly top departments) are really doing national searches at all. One could get the impression that some of them only look among a few people they already know personally. If that's right, then that would be the very first thing to correct.

  5. I can't speak for J Phil, but I don't think Phil Review has the problems that Colin is attributing to it. My impression (and I haven't had that much to do with the journal) is that the editors are perfectly happy to get outside opinions on work they don't know well, or even on work they do know well because it's useful to have further opinions. And my impression is that most of this is done blindly. As I said, I'm not aware of all of the details, and I could be wrong about just how blind all of the process is, but in most cases I didn't see much difference between how an in-house journal, like Phil Review, and a commercially published journal, like say Nous, operates.

    And I want to quibble with one thing Chris says. National searches are a very bad idea, unless one wants to rule out a priori hiring one of us foreigners!! I'm sure he wouldn't object to adding 'inter' before 'national', so this is just a quibble 🙂

    By the way, this post is harder than it need be to read without lines between the paragraphs. My attention span these days is so short that 20 lines of text in a row is too much. Blogging will, it seems, make you go blind…

  6. A lot depends on what the tenure evaluation process is supposed to turn up. I myself don't think it should simply judge a person's "impact on the profession so far". That could come to a screeching halt post-tenure, and, as Chris points out, impact is neutral between good and bad. It also can take time for ideas and views to develop. If the idea is to predict the likelihood of future meaningful contributions to philosophy (and to one's department and university) based on past performance, then there is some reason to think senior figures may be better judge of this (having had more experience).
    One thing you don't mention that has struck me as some cause for concern is this apparently widespread practice: potential tenure referees often will not agree to write if they are not already in favor of tenuring the candidate. It seems to me that a more rigorous process would be achieved if that wrinkle could be ironed out.

  7. Jason, the post is thoughtful and interesting.

    I would however point out that with respect to the "conflict of interest" consideration, more senior, established scholars are probably in the least problematic situation vis a vis younger philosophers. That is, the "competition," if that is what it is, would be much more significant if one were evaluating people in one's own cohort. I doubt if we should be asking people currently up for tenure to evaluate others in their situations in their sub-fields. And recently tenured folks are often the MOST CRITICAL of others who are being considered for tenure. This seems to illustrate a point made to me many years ago by Jules Coleman: people don't want to be paid in inflated currency…

    I suppose the letters from senior, established people should be taken as just one factor among various factors; this is the way it typically is done, as you know. And even if a senior person is not antecedently familiar with someone's work, he or she would presumably (!!) read the material and evaluate it for the tenure appraisal.

    These things certainly aren't perfect. Let me point to something I think we have discussed and agreed about in the past. A more significant factor in both hiring and tenuring seems to be academic pedigree and "connections". Again, our system is not perfect, and we are human beings subject to psychological factors that affect any human being. But for a group that prides itself so much on being rational and egalitarian (and meritorcratic), we (and I include myself at least sometimes) are often stunningly irrational and elitist.

  8. Jason: The charge that senior evaluators face a conflict of interest in evaluating the work of more junior members of the profession whose work does not agree with theirs rests on an assumption which seems to me to be questionable, namely, that senior evaluators are concerned with promoting their reputations or their programs without regard to whether they deserve their reputations, without regard to whether their programs are correct, and without regard to the quality of the work they are evaluating. Were this to be their motive, they would be undertaking to evaluate both work that disagrees with theirs and work that agrees with theirs in bad faith.

    Philosophers are no doubt prey to the weaknesses of human nature. One would therefore not want to say that such a thing might not happen from time to time. But there would be a systemic problem only if it happened frequently. I don't know of any reason to think that this is so or that the culture of professional philosophy in the English speaking world is particularly prone to the vice you describe.

    I do not know personally of any case in which what you suggest has happened. But I am aware of a number of cases of senior people being very generous to promising junior members of the profession whose views are in opposition to their own. The sort of bad faith that would be involved also seems to me to be out of character for any people in the class you have in mind I know at all well.

    It seems doubtful to me, therefore, that the well-functioning of the system of evaluation is predicated on the irrationality of the evaluators. Evaluating work on the basis of its quality is not irrational if that is your aim, and I think that is the aim of most people called on to do this, regardless of whether the person being evaluated is of their persuasion.

    I think you are right that the “the limited attention space” conception of the field is mistaken, and also right that the size of the Anglo-American system is a safeguard against cronyism in the profession. But I also think that the quality of the guild and its culture, which are connected, have a lot to do with it.

    I am not sure that the observation, if it is correct, that the more senior the figure, the less aware of work outside his or her subfield he or she is argues for not soliciting evaluations from senior figures in matters such as tenure, for in these cases typically the evaluations are of candidates who work in their fields. And if we are to have evaluations of candidates by people who do not have a vested interest in the person being evaluated, which seems reasonable, asking those who have a well-established reputation in the field seems like the most senisble thing to do. By the way, I don’t think it is only the most senior figures who are asked.

    I don't think anyone would argue that these evaluations should be the sole basis for reaching decisions about tenure, or other matters, and citations indices are certainly relevant if available.

  9. I've been working with citation indexes a bit in preparing submissions for my own department's evaluation (it is a component that's mandated by my university), and I've also sometimes looked up people the department was going to hire to see if their research has generated a literature. The main difficulty for both purposes is that the indexes available (in particular, Web of Science) don't track certain kinds of publications which are important in philosophy, namely, authored and edited books. Nor, of course, does it track another measure that's important in philosophy, namely symposia at conferences. In addition, philosophers aren't generally as citation happy as authors in other disciplines, and the time between appearance of a publication and when it generates the kind of response that's refelcted in citation counts is comparatively long in philosophy. These factors make it very hard to get an accurate picture of the importance of someone's work, especially if the people in question are junior. Sociological and geographical factors also skew this kind of evidence: if you're not already well-connected (because you're close to the New York area or have ties to the major players from graduate school, for instance) and aren't in a position (financial or time-wise) to attend lots of conferences it's that much harder to get noticed. This is also a major difference to other disciplines, where presentation at conferences are a much more common way of publishing, and where reviews of the current literature are a necessary component of any publication. All this of course doesn't mean that citations might be a useful thing to look at–just that the absence of citations in Web of Science isn't a reliable indicator of lack of quality or interest in someone's work.

  10. Marcus's posting, above this one, doesn't allow comments (why not?), so I'm just going to comment here:

    Great point. I'd never thought of that, and I have generally been anti-tenure (really), but maybe the 'hiring our competition' point is enough to change my mind.

  11. Jamie,

    If some people believe the hypothesis that any attention given to others is attention taken from them, then it would be rational for them to act accordingly. Furthermore, it's certainly a rational belief (though, as I've indicated, I definitely don't think it's true). Since I think that many people do explicitly believe the limited attention model, and even more people tacitly adhere to it, we probably shouldn't have a system predicated on no one believing it. The fact that it is widely believed perhaps could explain also why it is so impossibly difficult (at least in philosophy) to sustain a top department through multiple generations (of course, free agency is partly to blame here as well, as it is for so many other ills, like the Knicks).

    That said, it's clearly just one factor among many that prevents us from more meritocratic judgments. The issues raised by John Fisher and Richard Zach are at least as relevant. I actually think the main problem is simply laziness, rather than pernicious intentions (or to put it less harshly, lack of time to devote to all of one's life plans). We rely on letters from distinguished figures and academic prestige and personal connections because we don't have the time to spend reading widely in journals to find out what interesting work is being published by people we've never heard of.

  12. I'd like to agree with Chris on the unreliability of citation indexes as a measure of quality. One great way to get cited is to offer a competent but rather simple defense of some controversial position. Then you get to be the straw man, as it were, for all the people who want to attack that position. Being cited a lot may simply mean that you've provided your opponents with a convenient foil, not that your work is good. Another way to get cited a lot is to start doing research on fashionable nonsense. Then you may get cited a lot in bad journals. But this too is, of course, no indication of quality.

  13. Jason-

    There is no doubt a considerable difficulty in getting useful evaluations of philosophical work for, e.g., tenure reviews, but somehow you seem to have focused on what seems to me to be a non-existent problem. What one needs are honest evaluations done in responsible manner by people of good judgment. There is no systemic structure that will guarantee that one will get these. Let's look at the requirements in order.

    The evaluations must be honest. You have raised the spectre of senior members of the profession writing poor evaluations for promising younger people (that is, younger people they themselves see as promising) out of fear that they themselves will be displaced- that is, the spectre of someone dishonestly writing a bad evaluation. I have never seen, or heard, of such a thing, and rather doubt it occurs. To the contrary, some distinguished philosophers are known for so over-praising all candidates that their letters are regarded as unreliable.

    In your post, you mention that an evaluator may support others who "share their views, or at the very least their conception of what is important in the field". Not surprisingly, considering someone's "conception of what is important in the field" is part and parcel of evaluating the person as a philosopher. If someone is doing work that the evaluator judges not to be important, then the evaluator will honestly give a poor evaluation. This is not a matter of acting out of self-interest, it is a matter a of applying one's considered judgment about the value of the work. It is rather hard to imagine what you are expecting: positive evaluations of work that the evaluator thinks is ill-conceived and off target?

    Overall, I think honesty is the easiest thing to get in evaluations, and where it is absent it tends to run to then over-positive.

    For the evaluation to be done in a responsible manner means careful reading of the work. This is sometimes harder to come by because it is a significant burden of time and effort- a burden that is entirely unrecompensed. There is not much to be done here but continue to rely on a sense of integrity and professional responsibility. It does mean that one should only ask tenured faculty regularly to write evaluations- for an untenured person, the commitment of time and effort that would get no acknowledgment is too high a price to ask. I have often thought that one scheme would help- tenure and promotion packets shoud contain only, say 100 or 150 pages of material, chosen by the candidate as their best work. If a case can't be made in the best 150 pages, it won't be made. This would help ensure a careful reading of what is in the packet, and would reduce pressure to publish for the sake of having more pages. People with multiple areas of expertise could assemble different packets for each area.

    The most critical point, of course, is that the evaluator must have good jusgment. And this, alas, can only be secured by having those who choose the evaluators have good judgment. This is why Plato saw that the ideal state could not survive.

    Reliance on citation indices goes in exactly the wrong direction. It produces a premium for publishing as much as possible, and for the formation of groups who will constantly cite one another's work. In any case, evaluating someone for promotion or tenure ought not to be a sociological excercise, determining the person's "influence". Someone who has done good work but had the misfortune to be overlooked deserves promotion, someone who has attained notoriety for their stupidities does not.

  14. Tim,

    My concern is not with dishonesty in evaluation; I think that's unusual. My concern is rather that honesty in evaluations isn't necessarily a reliable guide to whether someone will go on to do important work. We are all guided by our particular proclivities and conceptions of philosophy. But good work will often be unusual, or will go along a path that was thought to be uninteresting, yet in fact was closed off prematurely. In short, I wonder whether relying so heavily on evaluations ends up forcing people to be less adventurous. The overpraising candidates concern is actually just the other side of the same coin I was discussing — unfairly overpromoting those who share one's proclivities is a way of harming those who don't.

    There are certainly numerous problems with citation indices, and of course I don't advocate relying exclusively on them. But I don't think that publishing a lot is a way to get cited a lot. It will just create a lot of papers that no one reads (if they are not very good).

    My own view of how things work is that an interesting paper gets written, and gets stumbled upon by people who peruse journals and books. It catches their interest enough to think about and write about. It's very hard to say in advance which papers will do that, and people are pretty bad at predicting even which of their own papers will be most likely to catch people's interest. But the fact that a paper arouses interest among a wide range of people not connected to the author is an indication that the paper has one kind of merit. The most important kind of merit occurs when thinking about a paper leads people to make advances on previously existing levels of understanding about the topic (I hope Rorty isn't reading this). But all that takes ages to figure out. I think we are quite poor, especially at an early stage in a scholar's career, and figuring out whose work is likely to lead to this.

    My favored way of conducting such procedures is to get together with my department and read work intensively and discuss it with one another. That seems to me considerably more reliable, since each person's particular perspective can be balanced against the perspectives of others.

  15. Just a brief response to Brian W.’s reply (way up above) to my concern about “in-house” journals. Just to re-state my central concern—I don’t think “in-house” journals are necessarily problematic, but in those cases where the discipline (e.g. in hiring decisions, tenure, etc.) places a premium on publications in such journals I think this is a problem. It is not a problem for the depts which house the journals (I am not suggesting this is a failing on their part, or that the papers they publish are not first rate papers) but for the discipline as a whole. The editorial policy of Phil Review, for example, states that two members of the dept. are responsible for the initial screening of submissions (250-300 papers a year!). No doubt such a screening process will weed out many papers that don’t meet the rigorous standards of Phil Review, but no doubt the sheer volume of submissions itself and the particular interests/specialization of the members on the committee in any given year will also be factors. As Brian admits, he is unsure of the exact details of the review process (and he is a member of the dept which houses the journal). This troubles me because I think journals which are considered “flagship” journals of a discipline should have a more inclusive and transparent editorial policy. Many of the most prominent journals in philosophy do not do this.

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