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More thoughts about philosophy and social norm violation (Rebecca Kukla)

Drawing on helpful facebook discussions in the wake of yesterday’s post, I now think there are at least three (pernicious) versions of the perceived connection between being a ‘real’ philosopher and social norm violation.

– First, we have a tendency to excuse systematic social norm violations in (successful!) (male!) philosophers, taking them as adorable quirks that go with the territory of being a ‘true intellectual.’ You hear people saying that “all philosophers are a little Aspergers-y.” (Why that’s problematic is worth a post of its own.) We admiringly comment on some famous dude’s inability to button his shirt straight or brush his hair. We proudly find it adorable that many of our own can be mistaken for hobos.  

– Second, philosophers will cultivate their own tendency to violate social norms and conventions that apply to others and to cross boundaries, taking this as some sort of performance of their intellectual hipness and depth. This I’ve already discussed and we have all seen it on display.

– Third, we put pressure on new philosophers to join in on the norm-violating culture of the discipline. This can make people feel like they have to use profane language, push sexual boundaries, avoid the appearance of concern with their looks, etc., in order to earn their place in the philosophical community. Many of us remember the letter of recommendation that made the rounds this year, in which the writer said that he associates philosophical ability with lack of concern for personal appearance, and hence found a student’s high quality surprising since she was pretty and ‘well-groomed’.  

The problem with all of this (or one of the many problems) is, again, that it comes at the cost of the most vulnerable members of the profession – those likely to be the targets of the boundary-violations and judgmental expectations rather than their instigators. Likewise it leaves us with no recourse when we feel violated. If we complain, we are just not understanding how to be a cool philosopher, or we are not intellectual enough to get the joke. It also generally puts women, people of color, and other disciplinary minorities in a different kind of impossible position: we can’t get away with the hobo look without repercussions, but we also get dismissed if we look like we care about social conventions (please extend the synecdoche as needed).

Of course, as philosophers, our commitment to challenging and questioning norms is real, and important. Far be it from me to claim that we’d be better off if we all had to be more conventional or couldn’t play around with taboos. Doing so is essential to both the philosophical method and the high quality of life we enjoy as philosophers. It’s just a dangerous game, is all, and people get hurt, and the hurt is not evenly distributed, so serious collaborative reflection on the dynamics at play is in order. We also need to get better at distinguishing between random, thoughtless bits of ideology and convention that deserve critical challenge, and norms that are in place to protect people from damage.

(With thanks to John Protevi and Timothy Burke)

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27 responses to “More thoughts about philosophy and social norm violation (Rebecca Kukla)”

  1. As a philosopher working on connections between social norms and moral norms, as well as the ways in which social norms contribute to group identity and action, it seems to me that this timely post can be extended in several different directions. Here I’ll focus on one point meriting elaboration.

    The question of the distribution of the burdens and the benefits of social norms is an important justice-related question, and one that is increasingly gaining attention within social and political philosophy. We should distinguish between several ways in which the burdens of social norms, particularly, can be unevenly distributed. On the one hand, there are the burdens of enforcing social norms. It is an empirical question whether strong or consistent norms against various kinds of sexual harassment are currently in place within the discipline, but, to the extent that they are, it may yet be that women philosophers (or younger philosophers; or self-identified feminist philosophers, of either gender) bear a disproportionate level of responsibility for enforcing such norms, due either to the deviance or the disinterest of their male (or older; or non-feminist) colleagues.

    On the other hand there are the burdens of having social norms enforced upon one. Here a variety of different norms may be relevant to the sexual harassment case(s) at the center of the present discussion. So for example, across the professions (and other groups, such as military units, sports teams, etc.) researchers commonly observe a norm against “snitching” (in quotes here because the term itself is a pejorative indicative of the norm). Even third parties who report the wrongdoing of colleagues to outsiders (university administrators; law enforcement; etc.) may face repercussions from other members of the group who observe the norm. Harsher treatment still is likely to be inflicted on victims of the behavior in question, if and when they decide to report it. This phenomenon is clearly indicated by the letter in the Guardian linked in Rebecca’s previous post.

    Philosophy as a discipline may in fact be characterized by a shared preference amongst members to disvalue and disregard some subset of social norms active within our broader institutional and political environments (or, as the literature has it, “reference sets.”) Other social norms are, however, quite clearly in place within the profession of philosophy, and assessing the distribution of burdens of those norms, as well as their origins and possible paths to transformation, is an important task, well deserving the attention it has here received.

  2. Hi Rebecca –

    I am almost always in agreement with everything I read of yours that is widely posted on blogs (Unfortunately, I don't read everything you post, though). But, in this one instance, I want to raise a question for you. I don't think that it indicates any deep disagreement between us, though.

    So, here's the question: In the origina post, who is the we you are talking about? I have not found these features to be *widespread* in the discipline.

    I do not encounter a lot of your #1 above. Most people with whom I casually chat experience the features you list in #1 as off-putting or annoying or downright offensive. I don't know anyone who finds them adorable. Some philosophers, though, are genuinely careful thinkers and speakers, which may make them appear odd because they take a long time to answer questions and the speak slowly. At least in academic discussion, this might be a laudable trait and so perhaps some of us admire that.

    Most philosophers my age and younger (I'm middle aged now, alas) seem to be pretty keen to look ok. At most of the philosophy conferences I go to, a lot people are actually pretty well put together fashionwise and the rest are dressed well in either a Old Navy or Eddie Bauer sort of way.

    I have no idea what to make of the hobo thing. Are you taking that one webpage as evidence for a discipline-wide acceptance of poor hygiene? Also, since when did having a big huge beard become the equivalent of poor hygiene?

    I cannot find your expanded discussion on #2. Can you share that with me? I should note, though, that this discipline does not regularly involve the violation of just any old social norms. In fact, we are a seriously conventional (even conservative) discipline. That is part of the problem, right? It seems to me that people in philosophy tend to think alike, tend to talk alike, tend to be white and male alike. There is a lot of sameness, including and especially sameness in the failure to violate sexist norms.

    Which social norms do male philosophers so typically violate so as to cross boundaries in the service of appearing intellectually hip? I cannot think of any. There might be this or that awful person who typically violates certain norms. But, I'd like to hear more about what norms are violated in a widespread manner.

    In my limited experience, I find most philosophers to be much less friendly to norm violation than I find people who work in, e.g., queer theory, who often say really shocking things in academically mixed company.

    Given my skepticism about #1 and #2, I cannot find any reason to accept #3.

    Does rampant sexism require 1, 2 & 3 above? Isn't it likely that the discipline is terribly sexist without these three claims being the case? There is terrible sexism in the discipline and I think that it is rooted in the widespread norms of our sexist society and more particularly rooted in many features specific to the horribly sexist past of our discipline. Systematic norm violations seem to me to be pretty much unconnected to this.

  3. A certain non-swearing grad student

    The pet tendency of many philosophers toward "social norm violation" carries the same irony that it always has for self-proclaimed boundary-crossers, from middle school to academia. One is really only "violating" the norms of the larger group, and in so doing, one forms part of another (albeit smaller) group in which, for social purposes, one is more or less a clone of everybody else. So when I started graduate school, I noticed that most of the grad students tended to dress quite similarly, swear profusely, and make the same sexual jokes and comments. By taking care to dress a little better, watch my language more closely, and avoid doing philosophy work on the sabbath, I became the odd duck and therefore the only one who was violating the more local social norms. Go figure.

  4. “all philosophers are a little Aspergers-y.” ((Why that’s problematic is worth a post of its own.) Rebecca, could you clarify this comment, if you have the time? Do you mean that it's problematic because it expresses some kind of ableist prejudice against people on the autistic spectrum. Or that the behaviours this excuses are particularly problematic, independently of the accuracy or otherwise of it's association with people on the autistic spectrum. Or that the whole category of Asperger's is a problematic and scientifically dubious one? Or a mixture of all three?

    Speaking as a philosopher with an Asperger's diagnosis from childhood, I must say I find this a very difficult topic. On the one hand, I wouldn't want to say that people with Asperger's are not more likely to behave in McGinn style-ways, shall we say, since I've never seen any stats on this. But I'm still a bit uncomfortable about people being very quick to assume the association (not that that's what you've done here). Uncomfortable enough that I've left this comment anonymous.

  5. Matt– I'm not sure exactly how you're counting (I mean, just in terms of what is Rebecca's #1, 2, 3) but you can count me as among those who have heard people try and excuse the most egregious, sexist, harassing, heterosexist and multiply other forms of discriminatory behavior by saying, 'You gotta understand, he's really socially awkward; I think he might be a little Asperger's." Exactly. that. phrase.
    As for the connection to being a "real philosopher"– I have a fairly high degree of confidence (though not certainty) that the tendency to try and excuse outrageousness in this particular way is somehow connected to the whole 'oh well, geniuses/smart people are all a little nuts' nonsense (nonsense, I say. The smartest, truly brilliant people with whom it has been my incredible privilege to work have been, to a person, properly socialized, truly decent human beings in addition to being brilliant.) But what exactly is the connection between this, and the first form of excusing discriminatory and/or harassing nonsense to which Rebecca is pointing– I don't know.

  6. Katy, can you clarify your last sentence, so that I can try to clarify in turn?

    Anon: I am reluctant to try to give a full answer because it's a complicated issue. Yes, all the worries you mentioned are among my worries. Plus I worry that this kind of spread of the character trait of 'Aspergersy' encourages distorted perceptions of what actual Aspergers is, and that it does an injustice to people with Aspergers by both watering down the diagnosis and associating it with various problematic behaviors that don't especially go with having Aspergers in fact. And I worry that it becomes a way of just neutralizing the moral charge of what is in fact genuinely bad, blameworthy behavior and making it seem uncorrectable and a matter of natural, given fact. And it does this at the cost of any actual engagement with what people who actually have Aspergers need and can do.

    That's just a super brief and partial answer. Maybe others will chime in. There is no way I can capture such a complicated issue in any short pithy way, nor do I have a complete and settled story to tell.

  7. I had (I think) a similar reaction to Katy Abramson's. I also recognize the lame excuse for abusive behavior. But I always thought it was just that: a lame excuse. The one philosopher I most often heard pop diagnosed as "Asberger" was possibly the man least likely to harass women, in all my acquaintance.

    Not to speak for KA, but here's what took me aback. Being very unfashionable in dress, to the extent that some people think it's funny to suggest that you're indistinguishable from a hobo, is not similar to being a serial harasser, despite the fact that both could be called "norm violations". I don't believe the fact that philosophers are willing to "excuse" the men depicted on that web site for looking like hobos (as if that were something that needed excusing) is intimately linked with the fact that (some) philosophers are apt to excuse self-styled geniuses for sexually harassing women. I am sure RK doesn't either, but it kind of comes across that way.

  8. Hi Rebecca,
    I didn't mean anything complicated, though I fear my own thought isn't terribly coherent at this stage either. It's just something like this: on the one hand, we have this false meme that to be philosophical smart (especially "really good") one has to be nuts. On the other hand, we have this pernicious all-too-common-even-if-not-prevailing custom whereby philosophers engaging in harassing or discriminatory behavior get excused for doing so because they're "socially awkward" or "aspergy". I think there's probably a variety of connections between the two– but I don't yet have a view about what the connection(s) is/are. Do they reinforce one another? Is there yet some background set of pernicious assumptions giving rise to both? something else? all of the above?
    Is that any clearer? (sincere question)
    As for the second pernicious bit– it occurred to me after I posted that it reminded me of another, delightful, meme that was going around facebook some time ago, to paraphrase that latter meme : " You are not socially awkward. You are an asshole".

  9. "This can make people feel like they have to […] avoid the appearance of concern with their looks, etc., in order to earn their place in the philosophical community."

    I've experienced this a lot as a male graduate student and during my undergrad years. It's silly that dressing in a neat and very casual business casual can cause such trouble. At least I've never been bothered for not living in an urn.

    Regarding your third point and related issues, I want to share that I happen to be a pious Catholic and that I would feel very concerned if certain persons in my department learned that. I do think things would be easier for me if I were a badly dressed Zen Buddhist. I hope the culture of norm violating matures and eats its own tail.

  10. Katy –

    Yes my sense is that they are deeply connected. I have directly heard the 'Aspergery defense' brought out to explain sexually harassing and otherwise sexually inappropriate behavior in at least two cases. I guess I don't see a big explanatory gap between the two, but maybe I am missing the point. Sexual norms and boundaries are just tossed in there among the other norms and boundaries that philosophers are supposedly just too quicky/brilliant/Aspergery/boundary-busting to be bothered with. I don't think the sexual norms are in a magical separate category, even if their flouting is especially prone to causing damage.

    As for discriminatory behavior, I have less of an opinion. I don't think that I think that philosophers are distinctively or intererestingly worse than other groups of people in that domain, although I expect I will get attacked for that view.

  11. Discriminatory behavior and/or tendency to try and excuse it/rationalize it away– are philosophers worse? I just honestly don't know. Every time I talk myself (speaking of rationalization) into believing that's not the case, I tell some scientist friends or friends in other fields or other professions entirely (lawyers, e.g.) what goes on, and the excuses that are given, and they gasp.
    I spend more time than I care to meta-reflect on not knowing what to make of that.

  12. Well, scientists aren't exactly a random sample of humanity.

  13. Hi Katy and Rebecca –

    Thanks for the responses.

    I think that there is a difference between it being standard in a discipline to say something (e.g., "x has aspergers") as an excuse for behavior and that something being the standard behavior in the discipline.

    That is, sometimes hearing people appeal to supposedly smart people having Asperger's (or something like that) is not evidence that philosophers act like they have Aspergers (or act as they *think* people with Asperger's act). And, that some people hear people attempt to excuse awful sexist behavior by saying that the sexist academic "might be a little Asperger-y" is definitely not evidence that "philosophers will cultivate their own tendency to violate social norms and conventions" or that we find the (not really) excused behavior to be a case of "adorable quirks that go with the territory of being a ‘true intellectual.’"

    This is really not a huge thing, except that Rebecca branded everyone in the discipline with three characteristics in the OP. Especially in the case of the second two of the three characteristics (which Rebecca lists as second and third), these seem to me to be mostly *absent* in the profession. Perhaps the first – the tendency of some to excuse high-profile male philosophers' bad behavior by appeal to Asperger's – is common. I have never heard *sexual harassment* excused in this manner, though. What I have heard is, "He's just a creepy [funny/obnoxious/smelly] old dude from another generation – you just have to put up with it." Obviously, that is not a valid excuse. It is a disgusting dodge and I confess that I probably have used it to avoid dealing properly with the bad behavior of my older teachers. Regardless, it is *not* an appeal to a performative norm violation.

    Still, I am happy to concede Rebecca's #1. I don't concede the rest, though. Almost all philosophy grad students and faculty with whom I've interacted in the past 15 years (I entered grad school in 1998) are well spoken, well dressed, well groomed and have not looked or behaved anything like hobos, bums, gutter punks, unwashed hippies, bedraggled drunks, festering drug addicts, or Jesse Pinkman on a bad day.

    There are many instances of sexism. But, that is, sadly, less norm violation than norm conformity.

    Again, not all that much hangs on this. We agree about the big issues. I am more responding to Rebecca's broad-brush characterization of the discipline as filled with men who are, just for the sake of appearing smart, slovenly cuss-mongers. That doesn't ring true to me.

    RK COMMENT: As in the last thread, I hereby cop to my tendency toward hyperbole, although I don't think I suggested that any of this was universal.

  14. ". . . hobos, bums, gutter punks, unwashed hippies, bedraggled drunks, festering drug addicts, or Jesse Pinkman on a bad day." At least some of these are pejorative terms for the homeless or those with substance dependence. I'm not suggesting that anyone on this blog means to offend. I do realize that there are non-pejorative uses of 'hobo' and, maybe, 'bum', but perhaps a bit more sensitivity is called for. Why not just say 'poorly dressed' or 'poorly groomed'? The "hobo or prof" quiz seems to me to be in bad taste too. At the very least it is unfunny and uninteresting.

  15. Thanks, M, I deeply agree. I am glad I am not the only one who finds the Hobo/Prof thing distasteful. I was troubled by the language in Matt's comment in just the way you are, but I was really hoping someone other than me would flag it as a problem.

  16. Anonymous coward grad student

    Some people may have cynical things to say about this, but the idea of being a professional philosopher appeals to me because it's the opposite of the corporate drone stereotype. You have freedom to work on the subjects you want, follow your own schedule, and do something you find meaningful rather than focusing mainly on your pay cheque. If there is to be any norm concerning personal appearance and dress code, I think it is fitting that philosophers should aim for scruffiness rather than emulate the dress codes found in business.

  17. I admit that I when I first heard about the McGinn case I was a bit taken aback to learn that he resigned since the sort of sexual harassment reported was pretty common in my graduate program. But I think there has been a change in the type of behavior that we are willing to tolerate in the discipline and this is related to the topic of this post. There has been a remarkable shift towards *professionalization* in philosophy over the past decade. This has its benefits (e.g., a refusal, perhaps, to tolerate some forms of harassment) and drawbacks (e.g., the possibility that fewer iconoclasts will be tenured in the future). I’m not yet sure what to think about this transformation; there is much to lament but also much to be encouraged by.

  18. OK people, I did not claim that dressing poorly causes sexual harassment, that all philosophers dress badly, that poorly buttoned shirts are a gateway drug to harassing students, that dressing in a slovenly way is the only way in which philosophers self-present as iconoclastic or norm-violating, or any of the other strong causal or universal claims that keep showing up in my inbox, and I am not going to publish more comments that presume I did. The point was about a general romanticization of certain kinds of boundary and norm violations in the profession. I do think these are linked in a family resemblance kind of way. I also think we have several manifestly good and very public examples of people in the profession explicitly trumpeting the claims I have been making (in certainly widely-read letters of recommendation and hand-themed blogs, for example). I understand that I am suggesting a picture of the profession based on anecdote and soft data, and that that picture is incomplete. People writing to tell me about all the slovenly dressers they know who don't harass anyone or about how wonderfully they and their friends dress can stop, please.

  19. Bharath Vallabha

    Anonymous coward grad student (16), I think what you are saying is deeply wrong and it is thinking like this that makes it really hard to change academia for the better. The contrast between being a professional philosopher and a corporate drone is doubly wrong. First, the fact that you or some people might find a non-academic job meaningless and that you can imagine doing it only for a pay check doesn’t mean that non-academic jobs are meaningless or that people who have them are money grubbers. If you feel that way, that is up to you, and make your career choices accordingly. But have the courage to make that career choice based on what works for you, not based on some general put down about the non-academic world. Second, by definition professional philosophy is something which aims to the norms of being a profession, and in this it aims to be no different from other professions, including the corporate professions. Freedom to work on what you want, have your own schedule, etc. are the perks of your chosen profession, just like being a doctor, lawyer, a baseball player or a carpenter has its own perks, which you might not be able to see. How do you propose academic philosophy to be professional without it emulating any of the positives of professions in general? It seems to me like you want to have the comfort of an academic job being professional without any of the responsibility and norms which come with being professional.

    This kind of mythologizing of academia while putting down non-academia makes it seem like any one who is an academic is already living a reflective, meaningful life. Just in virtue of being an academic. That whereas in the non-academic world there are issues of power and the resulting issues of harrasment , academia is free of this because it is space of reason and meaning, not of power. It is this attitude which can foster the feeling that when an academic is sexually inappropriate or culturally insensitive they are not really being sexist or disrespectful or another culture. For, the idea goes, that kind of thing happens only in the stupid, non-academic world, but not here, in the space of reasons. But academics are too smart, too self-reflective for that. That academics are already self-critical, so anything they do must have a deeper, ironic, creative meaning. This kind of thinking is simply a wall to hide behind. It is easy to see how famour academics especially might fall into this trap of thinking. Because if academia is a space of reasons, and one is a star academic, then they must be especially good at simply following reasons, and so what they do can’t be silly non-academics or lower academics might do. With your mythologizing academia you are implicitly giving power to this kind of distorted thinking. Get over it. Enjoy academia because you like it. Try to respect other careers. And see that since you are trying to become a professor, you have a duty to try to change academia for the better, not simply put it on a pedastal. Exercise your reason to see the obvious power issues in academia, and try to improve it as you can. An academic who thinks the way you seem to think is in danger of becoming like a clergyman who can’t imagine how churches and temples can ever do anything wrong, since they are “simply” spaces of a meaningful life of prayer.

  20. In the original post, Rebecca claimed (quite plausibly) that our acceptance and even adulation of appearance-norm violators has the undesirable side effect of further marginalizing people (esp. women and people of color) who for various reasons would be taken even less seriously were they to violate appearance norms.

    There are two obvious solutions to consider. One solution, which people seem to have discussed somewhat, would be to stop adulating, and perhaps even accepting, appearance-norm violation among our more privileged (often white male) members. The other obvious solution, which hasn't been discussed so much, is to stop holding appearance-norm violations against women and people of color. It seems to me that this ultimately must be the better option, though of course I recognize that it may be very hard to bring about.

    Another wrinkle perhaps worth considering: some sorts of appearance-norm violations are clearly much worse than others, with respect to the sorts of social justice issues we've been considering. E.g., it might be the case that it's helpful for white men to violate norms in a direction that involves making them display traits that are traditionally associated with marginalized people (e.g., long hair, colorful clothing, dreadlocks, hoodies) even while it is harmful to have white men violate appearance norms in other directions (e.g., perhaps, paramilitary gear, t-shirts with sexist slogans, "wife-beater" tank tops.) So one potentially productive topic of conversation might be what sorts of appearance-norm violations we might want to encourage.

  21. There's a fabulous paper by Amy Olberding that's highly relevant to this post: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hypa.12026/abstract

  22. Although the abstract doesn't mention it, she takes philosophers' behaviour as a key example.

  23. Hi Jenny,

    I clicked on the link to the Olberding paper and got an error message.

    UPDATE: The link has been fixed – RK

  24. Anonymous coward grad student

    Bharath Vallabha: Go easy on me! I admitted that there was some romanticizing going on, and I quite agree with you about the dangers associated with imagining that star philosophers are on some kind of higher plain. I don't think the danger of stereotyping, however, should forbid me from the opinion that some of the fields pursued by highly educated people, including areas of finance and corporate law, are socially useless and probably not intrinsically fulfilling for the people doing them. And I don't see why university departments should be trying to emulate that kind of environment. I didn't say anything about doctors, baseball players or carpenters, but they aren't known for wearing suits and ties to work either.

  25. Bharath Vallabha

    Anonymous grad student, I agree there are important differences between being a professor and, say, a business person. The tasks of these professions are quite different and I am not saying that academia should follow the corporate model. Academia aims for the pursuit of knowledge and passing on that knowledge through teaching; these are not the normal tasks of businesses. The fact that academia itself has business aspects (tuition, etc.) does not mean that these important differences can be blurred.

    Nonetheless, I worry about academia’s own narratives of the difference between academia and non-academia. Narratives like that academia seeks knowledge for its own sake, whereas non-academia is instrumental in nature; that academia allows people to grow as individuals, but non-academia stifles growth, or at least limits it; that academia opens the mind and broadens the horizons, and that non-academia is the space of boredom and repetition, etc. These are well known tropes. I think they are all false for the most part (or, at least they haven't been true for me). And I think none of them are implied by, nor are they necessary for, the idea that academia should not be treated on the corporate model.

    Moreover, I think these tropes and their persistent repetition by academics leads to covering over patterns of sexism, racism, class structures, etc. Why is the "Being a Woman in Philosophy" website a revelation? I think it is because it is striking to think of philosophy spaces as sexualized places to begin with. As long as the trope is repeated that business people are like Gordon Gekko and philosophers are like Spinoza, then it becomes hard to see what philosophers do in terms other than ideas, such as sexual terms. And when sexual terms recede into the background in philosophy spaces, then the abuses in that realm remain hidden. As long as those abuses stay hidden in academia while we hear about sexual harassment in non-academic spaces, the trope that academic philosophy is not like non-academic spaces is only reinforced. In this way the trope itself can become embedded within patterns of systematic, implicit habits which disenfranchise women. The trope is then no longer just a neutral observation of reality, or only a spirited defense of the beauty of academic life, but often an unintended affirmation of hidden power structures.

    As I say, I don’t think academia should be modeled on corporate terms. In this sense, academia is a special kind of public, work space. But this specialness didn’t drop down from the sky; it was constructed over thousands of years when women and minorities were treated as second class citizens, if as citizens at all. I now see that you were perhaps not doing this in your first post, but when that specialness is trumpeted in a knee jerk way, it often tacitly reinforces the historical power structures used to construct it. That is what I was reacting to.

  26. Post # 19: Very much what you said.

  27. May I ask why comments are being removed by the moderator, please? What is in them that we aren't meant to see?

    RK: I have not removed any comments whatsoever. I do not post every comment I receive – this is a moderated blog and my directions are to post contributions that I think further the conversation productively and are not unnecessarily hostile or inflamatory. But I am not sure what you have in mind. I've also basically turned moderation back over to Brian, although I thought I ought to respond to this since presumably it was directed at me.

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