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    Exactly! The question is not whether AI is conscious or forms human-like intentions. The question is whether AI–in carrying out…

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    This is a very strange comment. Searle’s Chinese Room, and his general position on intentionality, were controversial, and criticized (correctly,…

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New Paper: “Why Evolutionary Biology is (so far) Irrelevant to Law” (Leiter)

Michael Weisberg (Philosophy, Penn) and I have made available on SSRN here what we hope is the penultimate draft of this paper, which is being submitted currently to the law reviews.  Here is the abstract:

Evolutionary biology—or, more precisely, two (purported) applications of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, namely, evolutionary psychology and what has been called “human behavioral biology”—is on the cusp of becoming the new rage among legal scholars looking for “interdisciplinary” insights into the law. We argue that as the actual science stands today, evolutionary biology offers nothing to help with questions about legal regulation of behavior. Only systematic misrepresentations or lack of understanding of the relevant biology, together with far-reaching analytical and philosophical confusions, have led anyone to think otherwise.

Evolutionary accounts are etiological accounts of how a trait evolved. We argue that an account of causal etiology could be relevant to law if (1) the account of causal etiology is scientifically well-confirmed, and (2) there is an explanation of how the well-confirmed etiology bears on questions of development (what we call “the Environmental Gap Objection”). We then show that the accounts of causal etiology that might be relevant are not remotely well-confirmed by scientific standards. We argue, in particular, that (a) evolutionary psychology is not entitled to assume selectionist accounts of human behaviors, (b) the assumptions necessary for the selectionist accounts to be true are not warranted by standard criteria for theory choice, , and (c) only confusions about levels of explanation of human behavior create the appearance that understanding the biology of behavior is important. We also note that no response to the Environmental Gap Objection has been proferred. In the concluding section of the article, we turn directly to the work of Professor Owen Jones, a leading proponent of the relevance of evolutionary biology to law, and show that he does not come to terms with any of the fundamental problems identified in this article

Comments would be welcome.

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