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The illusion of choice in action?

The latest psychological research:

Suppose, as Wegner and Wheatley propose, that we observe ourselves (unconsciously) perform some action, like picking out a box of cereal in the grocery store, and then only afterwards come to infer that we did this intentionally. If this is the true sequence of events, how could we be deceived into believing that we had intentionally made our choice before the consequences of this action were observed? This explanation for how we think of our agency would seem to require supernatural backwards causation, with our experience of conscious will being both a product and an apparent cause of behavior.

In a study just published in Psychological Science, Paul Bloom and I explore a radical—but non-magical—solution to this puzzle. Perhaps in the very moments that we experience a choice, our minds are rewriting history, fooling us into thinking that this choice—that was actually completed after its consequences were subconsciously perceived—was a choice that we had made all along.

Though the precise way in which the mind could do this is still not fully understood, similar phenomena have been documented elsewhere. For example, we see the apparent motion of a dot before seeing that dot reach its destination, and we feel phantom touches moving up our arm before feeling an actual touch further up our arm. “Postdictive” illusions of this sort are typically explained by noting that there’s a delay in the time it takes information out in the world to reach conscious awareness: Because it lags slightly behind reality, consciousness can “anticipate” future events that haven’t yet entered awareness, but have been encoded subconsciously, allowing for an illusion in which the experienced future alters the experienced past.

In one of our studies, participants were repeatedly presented with five white circles in random locations on a computer monitor and were asked to quickly choose one of the circles in their head before one lit up red. If a circle turned red so fast that they didn’t feel like they were able to complete their choice, participants could indicate that they ran out of time. Otherwise, they indicated whether they had chosen the red circle (before it turned red) or had chosen a different circle. We explored how likely people were to report a successful prediction among these instances in which they believed that they had time to make a choice.

Unbeknownst to participants, the circle that lit up red on each trial of the experiment was selected completely randomly by our computer script. Hence, if participants were truly completing their choices when they claimed to be completing them—before one of the circles turned red—they should have chosen the red circle on approximately 1 in 5 trials. Yet participants’ reported performance deviated unrealistically far from this 20% probability, exceeding 30% when a circle turned red especially quickly. This pattern of responding suggests that participants’ minds had sometimes swapped the order of events in conscious awareness, creating an illusion that a choice had preceded the color change when, in fact, it was biased by it.

Importantly, participants’ reported choice of the red circle dropped down near 20% when the delay for a circle to turn red was long enough that the subconscious mind could no longer play this trick in consciousness and get wind of the color change before a conscious choice was completed. This result ensured that participants weren’t simply trying to deceive us (or themselves) about their prediction abilities or just liked reporting that they were correct.

What do informed readers make of this research?

 

 

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9 responses to “The illusion of choice in action?”

  1. I'm not terribly informed, but this doesn't seem to raise any new concerns beyond those already presented 25 years ago by Dennett in _Consciousness Explained_.

  2. I am unsure about W&W's premise that if x is an intentional action, then x is done consciously.
    If a baseball is suddenly hurled at my head, I will instinctually, spontaneously move my arm to block/catch it. That act is done "intentionally," in that it was done with the intent of preventing the ball from injuring me. But the act was entirely automatic, and so in that sense not performed "consciously." (At least, it is not done any more consciously than picking a cereal at the store.)
    There may be legit responses to this. But at minimum, we would probably need to precisify what is meant by 'intentional' and by 'conscious'; see Anscombe on the former and Lycan on the latter.

  3. Nietzsche on causae post effectum in Human, All Too Human [http://bit.ly/1TzfE0r%5D and in Twilight of the Idols [http://bit.ly/1qZK9De%5D.

  4. The actual result doesn't seem TOO surprising. Suppose (this may be unrealistic, but as an example it's easy to follow) that you make your prediction by ruling out one circle after another. Now suppose time runs out when you have only narrowed the choice down to two or three, one of which is the one that turns red. You might think "Yes, that's (one of) the one(s) I had narrowed it down to!" and not notice the parenthesized bits: what you are retrospectively giving yourself credit for is completing a process that in fact was still underway…

  5. There is a contingent in the neuroscience community that has decided to use a particular definition of who "you" are that precludes "you" from making decisions. Thus, as typically stated in the abstract or title of a paper, "you" do not have free will. Instead, your brain makes the decision and "you" are just along for the ride. Under this same logic, "you" would also have no memory, emotion, or sensory perception. Similarly, if the compensation for the half second of processing lag between stimulus and awareness is illusion then all perception is illusion.

  6. In reply to Allen Hazen: Seems a difficult strategy to implement in under 50 ms. (Also, participants were told to say they hadn't made a choice yet if they hadn't, and were told that they should expect that this would happen, as sometimes the change to red would happen very, very fast.)

  7. I considered a similar sort of 'backward causality' in an essay re. the way dreams often seem to coincide with external stimuli. Dreaming of a navel engagement, to use Russell's example, coinciding with a door slamming. It is unusual, I thought, that the narrative of a dream might build to some climax that happens to coincide with something in the 'awake' world; and this would seem to suggest that the dreaming mind has some power of foresight. Either this, I argued, or a sort of 'backward causality', where the slamming door, for example, happens first and then the naval engagement is written into our histories by the dreaming mind, for some reason…

  8. Backward causation is of course almost the first thing that comes to … mind. But is it a concept applicable beyond physics? Just because Deepak Chopra might think it is don't make it so. Design a good experiment however and you might find fortune and fame.

  9. Here is a good rebuttal of Bear's SA article by CEU philosopher Hanoch Ben-Yami:

    http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/philosophy-versus-neuroscience-on-the-question-of-free-will/

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