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    The McMaster Department of Philosophy has now put together the following notice commemorating Barry: Barry Allen: A Philosophical Life Barry…

More Strangeness about Philosophy in the NY Times

This time from Kristof, who is certainly not the most intellectually feeble of their columnists, and he usually seems a humane and well-intentioned person.   So perhaps professional philosophers need to think a bit about why stuff like this constitutes the public perception of the field.  Writing about the movement in recent decades towards more humane treatment of animals, Kristof notes:

[T]he movement is also the product of a deep intellectual ferment pioneered by the Princeton scholar Peter Singer.

Professor Singer wrote a landmark article in 1973 for The New York Review of Books and later expanded it into a 1975 book, “Animal Liberation.” That book helped yank academic philosophy back from a dreary foray into linguistics and pushed it to confront such fascinating questions of applied ethics as: What are our moral obligations to pigs?

I am not entirely sure what is meant by philosophy's "dreary foray into linguistics," but I assume it means a philosophical interest in the nature of language and meaning.   Singer's 1975 book certainly did not do any "yank[ing]" of philosophy away from work on this topic, as anyone familiar with the history of Anglophone philosophy in the last 30+ years knows.  Indeed, it was precisely many years after 1975 that philosophy of language came into very close contact with linguistics, which remains a rather lively interdisciplinary field to this day.  I admit I find this kind of work "dreary," but I feel the same way about recent work in geophysics:  but I actually don't think the geologists should shift their work in the direction of enhancing the quality of life for pigs.  "Interest" is in the eye of the beholder, and in matters intellectual it is probably best to let a thousand flowers bloom.   Peter Singer is no David Beaver, but undoubtedly Singer's work is more accesible than Beaver's.  Why think we need to choose or that philosophers should do one kind of work rather than another?

Why, though, is "our moral obligations to pigs" deeemed a "fascinating" question?  What about our obligations not to launch criminal wars of aggression against other countries?  Or to prevent vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes?  Or to view Palestinians as human beings with equal moral claims on freedom, bodily integrity, and opportunity?  Is it that our moral obligations to pigs do not present much threat to the Manhattan bourgeoisie, whereas the other questions would be especially unsettling?

Mr. Kristof continues:

John Maynard Keynes wrote that ideas, “both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” This idea popularized by Professor Singer — that we have ethical obligations that transcend our species — is one whose time appears to have come.

Keynes seems right about ideas, but the problem is journalists never have them (dare I quote Karl Kraus yet again?  "No ideas and the ability to expres them:  that's a journalist").  Why, though, is  Professor Singer's idea about "animal liberation"–far more radical than Kristof seems to recognize–an idea whose time has now come?  It obviously can't be because of Singer's actual arguments for his views, since his hedonistic utilitarianism also entails the permissibility of infanticide of the severely retarded, to name just one of the views for which Professor Singer is often denounced.  Singer and Bentham (as Mr. Kristof note) may both agree, "The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?," but it is quite clear that most citizens, and most moral philosophers, do not agree.

Query:  why do members of the educated public think that it is an objection to philosophical inquiry that it is unintelligible to them (or that it does not have immediate application to the quality of life of pigs, say), whereas no one would think to put such objections against esoteric work in the natural sciences?  Are other humanities subjected to this same expectation of "practical relevance and intelligibility"?  I am curious to hear what readers think.  Signed comments are strongly preferred; post only once, comments may take awhile to appear. 

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50 responses to “More Strangeness about Philosophy in the NY Times”

  1. "Are other humanities subjected to this same expectation of 'practical relevance and intelligibility'?" Of course they are. My degrees are in classics and history, and like everyone else who's ever done classics, I had to hear again and again the question: What is is good for? A few times, I would try to answer the question, only to see the questioner's eyes begin to glaze over. It eventually dawned on me: he (or she) didn't really want an answer. The intent was to let me know how useless what I studied was. That the people who ask this question never seem to intuit that it might be rude is, I think, further evidence of an almost reflexive demand for practical relevance. Note please that classics has far less practical application than either philosophy or history; so those who loved doing it got very accustomed very soon to the complete bewilderment of those around them. My anecdotes don't, of course, address the issue of intelligibility; I suspect, however, that non-pysicists are more likely to take the unintelligibility of much physics to the layperson in stride–again because physics is science and science is useful, don't you know? I doubt that someone interested in especially impenetrable literary theory would get the same deference.

  2. By the 'dreary foray into linguistics', Kristof probably means ordinary language philosophy. It will help if you bear in mind that the general educated public knows nothing about what has happened in philosophy since Wittgenstein and Ayer. I routinely run across academics in other disciplines who tell me that philosophy is not interested in big questions because it has ruled them all meaningless. As for the hostility to philosophy, I think this is because it is nominally a humanities discipline. People like Kristof expect to be able to pick up academic history or anthropology and be able to understand it (they may be increasingly disappointed as other areas adopt more formal methods). Humanities are widely supposed to need to keep in touch with the general educated public. Part of the problem, of course, is that philosophy is not well conceptualized as part of the humanities.

  3. Intelligent people who are ashamed of their own ignorance put down or make fun of what they don't understand.

  4. Just on the historical quetion about philosophy and "linguistics"…

    I agree with Aaron Baker that Kristof may have been thinking about "ordinary language" philosophy (well, most likely he was thinking CONFUSEDLY (cf. Joe Camp's book on the topic…) about both ordinary language philosophy AND the association of philosophy of language with linguistic theory). How old is Kristof? If he's about my age, he might have ben in college in the 1960s, a particularly dreary period in American academic philosophy: the heyday of ordinary language philosophy (mostly done by people who, unlike Austin, didn't have the talent to MAKE it interesting!), and a period in which both the O.L. philosophers and the heirs of Logical Positivism seemed to delight in declaring interesting questions "meaningless"…

    I think you have misdated the links between linguistics and philosophy of language. Particularly in places where Chomsky had been heard of, that link was already strong in the late 1960s. Fodor and Katz's "The Structure of Language" (anthology of papers in the philosophy of language, sensu lato) came out in the 1960s, and made issues arising out of Chomsky's program central to Philosophy of L.

  5. I find that people, on this question, tend to agree that aeronautics is very practical regardless of whether or not they understand the nature of the questions or the form of dialogue between experts in the field. It seem to be a consequentialist view-as in they like airplanes. Pin pointing the relevant product of linguistics (a) doesn't get as much press, and (b) is not exactly easy.

  6. Given that we've been hearing this (or something like it) since Thales fell in the well, I'm sort of inclined to not worry about it. But I do think there is a general principle driving this kind of talk, and it goes something like this:

    If someone is doing something that I don't understand and it is interesting and important, then I will have to admit that there is something interesting and important that I don't understand. Since it is impossible for me to admit that there is something interesting and important that I don't understand, then I am forced to declare that this work must be uninteresting and unimportant. Oh yeah, and I also must declare that the work is dreary, because it is impossible for anything to be fascinating and fun and inaccessible to me.

  7. I praise the discussion of animal rights in any public light, for or against. As someone who endorses the animals' right to a life free of suffering, anything mention of the subject presents an opportunity for people to consider their own values – also for or against. I, however, wish that animal rights discussion would expand from the field of philosophy into other areas. Though it is often discussed in relation to the environment, capitalism, et cetera, many discard the issue (as well as issues of human rights, environmental ethics, and so on) as being rather pointless – or at least as matters that never move past debate.

    Many people (philosophers and not) condemned women as a lesser sex until very recently. And the subject of a woman's rights were often disregarded as pointless or never moved past the realm of philosophical debate as well. I hope people will begin to take the animal rights issue more seriously (in and outside of the field of philosophy). But I, however, don't know why Kristof (a) thinks of this as a newer issue or (b) why he feels animal rights is more interesting (or important) than any other issue concerning the repression of some thing – be it human, the planet, or so on…

  8. This does not directly answer the question at the end of the post, but there are some things in the post I want to respond to. Sorry if this is too far off topic, and sorry it's so long, regardless.

    First, why is it "clear" that most citizens (I won't ask about most moral philosophers) disagree with Singer and Bentham? As I read it, this seems to presume that most citizens have coherent views about our moral relationship with animals, and are non-hypocritical in our actual interactions with the animal world such that our views can be read off of our actions. That is, most of us are leather-wearing omnivores, so most of us must think the suffering of animals is morally irrelevant to our decisions about what to wear and eat. Why is this a plausible presumption? Alternatively, have I misread the justification for the comment?

    Second, while I wouldn't agree that now is the time for the idea of animal liberation any more than the last few decades, note that the idea for which Kristof makes this claim is just that we have ethical obligations to animals. This idea enjoys vastly more popular acceptance than it did even a few decades ago, and it's at least arguable that, yes, some of Singer's arguments do play a significant part in explaining that fact. Of course, the ones that (I take it) have been most influential don't, or don't obviously, presume a utilitarian framework. In particular, his arguments against "speciesism"–the view that a difference in species, by itself, makes a moral difference–are often repeated by organizations like Farm Sanctuary and HSUS, the main organizations behind California's Proposition 2, mention of which starts off Kristof's article.

    Also, it's worth noting that a large chunk of Singer's /Animal Liberation/ is about facts. The middle of the book is taken up with describing animals in laboratories and on farms, and with explaining vegetarianism. There are arguments here, to be sure, and they're very important to the spread of the idea we're talking about, but you don't have to be a utilitarian to buy them. That there is more, more severe, and more unnecessary suffering involved in our interactions with animals than is commonly thought will be morally relevant to most of us, I think; and that vegetarianism can be easy and healthy and is environmentally responsible is practically relevant as well. To the extent that Kristof is right to claim that the idea's time is now, widespread dissemination of these arguments has surely been a significant part of the cause.

    Finally, what is the contrast between our moral obligations to pigs and various other moral questions meant to show or point at? Does Kristof claim those are non-fascinating in a column I haven't seen? Or is it supposed to be obvious that our moral obligations to animals is a frivolous topic? I suppose this would explain the repetition of the "pigs" formulation of the question. And maybe it's because I've never been to Manhattan, but exactly why is it that acknowledging the moral status of Palestinians would be less "threatening" to the Manhattan bourgeoisie than acknowledging the moral status of animals? Maybe because the bourgeois mind thinks it obvious that pigs are after all just pigs, whatever arguments there might be; an idea no one will accept is no threat to anything. But–and forgive me if this is unfair, Professor Leiter, since we've never met–you don't strike me as the sunny optimist about the prospects of the ruling class becoming convinced that we should "prevent vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes," another question from the contrast class. So I just don't see why the one question is supposed to be so much less threatening than the others–especially when you acknowledge that the idea of animal liberation is "radical".

    All that said, I don't think there's much more than laziness behind Kristof's silly comments about philosophy. He wanted to make his subject sound important; we've all heard that English-speaking philosophers are too obsessed with language and fine technical details, so it must be true, or at least truthy, right?

  9. I think there are good reasons why ethical issues connected to the treatment of pigs strike Kristof as more fascinating than the issues you cite involving humans. Ordinary people tend to have a more definite sense of how humans should be treated than creatures as different from us as pigs and chickens. So the question of how pigs and chickens should be treated will strike the educated layperson as more philosophically interesting.

    This seems to me the sort of thing that opponents of unjust wars and supporters of Palestinian independence might be happy to accept. It suggests that the rightness of their position is more obvious (at least to unprejudiced people who have all the facts) and requires less complicated philosophical thinking. Certainly, this is how it seems to me — you don't have to do much philosophy to figure out that the Iraq War was wrong.

    I'd also think that moral obligations to pigs are more unsettling than any of the above questions. It was very easy for me to become a supporter of Palestinian independence as soon as I got a proper knowledge of the issue. It's not as if any satisfaction in my daily life depended on oppressing Palestinians — as a matter of fact, I'd think that egoistic considerations in my case and the case of the average American support Palestinian independence.

    But a lot of people (including myself!) like eating pork, and this makes them extremely unsettled when they consider the suffering of pigs, as it strikes at something they regularly take pleasure in. Just because of the place it had in my life, the transition away from factory-farmed meat was harder for me than the transition to supporting Palestinian independence.

  10. Just to piggyback off of Sam Rickless's comment, people can be shown or told how science has benefited their lives in tangible ways ("Behold! An invention that can cook food, without using the stove! I call it the microwave!"), while a large percentage of the population (in fact, I'd wager a vast majority) do not understand how more "abstract" fields such as philosophy, or mathematics have given any benefit to their lives.

    The other day, I heard a semi-educated person commenting about how theoretical mathematics has never accomplished anything except allow universities to employ professors of that field. Before hearing that comment, I had described this person as educated without the 'semi' prefix.

  11. Stuart Campbell

    As a soon-to-be graduate student in philosophy, and an undergraduate in philosophy and classics, I have gotten the question of "what are you going to do with that?" asked many times. And it is usually very accusatory, suggesting that there is no relevance to either of those fields, whereas people in business or economics or the natural sciences get a response of "oh, good for you, there are so many options available for you." I usually respond with either "I don't know what I will do" or Whatever the hell I want, I'm smarter than you," depending on my mood at the time. (Usually the former).

  12. Expectations of philosophy are different to esoteric work in the natural sciences because the public has more of an acquaitance with the former. I for one would be hard pressed to give examples of the latter. Furthermore, philosophy is fundamentally concerned with communicating concepts with clarity; 'true' philosophy is intelligible.

    Why do members of the educated public think that it is an objection to philosophical inquiry that it is unintelligible to them?
    That is a silly question when you think about it. Do you have no preference for intelligibility? There is an expectation that philosophy should be relevant to how we live our lives, therefore intelligibility is a criterion. I hope we don't blame the educated public for the inability of philosophers to communicate clearly.

    Why should we care about what philosophers devote their energies to, rather than let a thousands flowers bloom, willy-nilly? That is an easy question to answer: life is short and we want the best out of philosophy for our lives. Priorities and concerns matter!

    I still don't think Academia in general is taking the public's complaints about its philosophical production seriously enough. There is too much defensiveness, bluster, dodging and denial of the issue, and care for personal status when these complaints are raised, rather than serious philosophical investigation. Examples of this can be found on this page.

  13. Talking abotu general perception, I completely agree here that sciences are spared the question of applicability.Though as a 'pure' mathematician , I've been subject to the question too. I think to a degree the same holds even true for most 'hard' sciences like theoretical high energy physics to a lesser extent. The omnipresence of technology(/medicine) and the confusion of science with technology has a huge role to play in making sciences seem 'relevant' and directly applicable even though unintelligible.And the central role that technology has to play in capitalism(late and early) and the capitalist view of science as a discipline aimed at producing more technology also goes a long way in aiding this misconception.It also helps sustain a consumer class with a mystified view of science with a limited understanding of processes and the methodology that are involved.People to whom one can sell 'fuzzy logic based washing machines'.
    If 'usefulness' is the sole criterion then even technologists should'nt be spared the question of being useful for whom and how? Especially in a world where a huge chunk of technology is far from accessible or relevant for most humans except for making a few buy stuff that they never needed.

  14. Why, though, is "our moral obligations to pigs" deemed a "fascinating" question? What about our obligations not to launch criminal wars of aggression against other countries? Or to prevent vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes? Or to view Palestinians as human beings with equal moral claims on freedom, bodily integrity, and opportunity? Is it that our moral obligations to pigs do not present much threat to the Manhattan bourgeoisie, whereas the other questions would be especially unsettling?

    —–

    How strange that you would think Nicholas Kristof, of all people, is not interested in all of these serious questions about human beings, just because he is interested in the serious problems of pigs.

  15. In reply to Jean Kazez: what would be the evidence that Kristof, who is the quinetessential bourgeois liberal, has any interest in the questions I noted?

    In reply to Neil S.: one might observe that your confidence about the rights of Palestinians and the morality of the Iraq war are not in much evidence anywhere on the pages of the NY Times, and the NY Times, in this regard, speaks for much of the broader culture. Hanging out with philosophers one can, perhaps, get a mistaken impression of what's obvious and what's not.

    In (partial) reply to Roger C.: the fact that almost no one endorses Singer's views about the treatment of the severely disabled is, I would think, rather good evidence that, contra Kristof, most people sympathetic to animal rights are not really moved by his kind of hedonistic utilitarianism. "[T]he contrast between our moral obligations to pigs and various other moral questions" is meant to point up the highly selective moralism of Kristof, and of the NY Times, generally. If I've missed Kristof's column on the injustice of Israeli treatment of the Palestinians or the immoral criminality of the war of aggression against Iraq, someone will no doubt point it out, and I will revise my opinion of him accordingly.

    In reply to Allen H.: obviously there was interest in linguistics among philosophers of language growing out of Chomsky's work pre-dating 1975, but linguistics is now much more mainstreamed into philosophy of language in the last 20 years than it was even after Chomsky: consider the work of, e.g., Jason Stanley, Jeffrey King, Peter Ludlow, David Beaver, Kai von Fintel, and the importance of the journal "Linguistics & Philosophy" has assumed during this time period.

  16. I think you're being a little hard on Kristof. "Dreary foray" comment aside, I thought it was a decent piece — especially compared to the dreck that David Brooks recently put up. I especially like the Kristof piece for being a refutation of the Brooks thesis: "All moral thought is just emotional reaction, so you philosophers can shut it." Kristof lays out a few recent political developments regarding the treatment of animals, and argues that this isn't just emotional reaction, but at least in part the product of philosophical ideas.

    Shorter Kristof: Keynes was right; Brooks was wrong; Here's an example.

  17. We need a more complicated taxonomy of those who trash-talk philosophy. I wouldn't place Kristof in the same category as most people who doubt the value of philosophy. He seems more like the Canadian columnist Robert Fulford, who has made similarly denigrating remarks. Unlike many who are down on philosophy, I think these guys love the humanities on some allegedly traditional conception of them, but that's a conception on which philosophy fills the role traditionally occupied by religion. So philosophy is good when it can be understood by the educated layperson and when it's edifying and about values, but bad (maybe even 'scholastic') when it's hard to understand and about more abstract matters. (I think Quine said somewhere that he found students who had this Kristof-Fulford picture to be the worst students.)

  18. Quick thoughts:
    Many members of the public view philosophy as dealing with opinion, and science as dealing with fact, and they may find it easier to reject opinions they don't understand than to reject views on facts they don't understand.
    In some cases I think something quite different is happening. Rather than sense that they don't understand academic philosophy, many members of the public sense that philosophy is weighing in on just the things they've had their loftiest thoughts about: what is 'right', how should one live life, etc. They can then be quick to reject philosophy that disagrees with their conclusions on these things. But these members of the public are less likely to feel that esoteric science ventures into their own domains of inquiry. Sensing that they lose their footing when these topics come up, they are more inclined to suspend judgment.
    Finally, many members of the academy, including philosophers, have been dismissive of fields of inquiry in part because they find them unintelligible. I think most of these people would say (on any reflection) that this is problematic, but have succumbed to the tendency nonetheless. Sometimes I fear this is part of what is going on when fellow philosophers of science are dismissive of esoteric metaphysics and don't have a well-thought out epistemology to underwrite the dismissiveness.

  19. You ask for the evidence that Kristof is interested in the topics you listed. Take"vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes." Kristof's many columns about sex slavery, obstetric fistulas in Africa, and the tragedy in Darfur (to name a few) create the impression of a man who's extremely interested in inequity. I can't imagine Kristof enthusing about "Animal Liberation," but pushing away Singer's new book "The Life You Can Save", with its concern for "inequities of wealth and life fortunes." Just the opposite. Pigs are a new interest for Kristof. Human inequity is practically his daily theme.

  20. As I said, Mr. Kristof is the quinetessential bourgeois liberal: he is concerned with "vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes" elsewhere, but not where it would hit too close to home. He is, like all the NY Times columnists, an apologist for capitalism, and a supporter of the one-party state in America. I infer that I'm correct about his silence on the immoral criminality of the war of aggression against Iraq and Israeli mistreatment of the Palestinians.

  21. Brian:

    I think your initial post is unfair to Kristof, in two ways.

    1. He talks of 'such fascinating questions of applied ethics' as our obligations to animals. That implies that there are others, which may include questions about the Iraq War, etc. Kristof certainly never denies that those are also important and interesting questions.

    2. One of the main themes of the article is the influence of ideas on people's behaviour — see the Keynes quote — and animal rights is one area where that has arguably happened. (Though many people may not accept Singer's out-and-out utilitarianism, there are overlaps between utilitarianism and a sensible deontology and Singer's arguments can come from that overlap, i.e. from the simple and not exclusively utilitarian idea that causing unnecessary suffering is wrong.) But though there's been philosophical argumentation about, e.g., the ethics of war, it hasn't exactly had a large impact on the military behaviour of states. An article about how some philosopher's writings have made U.S. foreign policy less aggressive hardly be persuasive.

    And I too think the reference to linguistics was probably meant to be to ordinary-language philosophy. And wasn't a lot of that in fact pretty dreary and pointless? ('We wouldn't normally say, "I voluntarily raised my hand," therefore it's not true that I voluntarily raised my hand.') We shouldn't assume that all criticisms of academic philosophy are necessarily ignorant, resentful, etc. The history of the discipline is not an uninterrupted series of intellectual triumphs.

  22. I certainly don't need to be convinced that "the history of the discipline is not an uninterrupted series of intellectual triumphs"! What's always worrisome, though, is when the contrast is drawn the way Kristof does: between an "applied" question ("how should we treat pigs") and some "technical" area of the discipline, which is deemed "dreary." It's one thing for Tom Hurka–who actually knows something!–to deem some part of philosophy dreary. But does anyone really think that Mr. Kristof is rendering an informed opinion like Tom's or just giving expression to a kind of anti-intellectualism towards difficult subjects?

  23. There's a simpler explanation why Kristof shines the spotlight on inequity elsewhere. It's much worse. We don't have girls and women here living with obstetric fistulas all their lives, or people who live on $1 a day. There's an obesity problem at the lowest income levels here, not a starvation problem. I can't imagine Kristof being afraid to take up some of the homegrown inquities that get covered in the pages of the New York Times–like the work conditions in US sweatshops and slaughterhouses. As to Iraq, Israel, Palestine, etc., that's not his beat. But yes, he's "just" a liberal.

  24. I think we have to be careful about going too far to the other side in reacting to anti-humanities folks.

    Chomsky once said (I think in that Bryan Magee book of interviews) that English Department borrowings of French philosophy circa 1968 failed a simple bullshit test. The test is this. Someone over a relaxed lunch should be able to explain to an uninformed-on-the-issue but otherwise rational and educated listener the central issues in the debate they are engaged in such that the listener can see how the claims in those debates can be taken to be both plausible and non-trivial.

    Chomsky claimed that the most recondite areas of theoretical physics, and linguistics and philosophy passed this test, but that English department post-modernism did not (to the extent that it even could be explained over lunch it is either plausible and trivial, e.g. "The word "dog" could have meant what the word "red" does," or non-trivial but preposterously absurd, i.e. "the fact that there are dogs is a social construct.").

    I think the Chomsky test is a good one and both deflects the often made post-modernist claim that the humanities are like the sciences and that we can therefore be confusing and confused in pseudo-technical ways, and also does not fall into lazy claims that all of philosophy must be easily accessible to aliterate T.V. babies.

    Given that Chomsky came up with the Chomsky test, it's a bit ironic that starting with Geoffrey Pullum of then GPSG fame, almost all linguists now working in computationaly tractable non-transformational frameworks such as CG, LFG, and HPSG (and even famed early transformational syntacticians Jackendoff and Cullicover in their new "Simpler Syntax" book) now argue that Chomsky's own later transformational frameworks fail the test. Likewise there is also informed debate (a couple of physicists have published polemics) over whether String Theory is bullshit. We need a way, without lapsing into crude positivism, of not a priori rendering such debates out of order. I think the Chomsky test does this pretty well.

  25. Brian,

    Kristof has indeed published on those issues. In the months leading up to war, Kristof in print opposed the invasion of Iraq. He was critical afterwards as well — the Libby/Wilson scandal in part got going because of Kristof's column, based on a source later revealed to be Wilson, that accused the administration of citing what they knew to be a forgery. On Israel and the Palestinians, he has, for instance, called for negotiations with Hamas and has written a column criticizing the narrowness of debate in the US and in particular the inability of US leaders to criticize Israeli policies and actions towards Palestinians. You might think he doesn't go far enough or otherwise disagree with his positions, but he hasn't been silent on these issues.

  26. "How strange that you would think Nicholas Kristof, of all people, is not interested in all of these serious questions about human beings…." This might seem strange if one is overly literal-minded.

    Others could be excused for wondering about Kristof's public interest in the specific issues mentioned, which clearly were pointedly chosen. It is an understatement to say that the NYT, including Kristof, hasn't done much to challenge establishment opinion and values on those fronts, that is, before the disastrous fact. (Darfur, which all "decent people" can agree is an atrocity and where the U.S. has little direct stake, doesn't count.)

    As for philosophy, I'm in agreement with Paul Robotham, though I'd also let a hundred flowers bloom. We flatter ourselves if we're under the impression that reasonably intelligent non-philosophers are ashamed of their ignorance about contemporary philosophy–as if it's obvious that they have reason to know or care and to trust that our research programs are important.

    The profession's haughty bunker mentality has not helped. Given the way universities were already going in ostensibly good times, taking for granted our modest presence in them seems increasingly foolish. Classics departments used to assume they were academically indispensable too.

  27. Professor Kazez: I did not say Mr. Kristof was "'just' a liberal," but that he is a "bourgeois liberal." He evinces the humane sensibilities of a liberal person, but with respect to issues and problems that do not threaten the domestic status quo or raise questions about the systemic causes of inequity and injustice.

    I confess I do not understand how starvation in Darfur is within his purview, but the suffering in Gaza is not.

    Severity of suffering might be a criterion for what to write about (though, quite obviously, that is not the driving criterion for his topic choices, but put that to one side), but so too prospects for a remedy might influence topic choices–and it is characteristic of the NY Times quite generally to ignore problems for which remedies involve systemic change, or to focus on problems in the piecemeal, anecdotal fashion that obscure any systemic or structural issues.

  28. Steve, if you or other readers had links to columns, that would be of special interest. My guess is that he opposed the invasion of Iraq not because it would constitute an immoral and criminal war of aggression, but because it seemed imprudent, which isn't quite the same. But links to actual columns would illuminate the matter.

  29. From Kristof's column "Wimps on Iraq", Aug 27, 2002:

    "So far the debate has been dominated by the hairy-chested types who smush cockroaches with their bare hands and urge invasion as a matter of principle, and by the hand-wringing doves who are principled opponents of any unilateral military action unless it's for whales. But many of us are unprincipled. To us the existing Iraq debate seems largely beside the point; the real issue isn't whether we want to overthrow Saddam, but what price we would have to pay to get the job done."

    [snip]

    "Iraq may well be different. President Bush has convinced me that there is no philosophical reason we should not overthrow the Iraqi government, given that Iraqis themselves would be better off, along with the rest of the world. But Mr. Bush has not overcome some practical concerns about an invasion."

  30. It may be that this all boils down to something Ludlow said: This sort of complaint is as old as philosophy. Indeed, many, if not all, of us have encountered open hostility in the academy itself toward any area of our discipline not easily enjoyed by non-philosophers. Perhaps we should all just be relieved that we don't have to endure the ridicule of someone as gifted as Aristophanes.

  31. Perhaps I'm unusual in not finding the kind of philosophy from which Animal Liberation is purported to have yanked us away dreary but, on the contrary, thrilling. Kristof says the wrong thing. Animal Liberation didn't yank philosophers away from philosophy of language, but it did (not alone, but in harness with Philosophy and Public Affairs, Judith Thomson's paper on abortion especially, James Rachels, a group of students and admirers of John Rawls, and a bunch of feminists) open up a set of issues in applied ethics for more rigorous and philosophical study than had previously been done. This was a very good thing. And, since some of the best of this work is informed by the techniques developed in core areas of philosophy, that we were not yanked away from those core areas is also a very good thing even if all you care about is the applied ethics which Kristof cares about.

    Kristof is, indeed, a bourgeois liberal (he writes for the Times for goodness sake). But, like many bourgeois liberals (and not enough journalists or columnists for the Times) he seems humane and relatively intellectually responsible. Someone who knows him (I presume someone reading this does) should chat to him about philosophy and suggest what he should read and who he should talk to.

  32. Alastair Norcross

    Singer is a preference-satisfaction utilitarian. If you have an account of pleasure in terms of preference satisfaction, as Chris Heathwood does, for example, you are both a preference-satisfaction and a hedonistic utilitarian.

    Even if it's true that most people don't endorse Singer's attitude towards the severely disabled, I don't see this as good evidence that those who endorse his attitude towards animals are not moved by utilitarian considerations. In my experience of teaching issues concerning the ethical treatment of animals to hundreds of students over the years, far more of them were moved by the badness of the suffering inflicted on the animals, than by the arguments of, say, Tom Regan. It is possible to be moved by utilitarian considerations, without accepting all the implications of utilitarianism. It may even be possible to construct an ethical theory according to which such differential moral emotions are in line with consistent moral judgments. That certainly seems to be the (so far unsuccessful) project of most non-consequentialists. Be that as it may, that many, even most, people who accept Singer's attitude towards animals don't also accept his attitude towards the severely disabled doesn't tell us much about the moral theory that they accept. Many moral emotions, especially those concerning vulnerable humans, are shaped by non rational forces.

    Consistency between moral belief and moral emotion is very hard (internalism about moral motivation is a patently false theory). The strength of a moral emotion, even when it is inconsistent with one's other moral commitments, may be so great that one is psychologically unable to accept that it doesn't correspond to a correct moral belief. This phenomenon leads to the kind of Ptolemaic approach to moral theory building that has provided us with so many fascinating scenarios involving out-of-control trolleys over the years. Some philosophers think that, if they can just add one more crystalline sphere, they can fix the appearances.

  33. "in matters intellectual it is probably best to let a thousand flowers bloom."

    I was surprised to see this comment given your usual statements regarding certain intellectuals (thinkers/writers), e.g. Derrida…

  34. I was supposing that there is a difference between the informed philosophical judgment that Derrida is a charlatan with the uninformed and quasi-aesthetic judgment of Kristof that technical philosophy of language is "dreary." That being said, if I were a university administrator, I would be happy to let the comp lit department fool around with Derrida and deconstructionist literary theory in the spirit of "let a thousand flowers bloom." But as a philosopher and scholar, I am happy to stick by my judgment of Derrida.

  35. As someone planning to begin graduate study of philosophy in the fall, I find this type of reaction to a newspaper opinion piece a bit frightening. It sounds all too much similar to the fruitless musings of print journalists about the crisis in the newspaper industry. It seems to me that the prudent thing for professional philosophers to do in the face of such open contempt from smart (albeit perhaps a bit ill-informed) people is to look inward. I'm not suggesting that the whole of the problem lays in the conduct of philosophical scholarship, but it seems unlikely to me that none of it lay there. I sincerely hope that the preeminent members of the profession will begin addressing the problem whether it be one of substance or style. Since most careers in philosophy are publicly funded at least in part, then it seems wise to begin looking for ways to make our case to the public, lest there be only vestiges of the profession left when it comes time for people like me to look for a place in it.

  36. As many have pointed out, the sources of difference in attitude people display towards philosophy vs. the sciences — namely practical utility and clear objective truth, or at least conspicuous consensus among practitioners — are obvious, ancient, and unsurprising.

    One interesting issue that hasn't been much talked about in this thread is the status of philosophy with respect to the other humanities. In response to the question professor Leiter raised in his original post, I don't think the other humanities get any kind of bye when it comes to the sort of considerations that lead self-avowedly 'practical' types to denigrate philosophy and lionize the sciences. Surely grad students in lit or history or whatever have to put up with just as much in the way of tactless "what good is *that*?" queries and other forms of anti-intellectual snobbery, for example.

    But I think there is a telling asymmetry even within this sphere. People who don't think much of academic philosophy are probably generally unlikely to believe staunchly in the value or success of the other humanities as actually practiced these days; but you also don't see them publishing op eds on "the end of literary criticism" or impassioned screeds (Carlin Romano, I'm looking at you) to the effect that the entire discipline of history has gone willfully and methodologically astray in the last hundred years. One might wonder why that is.

    I'd like to suggest that instead of getting reflexively defensive we consider taking it as a sort of compliment (while remaining constructive, of course.) People may not know much about how philosophy is actually done, but at least they *care*. One gets the impression that for many 'philosophy' is a name for something rather vague, which nevertheless matters deeply. They may not know what they want from it, but they do feel that they want something, and that we are very far from giving it. It may be true that an element of the misunderstanding is an inevitable product of our time, or of all times; but I'm hopeful that going forward we can do better, through the press and otherwise, to help them sort it out. Not to get all Tim Williamson or anything…

  37. Putting the question another way: what other disciplines are qualified to speak to issues such as moral obligations? Presumably educated people want philosophers to speak to moral and political (read: normative and non-aesthetic axiological) issues because philosophy is the only discipline which is qualified to do so. For many of them, the criticism isn't so much that Anglophone philosophers are doing philosophy of language as that (a) they aren't doing ANY moral and political philosophy (a patently false claim), (b) they aren't doing ENOUGH moral and political philosophy, or (c) the moral and political philosophy they ARE doing is shit. [I suspect that most conservative critics like Kristol are mostly arguing for something like (b) and/or (c).]

    Not to state the obvious, but an awful lot hinges on how we define "philosophy." Some critics of Anglophone philosophy come from a more or less traditional Marxian or critical-theoretical background that takes its cue from the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach. Radicals who believe that the point of philosophy is to "change the world" generally find little of value in the past 40 or 50 years of Anglophone philosophy, especially in the realm of Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian political philosophy. Of course, if the point of philosophy turns out to be "understanding the world" (or something like that) after all, then the radicals are simply asking too much, or asking the wrong sorts of things, of philosophy.

    There are also non-Marxian critiques of Anglophone philosophy coming out of the Nietzschean tradition, but I won't go into that here. If you're familiar with Nietzsche, as I Brian (obviously) is, you already know what he says about philosophers in general and professors in particular. At least part of the Nietzschean critique has to do with divorcing philosophy from life and lived experience (cf. Nehamas, Foucault, Hadot, etc).

    Lastly, it is unquestionably true that philosophy – even moral philosophy – habitually ignores or overlooks certain topics. This April marks my university's first ever celebration of Jewish Heritage Month, which I had a hand in organizing. Students ask me what philosophy has to say about the Holocaust, and honesty compels me to answer, ala Beckett, "Very little, almost nothing." If you want proof that this is the case, I suggest reading David Velleman's and Herlinde Pauer-Studer's masterful article on the subject ("Distortions of Normativity"). If you want to know WHY it's the case, I can't help you, and neither can Velleman and Pauer-Studer (though they present some interesting suggestions). Is there something about the way we DO moral philosophy that simply isn't conducive to analyzing the Holocaust? If so, is that a shortcoming for moral philosophy?

    For the record, I think it is. Students, too, expect a philosopher to have something to say about the Holocaust in particular and genocide more generally. I have nothing to say to them except as a person who had family die in the Shoah. That matters to people a great deal, obviously, but it's not the same thing as philosophical insight.

    Now I know Brian despises Derrida, but he has some things to say about the Shoah. Are they worthwhile things? Who knows, but at least he discusses the Shoah a bit. So does Badiou, Levinas, Deleuze & Guattari, Agamben, Arendt, Sartre, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Beauvoir, and others – non-Anglophone philosophers all. So the "very little" is coming almost exclusively from European philosophers, with a few mavericks like Eve Garrard and David Velleman thrown in for good measure. Why is that? I don't know.

    I just have a suspicion that it's reasonable for people to call on us to comment on such things qua philosophers, and if we don't have the slightest idea how to do so, that's a shortcoming on our part. (Admittedly I don't have much to back this up, since I'm operating mostly on intuition here as well as my own experiences organizing Jewish Heritage Month at MSU.)

  38. Leiter: "My guess is that [Kristof] opposed the invasion of Iraq not because it would constitute an immoral and criminal war of aggression, but because it seemed imprudent, which isn't quite the same. But links to actual columns would illuminate the matter."

    Kristof's columns can found in the free NY Times archive. The third result here (au: kristof and "iraq war"), from 1/23/03, may be useful towards answering the above question:

    http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?query=%22iraq+war%22+&d=&o=&v=&c=&n=10&dp=0&daterange=period&srcht=a&year1=1981&mon1=01&day1=01&year2=2009&mon2=04&day2=13&bylquery=kristof&sort=oldest

    Just replace "iraq war" with "palestinians" for more.

  39. "[W]hereas no one would think to put such objections against esoteric work in the natural sciences?"

    This is not correct. Pure science has an enormous amount of foes among the idiots. Their mantra is that "applied" science is the most they can tolerate funding. Let me put it this way–the sole purpose of the neocortex in Gov Palin-wannabes is to induce their their gag reflex upon stumbling on abstract/critical thinking, and it matters little if the context is in the sciences or humanities.

  40. "Why do members of the educated public think that it is an objection to philosophical inquiry that it is unintelligible to them?"

    The answer to this, quite simply, is because the educated public is interested in a number of traditional philosophical topics such as love, justice, beauty, free will and so on. Many will be familiar with the (generally intelligible) writings of philosophers such as Plato, Kant & Kierkegaard on such topics, and therefore expect modern philosophers to be dealing with similar questions in a vaguely intelligible manner.

    Of course this doesn't mean that only philosophy which is intelligible to the wider public is important. However, many non-philosophers are interested in 'philosophical' questions, and so are bound to be disappointed when they find that a great number of contemporary anglophone philosophers are (a) incomprehensible to them (b) dealing with subjects of little interest to them.

  41. What is the charge of "selective moralism" supposed to amount to? That is, granted that Kristof & NYT have wrongly ignored important moral questions, is it supposed to be a further wrong not to ignore another important moral question? I don't see why it would be, but if it isn't, I don't see the point of complaining against Kristof beyond his mistaken characterization of lots of philosophy as "dreary". Writing about one thing as "fascinating" does not imply that everything else is less fascinating.

    I'm happy to disapprove of Kristof for the columns he hasn't written, and for the mistakes in this one he has written, but I don't understand disapproving of the question he's chosen to write about.

  42. "People may not know much about how philosophy is actually done, but at least they *care*. One gets the impression that for many 'philosophy' is a name for something rather vague, which nevertheless matters deeply. They may not know what they want from it, but they do feel that they want something, and that we are very far from giving it." : Michael Conboy

    Exactly. And also what Nathan Jun said. There is an expectation among non-philosophers that philosophers should participate in debating moral, ethical and political questions in the public sphere. We all have our own opinions of right, wrong and how things should be. We seek validation from "experts," who we believe are trained to think systematically on matters we feel passionate about.

    I think Kristof is thankful to Peter Singer for the same reason I became a regular reader of Leiter Reports in 2005. My own instinctive and emotional reactions to the Iraq war were expressed here in a more cogent and persuasive manner than I was capable of doing. Similarly, Kristof hopes that Singer's advocacy on behalf of animals will carry more weight in changing public opinion and legislative policy than the sensationalist tactics of PETA or the appeal of the average pet owner. I think his remark about philosophy of language is no different from similar jabs at many other disciplines (yes, mostly in the humanities) that the lay public knows or cares little about.

    Off topic. The article notes that Spain is considering according legal rights to apes. I hope that all those bulls that are slaughtered for tradition and tourism are next in line.

  43. I don't think for a moment that only practically relevant moral or political philosophy is valuable. But I think that some practically relevant work is valuable, and Singer's work, whether you agree with it or not, has been a major contribution to philosophy. There are many good philosophers on both sides of the question about moral obligations to animals, and I love it when the views of a good philosopher like Singer make it into the intelligent popular press. Kristof doesn't imply that only practically exigent philosophy is valuable, but only that there was (so he suggests, along with a chorus of non-ignorant philosophers) virtually no practically relevant moral or political philosophy in the post-war period up until the late sixties. Singer's writings were obviously important in the shift that followed. I applaud Kristof for pointing out the roots of the developments he reports in the work of a valued member of our profession. I suspect that if a journalist had whined that philosophy has no practical relevance, he would have been pilloried for his ignorance of Singer and others. In general, it's an exciting development to see people like Kristof and Brooks taking serious strands in our profession seriously. It would be a shame if they decided that they aren't qualified to do this unless they have a PhD (presumably from a well-ranked department).

  44. As I said Brian, I think the justice of the Palestinian cause is obvious "to unprejudiced people who have all the facts." My views about what might be going on with the large number of Americans who oppose Palestinian independence can be inferred. In any case, unlike the pig-related matters, this is not the sort of problem where I expect philosophy to deliver any particularly fascinating solutions.

    Kristof has said some nice things on the Palestinian issue, especially relative to the larger American political spectrum. Here's a column:
    http://select.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18kristof.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fOpinion%2fEditorials%20and%20Op-Ed%2fOp-Ed%2fColumnists%2fNicholas%20D%20Kristof

  45. Neil writes: "the general educated public knows nothing about what has happened in philosophy since Wittgenstein and Ayer."

    The general educated public answers: "Ayer who?"

  46. Leiter wrote: "Why, though, is "our moral obligations to pigs" deeemed a "fascinating" question? What about our obligations not to launch criminal wars of aggression against other countries? Or to prevent vast inequities of wealth and life fortunes? Or to view Palestinians as human beings with equal moral claims on freedom, bodily integrity, and opportunity? Is it that our moral obligations to pigs do not present much threat to the Manhattan bourgeoisie, whereas the other questions would be especially unsettling?"

    Although these aren't the questions you specifically queried, I actually think the answers to these are pretty important. Happily, as a recently graduated philosophy graduate student who is also a journalist (albeit a former opinion columnist and opinion editor) I can provide some context for why opinion pages do this sort of thing. Apologies at the length of my reply – thus far, no other journalists have tackled the question.

    The reason our moral obligation to pigs is a fascinating question is because it's quirky. A lede addressing moral obligations to pigs is attention-grabbing, and may well generate Web site traffic – moreover, a large number of people might be curious enough to read more than five sentences of such a column. The topic is odd enough that there won't be 500 other columns available addressing this point, nor will there be countless blog posts on the subject. And it involves barnyard animals, which are often cute.

    Understand that this isn't snark, and understand that I know this doesn't speak well of journalism – it's obvious, petty and facile, but it's the answer to why columns about pigs are more interesting than columns about human rights.

    From an editor's perspective, on any given day there's a nontrivial chance that an opinion column somewhere may tackle one of the actually important and interesting questions you pose – moreover, some of them might even answer those questions correctly (though, as you note, that's much less likely). There's a sense that anti-war, anti-genocide and anti-Wall Street columns have been done to death – and there's little chance that columnists will have something new enough or interesting enough to say on the topic that justifies spending another 600 – 800 words on the subject.

    Though many journalists have staked their careers on the belief that only veteran reporters have the unique skills required to write opinion columns, the only requirement I can see is that a potential columnist must have quirky views. Often, a sort of ideological affirmative action takes place where editors hire odd combinations of ideologies to artificially "balance" the editorial staff. Often, this is done with little concern for quality of thought or writing ability – I did this with conservatives under my watch because I thought it was weird that a Lousiana opinion page had virtually no conservative writers, but the conservatives who applied were mostly shitty thinkers and worse writers so I ended up (accidentally) presenting conservative thought as if it was farce.

    (NOTE: As best as I can tell, The New York Times did much the same thing when they hired Bill Kristol)

    The pool of available columnists is further hurt by the fact that no one who isn't independaently wealthy can afford to be a columnist – and thus editors are naturally left with a group of bourgeois apologists of the status quo because they are the only people wealthy enough to work the gig professionally.

    But back to pigs. When I was editing, odds are I would have greenlit a column about moral attitudes toward pigs more quickly than I would have greenlit a column on Palestinian treatment or the War in Iraq. After all, I could run columns on those other, more important topics ANY week.

    In hindsight, I kept putting off the important topics for the merely interesting.

    I agree with you in that this is a bad thing, and think this is a major reason why newspapers are dying – journalists claim the Internet killed journalism, but I think you're right in that opinion pages' predilection for publishing the work of corporate apologists and shallow thinkers created a demand for substantive commentary elsewhere (enter bloggers).

    Editors who fight this sort of content are quickly eaten up and spit out by the demands of filling pages with content seven days a week. It's hard to staff a newspaper's opinion page with good thinkers who also happen to think about interesting things; And I learned quickly that the things I found philosophically interesting were topics that are either done to death or the sort of thing that no one actually read.

    I think where you go wrong is that you assume this absurd(?) standard of practical relevance applied to philosophical questions ISN'T applied to the hard sciences. Now, there is more hard science in a newspaper than philosophy, admittedly – but newspapers have a strong bias toward empirical events (we report on a protest that occurred; we report on a book that's coming out; we report on a war, usually badly; etc.).

    But newspaper coverage of science reflects this bias, too: a breakthrough line of research could cure cancer; new drugs help fight HIV; a miracle pill can protect your cat from FIV.

    The only hard science event I remember being seriously reported was the Large Hadron Collider, and every newspaper that covered it (aside from science publications) made sure to mention the "quirky" fact that a fringe group of scientists feared the world would end when we turned the thing on.

    There is very little reporting on an idea qua idea in most newspapers that I'm aware of. Reporters and columnists get at the big questions by filtering them through isolated, local events.

    And when they don't, they write about pigs.

  47. Well, this thread is getting a bit 'dreary' (though special thanks to Neal Hebert for some insight into how journalists and editors think about all this). A few thoughts:

    Roger C.: I didn't object to him writing about the ethical treatment of pigs, though it does strike me as a rather minor moral issue compared to the others on which he is largely or entirely silent. So the columsn on the Iraq War, which Rob S. helpfully provided a link to, confirm the utter moral bankruptcy of his position. On the other hand, Neil S. has found a column on the Palestinian situation which is above the norm for the NY Times (though still couched in the language of U.S. and Israeli interests, rather than the language of moral rights and wrongs).

    Neil S.: the issue was not about the best explanation for the disagreement, but about whether or not the issues are unsettling. Let us suppose, plausibly enough, that you're correct that there is a failure to impartially consider the nonmoral facts. Why is there such a failure, given that many of the facts are easily available and not hard to understand? Presumably because of massive partiality of precisely the kind that those in its grips would find very unsettling to abandon. Hence my original point.

    I do not share David E.'s sense of pleasure from the crumbs thrown us by Brooks and Kristof, but the more interesting issue he raises concerns the interpretation of what Kristof wrote (and I now see that one or two others are defending the same reading). On this alternative reading, Kristof says merely that applied ethics (and normative theory) more generally was a refreshing change of pace from "dreary" ordinary language philosophy and other linguistic philosophy that ignored substantive, normative questions. On my reading (shared by others, obviously, in this thread), Kristof says that applied ethics is preferable to hard work at the intersection of philosophy of language and linguistics, and so gives expression to anti-intellectualism. The first reading may well be correct, in which case only partisans of ordinary language philosophy and Oxford ethics circa 1960 should take offense. I'm loathe to invest too much more time into Kristof hermeneutics, however, so leave it for readers to decide which is the right way to understand Mr. Kristof's point.

    By the way, I'm slightly puzzled by the reference of several commenters to "defensiveness" in the way philosophers (this one included) respond to (apparent) displays of anti-intellectualism. I really don't understand why any of this constitutes "defensiveness." It's just exasperating and annoying. Philosophy doesn't need to be defended against Mr. Kristof, let alone Mr. Brooks.

  48. re: Neal Hebert's diagnosis. Is it really plausible that Nicholas Kristof sits around trying to come up with quirky topics, just to get his columns "greenlit" by his editor? I think being an op-ed columnist at the NYT buys you a lot more freedom than that. Kristof has written about animals several times in the last year. All signs are that he considers the treatment of animals an important topic, and that's why he's been writing about it.

  49. re: "defensiveness", I should clarify I didn't have debunking or puzzled posts like this or the Carlin Romano ones in mind. Actually, such posts strike me as very useful. But some commenters have been quick to chalk the misunderstanding between philosophy and the public up to the latter's vanity or willful ignorance. While I'm sure there's a significant element of truth in this, I also think it's not wholly accurate and, to the extent that it encourages dismissiveness towards an important issue, not very productive. (Though certainly cathartic, I admit.)

  50. Okay, cool, I think we're agreeing now.

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