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Speaking of Title IX “madness”… (MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY–UPDATED)

…a Northwestern radio, television and film professor had a Title IX "retaliation" complaint filed against her after writing an opinion piece in CHE about sexual politics and paranoia on campus; her chilling account of this appalling Kafkaesque ordeal is behind a paywall [UPDATE:  A free version, for 24 hours is here], but here is an excerpt:

When I first heard that students at my university had staged a protest over an essay I’d written in The ChronicleReview about sexual politics on campus — and that they were carrying mattresses and pillows — I was a bit nonplussed. For one thing, mattresses had become a symbol of student-on-student sexual-assault allegations, and I’d been writing about the new consensual-relations codes governing professor-student dating. Also, I’d been writing as a feminist. And I hadn’t sexually assaulted anyone. The whole thing seemed symbolically incoherent.

According to our campus newspaper, the mattress-carriers were marching to the university president’s office with a petition demanding "a swift, official condemnation" of my article. One student said she’d had a "very visceral reaction" to the essay; another called it "terrifying." I’d argued that the new codes infantilized students while vastly increasing the power of university administrators over all our lives, and here were students demanding to be protected by university higher-ups from the affront of someone’s ideas, which seemed to prove my point….

Things seemed less amusing when I received an email from my university’s Title IX coordinator informing me that two students had filed Title IX complaints against me on the basis of the essay and "subsequent public statements" (which turned out to be a tweet), and that the university would retain an outside investigator to handle the complaints….

I was being charged with retaliation, it said, though it failed to explain how an essay that mentioned no one by name could be construed as retaliatory, or how a publication fell under the province of Title IX, which, as I understood it, dealt with sexual misconduct and gender discrimination….

I wrote back to the Title IX coordinator asking for clarification: When would I learn the specifics of these complaints, which, I pointed out, appeared to violate my academic freedom? And what about my rights — was I entitled to a lawyer? I received a polite response with a link to another website. No, I could not have an attorney present during the investigation, unless I’d been charged with sexual violence. I was, however, allowed to have a "support person" from the university community there, though that person couldn’t speak. I wouldn’t be informed about the substance of the complaints until I met with the investigators.

Apparently the idea was that they’d tell me the charges, and then, while I was collecting my wits, interrogate me about them. The term "kangaroo court" came to mind….

I replied that I wanted to know the charges before agreeing to a meeting. They told me, cordially, that they wanted to set up a meeting during which they would inform me of the charges and pose questions. I replied, in what I hoped was a cordial tone, that I wouldn’t answer questions until I’d had time to consider the charges….

I’d plummeted into an underground world of secret tribunals and capricious, medieval rules, and I wasn’t supposed to tell anyone about it….

Both complainants were graduate students. One turned out to have nothing whatsoever to do with the essay. She was bringing charges on behalf of the university community as well as on behalf of two students I’d mentioned — not by name — because the essay had a "chilling effect" on students’ ability to report sexual misconduct. I’d also made deliberate mistakes, she charged (a few small errors that hadn’t been caught in fact-checking were later corrected by the editors), and had violated the nonretaliation provision of the faculty handbook.

The other complainant was someone I’d mentioned fleetingly (again, not by name) in connection with the professor’s lawsuits. She charged that mentioning her was retaliatory and created a hostile environment (though I’d said nothing disparaging), and that I’d omitted information I should have included about her. This seemed paradoxical — should I have written more? And is what I didn’t write really the business of Title IX? She also charged that something I’d tweeted to someone else regarding the essay had actually referred to her. (It hadn’t.)

Please pause to note that a Title IX charge can now be brought against a professor over a tweet. Also that my tweets were apparently being monitored.

Much of this remains puzzling to me, including how someone can bring charges in someone else’s name, who is allowing intellectual disagreement to be redefined as retaliation, and why a professor can’t write about a legal case that’s been nationally reported, precisely because she’s employed by the university where the events took place. Wouldn’t this mean that academic freedom doesn’t extend to academics discussing matters involving their own workplaces?

As I understand it, any Title IX charge that’s filed has to be investigated, which effectively empowers anyone on campus to individually decide, and expand, what Title IX covers. Anyone with a grudge, a political agenda, or a desire for attention can quite easily leverage the system.

And there are a lot of grudges these days. The reality is that the more colleges devote themselves to creating "safe spaces" — that new watchword — for students, the more dangerous those campuses become for professors. It’s astounding how aggressive students’ assertions of vulnerability have gotten in the past few years. Emotional discomfort is regarded as equivalent to material injury, and all injuries have to be remediated….

I’d been asked to keep the charges confidential, but this became moot when, shortly before my campus meeting with the investigators, a graduate student published an article on a well-trafficked site excoriating me and the essay, and announcing that two students had filed Title IX retaliation complaints against me. She didn’t identify her source for this information or specify her own relationship to the situation, though she seemed well versed on all the inside details; in fact, she knew more about the process than I did.

It wasn’t me alone on the chopping block. She also excoriated our university’s president for his op-ed essay on academic freedom, which, she charged, was really a veiled commentary on the pending Title IX charges against me and thus subverted the process by issuing a covert advance verdict in my favor. (He’d obliquely mentioned the controversy over the essay, among other campus free-speech issues.) She didn’t seem particularly concerned that she herself was subverting the process by charging that the process had been subverted, and by revealing the complaints in the first place.

She was also surprisingly unconcerned about how effectively her article demolished its own premises about the asymmetry of institutional power. If a graduate student can publicly blast her own university’s president, mock his ideas, and fear no repercussions, then clearly the retaliatory power that university employment confers on anyone — from professors to presidents — is nil. Nor had my own essay exactly had a chilling effect on anyone’s freedom of expression….

At the end of the interrogation, the investigators asked if I wanted to file my own retaliation complaint against the student who’d revealed the charges. I said that I believed all parties involved were using the process for political purposes. I declined to press charges against anyone….

Nothing I say here is meant to suggest that sexual assault on campuses isn’t a problem. It is. My concern is that debatable and ultimately conservative notions about sex, gender, and power are becoming embedded in these procedures, without any public scrutiny or debate. But the climate on campuses is so accusatory and sanctimonious — so "chilling," in fact — that open conversations are practically impossible. It’s only when Title IX charges lead to lawsuits and the usual veil of secrecy is lifted that any of these assumptions become open for discussion — except that simply discussing one such lawsuit brought the sledgehammer of Title IX down on me, too….

What’s being lost, along with job security, is the liberty to publish ideas that might go against the grain or to take on risky subjects in the first place. With students increasingly regarded as customers and consumer satisfaction paramount, it’s imperative to avoid creating potential classroom friction with unpopular ideas if you’re on a renewable contract and wish to stay employed. Self-censorship naturally prevails. But even those with tenure fear getting caught up in some horrendous disciplinary process with ad hoc rules and outcomes; pretty much everyone now self-censors accordingly….

As of this writing, I have yet to hear the verdict on my case, though it’s well past the 60-day time frame. In the meantime, new Title IX complaints have been filed against the faculty-support person who accompanied me to the session with the investigators. As a member of the Faculty Senate, whose bylaws include the protection of academic freedom — and believing the process he’d witnessed was a clear violation of academic freedom — he’d spoken in general terms about the situation at a senate meeting. Shortly thereafter, as the attorneys investigating my case informed me by phone, retaliation complaints were filed against him for speaking publicly about the matter (even though the complaints against me had already been revealed in the graduate student’s article), and he could no longer act as my support person….

A week or so earlier, the investigators had phoned to let me know that a "mediated resolution" was possible in my case if I wished to pursue that option….The students were willing to drop their complaints in exchange for a public apology from me, the investigators said. I tried to stifle a laugh. I asked if that was all. No, they also wanted me to agree not to write about the case.

I understand that by writing these sentences, I’m risking more retaliation complaints, though I’m unclear what penalties may be in store (I suspect it’s buried somewhere in those links). But I refuse to believe that students get to dictate what professors can or can’t write about, or what we’re allowed to discuss at our Faculty Senate meetings. I don’t believe discussing Title IX cases should be verboten in the first place — the secrecy of the process invites McCarthyist abuses and overreach.

UPDATE:  True to form, Justin Weinberg (South Carolina) actually comes to the defense of Northwestern's treatment of Laura Kipnis.  By selectively quoting from the original Kipnis article, he obscures the fact that in the passages in question, Kipnis was clearly talking about the lawsuit by the undergraduate against Ludlow, not the graduate student.  Kipnis's article says almost nothing about the allegations by the graduate student, and never names anyone, not even Ludlow.  Nowhere in the article does Kipnis accuse the graduate student of lying.  The only useful thing Weinberg manages to do is link to the Title IX "retaliation" provisions, which makes clear that for a "retaliation" claim to have merit, Kipnis would have to have "subjected the person [the complainant] to adverse action, treatment or conditions."  If Kipnis's opinion piece about sexual paranoia on campus, in which the graduate student is not even named and barely referenced, constitutes adverse "treatment," then there is no right for any faculty member at any institution receiving federal funds to offer any opinions, however indirect, about any question surrounding allegations of sexual misconduct at the institution.  Even in the Title VI context, I am aware of no decision finding that speech like that of Kipnis–who has no power over any graduate student in philosophy, or their professional situation or opportunities–could constitute "retaliation" (feel free to correct me in the comments with a citation to such a case).  The quite plain answer to "what's going on" at Northwestern in this instance is that graduate students have misused Title IX, and the University, fearful as all universities are of running afoul of those currently policing Title IX, aided and abetted this abuse.  Fortunately, some commenters have already called out Weinberg's misrepresentations.

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28 responses to “Speaking of Title IX “madness”… (MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY–UPDATED)”

  1. This is absolutely chilling indeed. I've also seen abuses of these administrative structures, of unsubstantial and supercilious complaints which put the accused through a kind of hell, threatened for months with expulsion, never really knowing why until the day of the hearing. I've also wondered if even discussing these matters, which were distressing to me, with friends or family opened me up for retaliation complaints.

    Something has to be done to clarify these rules, or to make these procedures more fair. I can understand why all the power is in the hands of the complainants, but if people are beginning to abuse that power, to file retaliation complaints when someone says something they don't like about sexual harassment, then some of that power has to be taken away.

  2. Sorry for the double post, but a question: If I'm a student at Northwestern, is remarking to a friend (maybe over email or a text?) "It's absurd and terrible that NN is making all of these Title IX complaints" does this constitute retaliation under Title IX? Asking honestly. Because the wording is so vague that I'm really not sure if it does.

  3. Can we conclude anything other than that Title IX — at least as it is currently being interpreted — is an abomination?

  4. Anon Grad Student

    Lexington,

    Yes we can, easily. That something sometimes screws up — even in pretty terrible ways — doesn't make it an abomination. Title IX has changed higher education almost entirely for the better. While I do feel bad for people who get trapped in administrative headaches and the rest, I'd feel worse had we continued to let universities and colleges mistreat women the way they had been prior to Title IX.

  5. Anon Grad Student

    (A brief addendum: I don't mean to suggest that there are no problems with Title IX or even that there are no serious problems with Title IX. There surely are, and it — like most regulatory schemes — is a work in progress. But we should not let our attention and work on those problems lead us to mistake Title IX for an abomination.)

  6. I just want to add that I agree with Anon Grad student. As I said on Twitter, this is a shocking "abuse" of Title IX. But it is an abuse aided and abetted by lawyers in the federal government who have failed to articulate clear guidelines that would rule out this kind of action. Because research universities are all mortified of losing federal money, or even having it delayed, they will err on the side of overkill, at the cost to other intellectual and political values unless they receive a clear federal signal that the actions are not necessary.

  7. Given the somewhat technical Title IX problems and the federal government and its lawyers, etc. (which seems to be a somewhat recent phenomenon in these areas), the really problematic issue here is why it seems to the people who brought this case against the author feel that it was the appropriate thing to do. Why did they think that such legal action is appropriate for what amounts to disagreements (obviously heartfelt, for sure) that are more or less conceptual, that might be addressed in different forums…..where communication on these matters is at least *possible* ("likely" is perhaps a different matter). Look, the horror of the author's predicament is frankly unbelievable (not entirely surprising these days) in what is supposed to be a country without quasi-but-worse-Star Chambers. But the broader, starker question is: what has happened in academia and our culture more broadly such that this is where we are now, that this sort of action against the CHE author is what people think they should do in these and other situations, and that this is what we, as academics, should expect? Maddening indeed.

  8. Russell Blackford

    Her conduct falls so far outside ordinary understandings of serious workplace/work-related misconduct for an academic that this action seems preposterous. You'd think that someone in the university hierarchy would have a discretion about which complaints are investigated further and which claims are dismissed as trivial or as revealing no misconduct (at least of a kind serious enough for disciplinary action) on their face. I'd normally expect whoever has that discretion to obtain (and follow) legal advice, or advice from HR specialists who are expert in these sorts of cases, and that a complaint like this one would get nowhere.

    At an earlier period of my life, I gave exactly that sort of advice to Australian universities, and, although I don't discuss actual clients and cases that I've been involved with, I'd have advised that this complaint was totally without merit. I hope that relevant people in Australia continue to give that sort of advice about clearly unmeritorious complaints.

    Watching all this play out on campuses in the US, I am astounded. One thing that astounds me is how a complaint like this one was even entertained seriously – not dismissed summarily on legal/HR advice. I can only assume there is a fear of exercising that discretion and the storm it would cause in the current cultural environment. It also surprises me that trade unions representing American university and college academics have not taken on this issue in a loud and concerted way, in an effort to protect academic freedom. It seems to be falling to relatively right-leaning (as far as I can work out) organisations like FIRE to do so. I'm sure there must be a fascinating story behind that. As far as I can see, FIRE is doing a good job, but it's the job I'd expect academic and student unions to do.

  9. Anon Candidate

    This is an incredible and incredibly insidious strategy: make an 'end run' around the debate by couching your complaints in medical / legal terms to which university administrators are legally obligated to respond.

    This is a bit of a side note, but I'm curious to know how this will all play out when conservatives avail themselves of the same strategy. Should we have a trigger warning on Hume's Dialogues for Christian students who may experience 'trauma' at having their most deeply held beliefs ridiculed? How about white students 'traumatized' by the idea that they may be complicit in racist social institutions? Or are these not 'traumas' because they're not ideologically correct?

    (To be sure, these hypotheticals wouldn't have the Title IX hook to latch onto, but there are plenty of actual, non-Title IX cases that have taken this form.)

    At any rate, whoever adopts this strategy, everyone loses.

  10. Anon Grad Student #10

    Janice Dowell is so certain that the harassment of Kipnis is a good thing, she's made a public FB post to advertise it: https://www.facebook.com/janice.dowell.58/posts/10152939033266156

    Her judgment is even worse than Weinberg's, IMO. Is there hope for our profession?

  11. Jeff Heikkinen

    Gotta love how Weinberg alleges that the original article is full of cherry-picked, out of context quotes and lies of omission, and then posts a "correction" that is absolutely nothing but cherry-picked, out of context quotes and lies of omission.

  12. Tenured Professor

    I don’t have an ax to grind on this issue. I take these free speech and campus political correctness cases on a case by case basis and am still learning and want to learn (if not the law, then my own moral thoughts about these issues). But when a tenured professor from a university campus wise to the ways of politics and campus governance hits down claiming students are being “infantilized” and then mocks students who have “condemned” an article or who had “visceral reactions” or are “terrified” or who “demand to be protected” or who claim an existing “hostile work environment”, then suddenly reverses course in his (or her) own defense to complain about their inability to “tell anyone about it” or bemoan that they “can’t write about it” (when they are writing about it here) or whine about some “chilling effect” about their own speech (which hasn't stopped them from speaking apparently), or grumble that their tweets were “being monitored”, or fuss that they cannot have an “intellectual disagreement”, or gripe that there are a “lot of grudges these days”, or take exception to the idea that students might have “safe spaces”, or protest how “dangerous campuses have become for professors”, or lament student’s “assertions of vulnerability” in recent times where “emotional discomfort is equivalent to material injury and all injuries have to be remediated”. It seems to me that this professor is the one who is having “visceral reactions” or is “terrified” about the “work environment” at his or her college (even while having to “stifle a laugh” because the students were willing to drop all charges in exchange for an apology). Yet, this professor has not been fired and only an investigation has begun. It appears at first glance that these students have learned from a master class complainer infantile-extraordinaire who in a parallel universe might very well be one of these students. I find all this very ironic. Professors have plenty of opportunities for speech inside and outside of the class while students with fewer resources for speech must arguably resort a bit more to posting signs or contacting administration then perhaps a professor who has more professional access to journals and blogs to say nothing of administration and typically decades of relationships with those in the university. Unless this professor indeed is charged with something from the administration, this seems like much ado and complaining about nothing. Some students are complaining about the school environment and now this professor is complaining about the school environment. If the professor is just complaining about the accusations and not any actual legal penalty which results from the inquiry, then how do he or she have any case in criticizing so called “safe spaces” or any emotional discomfort he or she is receiving on account of the accusations? By appealing to their ability to take on “risky subjects” or to “go against the grain” without any actual penalties incurred, it seems like this professor is merely talking about their own protected speech and not that of others. Have I missed something?

  13. @Tenured Professor:

    "Have I missed something?"

    You've missed the difference between speech and coercive action, I think. If some senior figure in NWU had declared that s/he strongly disagreed with everything in Kipnis's article, then that would be just one more speech act and she'd have little to complain about. That doesn't appear to be what happened.

  14. Anon Candidate

    Yes, you've missed quite a lot. To simplify: some students are complaining about feeling 'traumatized' after reading an article that opines on various contemporary problems on college campuses. The author of said article is complaining that she has been subject to a potentially punitive investigation for writing about these issues.

    Are you seriously suggesting that these complaints are equivalent? You write that for the author "only an investigation has begun." Oh great, it's "only" an investigation. An investigation that, it bear noting, could result in some *actual* professional and personal consequences, not some amorphous 'trauma.'

    I'm flabbergasted that it is the putatively liberal wing of academia leading the charge against speech rights and due process for academics.

  15. This article was linked in the excerpt that Prof. Leiter posted on his blog: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-leydonhardy/whats-a-president-to-do-trampling-title-ix-and-other-scary-ideas_b_7001932.html. I mention this because I'm confused about why you find students to be at a disadvantage when it comes to getting opinions out on well-trafficked websites and blogs without repercussions. Any student like this one could have just published a counter-piece criticizing Kipnis' article and I'm sure Kipnis would have been just fine with that. Furthermore, the claim that grad students have no other speech options than to go to administration is bogus not only because they do (this post is even evidence of that), but more importantly because going to administration is not an exercise of speech, but an exercise of authority.

    You bring up an interesting point at the end of your post, but I think it's a bit misleading. There's no doubt that risky speech should have a risk, but the repercussions should be more speech and not administrative action. I just think that in a safe space for free speech, the consequences of publicly taking on "risky subjects" or "going against the grain" should be ridicule and embarrassment rather than a formal investigation. Social repercussions for exercising free speech are not the same as administrative and legal repercussions, so when speech has only social consequences, then it should be responded to with speech having only social consequences. In this way I agree with you. The descriptions of the complaints the students and the professor have with one another interchangeable, and indeed the whole ordeal would look like a case of mere name-calling if it weren't for one highly pertinent fact: that one member of the conversation has very real potential administrative, professional, and even legal consequences for her speech while the other does not.

  16. Hi, Brian. Several thoughts, but I’ll just ask a narrow question of clarification. I find Kipnis’s general remarks about the power asymmetry of professors and students pretty implausible, and so I suspect I disagree with your views on the topic too. But I can’t tell if it matters to the broader issue of retaliation and Title IX. So, my question…

    In making your case that Kipnis’s speech doesn’t constitute retaliation, you emphasize that Kipnis “has no power over any graduate student in philosophy, or their professional situation or opportunities.” Would it change your view if she did have such power? If, counterfactually, Kipnis had been a philosophy faculty member with power over these students’ careers and had written the exact same letter, do you think her letter then would have been retaliation?

    If you say No, then it seems like your views about power and Kipnis (the bit I quote above) are a red herring. In that case, any disagreement I might have with you regarding power is irrelevant to the more important questions here about retaliation. If you say Yes, that seems like an important concession: a letter that is exactly like Kipnis’s could constitute retaliation, depending on the department that the letter writer belongs to—or, more generally, depending on the power of the letter writer over the students involved.

    BL COMMENT: If Kipnis were a philosophy professor at Northwestern, it's a slightly harder question whether her otherwise legally protected speech constitutes "retaliation" for Title IX purposes. But that's not our case, and on the facts of our case this is quite easy: the retaliation charge is without merit, and represents an abuse of Title IX that does a disservice to those whom Title IX correctly protects.

  17. I think a lot of people are unfamiliar with retaliation claims. Typically you are looking for a decision made by a supervisor that adversely effects the complaining party. In employment these are decisions to fire, or demote, or not promote, or materially alter the working conditions for the party. The analogs for education would decisions to expel or suspend the student, or prevent him or her from taking certain courses or achieving passing grades or attaining other academic awards. None of that has happened. If Kipnis was a professor in the same department then the concern that she was making some of these sorts of decisions is heightened. However, if she wasn't involved in those decisions then there is no retaliation. Some commenters elsewhere have suggested that the retaliation need not be a decision, but the creation of a hostile environment. That might be true, but it's extremely difficult to square with the facts. A claim based on hostile environment typically involves either 1 a supervisor who is indifferent to or encouraging of harassment of the complainant by subordinates or 2 an individual who has him or herself created a hostile environment through pervasive and lasting harassment sufficient to effectively deprive the complainant of her education. 1 seems ruled out by the lack of harassing subordinates. 2 seems ruled out by the fact that Kipnis only wrote one article, at the time the complaint was made, which referenced the complainant.

  18. Justin Tiehen's comment illustrates something fairly crucial about the freedom-of-speech issues here. For freedom of speech in general (or academic freedom in particular) to have any real force, it has to be more than just one desideratum to set against others (almost everyone agrees that freedom of speech is *other things being equal* a good thing). It has to be something that can be *relied upon* as protected unless one's speech is in some narrowly defined and clearly knowable category. Otherwise it's not possible to speak *knowing* that one's speech is protected.

    So: speaking against one's own current student is fairly clearly in a category of speech acts that academic freedom doesn't protect. Speaking out against current students in one's own department is less clearly in that category, but it's clear enough that someone knows that doing it isn't reliably protected. But when Justin Tiehan writes "a letter that is exactly like Kipnis’s could constitute retaliation, depending on the department that the letter writer belongs to—or, more generally, depending on the power of the letter writer over the students involved", we segue from a clearly defined category to some general and vague criterion that can't be safely assessed in advance. As a senior-ish academic in an interdisciplinary field at a prestigious institution, I have some small level of power over pretty much any student on the face of the Earth, and exactly how much power I have over any given student is subtle and controversial to assess. If my speech acts concerning students are protected only to the degree that I don't have a sufficient level of power over them, they're not protected in any way that I can rely on.

  19. Tenured Professor

    David Wallace and anon #14: If what I have missed is the difference between “speech and coercive action” or that the difference is that the author has been “subjected to a punitive investigation” then I suppose that both of you would immediately renounce said professor immediately if he or she were to file a lawsuit about how their reputation has been damaged (as we have seen already in other cases cited by Leiter). If potential consequences (instead of actual consequences) are the reason you side with the professor over the students then it seems like you are making a case for never filing a lawsuit over someone’s speech or at least if both of them file then it’s a draw? Again, unless there are actual penalties beyond the investigation, all I hear is whining so far. I’m sympathetic to the whining actually. I just don’t know why when students whine it gets dismissed outright but if a professor whines (about a cause certain people embrace), it isn't whining at all. What if they had only written a letter to the campus newspaper instead of approaching administration? Would this same professor complain about the “infantilization” of students? Would you two suddenly reverse course and celebrate said student’s response? Seems like this is not about free speech at all and instead about taking sides (in particular some conservative or otherwise cause you believe in), speech be damned.
    Also, anon #14, the blanket charge against the “liberal wing of academia” being against speech rights or due process seems like a fallacious charge to me. Evidence please. Otherwise, I will use my equally fallacious anecdote of a local extremely conservative history professor here in Los Angeles who had many complaints filed by students against him (for bias among other things) and who was defended successfully by the so-called “liberal wing” of academia or at least his liberal union. Not buying the ad hominem charges against liberalism. Sorry, I’ve found the greatest advocates of free speech to be the liberal wing of academia. Check Leiter’s coverage of the Salaita affair and who in admin or among donors or board members is responsible. I don’t think you’ll find any self-professed liberals among those who called for his ouster. And I think you’ll find the liberal wing of academia taking the lead in defending his speech rights as a professor or at least supporting his current campaign against the university.

    BL COMMENT: I find some of the accusations here a bit puzzling. Defamation is legally aciontable, and if Kipnis had defamed the student or the student had defamed Kipnis, then legal recourse would be an option. But that has nothing to do with this case: Kipnis's speech was not defamatory or otherwise unlawful. Nonetheless, she has been subjected to "investigation" because the students exploited a defect in the current Title IX standards. Please see the piece by my colleague Geof Stone at the top of the blog.

  20. Brian: One follow-up question. Set aside Kipnis; my interest is more general. (You can take it in the spirit of clearing up my unfamiliarity with the law, as AnonAttorney puts it.)

    At my school, I have the following sort of power over students who aren’t philosophy majors: I serve on various committees that make decisions about funding and awards. Specifically, over the last year I’ve made decisions about which (non-philosophy) students get internal funding for research projects, who gets IRB approval, who gets accepted into Phi Beta Kappa, who wins university-wide essay contents, and on and on—it’s endless. This is typical at my school: every professor serves on such committees. Plausibly, the decisions these committees make matter a lot to the career prospects for students. For some biochemistry student applying to graduate school, it probably won’t matter much if I gave her a B instead of an A in my Intro to Philosophy class, but it will matter quite a lot if I rejected her funding request for a summer research proposal. When I said in my original post that I found Kipnis’s remarks about power asymmetry implausible, this is part of what I had in mind. I make funding and award decisions about students, they don’t make such decisions about me.

    My question is, given this particular sort of power, if I were to write a Kipnis-style letter about students at my university but not in my department, would that constitute retaliation, in your view? (Or would it at least make retaliation a “slightly harder question,” as you put it in your reply to me?) More generally, should faculty not write Kipnis-style letters if they work at schools where professors play this sort of role in determining funding and awards? (I assume Northwestern is not such a school.)

    Hi David: I’m not really defending a position, but posing a dilemma. If a professor’s power over a student is irrelevant to the question of retaliation, then even a professor’s speaking out against her own student should be protected speech (a conclusion you reject). If power is relevant, then why doesn’t the sort of power I describe above regarding funding and awards count? (There may be a good answer to this question—it isn’t meant to be rhetorical.) If I want a free speech principle I can “reply upon,” as you put it, here is one candidate: don’t engage in Kipnis-style speech against students I have funding and award power over, so don’t engage in such speech against any undergrads at my university regardless of their department. There may be good objections to that principle, but it isn’t intolerably vague or difficult to assess in advance—so that’s not the problem.

  21. Justin: no, it would not constitute retaliation for you to write a Kipnis-style letter about students at your university (or, given the current lunatic environment, I should say it *should not* constitute retaliation, given how retaliation is usually interpreted in the Title XI and Title IX context, prior to this recent 'innovation'). It would constitute retaliation if there were evidence that your expressed views affected your decisions on the matters that you describe. Again, there is literally no evidence of any kind of retaliation by Kipnis against any of the complainants: their complaint, on every account I have seen, was based on her otherwise lawful speech.

  22. @Tenured Professor:

    "What if they had only written a letter to the campus newspaper instead of approaching administration? … Would you two suddenly reverse course and celebrate said student’s response?"

    Yes. (Well, I don't know about "celebrate", but I'd have no problem at all with it.) That's just one more speech act.

    @Justin: I think my concern is that a professor's power over people in their institution is too ephemeral to be legit grounds for a narrow exemption from freedom of speech. (In practice I have much more power over philosophy students in other institutions than over chemistry students in Oxford.) I agree that "never criticise your own institution's students" is not vague, but then so is "never criticise any students ever".

  23. Anon Candidate

    I was speaking loosely. Perhaps I should have said, putatively liberal academic moral philosophers. But regardless of the phrasing, in the context of this debate it's fairly obvious to whom I was referring. I was clearly *not* referring to those who are, for example, defending Salaita, or your conservative history professor.

  24. What is it about the issue of faculty-student sex that sends even the most responsible thinkers off the rails?

    Geoffrey Stone is author of great books on war and civil liberties. His defense of Kipnis's right to say whatever she pleases is admirable, and should be left there. But here is what he says of the substance of her views (defending faculty members' right to fuck their students):

    "Kipnis' article is a serious, provocative, and valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about these often difficult and vexing issues."

    Here is the article he praises for its seriousness:

    "For the record, I strongly believe that bona fide harassers should be chemically castrated, stripped of their property, and hung up by their thumbs in the nearest public square."

    I have been involved with this issue since 1995, when I proposed my university's first policy on faculty-student sex. There are indeed difficult issues here that serious people can disagree about. I don't see how Kipnis's exercise in playing the over-age class clown advances things, and I don't see anything gained by encouraging debate on her level. The right to free speech means the right to say what you want, no matter how idiotic. Let's leave it at that.

    BL COMMENT: Geof obviously did not share your view of the original piece, and the one line you quoted is hardly representative of the themes covered.

  25. Though it's not the central issue in this discussion, I want to make a point about faculty-student sexual and romantic relationships that is often overlooked in these discussions. I believe most institutions prohibit intimate sexual or romantic relationships between faculty and students when there is a supervisor/subordinate relationship–when, for example, the faculty member is a teacher, advisor, lab supervisor, etc. of the student. That seems to me to be clearly justified.

    However, there are increasing calls for prohibitions on any sexual or romantic relationships between faculty and students, at least undergraduate students. And some universities have enacted such prohibitions. (Harvard's "Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment Policies and Procedures for Faculty of Arts and Sciences" states that "No FAS Faculty member shall request or accept sexual favors from, or initiate or engage in a romantic or sexual relationship with, any undergraduate student at Harvard College. p. 8.)

    The Harvard policy allows for no exceptions–not even a marital one. The policy appears to prohibit a 30-year-old assistant professor of Classics from having a sexual or romantic relationship with her 35-year-old husband of ten years who is completing an undergraduate degree at Harvard as a non-traditional student. On a personal note, when my wife (of 20 years now) and I began dating, she was finishing her undergraduate studies at the institution where I was an associate professor. She never took a class with me and I exercised no supervisory role over her. But she was an undergraduate. She was also in her mid-thirties, an administrator in my department's college office, and the divorced mother of two children. Our relationship would be banned, and possibly subjected to punishment, by rules like the one adopted by Harvard's FAS.

    The push by some to enact prohibitions against sexual/romantic relationships between faculty and students (or faculty and undergraduate students) *tout court* is based, I think, on reasoning from stereotypes–in this case, the stereotype of the older, exploitative faculty member and the young, naive student. But there are many cases of romantic/sexual relationships between faculty and students that manifestly do not fit this stereotype.

    I've heard some people respond to these points by saying, in effect, "Don't worry … the rule wouldn't be enforced in those cases." I think this is dangerous thinking. It reminds me of a ridiculous attempt to prohibit flag burning, after the Texas v. Johnson decision that found that flag burning, in certain contexts, is constitutionally protected speech. One state legislator (from a state I can't recall now) proposed a statute making it illegal to burn anything without a permit from the local fire department. When it was pointed out that this would prohibit backyard barbecues without prior permission from the fire department, he responded, "Don't worry … the rule wouldn't be enforced in those cases." Those of us in a position to make rules have an obligation to make them say what we mean. If we are unable to do that, we sound very much like Potter Stewart when he declined to define 'hard-core pornography' and said, only, "I know it when I see it." That might be fine, as a practical matter, if all reasonable people saw it the same way. But the clearly do not.

  26. What the line quoted shows is that one doesn't know what Kipnis means seriously, and when she is just clowning around. Does she really think, as she states at the start of the article, that Northwestern's new policies render faculty fucking their students "more alluring"? (Do rules against plagiarism render it "more alluring"?) This is po-mo bullshit, not serious discussion.

    There is an air of jocularity about her treatment of these issues that anyone who has actually worked on writing sensible policies will find offensive. Can anyone discern what she is seriously proposing, as an alternative to the policies that universities are adopting? Hers is stuff for talk shows, not serious debate.

    BL COMMENT: I confess I didn't find it that mysterious as to when she was joking and when not. I found parts of the essay interesting, parts not. The response to it, though, was remarkable, even before the abuse of Title IX. Please read Josh Marshall's piece, which I just posted.

  27. The term 'speech act' is very interesting. My view has always been that freedom of speech should be absolute, but freedom of action should not. But sometimes speech and action are bound up together. If I walk dow the middle of street carrying a sign protesting against something, my freedom of speech won't be impingedwhen I am asked by the police to move to the sidewalk.

    It is the same with defamation. What is being circumscribed by the law is not mere speech, but the action of seeking to belittle someone's reputation unfairly. Maybe the term 'speech act' is valid for things such as defamation or attempts to intimidate student complainants. However, it is certainly not a valid term for Ms Kipnis' article which merely expressed an opinion.

    Organsiations need to step back from this idea that speech that is not also a deed, or 'speech act' as you rightly call it, can be prohibited by law. The University's task is to determine first whether a speech act has occurred at all, and then to see if that speech act contravenes the law. In this case, I think it is clear that Prof Kipnis's articles was not a speech act, but only speech.

    The students who brought the complaint against her should at the very least be named, so that they can bear the opprobrium or support of the community. Personally, I'd like to see them expelled for being nasty little shits whose speech acts caused a good professor grief, but I suppose one has to forgive the young darlings their adolescent follies.

    But why have American students become so whiny?

  28. No, David, writing a letter is not a 'apeech act,' it's just speech.

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