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Does the NY Times Not Realize That Stanley Fish is Philosophically Incompetent?

It appears not, judging from the fact that they keep running his sophomoric prattle.  I have been ignoring it, but a reader flags today's foray into bad epistemology and philosophy of science:

Evidence, understood as something that can be pointed to, is never an independent feature of the world. Rather, evidence comes into view (or doesn’t) in the light of assumptions – there are authors or there aren’t — that produce the field of inquiry in the context of which (and only in the context of which) something can appear as evidence.

To bring all this abstraction back to the arguments made by my readers, there is no such thing as “common observation” or simply reporting the facts. To be sure, there is observation and observation can indeed serve to support or challenge hypotheses. But the act of observing can itself only take place within hypotheses (about the way the world is) that cannot be observation’s objects because it is within them that observation and reasoning occur.

While those hypotheses are powerfully shaping of what can be seen, they themselves cannot be seen as long as we are operating within them; and if they do become visible and available for noticing, it will be because other hypotheses have slipped into their place and are now shaping perception, as it were, behind the curtain.

By the same analysis, simple reporting is never simple and common observation is an achievement of history and tradition, not the result of just having eyes. And while there surely are facts, there are no facts (at least not ones we as human beings have access to) that simply declare themselves to the chainless minds Hitchens promises us if we will only cast aside the blinders of religion.

Indeed, there are no chainless minds, and it’s a good thing, too. A chainless mind would be a mind not hostage to or fettered by any pre-conceptions, a mind that was free to go its own way. But how could you go any way if you are not anywhere, if you are not planted in some restricted location in relation to which the directions “here,” “there” and “elsewhere” have a sense?

A mind without chains – a better word would be “constraints” – would be free and open in a way that made motivated (as opposed to random) movement impossible. Thought itself — the consideration of problems with a view to arriving at their solutions — requires chains, requires stipulated definitions, requires limits it did not choose but which enable and structure its operations…. 

If there is no thought without constraints (chains) and if the constraints cannot be the object of thought because they mark out the space in which thought will go on, what is noticed and perspicuous will always be a function of what cannot be noticed because it cannot be seen….

Pking gets it right. “To torpedo faith is to destroy the roots of . . . any system of knowledge . . . I challenge anyone to construct an argument proving reason’s legitimacy without presupposing it . . . Faith is the base, completely unavoidable. Get used to it. It’s the human condition.” (All of us, not just believers, see through a glass darkly.) Religious thought may be vulnerable on any number of fronts, but it is not vulnerable to the criticism that in contrast to scientific or empirical thought, it rests on mere faith….

So to sum up, the epistemological critique of religion — it is an inferior way of knowing — is the flip side of a naïve and untenable positivism.

Quine, among others, would no doubt be surprised.  Feel free to discuss.  (And for those curious who the Paul Campos is that thinks Fish "smarter" than Dawkins, he is a law professor at Colorado, with an MA in literary theory and a penchant for foolishness, in both his 'scholarship' and his public pronouncements.)

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50 responses to “Does the NY Times Not Realize That Stanley Fish is Philosophically Incompetent?”

  1. However bad this one was–Foucault denies the (literal) existence of the author! (take that Foucault's estate's copyright interests)–the first one in this series was even worse, premised as it was on a massive confusion between questions of value (freedom is good!) and questions of fact (many people aren't free). The non proliferation of freedom in the world, Fish argues, shows that atheist-liberals (whoever that is) believe in freedom with a kind of religious faith.

  2. What is remarkable is that most of this quoted passage is not nonsense. It is, in fact, fairly commonly accepted. At least it is not an unusual position, or one outside the philosophical mainstream, to say that all observation takes place within the context of a range of assumptions that, at that point in time, are not being questioned. In various forms this view has obviously been around for well over a century.

    But to get to the end, he seems to make the remarkable jump to the claim that all systems of assumptions are equal, so there is no grounds for rejecting religious dogmatism. Even though he acknowledges that we can become aware of assumptions lying behind our conceptual system, bring them into question, etc., he seems to ignore that there might be diachronic conditions of reasonableness on this, that the process of successively bringing things into view, and holding them up to empirical criticism, is the essence of rationality. And it is precisely what a supernaturalist epistemology – one that puts various assumptions once and forever beyond rational criticism – rejects.

    (Also, are the passing uncritical remarks about Foucault really necessary? Maybe this sort of thing scores points with people who like to feel superior to authors they haven't read, but I assure you that Foucault's critiques of authorship are not stupid.)

  3. Mark Lance puts the point well: hence my comment about Quine. Much of this is banal, if a bit loosely put, and then a massive non-sequitur comes out of the hat. (I didn't take John Casey to be criticizing Foucault, by the way, but rather the way Fish presented it, but perhaps I'm mistaken.)

  4. Aldo Antonelli

    Let's not forget that this is the same Stanley Fish who was editing Social Text at the time of the Sokal Affaire.

  5. Sorry, Mark, for the confusion, but Brian is right: I definitely do not mean to criticize Foucault, whose position on authorship I take to be significantly more subtle than Fish seems to allow (Fish's remark on Foucault occurs somewhere else in this piece).

  6. The way to competence is through stages that include being a sophomore, and I presume what we learn at that stage is not entirely wrong. So, it would be interesting to read a substantive critique of the general philosophy of science ideas that Fish is pushing above. Perhaps a link to such an essay by the reader who pointed out the above is available?

    I am of two minds when it comes to Fish. I do not think he is altogether bad, but it will take a bit of time (and better editing format) to present that personal opinion of mine in some coherent argument.

  7. No, Aldo, this is the Stanley Fish who defended Social Text on the op-ed page of the NY Times. The editors at the time were Bruce Robbins and Andrew Ross.

  8. John, sorry for the confusion.
    Ravi, the thing is that there are lots of versions of the kind of view that Fish is pushing here. (The theory/practice/framework/etc. dependence of perception.)
    As Brian says, Quine is one version – along with various Davidsonian developments. (For them, it is mostly background belief that is relevant.)

    Another whole tradition of this starts with Heidegger. Here I'd suggest reading Haugeland's paper with 'truth and rule following' in Having Thought. Also the work of Joe Rouse.

    Of course the point – in particular the importance of looking at this diachronically – is central to Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". (I'd certainly read that carefully, if you haven't.)

    The importance of background practice is also central in Foucault. (Forms of life in Wittgenstein as well. And Nietzsche, Marx, feminist epistemology of all sorts, etc.

    Really, there are few philosophers of science who don't have a view that could be said to endorse Fish's claim in some form or other. Glymour's bootstrapping. Carnapian frameworks. Obviously Kuhn. Marc Lange's work on laws has an interesting and creative take on the idea. (He isn't talking specifically about observation, but he has an interesting and highly developed idea of the sorts of presuppositions that go into a theoretical practice.) No doubt others will have more suggestions and would highlight different philosophers. THis is not meant to include everyone important, or even necessarily the most important, just various ones that I find interesting.

    That's the thing. There is no single view here, just the widely accepted claim that there's a lot which is presupposed by an act of observing. Everything depends on what you think the lot comprises and what sense of presupposition you have.

  9. Much of this is banal, if a bit loosely put, and then a massive non-sequitur comes out of the hat.

    Hmm. Nobody should trust my reading of Fish, but I found the quoted material just to be rather "banal, if a bit [or more than a bit] loosely put" clear through to the end. So I guess what I'm missing is where Fish makes "the remarkable jump to the claim that all systems of assumptions are equal, so there is no grounds for rejecting religious dogmatism." I'm taking the "the epistemological critique of religion" that Fish is addressing to be just a particular argument that he takes (probably correctly) to be given by some of his readers — an argument lame enough that it can be answered (to the degree it deserves) by some rather banal & loosely put epistemological musings. (If the critique Fish is addressing is based on the denial of the "fairly commonly accepted" points Fish is loosely putting forward, then those points can provide an answer to that particular critique.)

  10. I have no love lost for Stanley Fish, and certainly none for Terry Eagleton, but I'll play devil's advocate here. I think Fish has a point. His premise, that we don't have unmediated access to the truth, is not terribly controversial, and while, of course, it doesn't entail the existence of god, it does deflate a lot of lousy arguments against religion.

    If you attend a meeting of, for instance, an undergraduate skeptics association, you'll hear atrocious arguments like “All knowledge comes from the senses, you can't see god, therefore god doesn't exist” and much, much worse. I think most of us would agree that this is not the case. And Fish's commenters argue in the same vein.

    Maybe I'm being too charitable, but I think Fish is trying to evoke Kant and Wittgenstein (dove w/o friction and using knowledge here as a result, there as foundations, respectively) to criticize this kind of naive empiricism. We need a reason to doubt the existence of god. I happen to think we have plenty of good ones: earthquakes, HIV, contemporary literary theory, et cetera, and Fish explicitly leaves the door open to other objections.

    As a dyed-in-the-wool atheist, I'm always embarrassed by my coreligionists who make these kinds of arguments and usually think that all theists are morons, but Ayn Rand was a great philosopher. Among atheists for every Dan Dennett, there's 35 “Objectivists” trolling the internet and leaving a steaming pile of comments that Stanley Fish has to read. I don't think his response was so bad.

  11. Fish was the executive director or some such of Duke University Press which was the publisher of Social Text.

    My first comment above was motivated by my sense that what Fish covered in the first part was not, AFAIK, controversial within PhilOfScience. Mark Lance brings that up well and also identifies the standard abuse of these ideas to claim both validity and immunity for some pet project or epistemology.

  12. (The first two lines of my comment are a quotation from Brian's earlier comment. My attempt to indicate that by putting the lines in itallics failed.)

  13. Keith: I take it the worry is that Fish argues from the theory-ladenness of observation (etc.) to the conclusion that science and religion are epistemically on a par. That's a non-sequitur, even if you think (as I'm sure you do) the epistemic bona fides of religious belief are more robust than I do (and I'm sure your reasons for thinking that are not that observation is theory-laden!).

  14. Keith and Stephen:
    For a lot of this, one could take him merely to be attacking a particularly stupid argument against the rationality of religion. So far, just a straw-man. But in the last quoted sentence, he says "So to sum up, the epistemological critique of religion — it is an inferior way of knowing — is the flip side of a naïve and untenable positivism." That's just a whole lot more general than responding to a bunch of stupid blog comments. He is taking himself to have refuted the whole idea that "religion is an inferior way of knowing" by refuting an untenable positivism that no one endorses anymore. And in the context of an op ed, it is really even more offensive to do this, because he knows that the vast majority of readers will tacitly assume that he is responding to the arguments of respectable academics who think religion is an "inferior way of knowing".

    And it isn't just that you have to switch to the problem of evil to see the point. You just need to go one step more sophisticated in the characterization of rational empirical method.

  15. I also agree partially with Mark. The weak point is the "remarkable jump" towards the end from the thought that all knowledge rests to some extent on unarticulated beliefs and assumptions, to thinking that this would imply that all beliefs and assumptions must therefore be on equal footing.

    But Fish argument seems to goes as follows. Fish admits that we can become aware of the tacit assumptions and criticize them (as Mark points out). But that this cannot be done fully because:

    "…if they do become visible and available for noticing, it will be because other hypotheses have slipped into their place and are now shaping perception, as it were, behind the curtain."

    (this is of course a bit mystical.) This is however taken to mean that we cannot fully free ourselves from the bonds of Faith.

    That may be so. But the religious faith expressed in holy scripts and dogmas is very explicit. So it is not in the form of hidden assumption and tacit beliefs, which would lie beyond the reach of criticism.

  16. Nicholas Shackel has a fun paper in Metaphilosophy called "The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology." Among other things, he describes the method of "Troll's Truisms." The idea is that postmodernists like to express radical claims about reality and rationality, but when pressed, retreat into trivial claims no one disagrees with. Shackel gives Fish as an example of someone who does this.

    I actually saw Fish perform this maneuver in person. A student group had him out here (to Brown) a few years ago. He spent 20 minutes saying that there is no objective reality, etc.–all the typical twaddle and poppycock. When some student criticized postmodernism, Fish berated the student, and then said that postmodernism is nothing more than the simple claim that all our beliefs are mediated by concepts. I was stunned.

  17. Mark: As I said, when Fish wrote of "the epistemological critique of religion," I took him to be referring to a particular critique that really is based on the denial of the (perhaps "fairly commonly accepted") points Fish was loosely putting forward. Straw man? Well, as I said in my earlier comment, this seems a pretty lame argument that he would be responding to. But in these dark days, it's not just blog commenters who weigh in with philosophically lame arguments for & against religious belief.

    Brian & Mark: I didn't see any strong reason to take Fish to be making a positive case for the rationality of religious belief, or for general epistemic parity of religious & scientific belief. I thought he could be (& charitably should be) read as providing a defense of religious belief from a particular critique. If your grounds for preferring scientific beliefs over religious ones is that the former are not based on any assumptions and require no faith while the latter are & do, well then, Fish is countering that (in some very broad & not well-explained sense — that likely matches the extent to which the critics' own use of the terms is underexplained, given the critics Fish has in mind) science too is based on faith and assumptions. In that fairly minimal respect (I take it that to make Fish's points come out true, this would end up being fairly minimal), the two are on a par.

    More serious critics would have to make a better "epistemological critique" than the one I'm taking Fish to be responding to. And then we would no doubt need a more philosophically able responder than Fish to address that better critique.

  18. Keith, there's charitable readings and then there's charitable re-writings! Others are invited to read Fish's piece and decide for themselves.

  19. I wouldn't ascribe to Quine the sort of "observation is theory laden" thesis that one sees in Fish's article.

    In Quine's view, observation sentences have determinate content, and are as objective as the most hard-nosed empiricist has ever maintained. What Quine held was that the observation sentences underdetermine scientific theory: semantically, high-level scientific claims cannot be reduced to sets of observation sentences; and epistemologically, there's always enough slack in theory to allow any favored part of one's theory to be maintained in the face of new observations, if one is willing to make adjustments in some other part of one's theory.

  20. That seems a fair point about Quine interpretation, though I wonder (and am not alone in so doing obviuosly) whether the confirmation holism really is compatible with the 'official' view about observation sentences. But we probably shouldn't derail this thread into Quine interpretation.

  21. Fair enough, Brian. Jason Brennan: Yes, I too complained about an instance of just that type of evasiveness on Fish's part in section 5 of this:
    http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=453

  22. I find this article, but especially the fact that NYT published it extremely upsetting and extremely harmful to the way our profession is perceived.

    Maybe it's time for an open letter to the Times?

  23. cvp:
    "…if they do become visible and available for noticing, it will be because other hypotheses have slipped into their place and are now shaping perception, as it were, behind the curtain."

    (this is of course a bit mystical.) This is however taken to mean that we cannot fully free ourselves from the bonds of Faith."
    Right. All this implies is that "anything can be criticized, though not all at once." There will always be background assumptions that have not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. Nothing mystical about that, just commonplace. But religious dogma switches the order of the quantifiers from "for any context, there is something that is unexamined" to "there is something, that in every context is unexamined."

    Keith, the blog comment wasn't rhetoric. In the article, he explicitly says he is responding to blog comments, before moving to the general conclusion, or if you like the conclusion one could reasonably assume the average reader of the NYT would take to be general.

    Brock: Unfortunately, Quine explicitly says both that the holism applies to observation sentences and that it doesn't. (At different points, but he goes back and forth more than once. I think he has rather deep commitments that actually lead to the contradiction, but whether or not that is correct, he certainly says both.)

    Jason: this methodology is sadly common, but I do object to the generalization to "postmodernists". First, the major figures in 20th c French philosophy never call themselves this. Foucault uses the term 'post-structuralist' but explicitly laughs at the 'postmodern' label. Says he has no idea what it is supposed to mean outside architecture. Second, attributing this sort of argument to this group, however you might reasonably define it, is both too broad and too narrow. Too broad because lots of folks you would mean to include don't, and too narrow because lots and lots of philosophers – including analytic philosophers at highly ranked departments have engaged in the same tactics.

  24. Scientists do speak for nature, but in data, confirmations, falsifications, etc. nature at least sometimes speaks for itself–and even sometimes has the final word. God, on the other hand, is always and inherently an invisible ventiloquist.

  25. Fish claims to be an anti-foundationalist. Many react to this, on the one hand, with accusations of epistemological relativism and, on the other hand, with accusations of bad faith (after all, Fish is comitted to the law of non-contradition, or is he not?) Fish replies that his critics miss the point: he insists that 'communities' (interpretive or epistemic or whatever) share epistemic standards or norms against which evidence is selected and used to test propositions. So he's not saying that 'anything goes' but that there's no foundational test of proof of epistemic standards, except that those are the standards we adhere to.

    I am a not a philosopher. I have four questions for you guys:

    (1) Is there anything 'radical' (either politically or epistemologically) about anti-foundationalism, given at least Peirce, Wittgenstein (The Second!), Quine, Kuhn, etc? (And not to mention Feyerabend, who may be too much of a 'bad boy' to be included in a list of conventional figures).

    (2) Why do self-styled pragmatists/anti-foundationalists (e.g. Fish, but also Rorty!) often (and against their more elaborate defenses of their own positions) move from the relatively uncontroversial claim that epistemology lacks "foundations" (in the above sense) to the bizarre claim that anything goes — that poetry is no less apt than science to convey empirical truth, or truth simpliciter, etc?

    (3) Isn't it fallacious to use an anti-foundationalist argument in epistemology – e.g. what counts as scientific evidence is internal to scientific practice – to undermine the epistemic norms of scientific practice?

    (4) Isn’t there a symmetry between Fish’s arguments and the arguments of certain reductivist materialists such as Dawkins? Trying to undermine religious faith by appealing to an epistemology – say, evidentialism – seems quite bizarre and wrong, to the extent that religious argument does not compete with scientific argument for the same cognitive space.

    These are genuine questions. I am puzzled by them. Many thanks.

  26. Goncalo:
    I'll try to reply briefly to your questions.
    1. Whether there is anything radical about anti-foundationalism depends on what the latter means. If it just means rejecting the view that Fish here rejects, as I've said above, then the answer is 'no'.
    2. I think that's not entirely fair to Rorty's position – don't really read much Fish – and certainly not the view of most pragmatists or anti-foundationalists, but obviously the inference is a bad one.
    3. This is more complicated. First, there is more to most anti-foundationalist positions than just the claim that scientific evidece is "internal to scientific practice" on any reading of that phrase. Second, whether it would be fallacious depends on what "internal to" means. Maybe one thinks that there are not entirely transparent norms of scientific practice, some of which are deeper than others and some shallow ones conflict with some deeper ones. One can certainly criticize positions from within. I don't know what the view is, so it is hard to guess. Certainly it is fallacious to say simply that the norms are instituted by the practice, therefore the practice should change. Does anyone do so?
    4. I don't see the symmetry. Nor am I sure what you mean by "compete for the same cognitive space". Of course some people think that religious practice is not a matter of describing the world. What looks like declarative truth claims is really some sort of expressivist performance, maybe a commitment to a way of life cum moral outlook. Lots of theologians who call themselves Wittgensteinian say this, as do lots of non-theistic but practicing Jews. (And probably others.) If that's what you mean, then there is no incompatibility. But most theists think they are literally describing the world, that there is a God, that he made the universe, perhaps that this conflicts with evolution, that these facts give us independent arguments for various moral and political conclusions. If one says this, one is playing in my cognitive space and one has to tell us what the evidence is for one's positions. It is this sort of theist that Dawkins is arguing against. (Well, primarily. He has some arguments against the expressivist also.)

  27. Fish's, basic problem (other than the giant non-sequitur): He confuses (good) metaphysics with faith. I have seen this happen with quite a few people who perceive themselves as clever.

  28. " I think Fish has a point. His premise, that we don't have unmediated access to the truth, is not terribly controversial, and while, of course, it doesn't entail the existence of god, it does deflate a lot of lousy arguments against religion."
    But it's an even worse argument for religion, which does claim to have unmediated access to the truth, Stephen.

  29. Fish and Eagleton both represent a type of mystical, almost deistic, theology as being mainstream. But the canary in the mine is acceptance of the theory of evolution, which really only has one contender–a theology predominated by an interventionist God which makes claims about the world. To see how many believers actually hold this view, consider the number of people who deny evolution as a percentage of those with religious beliefs. Only a portion of the remainder hold to the theology that Fish and Eagleton describe, probably about 5% of all believers. To claim otherwise is disingenuous, to say the least, and the people who actually believe what Fish and Eagleton claim is mainstream are not the ones the Dawkins and Hitchens are concerned about. The fact is that the vast majority of believers will never read any theology in their life, and certainly not the kind of theology that Fish alludes to. It is this majority that atheist writers are talking about.

  30. The comments above focus on Fish's "negative" argument–a criticism of the "epistemological critique" of religion. However, I also read an undeveloped "positive" aspect that Fish briefly alludes to at the end of the excerpt above (the comparative strength/wisdom of other possible forms of critique of religion–hence his vague conclusion that "Religious thought may be vulnerable on any number of fronts").

    Regardless of any problems with Fish's account of the "epistemological critique" of religion, I do think its important to point out the possible merits of the statement at the end of the excerpt above–that the weakness (from a tactical standpoint) of religion is better exploited by arguments that focus on, for example, socio-political issues instead of "epistemological" or "metaphysical" ones. Admittedly, this is not Fish's focus, but it is a consequence of his observation. As Bakunin famously stated in God and the State that since he was "a jealous lover of human liberty, and deeming it the absolute condition of all that we admire and respect in humanity, I reverse the phrase of Voltaire, and say that, if God really existed it would be necessary to abolish him".

    It's my observation that the general ends of anti-theism are better served by practical socio-political arguments than epistemic or metaphysical argumentation. The very existence of Fish's piece, in my opinion, is evidence of my point.

  31. In the column that got this mess (re)started, Fish–one suppresses the urge to call him "Eaglefish"–wrote:

    "By theological questions, Eagleton means questions like, “Why is there anything in the first place?”, “Why what we do have [sic] is actually intelligible to us?” and “Where do our notions of explanation, regularity and intelligibility come from?”

    "The fact that science, liberal rationalism and economic calculation can not ask — never mind answer — such questions should not be held against them, for that is not what they do.

    "And, conversely, the fact that religion and theology cannot provide a technology for explaining how the material world works should not be held against them, either, for that is not what they do. When Christopher Hitchens declares that given the emergence of “the telescope and the microscope” religion “no longer offers an explanation of anything important,” Eagleton replies, “But Christianity was never meant to be an explanation of anything in the first place. It’s rather like saying that thanks to the electric toaster we can forget about Chekhov.”"

    A few paragraphs (and wretched similes) later, we find that Eagleton really does (surprise!) think that religion is supposed to offer some explanations. What does Eagleton think religion is "after"? Fish again:

    "Eagleton, of course, does not tell us, except in the most general terms: “The coming kingdom of God, a condition of justice, fellowship, and self-fulfillment far beyond anything that might normally be considered possible or even desirable in the more well-heeled quarters of Oxford and Washington.” Such a condition would not be desirable in Oxford and Washington because, according to Eagleton, the inhabitants of those places are complacently in bondage to the false idols of wealth, power and progress. That is, they feel little of the tragedy and pain of the human condition, but instead “adopt some bright-eyed superstition such as the dream of untrammeled human progress” and put their baseless “trust in the efficacy of a spot of social engineering here and a dose of liberal enlightenment there.”"

    Now, aside from the false dichotomies (theological questions vs. non-theological, i.e. economico-scientifico-libero-rationalistic questions–a distinction made otiose by Fish's follow-up), the obvious straw men (in this case well-heeled-near-human Washingtonians/Oxonians and their "false idols"), and the vague non-answer to a question posed by the original author, the truly deplorable thing about this commentary is that Eagleton (and by tacit approval, Fish) appears to be entirely ignorant, not just of metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of science generally, but of naturalistic explanation, moral psychology, cognitive science…in short, some of the most interesting and important work of contemporary philosophy. It's hard to avoid the suspicion that these fields of study are being ignored, at least in part, because the "theological questions" to which they address themselves are presumed to be unanswerable.

    At this point, it's hard for me to avoid the conclusion that Fish is either appallingly ignorant of philosophy, or intellectually dishonest, or both.

  32. I just wonder what Mr. Fish would do if someone asked him to pay say 10^10^6 dollars ( 1 followed by one million zeros ) for his breakfast because 2$ + 0.3$ = 10^10^6 in his, equally valid system of thought.

  33. I'm confused. Can someone please tell me what was the prior constraint (chain) or assumption for this unequivocal statement:

    "To bring all this abstraction back to the arguments made by my readers, there is no such thing as “common observation” or simply reporting the facts. To be sure, there is observation and observation can indeed serve to support or challenge hypotheses. But the act of observing can itself only take place within hypotheses (about the way the world is) that cannot be observation’s objects because it is within them that observation and reasoning occur."

    It seems to me patently untrue. History of science is replete with incidents where phenomena were investigated for the first time on the basis of having been observed without any prior explanation or assumptions. This is where research begins.

  34. "…the people who actually believe what Fish and Eagleton claim is mainstream are not the ones the Dawkins and Hitchens are concerned about. The fact is that the vast majority of believers will never read any theology in their life, and certainly not the kind of theology that Fish alludes to. It is this majority that atheist writers are talking about."

    Fair enough, but keep in mind that Fish is also responding to comments by his readers, not just Dawkins and Hitchens. While I don't know either Dawkins's or Hitchens's work well enough to comment on either of them, I don't EVER hear atheists (of the philosophically untrained variety) make these fine distinctions you're pointing out about a mystical or deistic god versus an interventionist god when they're arguing against religion. On the contrary, it is standard for one to find these sorts of atheists arguing against the most simple-minded conception of god, often based on a naive overconfidence in science and observation, and thereby claiming to have refuted religious belief. Against these people, I think Fish has a legitimate point, though I agree that his presentation of it is very sloppy. I also agree that he fails to make the needed distinction between these types of atheistic arguments and more sophisticated ones, but this is somewhat understandable given that it's unlikely that his readers presented him with any sophisticated atheistic arguments.

  35. I don't doubt that a single observer can produce a distorted view of evidence, but so what? This is why people work to objectify evidence, using such tools as multiple observers, cross-checks, peer review, and so on. Whatever the odds of fallibility of single independent observers, the odds that multiple independent observers exhibit the same fallibilities is far lower. The more independent observers of a piece of evidence, the more reliable it tends to be. (Note my emphasis on "independent" observers: a group is not always made up of independent observers e.g. cases of mass hysteria leading to "visions".)

    For example, Copernicus made observations of the motions of the planets, and came to the conclusion that the Earth revolved around the Sun. What happened then? Not much. The idea really took root after Galileo looked at the same planets and came to the same conclusion a hundred years later. What are the odds of two observers, a century apart, viewing the same evidence and coming to equally distorted interpretations? Fish is hidebound by the notion that the fallibility of individuals precludes any or all objectivity.

  36. I agree with anik and others that Fish is sophistically making way too much of supposed theory-ladeness, etc.

    This being said, I think Fournier's presupposition that we should individuate religious beliefs in terms of what the majority of self professed believers are willing to assert is profoundly mistaken. If we asked most people about elm trees versus oak trees we'd have to conclude that our theory of trees entailed there were no differences between the two. If we tried to determine the content of our theory of carburetors by canvasing what people who use the word assert we'd end up with nonsense too.

    Of course this is circumvented in practice by their being non-circular criteria for expertise. Something like Mill's test for higher pleasures certainly comes in to play. Canvas the religious believers who actually know something about the relevant languages, texts, and histories (all which can be specified without presupposing the truth of any religious claims). If you do this you find the contemplative/mystical tradition to be overwhelmingly represented among people who claim religious belief and know what they are talking about.

    Liberal churches constitutively try to bridge this gap between truth for the elite and truth for the masses. Conservative churches are either controlled by ignoramuses at the top (most Protestant Fundamentalism) or in fact end up falling into some form of the two truths doctrine (most Roman Catholicism).

    Of course none of this is uniform. And the moral problems Mark S. raised are very real. The fact that regular attendance at church in the United States makes one more likely to support torture is sickening. And this is not just the unwashed: note Plantinga, Van Inwagen, and MacIntyre's embarrassing support for tax exempt institutions' right to discriminate against gay people.

    In this regard though I think it's interesting that Plantinga himself defends the rationality of religious belief in the po-mo Kantian (reason bad, so faith is O.K.) way that Fish does. Of course this makes no sense, starting with Kant. The original point was that you weren't supposed to be able to have beliefs about the thing in itself, because they would end up being incoherent. So if you conceive of "faith" as "belief" (as opposed to a faithfulness that has nothing to do with belief) then this will end up being belief in something incoherent (and like Plantinga's nuoveau epistemology, MacIntyre's historicism was also a form of neo-Kantianism with the scheme being historical epoch and content being that which gets organized).

    While there are important differences between contemplative traditions, unlike Plantinga and MacIntyre they all downgrade the importance of linguaform belief and stress meditative contemplation, love, and humility. From a Platonistic perspective, when you are loving then you are instantiating the form of the good, which is God. Your beliefs have very little or nothing to do with this, so much so that it is possible that a real Christian would not be a Christian (Jesus constantly abjured such divisions). From a Wittgensteinian perspective, religious belief is nothing more than the manifestation of an expectant hopefulness combined with a sense of community with all things. And obviously Platonism and Wittgensteinianism don't exhaust the ways in which philosophy can make sense of the contemplative traditions.

    That was a bit of a digression. The main point I'm making is that while I do agree that Fish is a sophist (and that this reason-to-make-room-for-religious-belief move is epistemically, metaphysically, and morally vile), it doesn't follow that the contemplative traditions in all major religions are tied up with this. And no matter what the majority of lay people think at any given time, these traditions are central to the faiths.

    As Gordon Kaufman argues extensively, "God" works paradoxically both to humanize the universe and to mark its ultimate strangeness. If any religion were to successfully abjure the contemplative mystics, monks, saints, prophets, and incarnations that founded and sustained it, then theistic talk would lose this dual role, and that religion would stop answering to human needs. I think the recent gradual withering away of the religious right in the United States is an instance of this, as is the rise of Hindu influenced monotheism (yoga, new age, etc.) in the United States since WWII.

  37. I think that Mark S. makes a fair point above, but I liked to quote the entire sentence Fish wrote and comment on another thing.

    "Religious thought may be vulnerable on any number of fronts, but it is not vulnerable to the criticism that in contrast to scientific or empirical thought, it rests on mere faith."

    The thing that is also criticized when one says that "religion rests on mere faith" (besides that there might not be credible evidence for religious beliefs in a scientific sense) seems at least to me be, that the faith of religious belief is in a sense much stronger than any tacit assumptions or beliefs that underlie e.g. a scientific theory.

    The reason it is stronger is that the your not supposed to criticize it. That basic tenets of your belief are true and you are not supposed to question or try prove them (excepts maybe as a theological exercise). The dogma is true and you only need to believe. This belief does not allow the possibility e.g. that Jesus was a mere man.

    Contrast this with an unspoken assumption underpinning a scientific theory. There is no real reason why such an assumption should not be revisable if this is conceivable. We might assume e.g. causality, but we may also throw it away.

    In science we would prove an assumption if we could, but in religion this is irrelevant and even undesirable.

    Fishs way of equating or even comparing the faith of religious belief with the faith that under pins scientific theory seems therefore a bit shallow and wrong.

  38. "I think Fournier's presupposition that we should individuate religious beliefs in terms of what the majority of self professed believers are willing to assert is profoundly mistaken. If we asked most people about elm trees versus oak trees we'd have to conclude that our theory of trees entailed there were no differences between the two. If we tried to determine the content of our theory of carburetors by canvasing what people who use the word assert we'd end up with nonsense too."

    I disagree here. Elm Trees, Oak Trees and Carburetors are objects with definite physical qualities and particular physical manifestations. I agree that we can't simply cast a wide net and say "most believers" think this and therefore.. x, y, z. However, whereas trees and autoparts can be examined as individual specimens, there is no such specimen of religion that one may use as representative. Accordingly, when one speaks of "religion(s)", one is by definition discussing general belief. Again, there are no particulars to discuss in relation to the general.

  39. Joshua Harwood

    "But the act of observing can itself only take place within hypotheses (about the way the world is) that cannot be observation’s objects because it is within them that observation and reasoning occur."

    Observations occur solely within hypotheses? What? Then how are the hypotheses formulated?

    I've seen this move before from religious people desperate to get scientific recognition. Gods come out ex nihilo for them, so they need to pretend that science has some grand leap of assumption of a similar kin. They can't seem to make their religion fit without either misrepresenting and condescending the scientific method or inflating the trivia of their scriptures in vain effort to catch up to the scientific world's models and findings.

  40. cvp- I think it's a real mistake to think of faith as a kind of linguaform belief that is not subject to doubt. First, lots of mystics and religious texts talk about "the face of God." On your model of belief it is as if there are a determinate number of hair follicles on God's face and believers are called to assert whether this is an odd or even number. Does that make sense? Second, to the extent that religious practice involves empirical beliefs they should be subject to the same doubt and empirical testing as any other beliefs. If all of the historical evidence suggests that there was no slaughter of the innocents either in Egypt or Judea later on, then one should not believe that the scripture is literally true in that regard.

    Pole- Would it have made a difference if I'd used beliefs about infinitity? Every semester I ask my students whether: (1) equinumerosity is definable by the existence of a bijection, (2) any two infinite collections are equinumerous, and (3) a proper subset always has less members than its superset. Every semester at least 95% of the students vote yes on all three of these! Even though provably no two of them are jointly consistent. Yet I still attribute beliefs about the natural number structure to my students.

    I'm not trying to do the Fish thing and argue that science, and math, and religion are all epistemically on a par because of Kuhn and that my paradigm is just as groovy as anyone else's. Just the opposite! In every case there are non-circular means of locating experts who can be deferred to about the content of claims. Of course these experts will disagree about a lot and there will be a level of indeterminacy. But it is entirely fallacious to conclude from this indeterminacy or from the problem of induction (as Fish does from both) that this somehow undermines the relevance of expertise.

  41. Interesting discussion. While I think all the relevant points about Fish have probably been made, the one thing I want to say is that in a way I applaud the NYT for having the impulse to give space to someone at least vaguely philosophical. What I wish, though, is that instead of someone like Fish, a real philosopher could occupy that space. I personally believe, from several years of doing Philosophy Talk, that there is a niche to be occupied in our public culture by real philosophy and that we need to do a better job of seizing that niche. Not that it would be easy to seize — because whenever the gatekeepers think about letting philosophy through the gates, they think more of people like Fish than of people we all would really want to see writing a regular column in the NYT.

  42. Jon Cogburn wrote:

    "I think it's a real mistake to think of faith as a kind of linguaform belief that is not subject to doubt."

    Ok, I may have put that a bit crudely. I didn't mean to say that religious faith prohibits you from having your moments of doubt or struggling with your faith.

    What I meant was that there is some sense in which religious faith is not really supposed to be based on critical reasoning or empirical evidence. Doubts you may have. These are however not overcome by reasoning. You are supposed to make a leap of faith. Or maybe base your belief on some semi mystical religious experience, that informs you of the correct belief and so on. It seems that genuine religious faith cannot even in some sense be based on rational belief.

    Religious faith is in this sense stronger than the faith in some assumptions underlying science. And I thought that Fishs way of equating epistemologically religious faith and faith in the tacit assumptions of science wasn't right, because the demands for believing and questioning them seem somewhat different.

  43. Fish also commits the fallacy of equivocation w/r/t authors:

    "A party to the dispute might perform comparative analyses of the writings of rival candidates, examine letters and personal libraries, research the records of printers and publishers, look at the history of reception, etc. Everyone who engages in the dispute will do his or her work in relation to well-established notions of what counts as evidence for authorship and accepted criteria for determining whether or not the evidence marshaled is persuasive."

    Such disputes concern just which actual historical writer put pen to paper and produced the text in question. Barthes, Foucault et al, on the other hand, had something altogether different in mind when declaring the 'death of the author', concerning interpretation, and didn't for a moment entertain the (absurd) notion that texts aren't actually written by people.

  44. Jonathan Birch

    I'm struck by the resemblance between this and the sociologist Steve Fuller's recent tirade against Darwinism, "Dissent over Descent". Fuller writes:

    "While I cannot honestly say that I believe in a divine personal creator, no plausible alternative has yet been offered to justify the pursuit of science as a search for the ultimate systematic understanding of reality."

    Fish and Fuller's argument in short: faith precedes scientific knowledge, so don't diss religion. But there are little leaps of faith, viz. faith in the world's susceptibility to scientific inquiry, and there are extravagant leaps of faith, viz. faith in an omnipotent, omniscient Creator. There's no reason to think all leaps are of equal length.

  45. "If we asked most people about elm trees versus oak trees we'd have to conclude that our theory of trees entailed there were no differences between the two. If we tried to determine the content of our theory of carburetors by canvasing what people who use the word assert we'd end up with nonsense too."

    Then again, most most people don't consider themselves to be practitioners of botany or applied stoichiometry.

  46. Michael Kremer

    Jonathan Birch: how do you measure the length of a leap of faith? Is there a reason to think that you are right about which leap is longer? Or do you just get to say so?

    (Fuller, by the way, can be read as saying: "give up on the creator, fine — I do too — but be honest and give up also on the idea that science is the search for the ultimate systematic understanding of reality." Which is not such a new thought: "The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both are right and both are wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they acknowledge a clear terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if *everything* were explained." (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.371-6.372)

  47. Michael:
    The length isn't quantitative; it is qualitative. I certainly don't think that there could be an "ultimate systemaitc understanding of reality" on any reasonable interpretation of those words. But science need not achieve that to be epistemologically different from religious faith.

    Any purported law of nature, or any other claim of science is open to the possibility of empirical disconfirmation. All that can be established by any argument of the sort Fish, et al, are referring to is that there is no testing of everything all at once. But every bit is open to revision by the process of empirical reason.

    Belief in the legitimacy of faith is belief that there are claims not so open to empirical/rational challenge, even in principle, which nonetheless ought to be accepted. Belief in a law of nature is, quite obviously given the history of science, something that we can learn we were wrong about. Belief in transubstantiation or the immaculate conception is not.

    That's not an argument that faith is irrational, but it is, I think, quite clear that religious faith involves a kind of insulation from reason that is simply not present in science.

  48. In case anyone hasn't seen Fish's most recent foray in philosophy:

    http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/empathy-and-the-law/

    I feel like Professor Leiter might have something to say to Fish's take on the Hart-Fuller debate…

  49. I realize that this thread is moribund, but I wanted to respond to a point made by Dr. Cogburn, who wrote:

    "[Problems with deriving the contents of our theories from popular beliefs are] circumvented in practice by their being non-circular criteria for expertise. Something like Mill's test for higher pleasures certainly comes in to play. Canvas the religious believers who actually know something about the relevant languages, texts, and histories (all which can be specified without presupposing the truth of any religious claims). If you do this you find the contemplative/mystical tradition to be overwhelmingly represented among people who claim religious belief and know what they are talking about."

    *If* the religious beliefs of the putative experts were a product of that expertise, this would be relevant. But what, precisely, is the connection between religious belief and expertise in history, or ancient texts and languages? It's uncontroversial, of course, that many people are driven to study these texts and this history out of a sincere devotion to certain religious traditions. But is there any evidence that the study of history or ancient languages and even religious texts independently fosters religious belief on the part of the student? Realistically, how many seminary students, who, we may presume, are antecedently committed to some tradition, find their faith strengthened by an awareness of the history of textual analysis, competing religious traditions, grossly common flood and fire stories from an array or different cultures and times, etc.? Simply put, I see no plausible connection between the set of beliefs you've specified and the putative criteria for expertise. We may expect, I hope, that there is no similar mismatch between botanists and beliefs about trees, or even set theorists and beliefs about transfinite cardinals.

    That said, there's a straightforward explanation for why more vulgar religious beliefs become replaced by a contemplative/mystical streak the more one knows about history–the contents of those (still linguaform)beliefs are often severely undermined by a critical view of that history–not to mention knowledge of the relevant languages and texts. A plausible way to protect the remnants of the original belief will then be simply to compartmentalize it in a way that makes it immune to critique, reconceptualizing it as metaphorical, or mystical, meditative, or "non-linguaform." This is all fine, of course, if your goal is to protect a "sort-of-belief" at all costs. But if you are trying to explain that "belief", or relate it clearly to some criteria of expertise, it's a complete non-starter.

  50. I don't dispute Mr. Combs conclusion, when it is restricted to informed people who want to stay a part of the religious tradition where they find community. In these cases mysticism can work the way Austin characterized sense data, that final residue of that which one can be certain about. But then precisely because it is so resistant to revision, it becomes impossible to specify its content (this ties to the myth of the given).

    But that is *not* the role that mystical/contemplative traditions that are essential parts of the historical development of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

    First off, it is not clear that contemplation should ultimately be understood in terms of "beliefs" rather than in terms of practices that have nothing to do with beliefs. This would be faith as faithfulness rather than as an irrational certitude about metaphysics.

    The Dali Lama is very nice on this point, noting in so far as Tibetan Buddhism can be thought of as having metaphysics propositions, empirical science could certainly disconfirm them. And under his auspices a lot has been learned about the brain by studying what happens when people meditate (one such thing is massively less brain activity in areas responsible for proprioception, verifying the claim of feeling one with the universe).

    As for Combs' first point, I don't get it. The issue is the content of the religious beliefs (both first order metaphysical beliefs, and second order beliefs about the nature of faith itself, such as my belief that faith does not concern belief but rather a certain kind of contemplative practice and engagement with the world), not whether those beliefs are true.

    Is the issue that primacy should not be given to believers? The problem is just that experts who do not belong to a religious tradition are likely merely trace a history of different social organizations with different beliefs. So, as important as their work is (and it must be taken to be relevant to issues about both the truth of religious beliefs and their content), they are much less likely to put forward proposals about the essence of the relevant terms. There's no circularity though, because we are consulting people only about the content of religious faith.

    And again, I'll repeat, the vast majority of genuinely informed academics are not fundamentalists. My impression (and I teach in a joint Philosophy and Religious Studies department) is that the Society of Christian Philosophers actually contains a far, far greater percentage of fundamentalists than you find among any group of comparable professors who practice religion in other fields (and this includes professors of Religious Studies). I think this is because about an academic generation ago, a non-trivial number of otherwise bright philosophy undergraduates at religious colleges interpreted Plantinga as encouraging them to go to graduate school merely so that they could sophistically defend what they already believe, instead of actually humbly following Lady Philosophy wherever she might lead, as anyone who claims to love wisdom should.

    There is also a normative issue. As Wittgensteinians like Phillips point out, for people of faith, faith is supposed to have very specific intrinsic connections to one's broader moral and psychological stance towards the world. I think this is the only important sense in which religious faith is different from science (not that science doesn't require values, the difference concerns the nature of the values). But if you are moral realist, and think that Mill or Kant (or both!) got important things right, then there are moral constraints on appropriate models of faith.

    Heterosexist bigots, people who blame natural disasters on those they feel superior to, people who make millions supporting monstrous war criminals like Charles Taylor in Liberia (Pat Robertson), people who support economic class division, people who support terrorism against medical professionals, people who support torture etc. are morally wrong. If one's religioius faith is constitutionally supposed to lead to greater moral sense (and Mill and Kant gave us reasonable (albeit divergent in some cases) metrics to measure this that do not presuppose the truth of religious doctrine), then we can say that the Pat Robertson and their followers do not have Christian faith. In this regard it is interesting that Saint Paul said one of the true tests of a Christian is the ability to recognize Antichrists!

    Finally, the proof is in the pudding. Just read the excellent essays in Andrew Moore and Michael Scott's anthology, "Realism and Religion." If we follow Combs' view, then we have to say that the great philosophers writing therein a priori cannot rationally debate the content of beliefs relating to faith. But this is what good philosophers of religion and theologians do. For example, Gordon Kaufman's essay presents a surprisingly compelling case that what is essential to the notion of God is the the affirmation of both the radical strangeness and human warmth of the universe itself. Then he argues that what he calls serendipitous creativity (strangely, the same thing Dan Simmons is getting at in excellent Endymion and Hyperion sci. fi. novels) fits this bill and is consistent with natural science.

    It would be absurd to say to Kaufman, or any other person of faith interpreting and revising the tradition, that he or she is a priori wrong just because a mass of illiterate American boors who vote how Pat Robertson or Jerry Fallwell tell them to would disagree. To think otherwise is to succumb to the grossest relativism, the same kind that is committed to Martin Luther King not being able to correct the moral intuitions (some of which should be represented as concerning the content of moral claims) of the society in which he found himself.

    Drake- I don't get your point. If most people consider themselves experts on the contents of their religious beliefs/practices, then most people are mistaken. Also, the phenomenon of "most people considering themselves experts" is a purely American one. Research shows that Europeans are on average just as ignorant as Americans about geography etc., but the difference is that they are far more likely to know (or at least admit to people taking the polls) that they are ignorant.

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