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    The McMaster Department of Philosophy has now put together the following notice commemorating Barry: Barry Allen: A Philosophical Life Barry…

On Intuitions in Philosophy

Brian Leiter

From the illuminating review by Michael Liston (Wisconsin/Milwaukee) of the new book by Penelope Maddy (UC Irvine) Second Philosophy:  A Naturalistic Method (OUP, 2007):

[This book] presents the best exploration and defense of naturalism I know of. A primary lesson is that we ought not to build philosophical theories on anything as shaky as intuitions that things must be thus-and-so. Too
often our intuitions — whether inherited from our academic training,
the workings of our language, or our natural make-up — are no more
than virtually irresistible impulses to think in certain ways. Liberal doses of concrete case studies are probably our best strategy of resistance.

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5 responses to “On Intuitions in Philosophy”

  1. R. Vangala

    Liston makes a compelling case for the interest philosophical naturalists ought to take in Maddy's book. I have long felt that naturalists should put forward a kind of manifesto, since I have not been overly satisfied with past attempts to do this, but if this review is fair, then it sounds like Maddy's book is perfectly suited to fill in said gap in the literature. At present, I am not sympathetic to all of the particular positions Maddy takes which are mentioned in the review, but I am deeply sympathetic to her methodological orientation, her "austere form of naturalism," which appears to be the central theme of the book. For this reason, I intend to pick up a copy of it soon. Thanks for linking to this very useful review.

    Reply
  2. Christopher Morris

    Can someone explain to me why philosophers in the analytic tradition regularly use the term 'intuition' in these contexts.? This term has a long associaiton with old forms of rationalism with which analytic philosophers rarely have much sympathy. My European friends are often puzzled by the frequest use of this word.

    Perhaps my question is what is an "intuition", as we say, other than a hunch or reaction, perhaps one we can shake with difficulty or not at all?

    I don't mean to dodge the interesting questions raised above.

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  3. Dave Maier

    They're discussing Maddy's book at the Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism blog (http://trans-phil-nat.blogspot.com/). Several interesting posts (good blog too).

    Reply
  4. Alice C. Linsley

    The Intuition/Deduction Thesis: Some propositions are knowable by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions. Intuition is described as “knowledge of something I have not experienced, but somehow have processed internally.” The word “intuition” comes from the Latin word “intuitus” and means “to look at and contemplate felt relationships.” Notice the word “felt,” suggesting that the intellect is not the ground of intuition. (Why are women said to have more finely tuned intuitions than men?) Intuition is information processing in a way that is not well understood, but that is well documented.

    The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Paul Edwards, Ed., 1967) identifies seven types of intuition. They are:
    1. Intuition as unjustified true belief not preceded by inference, in this (the commonest) sense "an intuition" means "a hunch." The existence of hunches is uncontroversial and not of philosophical interest.

    2. Intuition as immediate knowledge of the truth of a proposition, where "immediate" means "not preceded by inference." This is a philosophically important sense, since philosophers have found it puzzling that one can have knowledge, and thus justified belief, without having made oneself aware through the process of inference of any knowledge of a concept.

    3. Intuition as immediate knowledge of a concept. "Immediate knowledge" here means, roughly, "knowledge which does not entail ability to define the concept."

    4. Intuition as a nonpropositional knowledge of an entity – knowledge that may be a necessary condition, for, but is not identical with, intuitive knowledge of the truth of propositions about the entity.

    5. Sense perceptions, considered as products of a cognitive faculty distinct from the faculty of forming judgments concerning the entity sensed;

    6. Intuitions of universals, or (as in Kant) of such insensible particulars as time and space – intuitions that are necessary conditions of our intuitive knowledge of a priori truths.

    7. Mystical or inexpressible intuitions that, unlike sense perceptions and intuitions of universals, do not make possible knowledge of the truth of propositions about the entities intuited – such intuitions as Bergson's inexpressible intuition of duration, Ficht's intuition of the Transcendental Ego, and the mystic's intuition of God.

    I hope that this is helpful.

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  5. Timothy Scriven

    Here's my amateur's perspective.

    "Intuitions" can be off course but a lot of debate about philosophical intuitions is disguised debate about definitions. It’s legitimate to apply intuitions to definitions because most words mean whatever we want them to mean. Thus a lot of intuitions are self validating. Debating intuitions is a way of unpacking our complex views on the meanings of words. Many intuitions cannot be misleading because instead of being evidence for a view they are what make that view true.

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