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Geuss on political philosophy, Rawls, and the circumstances of philosophy

Interesting piece, from the preface to a forthcoming Chinese edition of his 1981 book The Idea of a Critical Theory; an excerpt:

The academic reflection of the massive social and economic changes that took place between 1970 and 1981 could be seen in the gradual marginalization of serious social theory and political philosophy—and of “leftist” thought in particular. The usual story told about the history of “political philosophy” since World War II holds that political philosophy was “dead” until it was revived by John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice appeared in 1971. This seems to me seriously misleading. The Forties, Fifties and Sixties, after all, saw the elaboration of major work by the Frankfurt School (including Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man), a rediscovery of Gramsci, various essays and books by Sartre, Camus, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, Debord’s La Société du Spectacle, early pieces by Foucault—all works roughly speaking “on the Left.” Meanwhile, Popper, Hayek, Leo Strauss and Oakeshott (to name only a few) were active “on the Right.” If Anglophones took no notice of this material it was not because serious work in political philosophy failed to exist, but for some other reason. To those engaged (in 1971) in the various and diverse forms of intense political activity which now collectively go under the title of “the Sixties,” Rawls’s Theory of Justice seemed an irrelevance. I completed and defended my doctoral dissertation in the spring of 1971, and I recall my doctoral supervisor, who was a man of the Left but also an established figure and full professor at Columbia University in New York, mentioning to me that there was a new book out by Rawls. In the same breath, he told me that no one would need to read it because it was of merely academic interest—an exercise in trying to mobilize some half-understood fragments of Kant to give a better foundation to American ideology than utilitarianism had been able to provide. Many will think that that was a misjudgment, but I think it was prescient. I cite it in any case to give contemporary readers a sense of the tenor of the 1970s.

Rawls did in fact eventually establish a well-functioning academic industry which was quickly routinized and which preempted much of the space that might have been used for original political thinking. He was one of the forerunners of the great countermovement, proleptically outlining a philosophical version of what came to be known as the “trickle-down” theory. Crudely speaking, this theory eventually takes this form: “Value” is overwhelmingly produced by especially gifted individuals, and the creation of such value benefits society as a whole. Those who are now rich are well-off because they have contributed to the creation of “value” in the past. For the well-off to continue to benefit society, however, they need to be motivated, to be given an incentive. Full egalitarianism will destroy the necessary incentive structure and thus close the taps from which prosperity flows. So inequality can actually be in the interest of the poor because only if the rich are differentially better-off than others will they create value at all—some of which will then “trickle down” or be redistributed to the less well-off. Rawls allows people who observe great inequality in their societies to continue to feel good about themselves, provided that they support some cosmetic forms of redistribution of the crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich and powerful. The apparent gap which many people think exists between the views of Rawls and, say, Ayn Rand is less important than the deep similarity in their basic views. A prison warden may put on a benevolent smile (Rawls) or a grim scowl (Ayn Rand), but that is a mere result of temperament, mood, calculation and the demands of the immediate situation: the fact remains that he is the warden of the prison, and, more importantly, that the prison is a prison. To shift attention from the reality of the prison to the morality, the ideals and the beliefs of the warden is an archetypical instance of an ideological effect. The same holds not just for wardens, but for bankers, politicians, voters, investors, bureaucrats, factory workers, consumers, advisers, social workers, even the unemployed—and, of course, for academics.

Thoughts from readers?

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43 responses to “Geuss on political philosophy, Rawls, and the circumstances of philosophy”

  1. Do any Rawlsians out there know whether Rawls actually spoke much about 'especially gifted individuals' or committed to the view that they were 'the overwhelming producers of value', as supposed to talking of how we need a system which incentivises everyone to develop their own talents?

  2. I'm sympathetic to the political views that Geuss espouses, but I think he's a little bit unfair to Rawls here. He's certainly correct that Rawls believes that inequality (of wealth) is justifiable because of the benefits of increased productivity and the preservation of the incentive structure. However, Geuss leaves out the full content of the difference principle: inequality is justifiable only if the benefits realized make the worst off better off than they would be under any other arrangement. The difference principle couldn't plausibly be interpreted as leaving for the poor only "crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich and powerful."

    This is not to say that there aren't problems with Rawls's views on inequality. For instance, he probably underestimates the impact that economic inequality has on social and political inequality (the rich gain not only wealth, but power and influence as well). Maybe Rawls thought he took care of this problem by making the first principle of justice lexically prior to the difference principle, but nonetheless, once we understand the threat that economic inequality poses to social and political equality, the tension between Rawls's two principles is noteworthy.

    But even still, all of this hardly justifies likening Rawls's views to those of someone like Ayn Rand. One major difference: Rand doesn't care at all about the benefits accrued by the worst off (or anyone other than the heroic capitalist, for that matter). This difference between Rawls and Rand amounts to much more than a mere difference of "temperament, mood, calculation and the demands of the immediate situation."

  3. Geuss gives the impression of not having read Rawls. Or, if he has, of projecting on to him whatever he needs to in order to fulfill his simplistic story about Rawls being, like Ayn Rand, in favor of inequality.

    Here are a few problems with the passage:

    – Rawls does not, to my knowledge, make the empirical claim that "those who are now rich are well-off because they have contributed to the creation of 'value'". (Geuss puts 'value' in scare quotes, which is strange, since if the concept occurs in Rawls at all, it isn't an important one. I assume Geuss has Rawls's notion of basic goods in mind.) It's entirely consistent with Rawls's theory and rhetoric, etc., that the rich are well-off because they inherited wealth that their ancestors accumulated wealth by exploiting slaves.

    – Rawls does not, to my knowledge, make any psychological claims about what's needed to motivate people to work or produce value/primary goods.

    – This last point is important, since it means that Rawls's theory is genuinely consistent with full equality. If one doesn't accept the psychological claim about motivation to work, then there would likely be no inequality that would benefit the poorest, and so Rawls's difference principle wouldn't permit any inequality.

    -By focusing on this psychological claim, Geuss misses the force of Rawls's difference principle. What I've always found compelling about this principle (whether in the end it works or not) is that it's hard to see what's wrong with some particularly inequality if it really improves the lot of the worst off in the long run.

    – That being said, Rawls's theory doesn't rule out inequality per se from the outset, without regard to empirical facts about society. And so given certain empirical assumptions, I guess it could lead us to a society that's interestingly similar to the kind that Ayn Rand would have advocated. But it seems pretty obvious to me that these empirical facts have never obtained and almost certainly never will. It seems most plausible to me that in the real world, Rawls's theory would reckon as just something along the lines of Scandinavian social democracy. It may even recommend something like Marxist socialism: the poorest in Cuba are arguably better off than in other Caribbean/Latin American countries that have higher GDP and higher inequality. The claim that the similarities between Scandinavian social democracy and what Ayn Rand advocated are more important than the gaps will only seem plausible to a puritanical, simple-minded true believer in complete equality.

    – Speaking of complete equality, is that what Geuss has in mind when he talks of "full egalitarianism"? Has anyone ever advocated that before? Marx certainly didn't. Cuba has always allowed varying levels of inequality, depending on the empirical reality. I hope Geuss has something more plausible in mind.

  4. Rawls as “trickle-down” theorist and academic “prison warden”? That’s not merely an uncharitable reading of the difference principle and the broader project of TJ. Geuss’s willful misreading is instructively provocative—albeit, and ironically, with “an ideological effect” characteristic of the intellectual excesses (and laziness) of 60s and 70s radicals.

  5. "To those engaged (in 1971) in the various and diverse forms of intense political activity which now collectively go under the title of 'the Sixties,' Rawls’s Theory of Justice seemed an irrelevance."
    That seems to me to be a fair statement.
    "He was one of the forerunners of the great countermovement, proleptically outlining a philosophical version of what came to be known as the 'trickle-down' theory."
    Not the whole story. Rawls himself later objected that A Theory of Justice had been misunderstood to be an apology for welfare-state capitalism. He later argued that welfare-state capitalism is unable to realize his two principles of justice because it rejects what he called the "fair value of political liberty," which assures that all citizens have a roughly equal chance of influencing political outcomes.
    "Rawls allows people who observe great inequality in their societies to continue to feel good about themselves, provided that they support some cosmetic forms of redistribution of the crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich and powerful."
    Not so. The difference principle kicks in only after fair value, a first-principle requirement, is satisfied. By the end of the century, Rawls's clarified position was that either of two "ideal types" of regime might realize justice: property-owning democracy and liberal-democratic socialism. The former tries to achieve fair-value by means of institutions that break up concentrations of capital and disperse them among citizens generally. The later is a regime of state-owned productive capital. Rawls was clearly unhappy with being mistaken as an apologist for the status quo.
    "Rawls did in fact eventually establish a well-functioning academic industry which was quickly routinized and which preempted much of the space that might have been used for original political thinking."
    The space available for original political thinking is too large for that to be a just complaint. Jerry Cohen's introduction to the 2000 edition of his Karl Marx's Theory of History is far more illuminating than Geuss's squib.

  6. I love your description of the piece as 'interesting'. Other words you might have used in place of 'interesting' include 'awful', 'woefuly ignorant', and 'wrong'.

    BL COMMENT: My own view is none of those other words are apt, even if the treatment of Rawls leaves something to be desired.

  7. To change the metaphor from one of a prison to one of a plague, in this case, a plague of neoliberal capitalism, doesn't the work of Rawls provide needed first aid in plague conditions?

    For those who are in critical condition due to a plague, it seems that whether or not they receive first aid is not just "ideological", but a matter of at times life or death and certainly, of the quality of life actually lived.

    Ok. The ideal approach would be to deal with the causes of the plague, but some plagues are endemic. It seems to me that capitalism is our endemc plague.

  8. Whatever the merits of Guess's historical analysis, to see the differences between Rawls and Rand as mere matters of temperament is to evince an unconscionably sloppy reading of both. Blanket statements of this kind are motivated by political goals, not philosophical reasoning.

  9. As usual, the typical Anglo-American philosophers hawk up and down on the minutiae (splutter, "where did… pfff … where ppffff where did Rawls say *that* *exactly*) while missing the fundamental message Geuss conveys: the Rawlsian cult props up the status quo, it is in service to the reigning ideology.

  10. The trouble reaches its peak with this line: "A prison warden may put on a benevolent smile (Rawls) or a grim scowl (Ayn Rand), but that is a mere result of temperament, mood, calculation and the demands of the immediate situation: the fact remains that he is the warden of the prison, and, more importantly, that the prison is a prison." Why is this troubling? For one thing, it culminates a discussion of value grounded in special individual gifts. How are those gifts manifest? Precisely as temperament, mood, calculation, and response to the demands of the immediate situation. There's nothing "mere" about it. Geuss may be exaggerating for effect here, but if for the sake of argument Rawls and Rand differ only in this respect, it's a significant difference. Secondly, the talk of incentive is confusing. Why do the well-off need motivation when, per Geuss's assumption imputed to Rawls, the creation of value already happily benefits them? Moreover, an "incentive structure" motivates some (to alter their temperament, mood, etc.), but not others, whose motivation may very well be their morality, ideals, and beliefs, not to mention the pleasure they enjoy in exercising their special talents.

  11. Like most of Geuss' work I find this interesting, and what he has to say about Rawls reviving political philosophy seems convincing. The comparison between Rawls and Rand is strained, but I suppose that could be the point – a kind of use of exaggeration to 'direct our attention to important features of the world that might otherwise be overlooked' (as Geuss himself puts it, in a gloss on Adorno's remark that 'all thinking is exaggeration). I confess, though, that I find it hard to see how it illuminates even when read as a deliberate exaggeration.
    L.K. McPherson's charge of intellectual excess (and laziness) is interesting. The scholarship in Geuss' last two essay collections (Politics and the Imagination and A World Without Why) seems to me much less careful than in Politics, Culture, and History or Outside Ethics. Lots of very broad citations of quite long and complex works (e.g. describing an argument by Max Weber, and citing the whole of the Protestant Ethic without specific page references). And some sweeping and abusive references to thinkers Geuss dislikes (e.g., the description of Gadamer as a 'reactionary, distended windbag,' or of Arendt as a 'journalist').

  12. Geuss' attempt to supplant the disciplinary narrative a pre-Rawlsian drought in political philosophy, usually attributed to post-analytic, ordinary language and logical positivist philosophies, is spot on. There was important and socially engaged work throughout the immediate post-war era; it just wasn't – on the whole – subsumable into Anglophone orthodoxy, then or now.

    As is by now renowned, Geuss is often a brazen and uncharitable critic, sparing little time and effort for close readings and scholarly exchanges. That is exactly the point, however, and follows from the force of the ultimate contention: that aToJ is an ideological support for the context of its articulation, for which the expenditure of serious attention – becoming party to the liberal moralist micro-industry – does exactly the same thing. This is obviously unsatisfactory for Rawlsians, but they would mistake the issue to understand it as anything but a disagreement at meta-ethical first principle.

  13. If you rise to a sufficiently lofty point of view, all things look despicably alike. There’s no difference between Barack Obama and Ted Cruz, between the EPA and Monsanto, and between John Rawls and Ayn Rand. I share the concerns of the Left, but I find their haughty attitude hard to take.

  14. Geuss is wrong in asserting that "trickle-down" theory post-dates *A Theory of Justice*. It goes back at least to the 1950s. If, for example, Geuss digs out his old Folkways album of Talking Blues (de rigueur for all American Leftists of the 1960s, surely) he'll find the following verse in a splendid song called "I like Ike", dating (I think) from 1956:

    The number one helper in the whole shebang
    Is a feller named Humphrey, the leader of the gang.
    I don't mean Hubert, Minnesota's pride and joy–
    I mean Trickle-Down George, the banker's boy.
    George says WE gotta balance the budget–And when he says WE–
    He means YOU–and ME– but not HIM.
    Now Trickle-Down George is in charge of the taxes,
    He's the big man in the Washington-Wall Street axis.
    He wouldn't cut the taxes for you and me.
    He says that's "irresponsibility".
    But for the big fat cats he swings his axe, and biff! bang! whoosh!–down comes their tax–
    But don't worry, brother–you'll pick up a couple of drops
    After a while–when she starts to trickle down.

  15. The tragedy here is that the misreadings are orthogonal to the interesting and original point he is making, which is that there was a whole world of political philosophy just before Rawls. We needed to be reminded of this. We did not need to be reminded of this via strange associations of Rawls with Rand (and, symbolically, with Reagan and Thatcher). Perhaps Joseph Streeter (above) is right, and Geuss has decided that provocative misreadings are more likely to get his main points read and discussed. For a senior philosopher, this is almost certainly true. Junior philosophers and graduate students, naturally, do not have the luxury of deploying this tactic.

  16. You don't have to be a Rawls-lover — I'm certainly not — to find Geuss's claims annoying. I read, and reviewed, his Philosophy and Real Politics book and found its positive program for political philosophy vague to the point of vacuousness — there was no there there. That to me is a more serious flaw than his admittedly wildly uncharitable readings of the philosophers he doesn't like.

  17. The claim that Rawls was a defender of the American status quo has always puzzled me. Rawls's two principles of justice (or the principles that result from extending justice as fairness to non-ideal theory) clearly demand large changes in American institutions.

    For example, Rawls's theory demands that we completely rethink the way education is financed. In a society in which property values vary from one community to another, the fair equality of opportunity prohibits financing schools locally with property taxes.

  18. Geuss' provocative rhetoric is just that, so it's unfair to demand a careful reading of Rawls from such a piece. Still, I think attributing a trickle-down view to Rawls is incorrect. He was not so much a prophet of Thatcherism as an obituarist who filed his piece on social democracy a decade early.

    The sensible complaint Geuss does have against Rawls is that Rawls played a crucial role in establishing a disciplinary standard where some form of liberalism (even in the form of POD or liberal-democratic socialism) is practically the only game in town. That shift firmly moved the centre of gravity of the discipline to the right. And no, a moralising socialist like G.A. Cohen doesn't count as an exponent of the leftist tradition that Geuss is nostalgic about.

  19. The best comparison for Rawls in terms of literature and lasting importance -for better or worse- is Tolkien. Rand was an intellectual vulgarian and an incompetent writer; Tolkien was an Oxbridge don and an articulate writer of high fantasy. Both Tolkien And Rawls were changed by war, a generation apart: Tolkien fought in WWI. Their audiences overlap and in my experience also their serious critics.

  20. It’s misleading, I think, for Geuss (whose point about other existing political philosophy is well-taken) to so sharply contrast the academics with the activists in the U.S. At that time the halls of academia were (by all accounts) buzzing with students and faculty who were newly activated by the social movements around black civil rights, women’s equality, and the Vietnam war. Many of them, as we know, had joined or started a variety of highly activist groups, movements, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, and more. The academic audience in 1971 was unusually politically activated by historical standards. TJ didn't produce this climate, of course, but when TJ came along, that is the same academic audience that turned TJ into the runaway classic that it became. Maybe Geuss thinks that college students and teachers on the heels of the 60’s were ripe for a big thick reactionary tome. Or maybe that’s not what they thought it was.

  21. Robert Colin English

    "Rawls allows people who observe great inequality in their societies to continue to feel good about themselves, provided that they support some cosmetic forms of redistribution of the crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich and powerful."

    I think Geuss misunderstands where Rawls locates the real egalitarian upshot of justice as fairness (which probably comes to the fore more clearly in Rawls' later work): the first rather than the second principle of justice. The _first_ principle ensures fair (rather than merely formal) equality of opportunity and the fair (rather than merely formal) value of the political liberties. To the extent that a society ensures both these conditions, inequality in wealth cannot be easily translated into inequality in power – the wealthy would lack the means to dominate the worse off by controlling the political process. And anyone familiar with Rawls' remarks in the preface to the revised edition of ToJ and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement will know that, far from being a patsy or apologist for "American ideology", Rawls explicitly states that the economic system currently ascendant in the US (which he calls welfare state capitalism) violates the first principle of justice and is therefore incompatible with justice as fairness. Property owning democracy and democratic/liberal socialism are the two economic systems which he claims are compatible with justice as fairness. In the preface to the revised edition, Rawls writes:

    "In a welfare state the aim is that none should fall below a decent standard of life, and that all should receive certain protections against accident and misfortune…Such a system may allow large and inheritable inequities of wealth incompatible with the fair value of the political liberties…as well as large disparities of income that violate the difference principle…By contrast, in a property-owning democracy…basic institutions must from the outset put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, the productive means to be fully cooperating members of society…" (1999, xv)

    I would imagine Rand adheres to what Rawls calls laissez-faire, unregulated, captialism – which he considers even worse than welfare state capitalism. The difference between the two of them, I think, is hardly the difference between a "smile" and a "grim scowl".

  22. I would suggest another diagnosis that leads to the same concern of Geuss, about the ideological role of Rawls' work.
    One major disagreement in the 1960s, in the civil rights movement for example, was focusing on popular mobilization vs. the courts. (John Lewis warned against forsaking the one for the other in his March on Washington speech.) This was never a disagreement in the anti-war movement, by the way, where the courts were no help. Rawls provided a way of doing political philosophy that linked it with constitutional issues, hence with the legalistic appropriation of the 1960s. This made sense for civil rights concerns; it did not speak to issues of the anti-war movement, which Rawls didn't seem much concerned with (I took three classes from him at the time and never heard him mention the Vietnam War). We can be glad he did this, but recognize its limits. His work does not speak to the politics of social activism, hence seems barren to those who think that's what politics is all about. It is a philosophy for Northeast privileged liberal academics who speak to their students as potential federal judges.

  23. It is worth keeping two things straight. One is what someone X said. The other is what impact the saying (and the not saying) by X has had. Geuss makes a fair point or two about how Rawls was taken. But Rawls said he had been misunderstood. He openly changed his 1971 view in several ways. But only one, maybe two, passages in TJ or his huge post-1971 corpus could be construed as an endorsement of the "near" justice of the basic structure of the United States or Great Britain. Those who are interested in what Rawls meant by what he said, and how it all hangs together, aren't mere pedants–or if they are, then philosophy is pedantry.

    The notion that Rawls's "sayings" have had some kind of regrettable impact on actual politics, or somehow had served up talking points to the Reganite-Thatcherite right is ludicrous. Frank Michelman pointed out that as of July 4, 1999, no member of the US Supreme Court "had ever mentioned the name of the philosopher John Rawls." The same is true (my researchers tell me) as of July 4, 2014. If, as Cheyney Ryan suggests, Rawls was pitching to future law clerks, he failed utterly. But then Rawls's mature doctrine is not something one could easily conjure out of the text of the due process and equal protection clauses anyway.

    Geuss's diatribe obscures rather than exposes what was truly conservative about Rawls. The pre-TJ Rawls was asking the kind of question that only a conservative could ask: what justifies disobeying an unjust law, or resisting an unjust policy by disobeying the law? I suspect that no activist in the civil rights or anti-Vietnam War movements thought to consult, or found sustenance in, Rawls's two (1964 and 1969) papers on this. More than that, Rawls never even asked the question: when is a revolution needed and justified? Kant and Locke at least posed this question. Rawls's closest pass at this is the "natural duty of justice," to support the creation of just institutions when we can do so at a cost acceptable to ourselves. By Rawls's own account, the United States and–Atlee's government aside–Great Britain have never seriously aimed at the kind of regime that would realize the principles of justice Rawls defended. So, our political duty, our duty of justice, according to Rawls is to … support the creation of just institutions if we can do so at reasonable cost? If Guess had pointed out utterly lame this answer is, I would maybe overlook his feeble grasp of Rawls's actual, actually radical, doctrine.

    Forgive me for putting it this way, but what Rawls needs now is his Leo Strauss, to unpack the things Rawls had to have meant, but thought too impolitic to say.

  24. I don't know when you took these classes, but when I was graduate student at Harvard in 1969 I attended a Vietnam teach-in in which Rawls spoke along with Chomsky and a lot of others opposing the way. His presentation was dry and analytical, and quite impressive.

  25. I took the classes in the late 1960's, and this is the first I've heard of Rawls doing a teach-in. Rawls was not at Harvard in academic year 69-70, but at Stanford. I don't remember any teach-ins in the spring of 1969 except those related to the ROTC conflict, which Rawls was not involved with. Rawls was not comfortable with public speaking, which is why his classes were where one might have expected mention of these issues. Anyway, I think the substantive concern is the relation of his political philosophy, or his kind of political philosophy, to political activism. Maybe some people feel there is an important connection between them. This is not my experience.

  26. So far as I can tell, this is basically a slightly more dyspeptic footnote to the sort of criticisms Geuss made in "Neither History Nor Praxis." (There was a nice discussion of it on this page: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2007/10/geusss-skeptici.html.) Several of the remarks above strike me as providing at least indirect evidence in favor of Geuss's complaints. So, for example, the mere fact that Rawls felt compelled to defend himself against the charge of defending the political status quo would seem to indicate either that his critics were being insufficiently charitable or that his work was insufficiently clear about actual matters of contemporary politics to ascertain which actual, hide-bound regimes might satisfy his formal constraints. (The fact that a question as basic as that doesn't appear to get a clear answer would seem to be a rather basic defect in a work of political philosophy.)

    I similarly take the complaint about the effect on the academic discipline of political philosophy to be to the effect that intense focus on the formal aspects of the principles, their lexical ordering, the original position, and endless discussions of minimally described institutions exerted an extreme opportunity cost, while at the same time functioning quite well to enable philosophers interested in theoretical ethics and political philosophy to get on with things like tenure and career advancement just fine without speaking to, or ostensibly worrying too much over, e.g., the actual hammers being taken to their own fleshy institutions and structures of state support under "neoliberal" reform. The analogy to Rand is, of course, a bit hyperbolic.

    But as an exercise, try to see how much of a stretch it would be to interpret the two principles of justice in a way that would have been perfectly cogent to a Milton Friedman. Absent further elucidation, the first principle gets on just fine under extremely narrow conceptions of basic liberties ("fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties" might or might not state a substantive right beyond the necessities of survival); it's plausible to interpret the phrase "fair equality of opportunity" in a way that claims both notions of fairness and opportunity to the accidents of birth (only by bringing in the ad hoc device of the original position does Rawls attempt to evade this; but it's never been clear which values and considerations might motivate us once scrubbed of our actual characters and dispositions); the difference principle almost sounds like triumphalist slogans of neoliberalism–the homeless may be miserable, but they've got the cheapest clothes ever! As Corey Robin has usefully pointed out, it's in the nature of conservative counter-reformationists to adapt the rhetorical trappings of political liberalism to their own separate revanchist ends. But absent a lot of talk about actual, historical politics and institutions, actual economic and political conditions, and the like, can't we at least complain that the notoriously abstract and activism-averse Rawls made the work a bit too easy for them? Worse still, as on display in the comments above, the criticism is inevitably met by a return to Rawls to elucidate a text. Work like that is, obviously, more fun than actual institutional or political history or analysis. Nothing in particular hangs on it, and it's remarkably devoid of any otherwise possibly alienating political commitments.

  27. The prison metaphor is strong. It immediately invokes memories of the other dominant political system during the 60s and 70s. People reporting about their life in the GDR (East-Germany) provide the minute details (there are excellent German documentaries about that). So there is a lot to keep in mind when evaluating conceptions in political philosophy.

  28. 1. The claim was never that there was no political theory in the broad sense before Rawls, it was that he revived a tradition of normative theorizing about social justice that had been largely moribund for a long time. Barry's Political Argument (1964) also has some claim here, but Gramsci and Marcuse (to name but two) were doing very different things.

    2. The date of 1971 is utterly misleading. There was a big increase in the sort of theorizing that Geuss claimed disappeared in the years after 1968. In fact, probably until the early 80s. Inspect the back issues of NLR if you wish to verify this claim. People who did this stuff didn't conceive of themselves as doing the same kind of thing as Rawls, Nozick etc, at all.

    3. In the years before 1968 it just isn't true that radical Marxist social and political theory was even widely practised in the academy, let along dominant. So if anything, it came along *in the academy* contemporaneously with Rawls rather than being displaced by him. The people who founded journals like the UK's Radical Philosophy weren't the pre-Rawlsian establishment.

    4. Some theoretical interest in "revolution" dissipated once it became clear that the revolutionary transformation of society wasn't going to happen in the way 68ists believed. Such dissipation is normal and not a consequence of a lack of moral fibre by philosophers. (I'd note though that there was a lot of interest among political theorists in revolution in the post-71 period. Skocpol's book is 1979 for example. Of course, to repeat the point Skocpol and similar aren't engaged in anything that's even in the same category as Rawls.)

    5. To claim that Rawls's programme amounts to a little bit of tweaking of capitalist democracy is tendentious, given what he wrote about "property-owning democracy", a programme of dispersal of capital-ownership far more radical that that espoused by any mainstream "left" party. Contrasting this with unrealizable 68ist illusions and declaring Rawls (by comparison) wanting is infantile posturing. Radical theorists who've actually had something to say about post-capitalist society (Van Parijs, Roemer, Bowles, Gintis etc) have not had a "Geussian" attitude to Rawls.

    6. There's lots wrong with Rawls. Some of it, ironically, is stuff he shares with radical social theory: namely an overemphasis on the importance of social structure (cf G.A. Cohen). Rawls's shortcomings and lacunae are not addressed by Raymond Geuss who merely engages in posturing and name-calling.

  29. David–This is excellent new historical scholarship on the political context in which JR finalized TR, with some bearing on (and perhaps a different version of) the alternative you lay out http://journals.cambridge.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9320988.

    Sam

  30. Perhaps some middle ground with Geuss. The first paragraph of his you posted seems not only reasonable, but insightful (and he could have backed it up further with the works of Gadamer and Habermas). The second paragraph is more out of control – okay, it IS out of control.

    Two caveats: With respect to the second paragraph, Rawls does very little to justify why a doctor should be compensated more than a garbage collector. (I know which one is more important!) And the first paragraph, Geuss does nothing to show why it is no small task to battle against utilitarianism, which Rawls surely did (and did well).

    My dissertation was called "Rawlsian Ethical Act Contractarianism." I really don't endorse most of what was proposed by it anymore, but one could see why I felt I needed to comment.

  31. 1. The revival of normative theory of social justice has been a largely conservative development, because it has been largely framed as a debate between social democracy and libertarianism. And social justice theory has become a disproportionately large part of political theory, compounding this effect.

    2. The date of 1971 (or 1974) is significant because of the above. The problem is that since Rawls and Nozick political theorists–especially those in philosophy departments–have been feeling warranted in ignoring the sorts of radical theory you mention. Robert Paul Wolff has written eloquently on this.

    3. Maybe, if by "the academy" you mean about five universities in the UK and US, as you probably do. Besides, I thought we were talking about the left, not the academy. And it's clear that post-Rawlsian political theory has infected the wider left with pointless talk of equal opportunities and various other liberal trinkets.

    4. So you agree with Geuss that most political philosophers are fair weather ideological shills.

    5. POD and democratic socialism are still forms of liberalism. Besides they are later developments so the timing with the whole 1971-74 debate doesn't add up. Calling radical thought infantile posturing is a move straight out of the Torygraph playbook. Geuss would not be surprised.

    6. That shows exactly why Cohen was a terrible thing for the left: he is in the end an apolitical individualist and a moralist, and so takes Rawls and Nozick far to seriously, eventually producing a toothless socialism. Brennan's admittedly infuriating *Why not Capitalism* shows this pretty clearly.

    7. Geuss rubs people the wrong way because he is a rare working class academic at a prestigious university, who constantly calls out his colleagues on their complacency towards the system that gave them the privileged positions they blissfully occupy thanks to a brittle ideological veneer ('merit', 'equal opportunities', etc.). Sure, scrutinising this privilege is just what the difference principle recommends. Yet making some form of liberalism the default position also allowed people to think that their privilege can't be that bad since some version of the current liberal system would be just. When even that attitude became almost impossible to sustain (post Reagan/Thatcher/Clinton) people started shifting to global justice.

  32. Sam: Thanks for that very interesting article, which I'm reading now. So far, it doesn't seem to be in any serious tension with my (more armchair) account (let me know if you think otherwise), but it adds a lot of nuance and is fascinating in general. Lots of political philosophers would like to know about it, so I'll be spreading the word.

  33. 'POD and democratic socialism are still forms of liberalism'

    So, what exactly do you object to about liberalism in it's democratic socialist, rather than capitalist form?

  34. As regards the political thinkers of the 40s, 50s and 60s Geuss refers to, I guess most of their work is much more concerned with an drawing up an analytic of power (and reason, and the way in which Reason is always caught up with power – of course an extreme simplification), than it is with justice. It would be interesting to pursue how their remarks would fit to, and perhaps criticize the project of Justice in its Rawlsian and utilitarianist outfit (as Bernard Williams remarks in his Ethics (reference omitted out of laziness)), yet it is clear to me that the French and German thinkers Geuss cites are not part and parcel of a movement towards such a theory of justice. E.g. it always struck me reading the Dialectic of Enlightenment that there is no positive or constructive thought to be found in the book, only the aphorism for Voltaire can, I think, be read as an exception to this general flow of the book.

    As far as Geuss' remarks concerning Rawls go, he seems to make a more or less convincing argument. One can criticize this project from within, as Cohen did in his 2008 book, and say – more or less – that even the Rawlsian project, pursued and thought through, would not provide for an incentive based society. However, I find this internal critique not very exciting. From a more critical perspective one should and could deliver an external critique of Rawls. The problem with, especially the TOJ, is that it strips us down to rational capitalists. He argues that the people behind the veil of ignorance “know the general facts about human society [and] […] they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology” (para. 24, p. 137 TOJ). I don't accept this Rawlsian premise, and I especially do not like the fact that he takes the incentive based drive of people to be such a "law of human psychology" or "facts about human society".

  35. The teach-in was in the spring semester of 1969, during the strike. I don't remember what he talked about, but he was fairly dispassionate.

  36. Whereof one cannot give page numbers, one should stay silent. (In academic publications, not blogs!) I have never seen Raymond Geuss discuss Rawls with the same detail and precision he shows for Habermas in ‘The Idea of a Critical Theory’.

    And Geuss’s criticisms of Rawls often collapse when one injects detail and precision into his interpretations. Samuel Freeman’s review of Geuss (in Ethics, 2009) notes that some of Geuss’s criticisms of Rawls and Nozick simply misunderstand these authors and their project, while some are outmoded objections which have been amply discussed and often answered in the literature since the 1970s – sometimes even being addressed by Rawls and Nozick in passages Geuss does not cite.

    Giving page numbers is a matter of research ethics. Responsible researchers show readers their evidence and try to check that they have read other authors plausibly. Jerry Cohen is equally slapdash in writing that ‘what I have read of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan, and Julia Kristeva leads me to think that there is a great deal of bullshit in their work.’ If Cohen has read enough of them to spot bullshit, he should give examples. The difficulty that he and Harry Frankfurt have in giving examples of bullshit casts doubt on their project. Something similar applies to Geuss.

    Giving page numbers is thus a matter of good research too.

    I agree with Tom Hurka (#16 above) about Geuss’s ‘wildly uncharitable readings of the philosophers he doesn’t like.’ Checking page references helps us try to constrain our biases.

    Sam (#30 above) has a great link to Katrina Forrester’s fascinating article on the 1960s background to TJ. Chris Bertram's history (#28 above) also opened my eyes to developments I was not aware of. I would point too to Jo Wolff’s fine chapter in Michael Beaney, ed., ‘The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy’, which charts considerable methodological innovation and progress through the 20th century. Rawls played a major part here, as did others.

    Rawls’s normative methodology is incredibly thoughtful and important, and deserves attention and respect even if we disagree with it or Rawls's conclusions. When reading Geuss on Rawls, I see little attention and even less respect. Geuss’s potentially important insights on Rawls are undermined by his inadequate reading of Rawls.

  37. The worry I was trying to formulate is that if some form of liberalism is seen as just it becomes easier to tolerate the injustice of actually existing liberalism. This may just be a point about rhetoric or semantics, but then those matter a lot in politics.

  38. My work is on Rawls, and I largely embrace justice as fairness and the idea of a political liberalism – just to be forthright about the direction of my bias. I am curious about a strain of criticism that appears in this comment thread: that TJ (or justice as fairness more generally) supports the ideology in which it was developed. Would any of those critics be be willing to offer something a bit more specific about this ideology, and their preferred alternatives? I'm assuming it isn't just capitalism, because Rawls is quite critical of contemporary capitalism, as other commenters have noted.

  39. I am puzzled by your claim that at the time questions like "what justifies disobeying an unjust law, or resisting an unjust policy by disobeying the law?" were "the kind of question that only a conservative could ask" (and that hence by asking these questions Rawls exposed himself as "truly conservative"). Are you suggesting that those involved in the legal positivism vs. anti-positivism debate (e.g. Hart, Fuller, etc.) were all conservatives? And authors like Arendt (with her "Reflections on Civil Disobedience"), among others, were true conservatives too? I must confess I am not familiar with the 60s' academic politics, just being curious.

  40. To Yao Lin:

    1960s US academic politics are not easy to summarize, and I came in late, not entering college until 1967. But I grew up in the Deep South and got to know a number of activist college students who had come down to work to end segregation. This was a period in which almost endless discussions about politics were the norm. Dr King and other black activists had engaged in civil disobedience as early as 1955, in Montgomery. Dr. King's Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963) seemed to satisfy anyone who still needed satisfying that nonviolent disobedience and resistance were justified by the magnitude of the injustice of segregation and the slowness and limitations of legal reform. By 1966, the question debated among activists was: How long to stick with nonviolence?

    As the focus shifted to the War in Vietnam, the issue I heard argued endlessly was, Is the War unjust or isn't it? The justifiability of civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance had already been settled. The issue in the discussions I was aware of or took part in, after 1965, was: Is there a moral equivalence between segregation at home and military action to prevent a foreign nation "going communist"? I don't say that other discussions weren't going on. But I'd say that for an academic or a college student to need convincing–as late as 1969–that nonviolent resistance to a gravely unjust policy is justifiable, would be to manifest a conservative predisposition.

    Katrina Forrister's article is interesting, Bear in mind that by 1969 some students were taking action against their own universities, and I suspect that Rawls (among others) felt compelled to address the question of proper targets and limits. Rawls was presumably addressing conservative students and faculty as well. It may be that Rawls had already answered the question to his own satisfaction and in 1969 was asking it again merely rhetorically. Nonetheless, the working assumption of Rawls's 1969 paper is that the United States is a "reasonably just (though of course not perfectly just) democratic regime" (CP 176); and the question posed is: How can disobedience be squared with the natural duty of justice, which creates a "presumption in favor of compliance" (CP 188)? Maybe Rawls simply wanted to work through the question "from the top" to fit it into the theory he was developing.

    The answer he gives in that paper is rather restrictive. He condemns covert nonviolent resistance and disobedience (and of course any kind of violence)–absent the most extreme circumstances. Furthermore, the justification is unavailable if legal reform through normal politics has not been "rejected" (CP 183). That seems to imply that nonviolent civil disobedience to protest segregation was not justifiable after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. And, as Forrister points out, civil disobedience to protest a foreign war can be justified only insofar as it can be tied to some domestic injustice.

    I did not mean to suggest that anyone abstractly interested in the question of political obligation exhibits a conservative trait

  41. Shouldn't a political position be labeled as conservative or progressive, in this case that of Rawls, not in relation to the radical student movement, but in relation to the political spectrum of the country as a whole?

    The U.S. elected Nixon in 1968 and re-elected him in 1972, which seems to indicate that Rawls, in relation to the country as whole, was quite progressive.

  42. Stephen Nayak-Young

    I wish I were patient enough to read the preceding comments, but since I'm not, I'll be brief. Rawls is not an apologist for trickle-down capitalism. His bare-bones theories can be quoted or paraphrased to cast him in that light, but if you read the other text he wrote in the vicinity of his statement(s) of the "difference principle," it's clear the position he advocated was (and is) radically egalitarian.

    Even more briefly: Haters gon hate.

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