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Non-Compassionate Ominvorism? (Nadelhoffer)

My point of departure in this post is the recent book by Peter Singer and Jim Mason entitled The Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter.   The main goal of the book is to examine the moral implications of our decisions concerning what we eat.  Rather than focusing on meat consumption in general, for present purposes I want to focus exclusively on the moral problems associated with factory farming or confinement agriculture—although I should specify in advance that I will not be explaining these problems in detail here.  For more information, you can look here, here, or here.  My present goal is to suggest that if confinement agriculture is morally problematic, then knowingly eating meat produced by these methods—when doing so is unnecessary—is also morally problematic.  As such, people who contribute to the corporations who are in the confinement agriculture business by eating their products should shoulder the responsibility of providing a moral justification for their eating and purchasing habits as far as meat is concerned.  But I am getting ahead of myself.  First, I need to briefly lay out the problem.

Given (a) the staggering number of animals that were killed last year in this country for food (estimates typically exceed 10 billion animals), (b) the horrific conditions animals are forced to endure in factory farms (e.g., no sunlight, inconceivable crowding, tail cropping, beak cutting, forced feeding, and the like), and (c) the health and environmental problems associated with contemporary meat production (e.g., overuse of hormones and antibiotics as well as polluted waterways and groundwater), confinement agriculture  deserves more attention than it gets these days.  For contrary to the mental images we have of what farms are like—with chickens, pigs, and cows wandering around idyllic green pastures and basking in the sun—modern day confinement agribusiness has reduced animals to nothing more than commodities.  Indeed, industry insiders are perfectly aware of the disconnect between what people believe about how farm animals are treated while they are alive and the actual conditions these animals are forced to endure—a disconnect agricorporations foster by relying on misleading advertising and labeling and by making sure that confinement facilities are not open to the public.  Unfortunately (and not surprisingly), these corporations have the law on their side.

For instance, there is no federal law governing the welfare of farmed animals.  Federal laws only become applicable once the animals are transported to slaughterhouses.  Moreover, most states that have animal welfare laws have built-in exceptions for “common farming practices.”  As a result, farmed animals are literally invisible as far as the law is concerned, and any common farming practice, no matter how cruel and inhumane, is legal.  This state of affairs has effectively enabled major corporations such as Tyson, Smithfield, and ContriGroup, to reduce animals to nothing more than meat producing machines.  As a result, any and all decisions concerning how these animals are to be treated while they are alive are driven entirely by productivity and profitability.  Given the current federal and state statutory schemes, these animals’ psychological well-being need not ever be taken into consideration. 

I will leave it to the reader to further investigate these issues as she sees fit.  For now I am more interested in a group of people that Singer and Mason call “compassionate omnivores”—i.e., people who choose to eat meat but who make sure that the animals whose meat they consume were treated humanely while they were alive.  Given how Singer and Mason define "compassionate omnivore," we should presumably call meat eaters who do not insist the animals whose meat they eat were treated humanely while they were alive, “non-compassionate omnivores.”  My question is the following: Are there any compelling arguments for the permissibility of being a non-compassionate omnivore—especially when being a compassionate omnivore, vegetarian, or vegan is always an option?  Perhaps I simply lack a vivid imagination, but I can not think of any compelling arguments in this regard.  I am interested to hear what kinds of arguments the readers of this blog manage to put forward. 

To prevent people from either misunderstanding or misrepresenting what I am arguing for here, let me spell out very clearly what I am not trying to accomplish or argue for in this post. I am not suggesting that eating meat is intrinsically wrong nor am I suggesting that non-human animals either do or should enjoy the same moral status as human beings (although both of these claims have been put forward in the animal welfare literature).  Moreover, I am not suggesting that it is always morally impermissible for humans to use non-human animals to suit our needs.  What I am suggesting is that certain forms of meat production and meat consumption are at least prima facie morally problematic and hence require a moral justification.  So, the onus is on the non-compassionate omnivores of the world to justify their eating and purchasing habits as far as meat is concerned.  Indeed, this post can be viewed as a challenge to the readers of this blog who engage in the form of meat consumption I have been discussing—and who thereby finance the form of meat production I have suggested is morally problematic—to put forward a moral argument that justifies these habits.  Eating the meat of animals that were treated humanely while they were alive is one thing.  Eating meat that comes from animals that were unnecessarily forced to endure bleak and miserable lives is something else entirely.

I suspect that most non-compassionate omnivores are simply unaware of what happens to the animals whose meat they eat.  Luckily, I have just given the readers of this blog the means of disabusing themselves of any misconceptions they might understandably have about how modern farm animals are often raised.  As a result, ignorance will not suffice as a justification.  Moreover, neither will simply pointing out how delicious meat is.  After all, I have not suggested that people should not eat meat at all. I have only suggested that certain forms of meat eating are morally suspect.  Indeed, if anything, the meat produced by small family farms that treat their animals well and do not pump them full of hormones and antibiotics should taste better than meat produced by confinement agriculture–plus, it’s better for you.  This leaves cost as perhaps the main justification for eating factory farmed meat.  But I am skeptical that enough moral mileage can be gotten out of cost alone to justify the practice under consideration.  Would the people in this country really be that worse off if they ate meat a little less often?  The statistics concerning obesity suggest we could all stand to eat a little less of nearly everything (except perhaps fruits and vegetables!).  So, what (if anything) justifies non-compassionate omnivorism?

Comments are open; no anonymous postings.  I should also be clear up front that juvenile and/or abusive comments will not be posted.  If you do not wish to seriously engage the questions and probelms I have raised, I politely ask that you not bother commenting.  Please post only once; comments may take awhile to appear.

UPDATE:  It has been brought to my attention that Roger Scruton has an interesting post over at Right Reason entitled "Eating Our Friends"–where he talks about the "virtuous carnivore."

UPDATE: This article in the new Mother Jones talks about alternatives to industrial agriculture.

UPDATE: This article in the New York Times talks about the rising demand for organic beef.

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50 responses to “Non-Compassionate Ominvorism? (Nadelhoffer)”

  1. In my discussions about this, I have observed that:
    1. Most people are indifferent;
    2. But, being moral people, when pressed for a justification, they will feel obliged to at least reflect on their habits. Nevertheless, many conclude that there is simply no need to provide a justification for choosing a confinement-grown animal over a naturally/humanely-grown one by invoking the belief that there is no moral distinction. What difference does treatment quality make when the animal will be killed all the same? That, of course, is like asking what difference murder makes when all men all mortal, and conveniently (and most likely unconsciously) dispenses with serious moral issues and distinctions altogether. It is not ignorance of the process, which is by now already becoming increasingly known, but lack of clarity in moral reasoning. It is not a justification, but it is one of the more common motives, I suspect. Obviously, that is not my position, and I am simply pointing out what some people have thought. If they were also presented with the murder question, though, they would probably be driven to inconsistency or silence.

  2. Thomas:

    Rather than answer your questions, let me ask you a few. You’ll likely see how my questions are relevant to your challenge, though I offer here no direct answer to your challenge. I’ve been writing a bit about this topic and would benefit from your input.

    Let’s agree that factory farming practices are horrible. This generates a prima facie obligation not to participate in them.

    What’s harder, it seems to me, is saying what follows from this about personal behavior. One reason this is difficult is that even thoughtful people like you and Singer aren’t especially clear about what conclusion(s) you want to defend. You suggest in your post that there is at least an initial prima facie case for your conclusion about personal behavior, given the wrongness of factory of farming. Your conclusion is, I think, that it is also at least prima facie wrong to “support” factory farming. That may be right, but I want to hear more about what you mean by “support”.

    Which conclusion are *you* after? (1) that *purchasing* the products is wrong? Or (2) that eating them is? Perhaps you want both conclusions?
    Your quotation refers to people who “contribute…. by eating” – but no one does *that*. *Purchasing*, not *eating* drives the relevant market.

    Perhaps this is why Singer does not defend veganism in the new book. Nor does he even defend the conclusion you seem interested in defending: that *eating* the products of factory farming is morally wrong. Singer’s view at least permits this practice when it’s done “freegan” style and may well permit this more generally when the eating is not accompanied by the purchasing (roughly), and perhaps in other situations as well.

    Whatever Singer’s exact position on meat eating, one can certainly eat without purchasing and purchase without eating and so these are surely separate issues, despite the fact that that there is a pretty strong correlation between actual cases of eating/purchasing. If one wants to defend specifically the “no eating” conclusion, I think one faces an uphill battle, at least relative to the “no purchasing” conclusion.

    I leave open just how hard it is to defend the no purchasing conclusion. As you are well aware, the usual arguments for specifically the “no purchasing” conclusion face a prima facie and not widely enough discussed problem of overgeneralization – typical rice purchases *also* financially support the torture of cows.

  3. Note that I am sympathetic to these worries, and have become a vegetarian precisely because of the horrific conditions under which these animals are forced to exist. But off the top of my head, here are couple of considerations that an opponent could raise:

    1. You could question the animals' capacity to suffer. That is, while they undoubtedly experience physical pain, it is less obvious that they experience mental suffering (e.g., from confinement, lack of sunlight, or boredom). (Note: I don't really buy this objection.)

    2. You could question the impact (economic and otherwise) of radically changing farming practices across the board. I don't know what the consequences of such changes would be, but I imagine the price of meat would rise dramatically. This may be problematic, especially, for lower-class families that would no longer have access to cheap protien. This would also impact restaurants and other businesses rely on meat. I don't know enough to predict the extent of such an impact, but I imagine one could argue that negative economic and social consequences outweigh environmental and moral considerations of the treatment of animals.

  4. I would demur at the contrast between 'compassionate omnivore' and 'non-compassionate omnivore', with the gricean implicature that the members of the second category lack compassion. The negation of "compassionate omnivore" includes many possibilities, including a class we could dub "morally complex omnivores", those who believe that there are multiple moral duties,(at least prima facie) many of which conflict, and some of which are more morally compelling than focusing on food sources for the elite few. Here are some other possible overriding duties: expanding food availability for the non-elite masses. restoring ecological balance through global, national and local action, expanding economic justice, including improvement of working conditions, for agricultural workers, including those who labor in horrible conditions in chicken and meat packing plants.

    The point is that these moral issues are complex. To grant that the treatment of animals in factory farming is morally objectionable does not automatically support an actual duty to boycott such products. Other issues have to be considered, including the existence of countervailing duties, the efficacy of boycott of certain products in favor of others (—as an aside, most 'whole food' or 'organic' supermarket products are themselves the product of factory farming, just with a slightly different chemical mix in production, and yupped up packaging and marketing, not to mention higher prices), and the moral pedigree of these more expensive alternative 'organic' sources of meat and grain.

  5. Just to forestall a few more common objections to such arguments for becoming compassionate omnivores:

    1) Universal and immediate boycotting of factory-farmed products would likely cause economic problems that would cause substantial human suffering. OK, so let's do it in a more gradual manner to avoid that outcome. And that's surely what will happen as more and more people gradually become aware of the problems and become compassionate omnivores. But there is no reason to think it is happening or will happen at a problematic pace any time soon, so the moral burden is not removed from any individual considering these arguments. Rather, there is every reason to think it is *not* happening nearly fast enough.

    2) "Animal-friendly" farms could not produce enough meat to sustain a large population eating meat at the rate Americans do. Right, so we would all have to cut down substantially, which would surely be good for our health, not to mention the environment and of course the animals.

    3) If factory-farmed animals feel no pain and do not suffer, then this argument for compassionate omnivorism fails. Indeed it does. But the evidence strongly suggests that such animals do have the relevant psychological states. One could try to advance a philosophical argument–e.g., that consciousness requires language–but (a) one would need to advance and defend the argument (good luck) and (b) it seems that the reasoning and evidence in support of such an argument would have to be strong enough to outweigh the potential moral harm that would continue to exist if the argument turned out to be wrong. (By the way, from what I've read, pigs are particularly smart, though intelligence need not correlate that closely to ability to feel pain and suffer.)

    4) This argument does not entail that we must stop using animals for medical testing. If causing a lot of pain to a lot of monkeys and rats has the potential to find a cure for, say, diabetes, AIDS, or breast cancer, then causing such pain is, to me at least, entirely justified. There's no clear parallel between needing to use animals for research and needing to eat them for pleasure. Of course, some research may not be sufficiently important to justify the suffering it causes to animals, but at least there are laws and IRB committees to review these cases and take into consideration the animals' welfare, whereas the oversight of factory farms does not really consider animal welfare.

    5) Finally, there's the common one-person-can't-make-a-difference responses. I won't rehearse all the reasons these responses fail.

  6. Not to be too simplistic about it, but there are lots of possible moral defenses for eating factory produced meat. For example, if you believe (like Kant) that the moral status of a being depends on its ability to exhibit rational agency, then all you have to do is show that cows, pigs, and chickens aren't rational in the relevant sense, and then take one of the easy routes around Kant's argument that we have imperfect duties to animals.

    Or, if you are a utilitarian, you can simply note that no one, not even Singer, has established with certainty that the suffering to sentient beings that comes from factory farming outweighs the pleasures or satisfactions. Once you try to include the 'preferences' or 'satisfactions' of farm animals along with the economics of world-wide industrial agriculture, the calculus becomes impossibly complicated.

    Or, if you are a certain kind or religious believer, you can take the Biblical line that animals were put on earth to satisfy humanity's needs, which implies that they are tools for our use and we have no special obligations to them except in so far as they benefit us.

    Of course, there are plenty of Kantians, utilitarians, and Jewish-Christian ethicists who are morally opposed to factory farming for principled, moral reasons. But the point is that these moral frameworks can easily be used to argue for the other side as well.

    This is a case where moral theory is about the least effective instrument one can imagine for social progress. If you want people to stop eating factory-produced meat, there is an easy and reliable way do it. Take them to a factory farm. Or, if that's not an option, have them watch a few of the documentaries produced by PETA and other such groups.

  7. The only response I can imagine is this one.

    Animal suffering is bad and thus not something that I should contribute to. However, as an individual consumer I do not contribute to it (my actions do not cause or prevent the suffering of a single animal now or in the future). So, the suffering is bad, but what's that to me? Picking up meat in the market, like picking up my meat from the side of the road, is possible only because the world is a bad place. As I don't make the world a bad place through my picking up what I do, I'll pick as I please.

    For the record, I don't buy the causal impotence response (Or, as I've called it before, the Homeric response 'It's not a lamb, Lissa. It's lamb'), but it is an interesting theoretical challenge to say precisely where it goes wrong.

  8. Because of the scale of factory farming operations it is implausible that their methods or level of production are sensitive to the purchases of any individual consumer or relatively small group of consumers. If I started eating factory farmed meat today (I've been vegetarian for a few years now), it is unlikely that a single additional animal will be raised and killed in factory farms a result. Similarly, if someone else stops eating such meat, it is unlikely to spare even a single animal from such a fate.

    If this is right, then there seems to be a pretty easy justification for the permissibility of non-compassionate ominvorism:
    (1) In general, it is permissible to engage in activities that are unlikely to produce substantial harm, especially where abstinence from that activity is unlikely to prevent substantial harm.
    (2) Individual consumption of factory farmed meat is unlikely to produce substantial harm, and individual abstinence from such a practice is unlikely to prevent substantial harm.

    The obvious objection would be to reject (1) and insist that:

    (3) Contributing to the production of substantial harm is morally impermissible even where one's own contribution is itself neither necessary nor sufficient for producing the harm.

    Now (3) seems plausible if applied to the case of a person beaten to death by an angry mob. Even if the mob was sufficiently large that the person would have died even without the kicks to the ribs that Jones provided, that doesn't mean those kicks were permissible.

    But (3) has much more sweeping implications than this. I pay taxes to the U.S. Government. As such I contribute to illegal NSA spying programs, the extralegal prison at Guantanamo Bay, and all sorts of other immoral policies. By (3) it appears I'm not morally permitted to pay my taxes.

    Moreover, even if I continue to avoid contributing to factory farming by refusing to purchase their products, I still contribute to them indirectly. My landlord is not a vegetarian, and I doubt he is a compassionate omnivore. Surely some of the hundreds of dollars I pay him every month goes toward his purchase of factory farmed meat. I thus contribute to his contributing to factory farming. Assuming that the 'contributing to' relation is transitive (perhaps it's not – but why not?), then that means when I pay my rent I am contributing to factory farming.

    In fact, so long as I continue to be a participant in an economy that includes factory farmed products it appears that I can't help but contribute to factory farming (as well as virtually every other government, corporate, or individual evil that depends on economic resources for its realization). So, if 'contributing to' is transitive, (3) implies that it is impermissible to contribute to the world economy in any way at all. Perhaps this is true, but if it is consuming factory farmed meat is the least of our moral failings.

  9. Eddy — any literature citation pointing to an article or book showing the failure of the "one person can't make a difference" response would be most appreciated. This response, weak though it seems to some, at least has some bite within the broadly consequentialist framework that Singer (and quite a few of us) like to operate.

  10. Thomas,

    Excellent question.

    Eating meat "less often" won't cut it: if the practice in question is immoral, then nothing short of total abstinence is acceptable. That leaves the question of cost. For most meat eaters it would be extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to eat any meat but that sent to market by the capitalist bastards you mention. Humanely produced meat either is not available in the places where they usually shop or, if it is, the cost is prohibitive. (The farther down the socio-economic ladder you go the more this is true.) I suppose that they could shop outside their neighborhoods. However, that not only increases the cost, but may entail the burning of fossil fuels, which, as your great-uncle and others have been warning us, is a VERY serious moral problem, perhaps the most compelling one facing us. Where does that leave compassionate carnivores? Is their behavior excusable in light of their circumstances or should they abstain entirely from meat eating?

  11. Fritz,
    Given that I, too, have been reading about “freeganism” recently, I should have been more careful concerning the eating/purchasing issue. You are certainly correct that it is unclear what is going to count as a contribution here. For instance, what if I eat factory farmed meat that someone else has purchased? Similarly, what if I buy factory farmed meat only to give to a family in need to eat? Am I contributing in both cases to the confinement agriculture industry? At first blush, it seems that I am (albeit to perhaps different degrees)—so long as I know in both cases that the meat came from a factory farm. Freeganism is different—especially when it comes to the practice of “dumpster dining.” After all, this is meat that has already been discarded. If the freegan doesn’t eat it, no one will. And what greater insult to injury could be added to the animals that suffered in order to make this meat possible than to have it simply thrown away. Minimally, freeganism certainly sheds some interesting light on the debate by prying apart the purchasing/eating correlation you mention. For now, I would like to hear more about the overgeneralization problem you mention at the end concerning the “no purchasing” argument.

    Tina,
    You said the following:

    “This may be problematic, especially, for lower-class families that would no longer have access to cheap protein. This would also impact restaurants and other businesses rely on meat. I don't know enough to predict the extent of such an impact, but I imagine one could argue that negative economic and social consequences outweigh environmental and moral considerations of the treatment of animals.”

    First, a can of beans is a much cheaper source of protein than meat as it stands—despite the attempts by confinement agriculture to drive down the cost of meat. Second, your concerns about the negative and social consequences of wide-scale compassionate omnivorism may be misplaced. After all, we got by without factory farms until fairly recently. Now fast food restaurants may very well be in trouble if more people go the route of compassionate omnivorism—but perhaps they should be (see Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation).

    Susan,
    First, I did not mean to suggest that there is no middle ground between compassionate and non-compassionate omnivorism. Surely there is—as you correctly point out. I was interested in the class of omnivores who simply don’t think the welfare of the animals they eat is relevant. The non-compassion was not supposed to apply to these people in general—perhaps they are quite compassionate towards their friends, families, and pets—it was only supposed to apply to their stance towards the animals they eat. Perhaps what we have are heartless omnivores on one end of the omnivore spectrum and compassionate omnivores at the other—with most omnivores situated somewhere in the middle. My question then becomes, are there any compelling arguments for being an omnivore of anything less than a compassionate stripe?

    You said the following:

    “Here are some other possible overriding duties: expanding food availability for the non-elite masses, restoring ecological balance through global, national and local action, expanding economic justice, including improvement of working conditions, for agricultural workers, including those who labor in horrible conditions in chicken and meat packing plants.”

    But absolutely none of these duties conflict with the duty to refrain from purchasing and/or eating factory farmed meat (this is a complex issue as Fritz has already correctly pointed out). Why does expanding food availability for the non-elite masses require confinement agriculture? It’s not as if the masses would starve if they could not buy a McDonald’s hamburger for 79 cents. They just might have to consume less meat. But what’s wrong with that? There are a number of things that people with less money have to consume less of than their wealthier counterparts. I also don’t see how confinement agriculture is supposed to help with any of the other issues you raise. Indeed, it seems this type of meat production is the very source of the horrible working conditions you mention. So, how can concern about these working conditions be a duty that conflicts with the duty not to purchase and/or eat the meat produced in confinement facilities? In any event, one of the virtues of Singer and Mason’s book is that they are mindful of how complex these issues can be. In fact, one of their goals is to explore precisely this complexity.

    Matt,
    Kant won’t help us here. After all, his view is not that we should not take the suffering of animals into consideration in our dealings with them. Indeed, we should—but not for their benefit but for ours. On his view, we denigrate ourselves by mistreating animals even though the animals themselves do not have any moral status. So, even if I agree with Kant that animals do not have any more status whatsoever—which is a view virtually no one holds (just look at our animal welfare laws)—it could still be argued that by being complicit in confinement agriculture we degrade ourselves.

    I also think that Matthew Scully has done an excellent job of discounting the religious argument in his book Dominion—which is written from a Christian perspective.

    Finally, you said:

    “This is a case where moral theory is about the least effective instrument one can imagine for social progress. If you want people to stop eating factory-produced meat, there is an easy and reliable way do it. Take them to a factory farm. Or, if that's not an option, have them watch a few of the documentaries produced by PETA and other such groups.”

    It’s funny you should mention this since I am already working on a follow-up to this post which discusses Richard Posner’s controversial claim that academic moralizing and theorizing is ineffective at best, futile at worst. So for now, let it suffice to say that I agree with you. I will have something more to say about this in a few days.

    Clayton,
    If the line of reasoning you mention were correct, it would justify the purchasing of stolen contraband. After all, I did not steal the item, someone else did. So, by paying for it now, I don’t contribute to theft in the world. Of course, if no one purchased stolen contraband, there would be far fewer thefts in the first place.

    Derek,
    Your point about “contributing to” and transitivity is quite interesting and I believe important. Because I am presently in a bit of a rush, I will have to punt for now. But I will issue a promissory note that I will post a more detailed response to it later on this evening.

    Robert,
    The point you raise concerning the burning of fossil fuels is an important one. Indeed, it is one of the more interesting things that Singer and Mason talk about in their book—which I highly recommend for vegetarians and non-vegetarians alike. It contains some very interesting insights and discussions concerning the precise issue you raise.

  12. Tony Iannitelli

    Why actually make an argument when one can just as happily attack your requisite but unsubstantiated assumptions that drive the question?

    1. You have not proven that it is unnecessary to eat factory meat — what is the proportion of the total on the market today? If everyone decided right now to eat only compassionately raised meat, could the world supply the demand? I think likely not. The agribusiness drove production costs down, but the business grew once demand rocketed.

    2. I do not agree with your assumption that agricultural animals have psychological well-being that humans have any duty (moral or otherwise) to maximize. Cows are just stupid, man.

    3. 'What I am suggesting is that certain forms of meat production and meat consumption are at least prima facie morally problematic and hence require a moral justification.' You need to do more than suggest it, brother, you must make the prima facie case.

    4. 'I suspect that most non-compassionate omnivores are simply unaware of what happens to the animals whose meat they eat.' You underrate the 'I don't give a hoot' contingent of the world. It's larger than your worst nightmare.

    5. 'Indeed, if anything, the meat produced by small family farms that treat their animals well and do not pump them full of hormones and antibiotics should taste better than meat produced by confinement agriculture–plus, it's better for you.' All idealistic assumptions with no meaningful justification. E.g., no one has yet devised a test for milk which can determine whether the cow was treated with BGH. For myself, I've never discerned any difference in free-range animals vs. mass produced.

  13. @Derek: Even if we can admit the transitivity of contribution, which makes sense prima facie and applies to other issues of "indirect" evils as well (although then the argument could be extended to claim that every person is responsible for everything, which is one reason, among many, why Camus claims that man cannot help but do evil), it would, in itself, be insufficient for establishing a criterion for distinguishing different degrees of responsibility. That fact alone would say nothing about the moral distinction between choosing to consume a factory-farmed animal, knowing all the alternatives, and abstaining from consuming it, but indirectly contributing to it. Insofar as the transitivity issue is as vague and ubiquitous as it is, it is not likely to be surmounted, which is why I would consider it somewhat secondary compared to the more immediate question of conscious consumption.

    @Robert: It is true that choosing to abstain from consuming factory-farmed animals and going the extra distance (literally!) to purchase a more favorable substitute could induce a variety of negative effects, but we have to separate the question of the morality of consuming factory-farmed animals in itself vs. other moral considerations. Those other issues may be irrelevant to the question of whether or not consuming factory-farmed animals is moral, if we want to be strict about it. On the other hand, we could simply be weighing one evil against another.

  14. Eddy,

    It's worth noting that there is an apparent tension between your first and last points.
    Your first point depends on it being true that one person (indeed several people) won't make much difference and on that fact being morally salient. People shouldn't worry about the effects of an immediate universal boycott because that isn't likely to happen. Your refusal to consume factory farmed meat will not make a difference to the lives of those who (directly and indirectly) depend economically on factory farmed meat, and so you the merely hypothetical consequences of the universality of your action aren't relevant here.
    But your last point depends upon it being either false that 'one person can't make a difference' or else morally irrelevant. If you say that it is false, then it appears that one person's consumption does make a difference – but then why doesn't it also make the sort of negative economic difference that you said we shouldn't be concerned about? If it's true but irrelevant, then why isn't it similarly irrelevant to consideration of an immediate universal boycott?

  15. Thomas,

    I want to be clear that I don't think the line of reasoning is correct. Even if my purchases do not cause any animal past, present, or future to suffer or suffer more than they would have were it not for me, it would still be wrong to purchase the stuff. Anyway, it does not seem that the argument sketched would justify purchasing stolen goods. At least, not if I could return those goods to their rightful owner and rectify that wrong. It is crucial to the causal impotence argument as I understand it that there is no token wrong that my choices would cause, prevent, or rectify and no increase or decrease in the levels of wrong that would result from my choices. In other words, I take it that the force of the argument is that it seems under certain conditions, there is no clear morally relevant difference between found meat and bought meat.

  16. Tony:

    First, I admitted in advance that I did not have the space in a blog post to substantiate every assumption I relied upon—which is why I provided links and left it up to the reader to look into the ins and outs of confinement agriculture for themselves.

    Second, it is unclear what it would mean for it to be *necessary* to eat factory meat—unless, of course, it was necessary in the first place to eat meat (which it is not). I never suggested that omnivores would be able to eat just as much meat as they currently do if they all switched to compassionate omnivorism—indeed, I explicitly acknowledged that there would be less (and more expensive) meat to go around. So what?

    Third, your “cows are stupid, man” comment is, well, very stupid “brother.” Setting that aside for the moment, if intelligence is the threshold for moral consideration as you suggest, then chimps and dolphins are in and the severely mentally handicapped are out. Moreover, I suspect that you are simply being inconsistent here. Either you think we should not have animal welfare statutes at all or you have to allow that at least some animals deserve our consideration. Presumably dogs would be candidates for protection on your view. If so, and if pigs are as intelligent as dogs, then you must concede that pigs deserve consideration too. Of course, perhaps you don’t think any form of animal cruelty is morally unacceptable. If so, you belong to a very small minority indeed.

    Fourth, perhaps you are correct that I underestimate the “I don’t give a hoot contingency.” I also suspect I underestimated the number of people who—like yourself—would proudly place themselves in this category. It is worth pointing out that I think that most I-don’t-give-a-hooters can easily be shown to be inconsistent. And for those who are consistent don’t- give-a-hooters, perhaps only moral reeducation will suffice.

    Finally, you are simply incorrect to assume that people cannot discern the difference between organic products and their non-organic counterparts. My entire extended family—none of whom are vegans, vegetarians, or compassionate omnivores—all switched to organic milk because it tastes better. If you don’t believe me, buy a gallon of organic 2% milk and a gallon of regular 2%. Have you friends and family do a blind taste test. Let us know how it turns out. I suspect it is you, and not I, who will end up eating your words. Luckily for you, you will have some milk on hand to wash them down.

  17. What I am suggesting is that certain forms of meat production and meat consumption are at least prima facie morally problematic and hence require a moral justification.

    Since when does anything "require" a moral justification? You might like to have such a justification, but obviously the eating of meat will go on with or without such a justification.

    The situation is clear enough from my perspective. Morality is the result of, broadly speaking, negotiation. There is also the effect of inherited impulses derived from natural selection, and the inertia arising from habit and culture, but fundamentally it's a negotiation. From this negotiation arise principles that people adhere to largely out of self-interest. One of these principles is utilitarianism, for example – it's a broad principle that people like becuase it gets good results for themselves if they subscribe to it (and avoid people who don't).

    While some animals have the power to negotiate in this broad sense – such as seen in the domestication of dogs – others do not, and hence, there simply is no morality when it comes to them. Although it seems to me that mammals in particular are obviously conscious and they obviously suffer, suffering (other than one's own) has never been the true foundation for morality.

    It is true that people feel compassion for animals, but compassion is an easily manipulated emotion that cannot be considered foundational. Scratch the surface of compassion and you always find something else.

    It's interesting to compare the indifference for pigs and chickens to the near-hysterical language that has accompanied the banning of horse meat and foie gras in California. Moral attitudes towards food are so obviously about class and culture that bringing up the actual treatment of sentient beings seems beside the point.

  18. Chlump,

    You are right that, for all I've said, we don't know anything about the relative blameworthiness of purchasing factory farmed meat and contributing to its production in more indirect ways. You also say that the question of relative balmeworthiness is, for practical purposes, unanswerable. You may well be right about this, but I'd be interested to know what serious attempts others have made to address it.

    What puzzles me is that you think we can set aside that difficult question and answer "the more immediate question of conscious consumption." Conscious consumption is *already* multiple steps removed from the direct harms done to factory farmed animals. The closest an ordinary consumer gets to the actual treatment of factory farmed animals is something like:

    factory farm commits harmful act <- grocer encourages harmful act by purchasing from factory farm <- consumer encourages grocer-purchase by purchasing from grocer

    More likely there will be other steps involving distributors, purchasing groups, the national buyers for a grocery chain, store/meat manager from local chain, and/or others.

    If you're right, and we must remain agnostic about how much blame passes across steps in indirect contribution, then we must therby be agnostic about how much blame attaches to consumers.

    Of course I'm not sure relative blameworthiness is relevant. My argument (and Thomas's challenge) was about what is and is not morally permissible, not about how much blame attaches to various impermissible acts.

  19. 1. Let me rephrase your question:

    "Are there any compelling arguments for the permissibility of being a non-compassionate omnivore, a compassionate omnivore, or vegetarian — especially when being a vegan is always an option?"

    You discuss the need for a prima facie case for non-compassionate ommivorism but fail to see a similar need for the non-vegan alternatives.

    I assume you would find a market for compassionate cannibalism problematic and self-contradictory, at a minimum for pragmatic reasons (How to determine whether a human or animal has been "compassionately" killed? How to maintain the proper incentives for care in life, when ultimately a creature is being raised only for death?). Why do you have different instincts when it comes to animals?

    Ultimately, it seems to me that it comes down to a moral tradeoff between (culturally-adapted) gustatory pleasure, on the one hand, and the life, death, and slavery (whether in "pleasant" or tortous conditions) of a sensitive and sentient creature, on the other. It is hard to imagine any coherent morality that allows the former (illusory) value at the cost of the latter. It is also striking how closely the current arguments for "compassionate" meat-eating parallel the arguments made for "compassionate" slavery in the early 19th century.

    2. Here is a nice site on the myth of "free range" chicken.

    http://www.cok.net/lit/freerange.php

    I have yet to hear of an actual and economically viable "cruelty-free" production system for meat. This is true even of places such as India, where a huge portion of the population is vegetarian for moral and religious reasons.

    Perhaps it has something to do with the fundamental disconnect between: (a) claiming to have moral concern for a creature; and (b) stuffing a hacked piece of its bloody flesh into your mouth, and savoring the juices of its death wounds.

    We do not have markets for (even voluntary) slavery for similar reasons. i am sure there are some twisted individuals who would benefit from such a market. But for hte rest of us, it is so disgusting as to be unacceptable. The same, it seems to me, should be true of markets for flesh (human or non-human).

    3. Having said that, i appreciate the post. Especially your willingness to knock down the typical straw man arguments ("other human interests come first", "animals don't really suffer", etc.) for eating meat.

  20. A colleague of mine makes the following weird argument, which could be taken to support non-compassionate-flesh-eating:

    Focusing on sentience is a misstep, because we really have no idea what it is like to be some other animal. As evidence, consider how great a difference hallucinogenic mushrooms make to one's experience, and how small their effect on the brain is. Since the neurological differences between me (sober) and a cow, say, are much greater than the neurological differences between me (sober) and me (on mushrooms), the cow's experience must be unimaginably foreign. So the premise that `cows suffer in factory farms' is one we have no reason to believe.

    I don't like the argument, as it trades on a notion of "neurological similarity" that is highly suspect. But it's an argument I've never heard anywhere else.

    (Slightly unrelated: Ted Kerasote's Bloodties is an excellent rumination on eating, hunting, and living in a fossil-fuel economy.)

  21. Derek, I don't think my first and last points are in tension. I began the first point by conceding that a universal immediate boycott of factory farming would likely cause more harm than it would prevent. So, the conclusion of the argument should be something like: "Unless you have any reason to believe that your boycotting factory farming will be accompanied by enough others boycotting it to cause sufficient economic harm, you should boycott factory farming." I do not think we have any reason to believe there is a problem, but the economists may need to help.

    Similarly, without economists' help (perhaps even with it), I'm just not sure what effect the purchasing decisions of individual "compassionate omnivores" has on the purchasing decisions of grocery stores and restaurants and hence on the factory farming industry (I suspect you don't really know what effects your or my purchasing decisions has either). But:
    1) it seems likely that there are enough vegetarians, etc. around so that individuals' decisions have effects. What else would explain the increase in organic food stores and sections in major chains or the increase in vegetarian options on many menus?
    2) it seems there would be a cut-off point for certain meat orders (e.g., n cases or n+1 cases) and, given how closely grocery chains track individual purchases, a single individual could affect whether the cut-off is met or not. I cannot know whether I am that individual or not, but I could be (just as I could be the, or one of the, individuals whose vote makes the difference in an extremely close election).
    3) I may affect others' purchasing decisions with my own purchasing and (more so) eating behavior. Now this point may be in tension with my initial point, but I don't think so, since again, the effects are likely (even aggregating across compassionate omnivores) to be gradual enough for the economy to adjust.
    However, this point may be in tension with the "freegan" view, and I actually find this tension to affect me often. That is, I want to be consistent in showing my family and friends that I do not support factory farming and perhaps raise their awareness of the issue, but if there is some big party or gathering with lots of meat and it's not getting eaten, I'd rather eat it (esp. if there's no other good options) than let it go to waste. Any thoughts on the best way to handle this dilemma?

    Fritz, I don't know any literature combatting the "one person can't make a difference" claim. I assume there must be something?? My intuition is that it could be refuted by showing it suggests a reductio, since it seems to imply that no one has duties to prevent harms that require many people acting together (where the agents don't know whether there are enough others acting)–e.g., to vote against bad politicians, to contribute to relief efforts, to avoid polluting…

  22. I just posted about this issue on my blog before a friend notified me of this post.

    http://pithiness.blogspot.com/2006/06/political-vegetarianism.html

    I think eating meat can be justified because of the indirectness and insignificance of one individual's choices (I noticed that others have raised this point). I also think that because of this, it is a mistake for animal rights activists to focus so much on mobilizing an economic boycott.

    I compare this case to that of slavery. I think gathering support for a collective action abolishing slavery was far more important and effective than trying to persuade people to boycott products made from slave labor. In the same way one could be an abolitionist without boycotting slave products, one can be a political vegetarian while eating meat.

  23. Fritz/Eddy: on the "one person can't make a difference" claim, you might look at Alastair Norcross' "Puppies, Pigs and People."
    http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~norcross/Puppies.pdf

  24. Tony,

    I don’t understand the bearing of your remarks on “negotiation” on the issue at hand. First, there are many kinds of creatures that don’t have the capacity to “negotiate” (unless most conscious non-human animals, and all being factory farmed, do too) but very intuitively have moral status (i.e. are such that we have moral reasons and even prima facie moral obligations not to harm them and not to allow them to be harmed if it’s sufficiently easy for us to prevent it), like sufficiently young (but old enough to be capable of conscious and mind states like pleasure and pain) humans (e.g. human infants) and mentally disabled (but not so mentally disabled as to be incapable of consciousness and mind states like pleasure and pain) humans. Some of these creatures may in the future come to have the capacity to “negotiate” (e.g. healthy young humans / human infants) and some may have had it in the past and lost it (e.g. mentally disabled humans who at some point had the psychological capacities to negotiate but lost them). For one thing, it would be very odd for the mere potential to come to have the capacity to negotiate or its having had it in the past could matter to the moral status of a creature before it has acquired it or after it has lost it. But moreover, other creatures that just as intuitively have moral status but do not have the psychological capacity to negotiate never had and never will have it (e.g. sufficiently congenitally mentally disabled humans, or humans born healthy but who suffer brain damage that prevents them from ever developing the requisite psychological capacities to negotiate). That a theory of moral status would entail that these creatures have no moral status is a very serious strike against it, especially if it doesn’t seem to have much else going for it (and I fail to see what this view has going for it).

    Second, I don’t remember when any of us actually “negotiated” in a way that gave rise to all the moral facts, and even if we had actually negotiated with each other in some kind of way that caused certain kinds of conduct to have property X, how could that negotiation cause conduct that has property X have any moral properties (e.g. that of moral wrongness) absent any non-actual-negotiation-dependent moral facts (e.g. that violating what one has agreed to in negotiation is prima facie morally wrong)? It seems rather that whether or not I ever negotiated or even communicated with a stranger on a desert island, it would be wrong to kill him just for fun (e.g. with a sniper rifle from the other side of the island).

    Third, if the “negotiation” in question is simply supposed to explain why we have our moral sensibilities or capacities – e.g. it was supposed to have taken place long ago among our evolutionary or cultural ancestors – and what you mean by “Morality is the result of, broadly speaking, negotiation,” is simply an historical claim about how our moral capacities (and I would think the moral facts as well) came to arise, then it’s very unclear what immediate bearing this could have on a capacity to negotiate being necessary for moral status. Just like the creatures who don’t have the capacities to negotiate, none of us who do have these capacities were parties to the negotiation anyway. Moreover, however, evolution and culture constructed our moral sensibilities, it’s pretty clear that it did so with strong intuitions that we have moral reasons not to harm many creatures without the capacity to negotiate (such as sufficiently young or mentally disabled humans, even ones who never had it and never will have it), and there’s no reason (certainly none arising from the mere facts of how our moral sensibilities arose) to suspect that these intuitions are less reliable than those that tell us we have moral reasons not to harm creatures with the capacity to negotiate.

    Fourth, if the “negotiation” in question is a merely hypothetical negotiation (e.g. something like a Rawlsian agreement behind a veil of ignorance), then all and only those creatures with moral status should be represented in the hypothetical situation. What this thought experiment would presumably seek to capture is what is morally right, conceived of as what’s fair, and what’s fair will require giving all creatures with moral status their due, so we’ll have to represent the interests of all the creatures with moral status to get the fair result. Unless we can independently establish that creatures have moral status iff they have the capacity to negotiate, the mere fact that a creature doesn’t have or never will have the actual capacity to negotiate is just as irrelevant to its being represented by someone in the hypothetical situation as the fact that I now was not actually able to participate in the negotiation due to its hypothetical character.

  25. Hello, just a lowly undergrad student here, and I have never posted on this site before, but I am very interested in environmental ethics. Here it goes:

    Without attempting to completely deny the moral agency of any individuals who engage in "compassionate" meat consumption, I have not yet seen one comment that has more than briefly brushed on the notion that the oraganization of our economy, and indeed our market-driven culture, denies the possibility of ethical behavior toward nature, and in many cases toward each other. For example, the "compassionate" meat masticator may also eschew owning a car in favor of public transporation, but nonetheless rides a bus that runs on diesel fuel, or, eschewing even that, rides a bicycle made in a Chinese sweat shop-or better yet, runs everywhere wearing shoes made out of rubber and fake leather (made out of petroleum)…

    What I am arguing here is that the possibility of acting consistently moral is nearly impossible given the interconnected and ubiquitous consumer culture that not only drives Big Agro, but also Big Oil and Big (insert industry here). It is the inescapibility of this fact that leads many into quiet acquiescence and resigned fatalism, because one's activity of consumption must either directly or indirectly support a morally objectionable activity in the form of malfeascent corporations.

    Rather than argue about the cognitive capabilites of a cow, we should be much more concerned about our limited moral agency given our huge reliance on manufactured goods. As my example above intended to demonstrate, changing a few habits here and there shows that the consumer has not followed the baroque supply-chain to its principle origins, and is thus still not exonerated of other misdeeds. Bookchin's paper "What is Social Ecology" places the factory farming issue in its proper context:

    The modern marketplace has imperatives of its own, irrespective of who sits in the driver's seat or grabs on to its handlebars. The direction it follows depends not upon ethical factors but rather on the mindless "laws" of supply and demand, grow or die, eat or be eaten. Maxims like "business is business" explicitly tell us that ethical, religious, psychological, and emotional factors have absolutely no place in the impersonal world of production, profit, and growth (http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/ANARCHIST_ARCHIVES/bookchin/socecol.html).

    Ostensibly, the boycott is itself a moral decision that takes into account the nature of "the market," and is an efficient cause that changes production techniques based on the intrinsic "profit-motive." However, one must still eat, and the alternatives (beans, corn, rice, etc.) are all for the most part produced by similar companies that engage in morally reprehensible acts in their own right (notably, waging economic warfare against peasants, destroying small farmers, extorting immigrant workers, etc.).

    In contrast to the fairly well-established model of vast agro-business and its intrinsic inability to act morally (or even immorally for that matter, considering Bookchin's description above), we might ask ourselves if an older agricultural model, that of the subsistence/single plot farmer, carries with it the same moral implications. This model is what Big-Agro likes to advertise itself as, by preying on our nostalgia for the grizzly old family farmer. There seems to be in this myth something palatable to the moral appetites of the consumer.

    However, this mythical farmer need not be the compassionate type with respect to his or her livestock. The farmer might actually be a disgusting person who only views livestock as a means to an end (profit, food), but this farmer has not the means to carry out the vast scale of commodification and rampant institutionalized abuse that the corporate farmer can and must do in order to survive. The model of the mythical farmer (who is of course not mythical in many parts of the world) carries with it none of the more serious moral challenges to participating in the consumption of products derived from Big-Agro and the industrial/corporate complex that supports and infuses every aspect of our lives.

    I think we often fail to characterize the true horror of factory-farming correctly. It is not only that animals are grossly mistreated (everyone must grant this-just go to factory farm and see for yourself), or that the products are unhealthy or not very tasty, but the greater, more subliminal horror is the pervasiveness of it, the vast scale, the cold, mechanical process of converting cows into widgets. The new "organic" movement itself can hardly be said to achieve something more morally tolerable (see free-range chicken link posted by Robert).

  26. Jem,
    It's really late (2am), but before I go to bed I just wanted to thank for the thoughtful comment. I also wanted to welcome you to the blog and tell you that I am pleased you decided to express your opinion (a sentiment I am confident Professor Leiter shares). In the future, you should never discount your own thoughts and ideas just because you are a "lowly undergrad"–many of us were undergrads once too! Your voice is always welcome here.

  27. Dear Thomas, you commented: "I am skeptical that enough moral mileage can be gotten out of cost alone to justify the practice under consideration." I am skeptical of your skepticism. It is important to remember that picky eating is a luxury, and that choosing to eat in a morally conscientious manner has costs which can be quantified either in terms of dollars or in terms of the things that must be forgone to finance this habit. Here are two examples of what I mean: many urban poor people live in neighborhoods which are underserved by grocery stores (and especially upscale stores like Whole Foods which make picky eating easy), but are well served by fast food chains. The cost in time and money to travel to another neighborhood every time they need to get food adds up. If they have to choose between saving money for a child's tuition at a parochial school and eating free-range chicken, which one should they choose? Or consider middle-class people who decide to devote money to buying organic milk (4x as expensive as regular), free-range beef, and so on. If their budget gets squeezed, they will have to cut out either this trendy eating habit or other luxuries, such as giving to charity. Is it better to give to Amnesty International or the local homeless shelter than to be counted among the compassionate omnivores? So for many people, becoming a compassionate eater would have morally significant costs. One could respond to this line of thought by pointing out that such economic choices are determined at least in part by each individual's own prioritization of preferences, and thus it may be possible for everyone to reprioritize their preferences in such a way that no one but himself has to make sacrifices for his new diet. But if you go down that road, you would have to explain why and under what conditions people ought to give up their own welfare for animals'.

    Second, the "one person doesn't count" argument seems to be getting short shrift in this discussion, but I don't see why. If it is assumed that demand for cheap meat would increase if the supply increased (i.e. people would eat more meat if it were cheaper), and if it is assumed that overall demand for cheap meat is unlikely to change much except as a response to changes in supply – reasonable assumptions, I think – then if one person has a significant effect on the demand for cheap meat (which itself is unlikely in a marketplace as large as ours), the only possible outcome is that other people will buy the cheap meat that the individual self-sacrificer would have bought if he hadn't let his conscience get the better of him. You may be tempted to respond that he should do the right thing no matter what he expects the consequences of his actions to be – but you can't ask him to ignore the consequences of his actions if you want to convince him in the first place that choosing to buy cheap meat is wrong.

    Finally, I wish to point out that many (or perhaps even all) of the financial choices we make have morally deplorable consequences, many of which are easily foreseen. For example, our taxes finance war and our sneakers finance sweatshops. However, it does not seem obvious to me that we are automatically responsible for the foreseeable effects of our marketplace decisions. I do not think that I should be blamed for wars or sweatshops merely because I choose not to play Thoreau or to make my own sneakers. For any economic choice we must make, the items on the menu (so to speak) are not determined by ourselves alone out of thin air; in effect, the marketplace forces us to choose between different ways of satisfying our preferences, and there are many menus (such as the (very short) menu of governments to pay taxes to, or the menu of sneakers to buy) which only include choices that either will have morally reprehensible consequences if selected or are prohibitively expensive. Given that we have little or no say in how the items got to the menu, why should we be held responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of what we choose? Or are we all to opt out of earning income and wearing sneakers?

  28. Thomas,

    Your question was this: Are there any compelling arguments for the permissibility of being a non-compassionate omnivore—especially when being a compassionate omnivore, vegetarian, or vegan is always an option?

    You seemed to be asking for *good* arguments. But some of the discussion has focussed on what arguments or reasons might *actually* cause people (who are at least vaguely aware of the characteristics of factory farming) to eat the meat in question anyway.

    Here is one that has not been mentioned. Lots of these people (not all!) will admit that factory farming is bad. And many of them would agree that they should not buy or eat the meat in question. So these folks will admit that they are doing something wrong. But they do not think that they are doing anything terrible. They will think that what they are doing is akin to driving 70 in a 55 zone. It is not good, it is not neutral, but it is only a very minor sin!

    And then the reason behind the idea that it is only a very minor vice, will have to do with what many commentators mentioned above: it will not make a difference to abstain, as the meat is on the shelf anyway.

    I do not think you can get many people to explicitly admit to all that. However, I think that often enough that line of thought is what is causing their behavior, although they will say all sorts of things to justify their behavior. Some kind of self deception is sometimes present.

    I am not endorsing the reasoning; I am just guessing as to how people are thinking about it.

  29. "1) it seems likely that there are enough vegetarians, etc. around so that individuals' decisions have effects. What else would explain the increase in organic food stores and sections in major chains or the increase in vegetarian options on many menus?"

    Sadly in the second case there is an easy explanation, namely that there is good market research to show that people will feel better about themselves if they shop and eat at a place that has healthy and/or ethical options, even if they themselves never partake in those options.

    So it can be worthwhile for a business to have vegetarian options on the menu, even if they sell only rarely.

  30. First, several people have pointed out that not everyone–for instance, the poor–have the luxury to be compassionate omnivores. Fair enough. So my question then becomes: What compelling arguments are there for being a non-compassionate omnivore when one nevertheless has the financial resources to be a compassionate omnivore? I assumed–I believe justifiably–that most, if not all, of the readers of this blog who are non-compassionate omnivores also happen to have the financial resources to be compassionate omnivores (of course everyone has the money to be vegetarian–but that is another story for another day).

    Second, several people have adopted something along the following lines: Given that much of the money we spend ends up in the hands of people who engage in practices that are immoral, why should contributing to confinement agriculture be any different. After all, it is not immoral to pay taxes even though our taxes end up funding immoral wars. The main difference is that the contributions people keep referencing in this context only *indirectly* contribute to the immoral practices in question. But when I buy a product that I know is produced via confinement agriculture (or made in a sweat shop), I voluntarily contribute money *directly* to the companies who engage in these practices. The fact that the grocer (or retailer) serves as a middle man does not get me off the hook. After all, I would presumably pay the company directly if I could–hence, the fact that my transaction happened to be mediated by a third party does not exculpate. Of course, that does not make the consumer single-handedly responsible for these practices—but to the extent that the consumer chooses to purchase products—from tennis shoes to factory farmed meat—that are produced in morally problematic ways when they could afford to buy more expensive products that were produced in less problematic ways, the consumer is voluntarily and knowingly complicit in these morally problematic methods of production. Indeed, if consumers were not complicit, these practices would disappear.

    Finally, I am surprised anyone is taking the “one person does not make a difference” argument seriously. After all, it is groups composed of these very individuals who purportedly don’t make a difference that end up making a difference. If everyone adopted this line of reasoning, we would still have slaves in the field, minorities in the back of the bus, and women stuck in the kitchen. Of course, individuals may not single-handedly make a difference, but by setting a good example for others—thereby encouraging them to similarly modify their habits—progress can be made. In any event, it is clear that if enough individuals decide not to purchase products that they deem are produced via morally problematic methods, fewer of these products will be produced. Demand fuels supply—not the other way around.

  31. Robert Gressis

    Thomas Nadelhoffer wrote,

    "Finally, I am surprised anyone is taking the 'one person does not make a difference' argument seriously. After all, it is groups composed of these very individuals who purportedly don’t make a difference that end up making a difference. If everyone adopted this line of reasoning, we would still have slaves in the field, minorities in the back of the bus, and women stuck in the kitchen. Of course, individuals may not single-handedly make a difference, but by setting a good example for others—thereby encouraging them to similarly modify their habits—progress can be made. In any event, it is clear that if enough individuals decide not to purchase products that they deem are produced via morally problematic methods, fewer of these products will be produced. Demand fuels supply—not the other way around."

    There are two separate points here. (1) Whether or not I purchase or don't purchase factory farmed meat, I make no difference to whether factory farming continues. (2) Whether or not the group of which I am a member purchases or does not purchase factory farmed meat, my group makes no difference to whether factory farming continues. (1), I think, is true while (2) is false.

    But you write, "[o]f course, individuals may not single-handedly make a difference, but by setting a good example for others—thereby encouraging them to similarly modify their habits—progress can be made." Sure, setting a good example is one way of making a difference. But what about contributing money to organizations that seek to abolish factory farming while continuing to eat factory-farmed meat? What about agitating for governmentally induced change through op-eds or public speaking while continuing to eat factory-famred meat?

    Granted, it certainly seems as though you're being hypocritical if you say that the government should get rid of factory-farmed meat while nonetheless eating factory-farmed meat. But are you being hypocritical? I can, for example, imagine a smoker in favor of laws against smoking in any public place (indeed, I know one such smoker). The smoker's reasoning would go as follows: "look, I know smoking is bad for me, and I want to stop. But it's really hard to stop when, every time I go out to a bar, smoke is in the air. It makes me really want to smoke. If there were no smoking-permitting bars to go to, then it would be easier for me to quit smoking. Since I want to quit smoking, I'm in favor of laws forbidding smoking in public places. After all, every little bit helps." I can imagine a non-compassionate omnivore reasoning in the same way. Granted, eating meat is not an addiction, but it's hard to stop, because meat tastes very good to some of us and most of the restaurants we go to have meat involved in their most appetizing dishes.

  32. Here's the problem from my point of view. As a poster already mentioned, most people don't care about the welfare of animals; they will buy whatever is cheapest, and meat raised on inhumane corporate farms is cheaper than humanely raised meat. It is VERY unlikely that a social movement to boycott corporate-farm-raised meat will gain enough steam to have any effect on the current situation. I see two solutions to this problem:

    1. Subsidize farms that raise meat humanely, and stop subsidizing farms that do the opposite

    2. Make laws that give substantive protections to the animals in question, so as to make the conditions prevalent in today's corporate farms illegal (and enforce this rule!)

    I really don't see this happening though, because the corporations buy out the politicians, and the general public doesn't give a damn, so they won't pressure the politicians to change their ways. I wish I could be more optimistic about this, but I have learned that most people do not care about coherent world-views, rational thinking, and justice.

    I think we rational folks need to take a step back and realize that most people aren't rational, and are not swayed by arguments. We need to take a page out of the corporations' book, out of the politicians' book, and use the insights that psychology and behavioral economics has given us. We need to use advertisements and rhetoric! As dastardly as this sounds, these are the thing's that sway people; so let's accept this fact and start using it to change the world for the better.

  33. Eddy,

    You are using very different metrics in the different cases. In the first case you treat the harm of an immediate universal boycott as though it is indivisible – either your action (with the predictable actions of others) cause the whole thing or else there's no problem. In the last case, however, you assume the harms of factory farming can be alleviated in an incrimental manner.

    It's true that I might be the one person whose purchases will make the difference between my local store ordering a case of chicken, and it's possible that that will turn out to be the chicken order that makes the difference between that factory farm increasing or decreasing its level of production. But in that case it may also be the order that either causes or prevents the sole breadwinner for a family of four to lose her job. How that weighs against the animals who would be saved will of course depend upon your account of the relative moral status of humans and animals.

    But in general I suspect the likelihood of each of those outcomes is rather low. I suspect you overestimate them because of a failure to distinguish the ability of *an* individual to make a difference from the ability of individuals to collectively do so. The ability of a group of vegetarians or compassionate omnivores to make a difference is immaterial to the question of whether *my* actions in fact make a difference. Now it might be true that the effects of my choices will be compounded by influencing the eating habits of others, but I've seen no evidence of this in my own life since becoming vegetarian (One friend has even stopped being vegetarian in that time, and another has threatened to eat two animals for each animal I don't eat).

  34. Brandon Watson

    "But when I buy a product that I know is produced via confinement agriculture (or made in a sweat shop), I voluntarily contribute money *directly* to the companies who engage in these practices. The fact that the grocer (or retailer) serves as a middle man does not get me off the hook."

    It isn't clear to me how this would be a difference. After all, we regard government bureaucracy as simply a sort of complicated middle man for a lot of things, so I don't see why it suddenly ceases to be one when the action on the other end of it is immoral. And, as you say, the fact that the transaction is handled by a third party — and, what is more, a third party we all have a moral responsibility to keep to the straight and narrow, which is more than can be said in most economic transactions — does not get us out of complicity. (This is perhaps particularly true since it is usually common to regard the middle man in this case as more culpable than the persons actually engaging in the action — e.g., we tend to attach more moral blame to hawkish politicians who authorize wars in the name of the people they are representing than to soldiers who actually fight them. Immoral wars and the like *directly* problematize our relationship with those who govern.) And it's certainly the case that if people would refuse to be complicit in such actions, they would become more rare.

  35. Derek,

    Let me start by saying that your argument is indeed interesting, and certainly valid. I merely want to clarify some of the issues.

    When I talk about “the immediate question of conscious consumption,” I am trying to abstract away all the secondary aspects that may or may not apply, and which, for that reason, may be completely irrelevant to the question of morality. To that extent, introducing them may also conflate those aspects and obscure the underlying issue.

    For example, some have alluded to the individual ability to afford non-factory-farmed animals. That may be an important issue in a practical sense, but it does not answer the question of the conscious choice made by affluent people who cannot use that as a justification. Would it still be moral, then, for an affluent person to consciously consume a factory-farmed animal? Or, can economics truly be a justification? Is one justified in murder simply because of economics? Why or why not? How is that issue different from the current one? Most importantly, what is it about economics in itself that confers any justificatory quality? Why, in other words, should it be morally relevant?

    Similarly, saying that “I cannot make a difference either by consuming or by abstaining” still says nothing about the moral responsibility that one ought to assume. In other words, we can still ask the ethical question even when that choice does not make a difference. To put it another way, whether or not that choice can have some practical difference need not be a criterion for making a moral assessment.

    Proceeding in this way, we can develop a very narrow question, one that does not depend on accidents like ignorance (which can be rectified by documentation, rallies, etc.), economics (which does not apply to everyone and which, if we are serious about it, may be completely irrelevant to the moral question), and so on. We can even define the conditions explicitly: given that A is affluent (or we could even say something like, the costs for the alternatives are equal), does not add to pollution (because he rides his bike to get the meat), is perfectly aware that factory farming has significant negative effects on the animals, etc., would A still be justified in consciously choosing to consume factory-farmed meat? The rest of the issues will follow, according as the circumstances do. This is what I was asking. Where the consumer is in the economic chain need not apply.

    I, too, would like to know what others have said about the transitivity of contribution and moral responsibility. It is a very good point, and it really determines, practically, how ethical a person can be. You are absolutely right in saying that the consumer is far removed from the source within the distribution chain. I agree with you completely when you say that a person is inherently responsible, simply by being in the economy. But if we accept your argument, that everyone is somehow responsible simply by participating in the economy, it provides a good baseline and perspective, but it does not yet broach the question about conscious consumption. Why do I say that? Because we can abstract away the contribution issue, hold it constant, so to speak, and continue to ask whether or not consuming factory-farmed meat is moral. Even if a person did not contribute to the evil indirectly, would he be justified in choosing factory-farmed meat over non-factory-farmed meat? There is still the moral permissibility issue over and above the issue of contribution, especially because of the nature of the latter.

    Also, I think we should be careful when we bring up something like contribution as a justification. I am not saying that you did, of course, but some people might. It would be possible to legitimize evil simply by being human, or by acting, a moral blank check, as it were. I agree, the argument itself nevertheless holds, whether or not it is a valid justification, but to the extent that we can say this at all, there must be some other aspect that is more relevant. That is my take on it.

    If we are asking the immediate question, I do not think there are legitimate justifications. (Maybe all of you will say that my standards are too high.) Now, whether or not it is possible for us, as modern economic agents, to completely absolve ourselves of all guilt is a separate question (and one, I think, with a negative answer), but it should, at least, be possible to make conscious decisions that reduce the evil that is done and somehow improve the world. If we know why consuming factory-farmed meat in itself is morally reprehensible, at least that can be rectified. Of course, managing the consequences of that decision is also important.

    And Jem, you’re not the only undergraduate here. I am one too (well, a recent graduate)!

  36. Thomas, you write,

    "First, several people have pointed out that not everyone–for instance, the poor–have the luxury to be compassionate omnivores. Fair enough."

    I'm not so sure that this point is so fair, actually. I suspect that there are very few people in places like the U.S. and the U.K., at least, where it's economically prohibitive to refrain from eating factory-farmed meat.

    Some people (like Kessler above) seem to think that the 'picky eater' who decides to refrain from eating factory-farmed meat will then continue to eat the same amount of chicken, pork, and beef, but get so-called humanely raised versions of each of those from the local Whole Foods. That would be really expensive, and it's true that this would be a luxury that many poor people couldn't afford.

    But obviously this isn't the only way not to eat factory-farmed meat. It's not that hard to have a cheap, healthy, and satisfying diet while refraining from eating meat entirely. And if you decide to be a 'compassionate omnivore' rather than a vegetarian, you can always make meat an occasional treat rather than a staple of your diet–and you'd probably be healthier for doing so.

  37. Eddy Nahmias writes,

    "I want to be consistent in showing my family and friends that I do not support factory farming and perhaps raise their awareness of the issue, but if there is some big party or gathering with lots of meat and it's not getting eaten, I'd rather eat it (esp. if there's no other good options) than let it go to waste. Any thoughts on the best way to handle this dilemma?"

    I dunno-I think that the easiest and most straightforward thing to do is not to eat it. Besides setting an example and raising awareness, a few other considerations:

    –If people start to realize that a good number of the attendees at parties and gatherings don't eat meat, then (if they're considerate) they'll start to provide vegetarian alternatives, and maybe buy a little less factory-farmed meat. So your refraining from eating that meat can still have an effect downstream.

    –If you make it your policy simply not to eat f-f meat, then (if the subject comes up) you can simply and honestly say "I don't eat factory-farmed meat" and explain why. That's more likely to be effective than saying, "Well, I pretty much don't eat factory-farmed meat, unless I'm at a party and… or when, you know…"

    So as a long-term strategy, I think that simply refraining is more likely to be effective than 'freeganism.'

  38. The discussion of the economic burden of free range meat is completely irrelevant. First, because free range is a myth in practice, and probably also in theory (once institutional constraints are taken into consideration– in particular monitoring and enforcement). Second, because if animals have moral interests, then you have just as much of an obligation not to eat them, as to not torture them. Is that so hard to see? Would you eat the bloody and hacked flesh of your dead child if she died "compassionately"?

    It is dirt cheap to eat vegetarian or vegan. There is something like a 40:1 energy loss in converting plant calories into flesh or dairy. And that does not take into account the other economic costs of raising animals.

    It is thus patently false to say that the poor cannot live with a diet that does not support violence and murder. Indeed, they (like the rest of us) would probably be signficiantly better off with a cruelty free diet, along both economic and health dimensions. What they lose is gustatory utility, but that is an adaptive preference. Hindus who grow up on a vegetarian diet are disgusted by the very sight of meat — much as we would be disgusted by the sigh of a human steak. After 10 years of vegetarianism, I feel the same way — this despite the fact that I used to gorge almost exclusively on meat. (I would pick out the meatballs in a plate of spaghetti, and leave the noodles and sauce.)

    The discussion of the harm of a boycott is also quite absurd. If you take the moral interests of animals seriously, then any harm created by a boycott is not a social harm, but a matter of corrective justice. Arresting a serial killer has a massive cost on his livelihood — his livelihood, his freedom, and possibly his life will be taken away from him. But any value generated from his activity and life was sadistic and has no relevance for social policy. The same is true of anyone who works in a slaughterhouse or factory farm.

    The debate is ultimately about criterion for moral significance. Second-order debates about speculative empirical harms to wrong-doing humans, or even more speculative harms from alternative consumption/purchasing patterns, become completely moot if you answer the initial question of moral significance in the affirmative.

    And what is striking is how utterly empty and fallacious the arguments against moral significance are. (perhaps with the exception of pure moral agnosticism, which is coherent but I think untenable for other reasons)

  39. Derek,

    It seems to me fairly straightforward that in the nuanced world we live in the correct metric to use is incremental rather than indivisible. Even so, and given Thomas's comments about money being spent on meat going directly to the industry (or to middlemen engaged in the practice of supporting it) as opposed to the indirect effects of "transitive" purchases, I think an easy case can be made that the degree of harm done by purchasing factory-farmed meat is far worse than that done by purchasing other products. If we have four choices:

    1. Spend X amount on factory farmed meat.
    2. Spend X amount on alternative to factory farmed meat.
    3. Pay X to landlord, who in turn will spend some small percentage of X on factory farmed meat.
    4. Don't pay X to landlord.

    It is clear that the moral difference between 1 and 2 is far more significant than the difference between 3 and 4. And the alternative to 1 is simply to eat veggieburgers, or perhaps beans, whereas the alternative to paying rent is being homeless (for some of us).

    And as for causing the sole breadwinner of four to lose her job, this seems to be based on a mischaracterization of the decision. It is not simply a choice between ,"sending money to the meat industry, yes," and "sending money to the meat industry, no." Rather, it is a choice between spending money on factory farmed meat versus spending that same money on some alternative. So buying one over the other are equally likely to cause a breadwinner to lose her job.

    In general, I think this point hasn't been stressed enough during the discussion so far: factory-farmed meat is in competition with alternative products over the same consumers. Both sides engage in advertising campaigns to try to win over customers from the other side, and probably engage in all kinds of lobbying and schmoozing to stack the deck in their favor. So every purchase of factory-farmed meat is, in a sense, choosing one side over the other. And given that (1) the average consumer of meat probably spends hundreds if not thousands of dollars on meat every year, (2) some forms of advertisements which perpetuate the purchasing behavior of consumers are relatively cheap, and (3) the fact that any money spent is probably far more valuable to the factory farmed-alternative companies who are not as large as the big meat companies, it just isn't correct that the behavior of an individual "can't make a difference."

  40. Dear Thomas, regarding your response to the "one person can't make a difference" argument: you claimed that demand determines supply, not the other way around. Of course, that is sometimes true – but it is not necessarily true in cases in which demand is elastic. For example, the high demand for cars last summer was caused by a high supply of cars, not the other way around; short-term demand for cars is elastic. And I am suggesting that demand for cheap meat is also elastic.

    I was puzzled by your other comments in response to me. I did not mean to suggest categorically that individual action can never make a difference – rather, merely that individual consumer choices about eating incompassionate meat can reasonably be expected not to have any 'compassionate' consequences. And your examples seemed strange too, since e.g. black slavery in America was driven by individual consumer choices, not hindered by it.

  41. Thomas,

    (1) You seem to assume there is a clear and obvious way to distinguish 'direct' from 'indirect' contribution, but I can't tell what that standard is.

    In some of my other comments I was using direct in the sense of 'direct from the factory,' i.e. involving no middle men. In that sense, only the employees of factory farms directly contribute to the suffering of animals. Thus on that usage knowing consumers of factory farmed meat are only indirect contributors to the suffering of animals. I'm not sure whether that gets them off the hook – but if it doesn't, it appears that we're all on the hook for almost everything that happens.

    On a conception of 'direct' that is insensitive to the presence of intermediaries, it's not clear to me what makes my rent payments 'indirect.' There is a straight line from my rent payment to animal suffering, there are just more intermediaries.

    The difference you do show has to do with the truth of certain counterfactuals. "I would presumably pay the company directly if I could–hence, the fact that my transaction happened to be mediated by a third party does not exculpate." This seems morally relevant, but I'm not sure how it connects to 'directness.' I would also note that the counterfactual is false for many. If they had to go onto the factory floor to purchase their meat, many omnivores would abstain.
    Does that mean that squemish omnivores are 'off the hook,' while the less sequemish are not?

    (2) You also say you're surprised that anyone takes seriously the 'one person can't make a difference' argument. I'm astonished that so many people fail to take it seriously.

    The cases you and Eddy offer as reductios aren't all paralell cases – for instance, at least some of the individual contributions necessary to end explicit institutional slavery, racial descrimination, and subjugation of women were intrinsically worthwhile independent of their contribution to ending those institutions. Part of ending slavery involved actions like freeing individual slaves, something I think appropriately situated individuals were under a moral obligation to do so irrespective of any larger consequences. It's less clear that individuals had (have) an obligation to refrain from purchasing the products of slave labor.

    But even if the reductio succeeds, it is a reductio only of an extreme position:
    One never has an obligation to refrain from any activity unless that individual act of refraining will itself prevent some harm or produce some good.

    But, as I've tried to show, it's not entirely obvious that we should adopt the opposite extreme: It is impermissible to act in any way that contributes to some harm.

    The challenge then is to find a principled way of splitting the difference (your direct/indirect distinction above is one attempt). It's not obvious to me what that way is, and so I'm not sure which side of that divide noncompassionate omnivorism falls.

  42. Robert,

    You assume that 'moral significance' is a binary concept – yes or no. I rather think that different beings have different mooral status according to certain relevant characteristics. Moral agents have duties of reciprocity to one another that are of a different order than the moral obligations we have to sentient nonagents. Our duties to sentient beings that lack moral agency are less stringent. I am inclined toward a position Robert Nozick called 'Kantianism for people, Utilitarianism for animals.'
    I will admit that I do not have a complete justification of this view, but consider some things that seem to be implications of your alternative:
    – We ought morally to be just as concerned about predator animals attacking other animals as we are about such animals attacking humans.
    – Our obligation (if any) to provide comprehensive health care for human beings is equal to our obligation to provide such health care for animals. On a per organism basis we ought to invest as much (per organism) on animals as on humans.
    – In response to disasters, we should deploy as many resources (per organism) to rescuing animals as we do to rescuing humans.
    – We are justified in using as much deadly force to free animals from factory farms as we would be to rescue humans from similar conditions. Killing meat industry workers in order to liberate animals is morally equivalent to killing Nazi soldiers in order to liberate people from concentration camps.
    Do you really endorse all these conclusion? If not, it appears that you think our obligations to people are different than our obligations to animals.

  43. Have you seen this article?

    http://www.slate.com/default.aspx?id=2142547nav/tap1

  44. On what grounds are we declaring non-compassionate meat consumption morally reprehensible? Most arguments have been made on economic grounds (my own included), describing the reasons that make it difficult to act morally, or alternately, speculating on practical solutions based on demand-side pressures. I would like to isolate the possible justifications for believing that something should be done in the first place:

    1) non-compassionate meat eating (exemplified by factory-farming) is wrong because of the vast suffering inflicted on sentient beings that far outweighs the pleasure that other sentient beings receive from eating them (Singer's utilitarian argument).

    2) non-compassionate meat-eating is wrong because in doing so one is either directly or indirectly supporting an explicitly immoral attitude toward nature (anthropocentrism).

    3) non-compassionate meat eating is wrong because meat consumption is inefficient in maximizing energy flow in a system, leading to a potential (likely) future breakdown in ecosystem resilience; this includes grazing lands and farms and is due to increased methane production, improper waste disposal, top-soil erosion, depletion of minerals, etc. Collectively this argument can be called the "Large Ecological Footprint" problem.

    Of course, there are many other reasons why we shouldn't engage in this activity, but I was curious about what everyone thinks of these three justifications, especially (3), which I feel puts the activity of meat-consumption back into its ecological context and might get some (not so market-based) intuitions going.

  45. Kessler,

    Could you explain your argument a bit more; right now it does not make much sense to me. You claim that a high supply can sometimes cause a high demand (when demand is elastic), and you point to the fact that the high supply of cars last summer caused more cars to be purchased. But the obvious explanation of this, it seems to me, is that a high supply in relation to the same demand causes the items to be sold for a lower price.

    So let's say a small group of individuals decrease the demand for factory-farmed meat by "going compassionate," and the industry responds by lowering prices on the meat and ultimately selling the same quantity they would have if the demand hadn't decreased. Since the same quantity was sold at a lower price, it follows that less profits were made by the industry, and hence that a few individuals did make a difference. Furthermore, since the people buying the now-cheaper meat would have been willing to pay more for it if the supply had been less, it follows that the meat industry could have made the same amount of profit with a smaller supply of animals and hence have a reason to not subject as many animals to a life of suffering the next time around. You can avoid this story if you have a reason to think that high supply can increase demand without lowering prices, but if so I think you need to explain how this could happen to those of us less familiar with economic theory.

    And one more shot at the "one person can't make a difference" response. Doesn't this response hinge on seeing the choice to buy factory-farmed meat as an event that takes place at a particular time rather than as a choice that spans a lifetime. So choosing not to load up on meat at the supermarket might amount to not giving a couple bucks to the industry, but choosing to become a vegetarian or compassionate omnivore for life is the equivalent of deciding not to write a one-time check for tens of thousands of dollars to the industry. Just as stealing a dollar a day for 10,000 days is the moral equivalent of stealing 10,000 dollars once, choosing to be a compassionate eater has serious financial consequences.

  46. Derek:

    Thanks for the reply.

    1. I do not assume moral significance is a binary concept. I subscribe to that position, personally. But it's a minority view even in the animal rights community.

    What I DO assume is that certain interests lexicographically dominate others. In particular, I assume that any morally significant (however "significant") creature's interest in freedom from pain, torture, slavery, and death dominates an illusory, culturally-adapted gustatory preference.

    The paper posted above (puppies, pigs and people) is being far too charitable in its analogy (brain trauma leading to a desire to torture and abuse puppies, similar to others' desire to eat pigs) because it assumes that human gustatory tastes are fixed or difficult to change — analogous to brain trauma. That is patently false. What is hard to change is the social norm dictating that meat-eating is desirable — not the taste for meat (at least for humans, who evolved as omnivores).

    2. Even if you take a non-binary view of moral significance, you have failed to justify your emphasis on agency (by which I assume you mean Kantian normativity) as the relevant metric for significance. Presumably, you do not think young children or the mentally handicapped — who also lack normativity — have less "moral significance." And even among non-handicapped adults, normativity is a grey scale and not an on-off switch. What if it is ultimately discovered that there are race- or gender-based differences in reasoning capacity? Are you prepared to abandon political equality among humans for the sake of discrimination between animals?

    A dolphin is equipped to achieve its ends in a fashion dramatically different from a human. It has sensitivities and capabilities that a human could never dream of. That does not make the dolphin (or its suffering) any more (or less) morally significant or sensitive. It simply makes the dolphin different.

    Differing capacities might imply different sorts of legal rights, to be sure. But it does not imply the moral superiority of one creature over the other — any more than the physical strength of an abusive father implies moral superiority over his defenseless daugther.

    3. You admit that you have no justification for your view that our duties to creatures that lack reasoning capacity (or, to be precise, lack reasoning capacity to the same DEGREE that humans have it) are less stringent.

    On the other hand, I think I have a clear justification for my view that our duties to "non-agents" are equally stringent — namely, that pain, frustration, and death are the same regardless of a creature's race, gender, or species. You might try to argue, as some have (both in the species, and race/gender context), that animals simply do not suffer, or become frustrated, in the same fashion that humans do.

    I think you will be hard-pressed in justifying this position with scientific evidence. We all (meaning vertebrates) evolved along a similar evolutionary path; it would be surprising if we experienced pleasure, pain, and frustration in a fashion that was qualitiavely and dramatically different. And spend 10 minutes with a happy puppy (or 10 minutes in a modern slaughterhouse), and I think you will probably agree — Nagel's "bat problem" strieks me as completely fallacious, from both a sicentific and common-sense perspective.

    One can make a colorable argument that, if there ARE differences, those differences suggest PRIVILEGING rather than DENIGRATING animals. A dog, unlike a human, cannot reason to himself that the veternarian does not mean harm when he is plunging a needle into his neck; he will thus suffer terribly when he anticipates the needle coming. Humans, in contrast, are a remarkably adaptive species, and can happily engage in all sorts of self-destructive behavior if they hold some belief that the harm is temporary, "right," or otherwise desirable. Many psychologists who study happiness think that objective circumstances are virtually irrelevant to human happiness, precisely because of this psychological adpatation. (the "setpoint" theory of happiness)

    4. I whole heartedly endorse the specific implications of my position that you descirbe.

    – Predator animals should be contained, or eliminated if they cannot be contained. This is no different from predatory members of our own species.

    – I absolutely do think that we should be equally concerned about the health of all animals, just as we should be equally concerned about the health of all races. That does NOT imply that we should invest equally in all animals, as a practical matter. First, as with redistribution to the poor, there is a limit to how much charity governmetn can impose before destroying the incentives of the wealthy. Second, some animals will live terrible lives if we even attempt to give them "health care." A wolverine will suffer more if you try to give him a vaccination, then he would gain from any reduction in risk.

    -Regarding disasters, same as above.

    -Finally, the use of force. This, ultimately, is an empirical question. If I thought that what, for example, the ALF did actually improved the lot of animals — in the short or long run — I absolutely would support it, just as i would have supported American intervention in WWII on the basis of the Holocaust alone. It is not clear to me that the analogy is correct, factually speaking, because the ALF has no sense of the real effects of its actions, and no long-term strategy.

    On the other hand, I cannot say that what they do is wrong (rather than futile or counter-productive). Their motivation and seriousness of purpose is absolutely valid. And I admire their willingness to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of tortured and defenseless creatures. Much as I would admire the bravery of an individual who stood up to a mob bent on lynching someone for being gay.

    If you watch what is happening in factory farms, it is hard to say that the workers are kind and decent people. It takes a certain type of person beat, cut, and disembowel a squealing and terrified creature, with complete and utter nonchalance.

  47. Jem:

    non-compassionate meat-eating is unlikely to reduce the ecological footprint of agriculture. if anything it will increase it by inducing factory farms (and there is no question that supposedly free range farms are still factories) to engage in less efficient practices.

  48. Derek, I agree with you that these questions about the effects of individual actions and their relation to the aggregate effects of group's actions are complex (really interesting philosophy as well as economics to be done here). Others have offered some interesting responses to the problem. I want to turn the tables and ask you to explain your argument more clearly. For instance, I don't understand this sentence:
    "The ability of a group of vegetarians or compassionate omnivores to make a difference is immaterial to the question of whether *my* actions in fact make a difference." I don't understand why it is immaterial.

    Here's one way to put things. Suppose there are two groups, A and B, differentiated by the way they behave regarding some practice (e.g., purchasing factory-farmed meat). And suppose the respective behaviors of the two groups, as groups, has an aggregate effect that is morally significant (e.g., reducing factory farming or not). Then, this principle seems right to me: one has an obligation to behave in accord with the group whose behavior produces the moral effect one believes is right, *even if* one does not know whether one's own (relevant) behavior contributes to bringing about this effect (perhaps even if one knows it does not contribute?).

  49. Eddy,

    The sentence of mine that you quote is specifically about the purely factual question: do *my* actions make a difference. If you show that the actions of lots of people doing what I'm doing make a difference, that still doesn't show that *my* doing so make a difference. If enough people vote for Democrats in this year's Congressional elections, their votes taken collectively will be enough to allow Democrats to take over Congress. Despite this fact, it is almost a mathematical certainty that my voting or not voting will make a difference to which party controls Congress. Similarly, the ability of lots of vegetarians to make a difference is poor evidence for the efficacy of my choices as an individual.

    Your discussion of groups A and B, however, don't seem to be about this factual question – rather they're about the moral significance of the fact (if it is a fact) that my actions don't make a difference. You propose an interesting moral principle that avoids most of the worries I've raised.

    First, your principle only applies in those cases where the aggregate actions of the members of one group actually produce some effect. Thus, you avoid the problems attendant with the merely hypothetical 'if everyone did what I did' approach.

    Second, it takes a purely positive form – it says that we ought to behave with a group that produces morally significant effects that one believe is right. Thus, you avoid many of the worries I've raised about the unavoidability of contributing to harmful activities. That my rent-paying and other economic activities are part of an aggregate that produces harm is only relevant to your principle if there is some alternative action which could be part of another aggregate that actually produces morally preferable outcomes. While such alternatives are possible, (I could refuse to rent from non-compassionate omnivores) they are not at present being acted upon with sufficient frequency to have any singificant effects, even at the aggregate level.

    It certainly bears further consideration.

  50. Robert-

    You say: "Predator animals should be contained, or eliminated if they cannot be contained. This is no different from predatory members of our own species."

    I'm curious how you would justify the containment or elimination of predator animals. Surely there is an enormous difference between containing (or eliminating, if you think we should go so far) one human being who has murdered another and containing or eliminating a hawk that has eaten a mouse.

    Additionally, doesn't your position commit you to the elimination of all carnivores? Containment doesn't seem to be an option, since I'm sure that many carnovores, at least, would be unable to survive without eating other animals. Even if they could survive on other food, I don't see how such a change could be brought about in any way that would allow more than a small fraction of each omnivorous species to survive, and those not even in the wild.

    Perhaps you could justify the elimination by claiming that carnivores have less moral worth simply because they are carnivores. In a perfect world, you might think, every animal should be an herbivore. Even then, is that enough to justify the outright elimination of all carnivores? After all, it's hardly the hawk's fault it eats mice. How can it possibly deserve to be eliminated?

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