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    The McMaster Department of Philosophy has now put together the following notice commemorating Barry: Barry Allen: A Philosophical Life Barry…

Philosophers Writing on Wittgenstein: Sympathetic but Critical?

John Hyman (Oxford), in a quite positive review of Michael Forster’s book Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (Princeton University Press, 2004), makes an observation that is striking for those of us who are not Wittgenstein scholars but occasionally read the literature in that area:  after noting that Forster’s book is "lucid, subtle, and intellectual scrupulous," Hyman also observes that it "is unusual in being both sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s ideas and critical of them."  (This is, by the way, true of all of Forster’s work that I have read, for example, on Hegel and on Herder.  Forster, of course, is best-known for his seminal work on German philosophy from the late 18th- through the 19th-century [e.g., here, here, here, and here], where he is clearly one of the three or four leading scholars working on figures in this period in the Anglophone world.) 

I would be curious to hear from readers whether there is other work that fits this bill, i.e., that is "both sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s ideas and critical of them."  I’m particularly interested to hear about books or articles in this vein that have been recommended, with success, to graduate students.  Thanks.

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14 responses to “Philosophers Writing on Wittgenstein: Sympathetic but Critical?”

  1. Marie McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Language and Logic.

  2. The quote seems a fair description of Crispin Wright's attitude in the essays collected together in 'Rails to Infinity'.

  3. Edwards, James C., Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life (ISBN: 0813008395).

  4. The extremely illuminating work of Ian Proops and Peter Sullivan on the Tractatus fits the bill.

  5. The Hintikka and Hintikka book, Investigating Wittgenstein, fits that description and is also very good.

  6. George Wrisley

    Seven or so years ago after having basically completed my MA thesis on "Wittgenstein's conception of the arbitrariness of grammar (autonomy of language)," I went to Bielefeld University in Germany to study with Eike von Savigny and Joachim Schulte for a semester. When I arrived I was rather zealous in regard to Wittgenstein, but after many conversations, particularly with Eike von Savigny, I left with a much more tempered attitude. I can't think of any particular pieces off hand, but they were both in different ways sympathetic and, in a sense, critical of Wittgenstein.

  7. Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit.

  8. G. E. M. Anscombe is probably one of the most apt examples. See her many works on the Tractatus and her essay on whether Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist later in his life.

  9. When Hyman writes that Forster's "book is entirely free of the convoluted musings about method we have come to expect in recent Wittgenstein studies–about whether Wittgenstein was resolutely resolute or irresolutely resolute, and how many kinds of nonsense he could talk at once," wasn't he referring, implicitly, to philosophers like Diamond?

  10. Two comments … First, Hanjo Glock (Reading) does wonderful work on Wittgenstein that, I believe, fits your bill ("[work] both sympathetic to Wittgenstein's ideas and critical of them"), Brian.

    Second, not only is Nate's reading of Hyman's remark correct, but also that remark implicitly allies Hyman with Hacker's work. I myself believe Hacker to have done the most important work on Wittgenstein (ever), but I gather that you would not agree … precisely because (on your view, I think) Hacker's work fails to fit your bill.

  11. Jacques Bouveresse might fit the bill, even Pascal Engel; I am quite sure that John Hyman would exclude from those "unusal philosophers" any person who is understood to be either old or new Wittgensteinian, which makes more or less invalid almost all the suggestions above.

  12. Its a long time since I read it, but Malcolm Budd's Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology springs to mind, as do a number papers written by Barry Stroud.

  13. Graduate Student

    Having read through masses of bad Wittgenstein literature for my thesis I would say that most fits the negative description "sympathetic but uncritical" : all of the so-called "New Wittgenstein", and almost anything written on the later Wittgenstein, especially anything comparing him to continental philosophy.

    But what is "sympathetic but critical":

    As noted above Crispin Wright is a good example, as is Hinttikka's _Investigating Wittgenstein_ and his _Half Truths and One and a Half Truths_

    But to start with the early scholarship I would say that the best early book on the Tractatus is Stenius's work. Max Black's companion to the Tractatus is a standard, though there are many errors which the later literature corrects. Of all those involved with Wittgenstein's Nachlass you can really only trust what Von Wright wrote.

    Andre Maury's book on the Tractatus is good. David Pears's two volume _The False Prison_ is critical and interesting.

    The more recent books on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematic by Pasquale Frascolla and also by Mathieu Marion are quite good. And recent work on the logic of Tractatus by Leo Cheung is of the highest quality.

  14. As I am mentioned by a.ziel in this circumstance , you can consult my

    "the trouble with Wittgenstein"

    http://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/enseignants/pe/Engel%202007%20The%20Trouble%20With%20W.pdf

    it is stupid , for an analytic philosopher, to be against Wittgenstein. But it is quite sensible to disagree with a number of interpreters, even to think that some pervasing readings of W are strongly opposed to the rationalistic kind of analytic philosophy that many of us favour.

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