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Alex Rosenberg on Cochrane and Economics

Alexander Rosenberg (Duke), as most readers will know, is a leading philosopher of science, especially of biology and economics, and author of a devastating critique of economics, Economics:  Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminshing Returns? (University of Chicago Press), which won the 1993 Lakatos Prize in Philosophy of Science from the London School of Economics.  I asked Professor Rosenberg for his reaction to John Cochrane's reply to Krugman, and he kindly gave me permission to post his thoughts:

I can imagine how a Chicago-school free-market economist like John Cochrane feels when he reads an article in the New York Times Magazine like Paul Krugman’s “How did Economists get it so Wrong?” How would analytical philosophers have felt if Quine had published an accessible version of “Two dogmas of empiricism” in the Times, along with cartoons making fun of Kant and Carnap?

The fact that Cochrane can't do any better than the response on his blog is about as significant for economics as the fact that the best opponents could do to Quine was Grice and Strawson’s question-begging article, “In defense of a dogma.”

Cochrane thinks that neither Krugman nor the last years of the Bush stock market can impugn the “efficient markets hypothesis” and so everything in conventional economic theory is untouched.

The efficient markets thesis is that the market makes complete use of all relevant information, and the “proof” is roughly that in a perfectly competitive market among perfectly rational agents prices invariably and instantaneously reflects all agents’ real beliefs and real desires. Any one who knows anything that can make him or her money acts on it—buys or sells—and that signal is picked up by every one else, who also acts on it, thus preventing any one from making excess profits—rents–long-term.

The first thing a philosopher notes about this notion is that since most people have false beliefs, especially about the future, an efficient market doesn’t internalize knowledge, but only beliefs. If they are mostly false, then the market isn’t efficient at internalizing (correct) information, it’s efficient at internalizing mostly false beliefs. If false beliefs are normally distributed around the truth, then they’ll cancel out and the proof of a probabilistic version of the efficient markets theorem will go through—market prices reflect the truth most of the time. Too bad false beliefs don’t always take on this tractable distribution. Even worse, when enough people notice the skewed distribution of false beliefs, they can make rents, as the markets crash. This is what Cochrane seems to think can't happen. How many times will it have to happen for the Chicago School to give up the efficient markets hypothesis?

There are so many way the assumptions of the efficient markets theorem can go wrong—different ones at different times, often even cancelling one another out, that it's easy for a complacent economist to see in the long term trend a vindication of the efficient markets theorem. And all Chicago economists have been taught to be complacent with their mother’s milk—Milton Friedman’s famous insistence that the falsity of assumptions doesn’t matter.

But Friedman’s children, like Milton himself, forgot his caveat that false assumptions are harmless so long as predictive power is improved, or at least preserved. Now the real point of Krugman’s essay is the obvious one. The economic theory the Chicago School prizes lacks the predictive resources even to have retrodicted the last two years of the world’s economic trajectory. The catastrophe of international finance is only the head-line grabbing symptom of this failure. And Chicago economists don’t have the slightest idea of where to start to explain (to retrodict) it. They don’t know which of their assumptions to give up, and how much of each of those to give up. Add in their ideological attachment to the nonsensical ideas that the marginal productivity of labor or capital measures its causal role, and therefore its moral right to a proportional slice of the profits, and you easily slip from Laissez-faire “science” to “trickle down” political philosophy.

Cochrane talks earnestly about how the Chicago School’s scientific economists are forever comparing their theories to quantitative data.  Since most of what they will accept as data is unreliable, and mostly it shows no short-term trends, the Chicago School satisfies itself that its theory is consistent with the long run (the logarithmic long run at that). Here the expected quote from Keynes can’t be resisted. In the long run, we are all dead. What we want from economics—if it purports to be a science—is at least medium term predictions. What Krugman seeks, and Keynes before him sought, is a theory that has some medium term consequences, something that would make it relevant to governmental policy that will ameliorate peoples’ lives while they wait for the hidden hand’s benevolent long run outcome. The Chicago school has scientifically self-protective and normative objections to the very possibility of medium-term prediction. It will put a theory that can make none out of business, and it will put a theory that does at the disposal of a government that might use it to redistribute if that is what it takes to increase the total size of the pie.

Keynes, not Kahnemann, was of course the first of the behavioral economists—think about propensities to consume, liquidity traps, and most of all “animal spirits.” It was easy for Chicago School proselytes to explain away ‘70’s stagflation by showing that perfectly rational economic agents couldn’t be fooled into spending their way out of a recession by inflationary government policies Keynes inspired. But the fact is that people are not like that. They are satsificers exploiting fast and frugal heuristics with kinky indifference curves.

Keynes’ repudiation of rational choice theory’s description of the economic agent was the first straw, and the last for the Chicago school.  Without even allowing for the work of the last 40 years, it was enough to put paid to Keynesianism among the free market elect. For the same reason—their retrospective rationalization of the stagflation they hadn’t predicted—they felt themselves able to ignore work that won many of the subsequent ersatz Nobel Prizes in their subject—especially those awarded for work in behavioral and other branches of economics that don’t take general equilibrium solutions seriously. The same after-the-fact account of why Keynesian pump priming stopped working in the ‘70s also licensed their repudiation of the Obama administration’s stimulus spending this year. We wont hear of its successes from them.  Too much of an embarrassment.

All the reasons the failure of financial markets gives us to question the scientific status of Chicago-school economic theory are mutates mutandis reasons to ignore their “rational expectations” claims (the wish being the father of the thought) that the stimulus wont work—or at least that the non-tax-cut portions of it wont.

Since I am not an insider, I’ll refrain from commenting on Cochrane’s hurt feelings about the insults. But if this is the best a Freshwater economist can do by way of reply to Krugman, there is not much chance he will have to take anything back.

Signed and substantive comments welcome.  Submit your comment only once; it may take awhile to appear.

UPDATE:  For the reading impaired, a signed comment is one with your full name in the signature line.  Postings that aren't signed, or are being posted with pseudonyms, are being summarily deleted:  they won't appear, so you're wasting your time.  And a substantive comment is one which engages the substance of the arguments.  Ex cathedra pronouncements by random nobodies are not substantive, and won't appear.

AND ANOTHER:   The comments of Brad DeLong, an economist at Berkeley, are also relevant to our topic du jourThis is also pertinent:

Alex Tabarrok has a great post today clarifying the complaint that "economists failed to predict this crisis." Some big guns have come out and said that not only should they be excused for failing to predict the crisis, but they should be congratulated for predicting that they would fail to predict this and all future crises. (If you think I'm exaggerating to make a joke, read it yourself.) So Tabarrok calls this move for the obvious foul that it is. (Incidentally, Tabarrok is responding to this defense of macro by David Levine. But when I get more time, I have to write a full-blown article on it, it's so bad.)

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18 responses to “Alex Rosenberg on Cochrane and Economics”

  1. A question about this: "since most people have false beliefs, especially about the future, an efficient market doesn’t internalize knowledge, but only beliefs. If they are mostly false, then the market isn’t efficient at internalizing (correct) information, it’s efficient at internalizing mostly false beliefs."

    I have always taken it that the beliefs themselves were among the facts that the market internalizes. If I believe that a commodity is well-priced for me, that's something an efficient market will internalize — whether or not it's true that the commodity is well-priced for me.

    Isn't this what the efficient markets hypothesis means to say?

    Mohan Matthen

  2. This is lovely summary of the debate that I think gets it exactly right. I am still waiting to see much in the way of acknowledgment of the flaws in the efficient markets hypothesis from the those who enthusiastically embraced its supposed applications for legal theory and regulation. However, I am not holding my breath. Perhaps ordinarily we might expect that the weight of evidence arising from the events of the last several years would be all that is necessary to repudiate a theory if this were a scientific endeavor. I fear though that the problem goes even deeper. The beauty of the theory is in its suggestion that through it, not only all messy moral questions can be avoided by deferring to the market "solutions" as self-evidently correct because they have been chosen, but the more recent behavioral work with its truly unsettling observations can be derided as too fuzzy to offer workable guides to regulatory policy. The behavioral work, presaged by Keynes' observations about "animal spirits," foregrounds what libertarians would identify as the problem of paternalism inhering in any governmental response. More fundamentally it is raises questions about the nature of our agency as individuals, about what constitutes causation, etc. that strikes at the heart of some of our most cherished beliefs about these issues and it conflicts with our emotional experience of ourselves are "freely" choosing. While I do not argue that there is no such thing as choice, the evidence suggests that it is far more hedged about by factors that we do not fully understand and that demand exploration than previously thought. That something may be true or accurate seems never to have guaranteed widespread acceptance if it is uncomfortable. The failure of the free-market school is very uncomfortable to confront as long as economists like Krugman do not command more of the attention of lawmakers. Tamara Piety

  3. twitter.com/gappy3000

    This doesn't seem much of a philosophical rebuttal of the EMH. I am not sure that Rosenberg understand the EMH, but if he does, he would not have written:

    If [beliefs] are mostly false, then the market isn’t efficient at internalizing (correct) information, it’s efficient at internalizing mostly false beliefs.

    "Prices, according to the EMH, reflect available information, as coded by (possibly incorrect) beliefs of agents about future events."

    Then he goes on to say:

    "If false beliefs are normally distributed around the truth, then they’ll cancel out and the proof of a probabilistic version of the efficient markets theorem will go through—market prices reflect the truth most of the time."

    "which is a version of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, and is much stronger than the EMH. This belies a fundamental misunderstanding of the issue at hand."

    and finally:

    "The economic theory the Chicago School prizes lacks the predictive resources even to have retrodicted the last two years of the world’s economic trajectory."

    but indeed, neither the EMH not the REH would have *claimed* to predict a crash. If anything, the EMH states the impossibility to predict such an event. If Rosenberg believes otherwise, he's welcome to provide a scientific reference.

    The operational test for the EMH is that assets are not *consistently* mispriced (either across asset classes, or agent strategies). A sudden "crash" in asset prices is *not* rebutting the EMH. Other facts may (the most famous of which is probably momentum strategies). As far as philosophical rebuttals of the EMH, this relies on a single piece of evidences, and deals with it summarily.

    I would invite Leitler, or Rosenberg, to provide a quantitative, testable formulation of the EMH (consistent of course with the academic literature — no straw men please), and then evidence that the hypothesis does not pass this test.

    One last comment. Cochrane's response to Krugman is resentful but substantive. He may not get some things right, like Say's law, but he doesn't engage in attacks ad hominem. Rosenberg' s criticism is instead light on arguments but doesn't hold back criticisms of the Chicago School as a whole. For example, Friedman's famous epistemological posture is irrelevant to this discussion, since neither Fama nor Samuelson invoked it. Given the current tenor of the conversation on macroeconomic thought, I am not surprised, but I am still able to be recurrently disappointed.

    -giuseppe paleologo (twitter: @gappy3000)

  4. The EMH says that prices reflect all available public information. It does not assert markets reflect all agents beliefs or desires. It is not clear what that would even mean. The EMH just says that you cannot make money predicting future prices by extrapolating from past prices. Investors have already used that information. Nor can Rosenberg really be serious when he talks about rents being earned when a bubble bursts. Most people would argue that the money made by shorts are equal to the losses incurred by those who are long on assets. Or does Rosenberg really believe that the collapse of bubbles creates real rents? If so, shouldn't we have more of them?

    I could not read past the paragraph on efficient markets.

  5. I don't have a substantive contribution, more of a question. If indeed the "market makes complete use of all relevant information," then a proper science of economics would generate a great amount of such information– which would then be used by rational agents to maximize their utility as "any one who knows anything that can make him or her money acts on it."

    So the accurate predictive model must take into account the fact that the model's output will affect the very thing modeled. I have an intuition that it is impossible under these conditions to create models with high, narrow short-term precision (such as: stock XYZ will rise, currency ABC will fall), because generating such information would change agent behaviour, which changes the model's predictions, which changes agent behaviour… and so on.

    Is this a real problem? And what does it say about the possibility of the kind of "medium-term" predictions we're after? It must have been addressed by someone at some point. It seems an essential difference between, say, physics and economics that the systems modeled in the former don't change in virtue of being modeled (pace some quantum complications). While the latter case seems to fall into an interminable feedback loop.

    I apologize if this is out of place. It just struck me that true beliefs might be as problematic as false beliefs as far as a predictive 'science' of economics was concerned. For the record I'm a grad student with no background in economics.

  6. A brief response to a point made by Giuseppe Paleologo:

    Rosenberg writes:

    "The economic theory the Chicago School prizes lacks the predictive resources even to have retrodicted the last two years of the world’s economic trajectory."

    Paleologo responds:
    “but indeed, neither the EMH not the REH would have *claimed* to predict a crash. If anything, the EMH states the impossibility to predict such an event. If Rosenberg believes otherwise, he's welcome to provide a scientific reference.”
    “The operational test for the EMH is that assets are not *consistently* mispriced (either across asset classes, or agent strategies). A sudden "crash" in asset prices is *not* rebutting the EMH. Other facts may (the most famous of which is probably momentum strategies). As far as philosophical rebuttals of the EMH, this relies on a single piece of evidences, and deals with it summarily.”

    Paleologo takes Rosenberg’s claim to be that the EMH (or its proponents) made inaccurate predictions regarding the trajectory of the world economy. Paleologo then rebuts this claim by saying that the EMH cannot make such predictions.

    But Rosenberg’s claim is not that the EMH made inaccurate predictions, but that the EMH is fatally flawed because it cannot make such (medium-term) predictions. Any scientific hypothesis worth its salt should be able to make some such predictions. Indeed it is not as if no one else predicted a coming crisis. This in itself suggests that there are better economic theories available than EMH (although they may not be as well elaborated or defended), which is precisely what Krugman was claiming in the first place.

    In short, in admitting that the EMH has no predictive power, Paleologo confirms Rosenberg’s argument regarding the EMH while claiming to refute it.

  7. twitter.com/gappy3000

    Nicholas,
    your intuition is correct. In fact, there is evidence that whenever an anomaly is identified, it gradually disappears (I have read this in Doron Avramov's research papers). But I don't see this as particularly problematic for the EMH.

    -GIuseppe

    P.S. for mysterious reasons, the double quotes are messed up in my previous post. I restate the relevant piece, with the correct quoting.
    —-
    "If [beliefs] are mostly false, then the market isn’t efficient at internalizing (correct) information, it’s efficient at internalizing mostly false beliefs."

    Prices, according to the EMH, reflect available information, as coded by (possibly incorrect) beliefs of agents about future events.

    Then he goes on to say:

    "If false beliefs are normally distributed around the truth, then they’ll cancel out and the proof of a probabilistic version of the efficient markets theorem will go through—market prices reflect the truth most of the time."

    which is a version of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, and is much stronger than the EMH. This belies a fundamental misunderstanding of the issue at hand.

  8. Hats off to Professors Leiter and Rosenberg for this rich thoughtful post and accompanying thread. I've a couple of related remarks that I'd planned to add last week, but which I suppose still can be offered inasmuch as they complement those made here.

    My impression is that there is a tendency among some economists, and many who read them, to equivocate between two senses of "efficiency" and two senses of "rationality," and that these equivocations themselves might be partly responsible for the difficult pass in which we now find ourselves. Here's what I mean:

    On "efficiency," as Prof. Rosenberg effectively observes, the so-called "ECMH" (also "EMH") is an hypothesis concerning the speed with which the capital markets aggregate "information," and the "information" in question is not restricted to facts actually bearing upon firms' future prospects. (If it were, then informational efficiency would conduce to allocative efficiency, more on which presently; but it is not.) The "information" in question also can include misinformation, disinformation, partial information apt to be revised or more fully filled in later, and so forth. The idea, in other words, is simply that trading has become sufficiently quick and easy, and the markets accordingly so liquid, that securities prices very quickly impound and reflect the beliefs of all market participants, even beliefs that in the end prove ill-founded, incorrect, only partly correct, or what have you. (It probably bears noting here that the so-called "semi-strong" form of the hypothesis has thus far been pretty well empirically corroborated by Fama and his followers.)

    But now also, and perhaps more crucially, the EMH has nothing what ever to say about facts bearing upon firms' future prospects of which no trader as yet has any knowledge or inkling at all — facts that I imagine would fall under the Keynesian and Knightian headings of "uncertainty" as distinguished from "risk." Where we not only don't know which face of the die will land up, but also don't know what values are etched on the faces of the die to begin with, we cannot speak of probability distributions at all, hence cannot compute even "expected" values, let alone actual ones. (It is in this realm of complete informational void that Keynes thought "animal spirits" to play most freely.) That fact, in interaction with the next observation I'll make — on "rationality" — seems to me likely to have played a role in our recent bubbles and crashes. More on that in a moment.

    Now the equivocation on "efficiency" to which I alluded above is just this: There seems to be a tendency for some to conflate informational efficiency (on the permissive understanding of "information" just elaborated) either with allocative efficiency, or just plain "efficiency" understood as a rough sort of synonym for "the state of being as good as it gets." The thought seems to be that, because the capital markets quickly take in and impound value-pertinent information, they also unambiguously facilitate available capital's flowing toward where it adds most value. But the moment one reminds oneself that "information" is actually employed in a much looser sense than the "value-pertinent" sense, one spots a gap between informational efficiency and allocative efficiency.

    Keynes, of course, famously spotted that gap, and virtually all of the General Theory's observations and recommendations are in effect situated within it. Keynes's interest in this gap also underwrites the most lovely, in my humble opinion, of all of his many quotable recommendations (thought this one for some reason is seldom quoted). I refer to the recommendation that we seek, in his words, "the euthanasia of the rentier." A frequent and accomplished trader in his own right, K ultimately came to think the securities markets so prone to what we might call not just "informational efficiency," but also "misinformational efficiency," that he ultimately advocated we consider some form of what he called "the socialization of investment." To employ the more contemporary Fischer Black lingo, he came to think "noise" trading more the rule than the exception, and recommended in consequence something a bit like a government-guided "industrial policy" — something a bit like what MITI famously did in Japan in its "miracle" period, and what China's government does even now.

    Now, next, on the conflated two senses of "rationality," it is sometimes, but alas, it seems not often enough, observed that multiple acts of individual rationality can aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes. The most familiar instance of this phenomenon is of course the tiresomely familiar "prisoner's dilemma," but there are many more. All so-called "collective action problems" and probably most so-called "coordination problems," one reckons, are instances. Yet many commentators seem to speak of "market rationality" and "trader rationality" almost as if they were one and the same thing, or at least as if the latter always aggregates to the former. But it just isn't so. Indeed, to take a most recently salient case in point, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to the effect that hedge fund managers and like folk knew in recent years that they were trading under bubble conditions and knew in consequence that at some point the whole thing would come acropper, but kept trading anyway in view of (a) their knowledge that the closer you draw to the endpoint before exiting, the more you win, (b) insistence on the part of their customers that they stay in and keep winning for them, and (c) their not altogether insane hope that they might manage to get out comparatively early once the collapse commenced.

    These observations on efficiency and rationality suggest to me that the best picture of what happened in the years leading up to and including 2008 is a modified version of the game of drag race "chicken" observed in the old James Dean film, "Rebel Without a Cause." So: Imagine the drivers cannot see ahead, only each other. (This models the uncertainty, as distinguished from risk, that the drivers face in respect of the date of the bubble's inevitable collapse.) Imagine further that they win more money with each foot they traverse en route to the edge. (This models continued winnings as the bubble continues to inflate.) Imagine also that they can place side bets on their performance with other, non-racers, with a view to hedging some of their risk of losing the drag race. (This models the swap arrangements that also played a key role in the recent collapses.) Finally, imagine that there is a net down below the cliff, and that racers are assured by the government that they will get to keep some — though it's not stated how much — of their winnings even if they drive over the cliff. (This is the "bailout.) I submit that there is no generally accepted canon of rationality pursuant to which these drivers can be deemed "irrational." Indeed, it might even be tempting to say that they verge on irrationality (not to mention violation of fiduciary duty) if they do *not* play, assuming that this form of play constitutes their occupation, which of course it does for many professional market participants.

    In other words, multiple acts even of bona fide individual rationality, occurring against the backdrop even of an admittedly informationally efficient market, can, if the "information" in question does not include anything one way or the other so far as the end date of an asset price bubble is concerned, can readily aggregate to a pathological — a collectively irrational and allocatively inefficient — outcome.

    I think this point important to make even if we are skeptical about whether all were rational or whether markets are informationally efficient over the course of the past several years. I think that because I suspect that a misconception concerning rationality's and efficiency's compatibility with bubbles and bursts might at least partly account for "our" — through our collective agent, that systemic financial risk regulator known as the Fed — not having looked out for and acted to forestall our recent asset price bubbles and busts.

    My guess is, in other words, that people like Greenspan mistakenly thought that asset price bubbles — or at least their detectability in advance of their bursting — are incompatible with individual rationality and market informational efficiency. Then, reluctant to part with the latter presumptions (which again are not altogether lacking in empirical corroboration), they concluded that there was no point in looking out for and acting to head off the bubbles. Had these people been clearer about bubbles' and bursts' compatibility even with individual rationality and informational efficiency as these are actually understood in the literature, they might have helped prevent the whole sorry thing's happening — or at any rate lessened its severity.

    If anyone's interested in more on this, here's the link to an early draft of a forthcoming article on this whole matter, soon to come out: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367278 .

    Many thanks again,

    Bob Hockett

  9. Thanks for the link. (I was the guy linking to Tabarrok.) I actually wrote a pretty lengthy critique of Cochrane's response to Krugman myself, if you don't mind the self-promotion:

    http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2009/09/my-response-to-john-cochrane-who-was.html

    (I am an Austrian economist, and I was warning other Austrians not to take delight in Cochrane's post, just because he was kicking sand in the face of our old nemesis, Paul Krugman.)

  10. I confess that I don't know much about economics, and I am agnostic about the EMH. But there are some fishy things being said here about what can and cannot be a scientific hypothesis. The Heisenberg uncertainty relations (HURs), for example, certainly constitute a scientific hypothesis. In fact, they are part of what many consider to be one of the best confirmed theories we have: Quantum Mechanics. But HURs "predict" that if an electron is in the state that follows a measurement of its spin as +1/2 in the x direction, then it will be impossible to predict what the measurement outcome will be if you measure that same electron's spin in the y direction. That you will be unable to predict the outcome of the second measurement is an important prediction of QM. If someone were able to predict such an outcome more than 50% of the time, that would be a serious blow to QM.

    So, I do not understand claims like these:

    "Rosenberg’s claim is not that the EMH made inaccurate predictions, but that the EMH is fatally flawed because it cannot make such (medium-term) predictions. Any scientific hypothesis worth its salt should be able to make some such predictions."

    and

    "Some big guns have come out and said that not only should they be excused for failing to predict the crisis, but they should be congratulated for predicting that they would fail to predict this and all future crises. (If you think I'm exaggerating to make a joke, read it yourself.)"

    Much like the HURs (under the right circumstances), the EMH, as I understand it, is (at bottom) a hypothesis about what cannot be predicted. Just as someone who wants to falsify the HURs has only to consistently (i.e. better than chance allows) predict measurement outcomes more accurately than HURs say you can, someone who wants to falsify EMH needs only to consistently predict market movements. (and the propent of EMH would add: anyone who can do this should probably make themselves a boatload of money before they share their secret.)

    So, I dont understand why someone should be ridiculed for saying that the failure to predict market crashes confirms the EMH. I dont see how that's any different than a physicist saying that our consistent failure to predict the outcome of the second electron measurement above confirms QM.

  11. Perhaps it changes the focus too much to respond to Eric's comment….but QM does predict, as he observes, the probabilities of measurement outcomes…. and in the case he mentions that e.g. the probability that of obtaining between 490 and 510 x spin up outcomes when measuring y-spin (relevantly identical) electrons is very close to 1….

    As I understand the discussion there is no similar probablistic prediction of the EMH re crashes etc….. crashes are too rare… and there is no notion of "relevantly similar situation" . But perhaps there are other probabilistic predictions that the EMH makes that can be tested in the usual way that probability predictions are. If there are the discussion here so far hasn't mentioned them.

  12. Hi Barry,

    As I understand things, the EMH makes similar predictions. Given a certain degree of volatility of an underlying asset, its predicts probabilities that the asset will find itself within some range after a certain amount of time, etc. Just as any random walk hypothesis does. A lot of people make a living trading options using models that are structured around these predictions. Now, its true that unlike the probabilities in QM, which can usually be calculated from known values (like the angle between to the two detectors) these sorts of quantitative predictions always depend on an unknown: the future volatility. And future volatility can only be predicted as an estimate from measurable past volatility. So that gives rise to circumstances where it is not a clear matter of objective fact what the hypothesis should have predicted (unlike QM). But there are lots of (non-crash) circumstances where volatility remains relatively constant. Those, I take it, would count as "relevantly similar situations."

    So, of course there are disanalogies between EMH and QM. No one should claim that the human sciences can make predictions that are as precise and accurate as the physical sciences–and I didnt mean to suggest that i was. But I also dont think its correct to say that no prediction is being made in the crash case. Predicting that no one will be able to predict is a substantive prediction.

  13. Putting Barry Loewer's point a different way: the idea that the QM uncertainty principle says anything about "things being impossible to predict" is just a popular-science gloss, and it's pretty misleading. A better gloss would be that the uncertainty relations predict quantitative mathematical relations between the dispersion patterns of measurements of different measureable quantities. (And these dispersion patterns have been measured very carefully, and the quantitative predictions are borne out very accurately.) "Predicting that no one will be able to predict" (as Eric Winsberg puts it) may or may not be a substantive prediction, but it's not what QM does.

  14. Many good points raised here, particularly on the various versions of efficiency and rationality that pop up in the economic arguments. One point not touched upon is the role of economic analysis from a comparative institutional perspective. The market and unregulated individual decision making are often touted as the best of all possible worlds when the more modest point seems to be that they may be better than any available alternative institutional arrangements. The recent downturn challenges the point about institutional design, however. Rules about capitalization and greater oversight of the derivatives markets would have lead to better results. The challenge, however, is to make the case for the right set of institutional arrangements (markets, state agencies, self-regulatory bodies, etc). And of course that challenge is made more difficult by differences in normative goals (wealth maximization, wealth distribution. Understanding models as idealized forms of institutional arrangements needs to give way to a more concrete analysis of institutions, and I think there are good examples of economic analyses from an institutional rather than a purely behavioral starting point (Arrow on health care, the various property rights theorists, Greif in economic history).

  15. Maybe this is all getting too off topic, (and if so, Brian, feel free to ignore this): everything that Barry and David say is of course true. But its not the relevantly analogous fact here. What economists are being faulted for doing, in this case, is failing to predict _an individual occurrence_.

    Yes QM makes very accurate quantitative predictions about distributions of measurement outcomes, but so, arguably does EMH (though they are surely somewhat less precise and accurate) since it contains a random walk hypothesis. I made this point in my last post, but I see now that it is really not the relevant fact.

    What was at stake in this discussion was not the ability to predict the frequencies of measurement outcomes, or of market events. What's at stake here is that an individual occurrence of a rare event type took place (a crash) within some time frame (the 3rd quarter of 2008 say), and no one was able to predict that that particular low probability event would occur within that relatively short time frame.

    My electron example was a poor choice to build a good analogy to this. Maybe a better example would be this: give me a milligram of naturally occurring selenium and ask me to predict when one its SE-82 isotopes will decay. Such a sample has about 10E19 particles overall, and about 10E18 SE-82 isotopes. But the half-life of SE-82 is 10E20 years. So SE-82 decays will occur, but they will be rare, and "no one will be able to predict when they will occur". You will know that they will occur about once per century, but you will not be able to predict that the fall of 2008 will be when one should be expected.

    So, if one SE-82 particle from that sample did decay in the fall of 2008, and someone faulted you, or QM, for failing to predict this, then it would be natural for you to reply that that person did not understand QM, that QM predicts that such a prediction is impossible, and maybe even that the fact that no one could make such a prediction actually supports QM.

  16. Jonathan Halvorson

    Eric, you write:

    "Yes QM makes very accurate quantitative predictions about distributions of measurement outcomes, but so, arguably does EMH (though they are surely somewhat less precise and accurate) since it contains a random walk hypothesis."

    If I parse that correctly, you are saying that EMH makes very accurate quantitative predictions of the distributions of measur[ed] outcomes, though somewhat less precise and accurate than those of QM.

    Please give an example of one of these (very, somewhat) accurate quantitative predictions for EMH.

    QM gives us laws and models so precise that they allow us to identify numerical constants of many significant digits. Our most accurate clocks rely on QM. It doesn't get more precise than that.

    What in EMH is even remotely like this? No hand waiving, please.

    A fundamental fact of economic phenomena, and of phenomena dependent on human social action generally, is that there are no numerical constants. It isn't that we're less able to be precise. It is that the coefficients in our models used to predict real phenomena shift over time. Not in crazy ways. Not so much that every step is blind, but it is enough to show that we are dealing with a different kind of animal (and animal spirit) in the study of human interaction than in the physical sciences.

  17. Jonathan,

    I think I said as much above. I wrote: "Now, its true that unlike the probabilities in QM, which can usually be calculated from known values (like the angle between the two detectors) these sorts of quantitative predictions [those one can make with EMH) always depend on an unknown: the future volatility. And future volatility can only be predicted as an estimate from measurable past volatility."

    I take it that this point is very much in agreement with what you write here. ("It is that the coefficients in our models used to predict real phenomena shift over time.") If I want to know the probability of an electron coming out one way or another from a Stern-Gerlock device, I just have to know the angle between that device and the last one that the electron came out of. And that is a fixed, knowable, value i can measure with arbitrary precision. But if I want to know the probability that some asset's price will fall between two values after some period of time, then I need to know that asset's volatility, and that is not a fixed number which can be known with the same degree of certainty or accuracy as the numbers I need to plug in to make predictions with quantum mechanics. And that, as you say, is "a coefficient that shifts over time." So, I think we are in complete agreement.

    I was being sloppy in using the words "precision and accuracy" to characterize the difference. You are right that a crucial difference is one between fixed values that are, in principle, knowable to arbitrary degrees of precision (QM), and values that are always in flux. But I also agree with you that it doesnt seem like the coefficients in financial models fluctuate so wildly that it is appropriate to describe them as unscientific (that "every step is blind").

    And certainly, the point stands that whether the half-life of SE-82 were exactly 10E20 years, or some number that fluctuated between 10e19 years and 10E21 years, QM would still predict that no one would be able to predict in what quarter of what year to expect a decay.

  18. Barry Loewer's comments above seem to me quite rightly to dispose of arguments for the respectability of the efficient markets hypothesis from the limitations Heisenberg uncertainty enjoins on the prediction of conjoint magnitudes in quantum mechanics. QM uncertainty and its limitations on predictive precision or even in some cases generic or qualitative (existence claim or +/- sign) predictions are completely irrelevant to the present debate about economics. As Feynman was proud to point out, QED predictions are right to 12 decimal places. That sort of accomplishment effectively insulates some of QM's limitations on prediction from the suggestion of special pleading, unfalsifiability, mathematical truth or pseudoscience. No part of economic theory–macro or micro–makes the sort of increasingly precise prediction over a growing range of phenomena that would allow us to accord much confidence to it. The EMH is evidently falsified in the short and medium term and the long run track record that fund managers do no better than the S and P average is open to so many alternative explanations, that in light of the EMH's plainly idealized assumptions, it secures no confirmation from this fact about fund manager's failures.

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