He really didn't:

Pia and Sid sit in La Bellota Hermosa. Across the plate, now empty of presunto, Pia watches Sid, chest becrumbed, reducing a mass of toothpicks to rubble as, slowly and methodically, he works the last strands of fat and sinew out from between his teeth. Pia closes her eyes. It stops. Not the tooth-picking, but the sight of it. From the crevices of such examples John Searle extracts this conclusion: seeing is a subjective experience which takes place within the head (e.g., 17, 52.) Moreover, such experience involves (or consists of) visual consciousness of what occurs in a 'subjective visual field' so that an experience of seeing involves both a subjective and an objective 'visual field'. (3-4) Such is the order of non sequitur characteristic of his new book….

J.L. Austin once gave this reason for attention to how words actually work: that the distinctions language has been forced to recognise are likely more illuminating than any a philosopher may think up in his armchair of an afternoon. (1956: 182) Language, from this perspective, is a starting point for philosophy, though, as Austin also stressed, not the end of its ambitions. Searle prefers the armchair. Its advantage is free rein to fancy. Its real risk, with the snares language sets, is dejà vu all over again.