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The growing mismatch between jobs for philosophers and what the leading PhD programs emphasize, or, the so-called “core” is dying

PhilJobs is starting to fill up with ads, though not as many ads as one would like to see (at least not yet).  But what is striking is the pattern in areas of interest:  lots of value theory and history of philosophy (esp. early modern, but also a fair bit of 19th-century), some currently "trendy" areas like philosophy of race and gender, but very little "core analytic" (as the Stanford ad puts it), i.e., very little philosophy of language and mind, metaphyscis & epistemology, the latter being the historical "prestige" trackers in the profession for the last half-century.  But as I've remarked before, what is prestigious and central at the top PhD programs may no longer bear much relationship to most of the jobs that exist.  That seems increasingly true (we've seen other signs of it).

Far too many PhD programs currently operate on what we might call "the MIT model":   little or no history of philosophy or post-Kantian Continental philosophy, certainly no non-Western philosophy, but lots and lots of "core analytic" (sometimes with some philosophy of science thrown in), plus a bit of value theory, though mostly to the extent it is close to the former areas.  The MIT model served MIT well when Robert Stalnaker was active and training tons of students, and before Stephen Yablo was, tragically, taken ill (though Yablo is still teaching happily).   Perhaps the MIT model can survive as a viable model for graduation education, and might do so if MIT were the only purveyor–but the University of Southern California, despite being a much larger faculty, has adopted the MIT Model with a vengeance, and Rutgers has largely migrated in that direction.  Other "MIT model" programs–wholly or heading in that direction–include Michigan, Texas, U Mass/Amherst, Rochester, UC Davis, UC Santa Barbara, among others. 

A close, but preferable (at least by my lights) relative, is the "Princeton Model," where the investment is heaviest in "core analytic," but there is also a substantial commitment to history of philosophy and sometimes even post-Kantian Continental.  NYU followed the Princeton Model, more successfully than Princeton, which no doubt explains its dominant position in Anglophone philosophy.  "Princeton Model" departments include Pittsburgh, Yale, Berkeley, UCLA, Harvard, Brown, and Cornell, among many others.


And then there is what I will call the "Naturalist Model," for which Rutgers was, 25 years ago the exemplar, but no longer.  On this view, armchair "analytic" is marginal, since philosophical inquiry should operate in tandem with the empirical sciences, whether biology or psychology or linguistics.   History of philosophy often looms large in these departments–at least when they are doing the model right!–since history is a powerful empirical corrective to the "intuitive" nonsense of the present, and so much historical philosophy was deeply interdisciplinary, as it were.  Departments in this model include Pitt HPS (which has fabulous job placement, reflecting not only the strength of the program but the appeal of genuinely interdisciplinary young philosophers to colleges I suspect), UC San Diego, Penn, Wash U/St. Louis, and Duke, among others.  (UCSD and Penn are notable in this group for their strong commitment to history of philosophy.)

Of course, these are all "ideal types," and one can quibble about the precise groupings.  But insofar as these three ideal types explain an awful lot of the most distinguished PhD programs, one can see the trouble on the horizon, at least for the MIT Model (when adopted elsewhere–MIT still maintains strong placement, but it skews to elite institutions, and it benefits from a strong commitment to feminist philosophy, increasingly in demand as an AOC).

I'm curious how others perceive the trends on the job market in terms of what's being advertised and who's being hired.  Readers may also comment on my three "ideal types," but let's try not to get bogged down in disputes about particular programs.

UPDATE:  Comments now open, sorry about that.

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35 responses to “The growing mismatch between jobs for philosophers and what the leading PhD programs emphasize, or, the so-called “core” is dying”

  1. The 'but' in 'MIT still maintains strong placement, but it skews to elite institutions' sounds misplaced…'Tom Hanks is a great actor, but a very nice person.'

    BL COMMENT: Intended meaning was only that the MIT Model still sells at the most elite institutions, less so elsewhere, which was consistent with my general point about the decline of "core analytic" on the job market.

  2. I am not sure I fully understand the divide between the MIT model and the naturalistic model. Stalnaker's work, e.g., is deeply naturalistic and deals with issues in linguistics, cognitive science, and decision theory. And MIT graduates are often impressively well-trained in formal semantics, syntax, etc. In this regard, the kind of stuff going on at MIT is pretty much in line with what was happening in Rutgers 20 years ago—or 5-10 years ago. My impression is that, for many years, Rutgers, CUNY, and MIT shared a common philosophical tendency.

    BL COMMENT: Stalnaker is retired, and while his work engages with linguistics and MIT students obviously benefit from a first-rate linguistics faculty, much of Stalnaker's work, and most of what others do there, is "armchair" metaphysics, mind, epistemology, etc. But as I said, I really don't want to debate the details–ideal types always smooth over certain differences.

  3. I'm puzzled that you consider the University of Michigan to be a department that follows the "MIT model." We have as many faculty in philosophy of science as we do in "core analytic" areas, and our largest concentration of faculty by almost a factor of two is in value theory. We may not currently have as many faculty in history of philosophy as Princeton, but the disparity disappears if you leave out ancient philosophy–and we now have a scholar of Chinese philosophy.

    BL COMMENT: "Core analytic" would include Lasonen-Arnio, Lormand, Manley, Moss, Swanson, Weatherson, plus several others working close by like Joyce, Matira, and Tappenden. Almost all the recent tenurings have been in "core analytic," with the exception of you. Michigan does have more value theory than MIT, though saying that Michigan is trending in the MIT direction still seems right. That there is anyone doing Chinese philosophy again is news to me! A department as big as Michigan with just one ancient and one early modern person, and no Continental: well, that fits my characterization I think.

  4. Well, it's one ancient, one early modern, one Kant/early modern, and as I said, one in classical Chinese philosophy. It's also a bit of an understatement to say that our value theory contingent is larger than MIT's, since we have eight faculty specializing in ethics, phil of law and social/political, plus several others who frequently dabble.

    BL COMMENT: Sorry, I should have said one tenured person in ancient, one tenured person in early modern. Contrast Princeton with 3 tenured faculty in ancient,1 tenured doing Kant, 1 tenured doing early modern. I'm not quite sure how you're counting faculty, but no one primarily in philosophy works in philosophy of law. I would have thought the value theory head count was Anderson, Railton, Darby, Jacobson, Buss, Krishnamurthy, with Sripada and Maitra around the edges. (MIT is a smaller faculty, by the way, than Michigan, so of course they will have fewer in value theory.) But please, let's drop this: I didn't say Michigan=MIT, I did say it's trending in the direction of that Model rather than Princeton's. I hope it changes!

  5. One obvious upshot of trends in the market is that doing a Ph.D. in a "core analytic" area outside one of these very elite institutions simply won't pay off, at least in terms of placing in academia. If trends continue, the number of elite institutions where it does pay off will sharply contract. Hiring in these areas will mostly be among elite institutions, and graduate students working on technical topics and/or on topics that bear little relevance to questions outside "core" areas will have an especially tough time getting hired at less prestigious institutions.

    It's not clear to me how much switching to the "Princeton" or "Naturalist" models will really help things. For those jobs where it is important to show the broad implications of one's "core" work, having been trained in a "Naturalist" institution might help, but even those jobs are so few that there will be a massive shortage in them in comparison to areas like value theory. I don't expect these trends in hiring to reverse, so it will be interesting to see how graduate institutions respond.

  6. It is misleading to say that MIT's graduate program involves "little or no history of philosophy". There's a time-honored tradition of MIT students taking courses at Harvard. This is encouraged. History AOCs are in many MIT students' reach.

    Also, although it's true that MIT's historically strong placement does owe a lot to Bob Stalnaker, there's no reasonable way of carving up MIT's recent success, say, across the last decade, in a way that attributes it wholly or mostly to the success of Stalnaker advisees. This should be apparent upon consultation of MIT's online placement and dissertation information. (One might highlight, for consideration, the total success of recent advisees of Roger White and Alex Byrne.) It is also not clear that it is a "commitment to feminist philosophy" that is now keeping MIT's placement strong. What evidence do you have for this claim?

    You've repeatedly speculated about what explains MIT's success (here: leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/09/the-strong-showing-of-mit-in-top-25-placement.html). But your speculations aren't borne out by the data. Today, the MIT faculty have diverse interests, as do the grad students (see: web.mit.edu/philosophy/phil-grad.html). Stalnaker and Yablo are in every way integral, beloved members of our community. Both are presently dedicated to multiple advisees. Anyone who has visited MIT recently could confirm all of this for you. Our job candidates do well for a long list of reasons, many of which can be experienced first-hand in the daily philosophical life in our department.

  7. Every generation creates its own philosophical fads. Today, some of the big ones are "Environmental Ethics", "Philosophy of Race and Gender" and "Non-Western Philosophy". A few years ago, it was "Experimental Philosophy". Today, ex-phi is moth-eaten. Beware those who measure philosophical quality in terms of quantity of jobs in a given year; that's no criterion. Many who are the excitement of today won't be the excitement of tomorrow. Maybe it will be "Philosophy of Veganism" or "Business Ethics [sic]" or "Ethical Non-Monogamy". Predictions are difficult, especially about the future.

    History of philosophy has considerable pedagogical value for undergraduates, but it's largely a highly ritualised form of necrophilia qua research programme. Did Dead Philosopher say p or did he say q? Let's devote our scholarly lives to figuring out which! While this strikes me as a much more worthwhile project than so-called Naturalism, it's not exactly throwing light on the human condition. Core analytic philosophy, while difficult to master and very complex, can throw light on our problems, from causation to communication to knowledge and perception. It has a proven track record with work by philosophy's greatest minds. On Brian's list of the best Anglophone philosophers since 1957, nearly all of them work (or worked) in core analytic philosophy: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2017/03/best-anglophone-philosophers-since-1957.html.

    There is thus great appeal in the so-called MIT model. Those trained in core analytic philosophy can easily apply their knowledge and skill too applications in ethics or elsewhere. The reverse doesn't hold.

  8. I don't see that it's responsive to the claim that the MIT model involves "little or no history of philosophy" to point out that MIT grad students have to go to Harvard to take history of philosophy: that just confirms the point.

    If one looks at MIT's recent placement, http://web.mit.edu/philosophy/placement.html it is striking that more than half the most recent graduates do not have permanent posts or are even in academia. And the data from earlier years bear out precisely what I said in the September 2015 post of mine you linked to.

    The MIT faculty only have "diverse" interests by the parochial standards of the last 15 minutes of analytic philosophy. MIT faculty are very good at what they're doing, but a faculty with no specialists in ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, early modern philosophy, Kant, 19th-century German philosophy, 20th-century Continental philosophy, Chinese philosophy, etc. is not diverse.

  9. I didn't know X-phil was moth-eaten, or that history of philosophy was a "ritualized form of necrophilia" or that those trained in "core analytic" can do significant work elsewhere. This sounds suspiciously like things that defenders of the MIT Model would believe, though!

  10. "History of philosophy has considerable pedagogical value for undergraduates, but it's largely a highly ritualised form of necrophilia qua research programme", etc.

    I suppose the same holds of the history of literature, the history of art, and more generally the history of X, for any X. What a sophisticated perspective. I realize that you precisely wanted your comment to be irritating, and it would be invidious not to let you know that you achieved your goal: it was very irritating indeed.

  11. Just wanted to quickly chime in to discuss the question raised above about the change over time in the status of experimental philosophy. As I see it, there are two important major trends:

    1. A decade ago, there was a great deal of discussion of the very idea of experimental philosophy (e.g., numerous papers that were not about any specific philosophical question but rather about the very idea of using \experiments in philosophy). There is now considerably less discussion of these issues.

    2. At the same time, there is now considerably more in the way of actual experimental work designed to address specific philosophical questions. For example, within formal semantics, there have been important experimental studies over the past few years by Seth Yalcin, Andy Egan, Justin Khoo, Janice Dowell, Fabrizio Cariani, Melissa Fusco, Daniel Rothschild, Julia Zakkou, Markus Kneer, Bob Beddor, Justin D'Ambrosio, Teresa Marques, B. R. George, Jonathan Phillips, and many others. None of these people are writing about the idea of experimental philosophy per se; all of them are just conducting experimental studies as a way to make progress on specific questions that arise in philosophy of language.

    It is hard to know what explains these two trends, but one obvious hypothesis would be that the latter is the explanation of the former. As experimental work becomes normalized, it is only natural that there will be ever less interest in picking it out as some special type of method that requires discussion as a topic in its own right.

  12. Whenever this issue or related issues have come up, I have always spoken from my experience having chaired several search committees, serving on even more, and having been Department Head during two searches. The point is simple, but seems to be confusing to any number of otherwise very smart people.

    1. Most students in the US get their higher educations at undistinguished public institutions of one kind or another.

    2. Most jobs in philosophy are at such undistinguished public institutions.

    3. Most of the students at these sorts of places do not major in philosophy. Indeed, the typical numbers of philosophy majors at such schools is very low.

    4. Very few of those who major in philosophy at such places go to graduate school in philosophy. (In the 20 years I've been at Missouri State, I've sent fewer than five students to graduate programs, although several went to very good ones, and I am, of course, proud of that.)

    5. The economics of this sort of higher education rests almost entirely on credit-hour production.

    6. Therefore, a philosophy program, if it is to survive, has to attract a lot of general education students, as well as students from other programs for its upper division courses. My Aesthetics course enrolls 50-60% Art and Design Students, while my Philosophy and Literature course enrolls about the same percentage of English majors. I am in the process of developing a Phil Psych course that hopefully will do the same with Psych majors.

    7. What this means is that philosophy programs in such places must hire people who (a) can effectively teach across the curriculum; (b) can effectively teach higher level material to non-majors and to people who will never go to graduate school in philosophy; (c) will not resent 2/3 of their course load consisting of general education courses. (d) will be effective teachers of general education.

    We have not found candidates from the top programs — and especially, the "MIT style" programs — to satisfy these criteria, which is why we virtually never hire anyone from them. And given points (1) and (2), you would think this would matter to such programs, given that presumably, they want their graduates to find employment. (Although the sophomoric snark of the likes of "thefinegameofnil" above makes me wonder.)

    The candidates who seem best suited to us are those whose education has been more classically "liberal" than it has been narrowly or technically analytic. Indeed, I am the last person to have been hired from the latter sort of program, and I was very anomalous in that program, as I never really bought into that narrow, technical way of doing philosophy. It certainly provided me with some sharp intellectual instruments, but with respect to the subject matter I was always much more interested in history, art, literature, and that sort of thing.

  13. By the preferred measure identified — jobs advertised in the present market — a simple search at PhilJobs with "experimental" returns exactly one job inviting the ex-phi crowd to apply, in Princeton's cognitive science program. I thought it tolerably clear that training in core analytic philosophy is preparatory for work in applied fields, but perhaps I should illustrate this with an example. Knowledge of philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics and epistemology are important resources for one doing serious work in ethics or politics.

    Overall, there's a major conflation of what philosophers are hiring in nowadays and what quality philosophy is. Many of the philosophy courses taught to undergraduates are in ethics or politics or history of philosophy, so there is no great mystery when it comes to why many value theorists and historians of philosophy are employable at undergraduate-focused institutions. Many philosophers also feel a need to pursue the trendy, so there are courses to be taught in race and gender, sexuality, non-Western philosophy like Buddhism, identity politics and the like. Philosophy blogs like the New York Times' Stone and Daily Nous have been rah-rah boys on behalf of these subjects. But, as I said, the excitement of today is seldom the excitement of tomorrow; fads will change. Overall, the trend towards race and gender and identity politics has not been good for the humanities, at least in terms of getting humanists employed, if that's to be the criterion. By induction, if philosophy focuses on such subjects, then it will increasingly share the (increasingly grim) fate of the rest of the humanities.

    Core analytic philosophy is being jettisoned for the very worst of reasons, often petty and political and self-interested. It has served philosophy well, as a catalogue of recent great philosophers will attest to; I linked to such a catalogue earlier. Bryan Van Norden and Jay Garfield put out a self-serving piece of rhetoric that served their aims well: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/if-philosophy-wont-diversify-lets-call-it-what-it-really-is.html. Look at all of the jobs now in non-Western philosophy. The thing is that it's a zero-sum game. Gains in jobs in trendy subjects like race and gender have come at the expense of rigorous ones in core analytic philosophy. Some may not like to admit it, but Linda Alcoff's vision of philosophy is winning. See her piece "A Call for Climate Change" here: http://www.apaonlinecsw.org. Maybe core analytic philosophers should wake up and defend their discipline before it ends up like, say, comparative literature or sociology, in which politically trendy work is all the rage.

  14. In 1959, Paul Arthur Schilpp delivered a Presidential address to what was then called the Western (later the Central) division of the American Philosophical Association. Titled “The Abdication of Philosophy,” (Proceedings and Addresses…, Vol. 32) Schilpp’s address accused analytic philosophy of a “reluctance … to make any contribution to man's existing dilemmas.” (21) “Most of the great thinkers of mankind,” he said, “seem to have believed wisdom was a good thing not merely for living the good life, but necessary for the development and running of society and of the state. This being the case, ethics and social and political philosophy occupied a considerable portion of their interest and work.” (20) In an age of world-wars and the threat of species-wide annihilation from atomic weapons, the need for such wisdom was more urgent than ever. But rather than doing more to meet the need, analytic philosophers had done much less :

    "Once upon a time … a Plato wrote The Republic and The Laws, St. Augustine penned his City of God, Sir Thomas More his Utopia, Kant his Perpetual Peace, and even Nietzsche his Zarathustra. By contrast, most 20th century philosophers manage to come as close to that sort of thing as [C.L. Stevenson’s] Ethics and Language, which tells us a great deal more about language than about ethics. In fact, the big issue which today seems to divide philosophers in the Western world is that between the devotees of ordinary language and those of constructed linguistic systems. Our so-called "lovers of wisdom" appear to think that wisdom applies only to the manipulation of language. … This, then, is the abdication of philosophy. We will be linguists, semanticists, symbolists, grammarians – yes, and even logicians. But we will not be philosophers!" (20-21)

    It seems to me that the analytic tradition has only made the most minor of recoveries from this “abdication” (seethe recent Oxford Review of Books interview with K.A. Appiah to which Leiter Reports linked back on 9/25), and that – pace thefinegameofnil – current trends in the job market are not so much fads-du-jour (although there certainly are elements of faddishness involved in the details) as they are signs that an increasing number of people are recognizing society’s need for wisdom, and philosophy’s duty to (try to) meet that need. Whether “[t]hose trained in core analytic philosophy can easily apply their knowledge and skill too [sic] applications in ethics or elsewhere” in ways that prove socially useful remains to be seen. But the track record so far is not promising.

  15. I suppose that I can be very good at provoking a reaction; that was indeed my intention.

    What I object to in history of philosophy is indeed its necrophilia. There is an obsession with whether Plato meant p or Thomas Aquinas q or Vasubandhu r that is, frankly, not very useful to living, breathing philosophers. There is a kind of historically-informed philosophy that is a fascinating subject, and it's about helping to find today's philosophers find their own voices. An excerpt from Peter Strawson's review of Jonathan Bennett's Kant's Analytic should suffice to demonstrate the point: "Bennett, as was to be expected, has written a first-rate book on Kant's Analytic. It is vivid, entertaining, and extremely instructive. It will be found of absorbing interest both by those who already know the Critique and by those – if there are any such – who have a developed interest in philosophy, yet no direct acquaintance with Kant. These last it will surely drive to the text and, as surely, will drive them to approach it in a truly philosophical spirit. Bennett's Kant is not a giant immersed, or frozen, in time. He is a great contemporary – a little out of touch, admittedly, with recent developments in mathematics and physics – but one with whom we can all argue, against him, at his side, or obliquely to him. And so Bennett does argue, continuously, fiercely, and fruitfully; and summons to join in the argument, at appropriate moments, those older contemporaries, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, and those younger contemporaries, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Ayler, Quine, Quinton, Warnock, and others. This is splendid, and a necessary corrective to that extraordinary isolation in which Kant tends to be islanded, partly indeed, by his own unique qualities, but partly by oceans of the wrong kind of respect. Bennett, continuously engaging his great antagonist, shows the right kind."

    Brian has written a great deal about Nietzsche, but much of it seems to be necrophilia. It is not particularly surprising why Brian advocates on behalf of history of philosophy: he is himself a scholar of Nietzsche, Freud, Marx and other Teutonic figures. Was Nietzsche an ethical anti-realist? That's a serious question, but it's also a matter of necrophilia. I know full well that Alexander Nehamas' Nietzsche probably doesn't have too much in common with the actual man, but that's fine; I'm not a necrophiliac. I want something interesting, perhaps even relevant to my own work and Nietzschean much more than something that's dry and historically true to the actual Nietzsche.

    BL COMMENT: Actually, Nietzsche is an anti-realist about all value; understanding why is interesting because it's the correct position, vividly put by Nietzsche as it happens. I am interested in Nietzsche (and Marx) because they are right about a lot of things: they are alive and interesting, not dead and boring like so much of current "core analytic."

  16. I don't disagree with the economic facts that you cite. I would have thought students trained in core analytic philosophy are very good at teaching intro courses and the like, certainly better than students trained in non-Western philosophy or race and gender theory. There's certainly a lot of analytic aesthetics; it's rather easier to make sense of than the other brand.

  17. One might've thought that volumes Schilpp edited should have taught him otherwise. It seems to me that the best ethicists today take very seriously Stevenson and Blackburn and Gibbard and Mackie and so on. Plato's Republic is a great book largely dealing with substantial issues in core analytic philosophy; he talked a lot about epistemology and metaphysics and that enabled him to talk about how to live. Maybe we should be open-minded about how to live and, therefore, open to the prospect that philosophy oughtn't to tell one how to live. At the very least, we shouldn't decide it a priori because we're in love with some Greats.

    As part of a comprehensive general education in the humanities, I think all of the books Schilpp listed ought to be studied. (Maybe the Genealogy instead of Zarathustra.) That's a part of our intellectual heritage, after all. But I don't believe that we need to make philosophy solely about Greats.

    You mentioned Kwame Appiah. I haven't read the piece you cited, but my recollection is that Appiah did his dissertation under Hugh Mellor in philosophy of language.

  18. I find global anti-realism about value a bit difficult to grasp, since it'd entail that we should be epistemic anti-realists too. But this isn't quite the proper place for that discussion.

    Re: your remark "I am interested in Nietzsche (and Marx) because they are right about a lot of things: they are alive and interesting, not dead and boring like so much of current 'core analytic'", it's telling. I too am an anti-realist on most normative matters, so you have your necrophiliacs and I have mine. Disagreement about such cases cannot really be resolved, but it is good to know where one stands; it is solely an issue of, as Lionel Robbins memorably put it, thy blood or mine.

  19. How do non-US departments fit into these models? (Or is it a decidedly US-phenomenon?)

    BL COMMENT: Oxford is so large it's hard to characterize. Cambridge Philosophy proper is very much on the MIT Model, but of course there are large groups of ancient philosophy scholars and philosophers of science in cognate units. I would say that KCL is closer to the MIT model, UCL to the Princeton model. Bristol, Essex, Edinburgh, among others, are a bit harder to fit within an ideal type.

  20. Dear finegameofnil: please take a 24 hour hiatus from posting comments here!

  21. MIT Grad Student #2

    I second these remarks. I am an MIT graduate student of several years (and don't know who the OP is, but hi).

  22. I don't know that they actually do a whole lot of explanatory work, but in the absence of hard data I'd like to add two thoughts to the discussion:

    1.) Perhaps it's partly in the nature of "core" areas to be self-effacing. What I mean is, if they're really core subjects, then they're subjects that connect closely to issues in other subfields. So, for example, your bog-standard analytic philosopher of art, feminist theory, mind, race, or science is going to be doing a lot of applied metaphysics or epistemology. And to the extent that they do so, they're basically a 2-for-1 deal where hiring is concerned. And that's probably going to suffice for the vast majority of departments, for the kinds of reasons Daniel Kaufman has outlined. And it'll probably suffice for a lot of PhD-granting programs, too, unless they don't already have someone working "purely" in whatever core area is under consideration.

    In this respect, I think the case of logic is pretty instructive: it seems fair to say that just about everyone agrees that logic is crucial to/a core aspect of philosophy, but AFAIK (which, in fairness, isn't all that far!) that's never really been manifested as a massive, ongoing demand for strict logicians. Instead, it's manifested in terms of the kind of training we get, the logic requirements in place at most programs, the kind of work we produce, the fact that just about every department offers introductory courses in logic, etc. Logic is everywhere, but logicians aren't.

    2.) I don't know to what extent this is borne out by the data (or even whether the data exist), but it seems worth asking what proportion of "open" jobs go to people working in "pure" core areas, especially since the proportion of open jobs seems to be increasing. It would also be worth knowing what kinds of institutions are advertising open positions to begin with, and what proportion of open hires are in subfields that have been trending upward in the few years preceding whichever year is under consideration.

  23. A small comment in response to your #2:

    I think you're right that the number of jobs advertised as "open" on, say, philjobs has gone up. But in my experience as an applicant the number of these jobs that are *actually* "open" is quite small. Usually, when you open the ad, they're "open, but with a strong preference for *insert trendy area here*". So while I agree that what you mention is worth looking into, I also think that the trendy areas will come out well on this metric, but largely because many "open" jobs are not in fact open.

  24. I'm curious (actually curious, though this will sound angry!) about one thing in your comment, Daniel:

    You say "We have not found candidates from the top programs — and especially, the "MIT style" programs — to satisfy these criteria, which is why we virtually never hire anyone from them."

    How do you know, without hiring them, that candidates from top programs don't satisfy these criteria?

  25. Brian,

    I'm a bit surprised at how you view KCL. I would think it is one of the best places to do history of philosophy in the world. They have a lot of superb historians: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/people/staff/academic/index.aspx

    BL COMMENT: Fair enough, more Princeton Model!

  26. I have published in and taught a wide variety of subjects: philosophy of language, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, mind, ethics, aesthetics, existentialism and phenomenology, history of modern philosophy, philosophy of biology, philosophy of literature, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of film, Wittgenstein, Locke, Hume, Shakespeare, Nabokov, etc. I have written specialist works as well as books directed to students and the general public. I could fit into almost any type of philosophy department. And yet I have no academic job. Strange.

  27. Our primary criterion for hiring is demonstrated excellence in teaching, across the curriculum. Candidates from the "MIT style programs" tend to focus on research and consequently, tend to have inferior teaching portfolios when compared to those from less elite programs.

  28. Daniel Kaufman is surely right to say that:

    "2. Most jobs in philosophy are at such undistinguished public institutions."

    But it is much less clear that most *full-time, tenure-track, living wage* jobs are at such institutions. As you well know, institutions like yours have to constantly fight to maintain existing tenure-lines. The prestigious R1s will typically have a much easier time justifying a replacement hire or even a new line. So given the forced reliance on adjuncts and other contingent faculty at undistinguished public institutions, it's not at all obvious that there are more career-able jobs at schools like yours.

    I haven't found any good numbers on this, but just going off positions listed on PhilJobs, the numbers skew heavily toward research positions (see the informal survey from 2015 here: http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2015/12/where-the-jobs-arent-2015.html )

  29. Yes, I was speaking of jobs period. But you are mistaken regarding living wage. Our Imstructors are salaried, with benefits and do not get paid per course. The same is true at the local community college. So a job doesn't have to be tenure track, ranked faculty to make a living wage.

    And you can bet this trend will be coming to the shi-shi places too, just a little later.

    If people want to hold out for their dream job that's their prerogative, but it's foolish. Not a single person from my graduating class who did that is working in the profession today.

  30. Guess the genius project doesn’t work for everyone.

  31. Great to hear that your instructors – and those at your local CC – have decent terms of employment. Sadly that is not at all typical nationally – especially for community colleges where having 2/3 or more of instructional staff as part time is not unusual. So, sure, banking on your dream R1 job will be a foolish strategy for most graduate students. But I've not yet seen any evidence that banking on a sustainable teaching-focused career in philosophy is any less of a long shot.

  32. If this is true, it is a bit outrageous. Can someone in the profession please give this man a job or at least lend him a hand. That would be great. Thanks!

  33. I don't think PhilJobs alone is a reliable source of "full-time, tenure-track, living wage jobs" in philosophy. There are, for example, over 100 Community Colleges in the state of California alone with jobs fitting this description that don't often advertise at philosophy job sites or even national sites like the Chronicle. Many of these jobs have higher salaries than at many state universities (albeit with higher costs of living). Along with less distinguished state universities and private teaching or liberal arts institutions already mentioned, the number of primarily research positions in philosophy pale in comparison to the number of primarily teaching positions (not to mention interdisciplinary positions with a philosophy focus) at such state universities, liberal arts colleges and community colleges. If the job market in philosophy starts to decline in future years or if the prestige of the field takes a turn for the worse and funding for new or replacement positions drops, I would not be surprised if the philosophy jobs most affected would be those associated with research at middle of the road universities rather than the teaching and more interdisciplinary positions already tied into seat counts. Sure, there is a very real and very disappointing reliance on adjuncts at many state universities and community colleges just as there is reliance on graduate students and Visiting or temporary positions at R1 institutions. However, using California as an example, the sheer numbers of "full-time, tenure-track, living wage jobs" are at the 100+ CA Community Colleges and 27 Cal State Universities compared to the 10 UCs and select few privates. Of course, this disproportion is not as pronounced on the East Coast where community colleges are often more vocationally oriented and the elite universities are almost exclusively private (rather than public). That said, state universities and community colleges could do a better job of increasing the number of full-time positions or at least combine some of the adjunct schedules into yearly or temporary lecturer positions as many privates already do.

  34. This is partly what I was trying to get at, but you said it far better.

    Dr. Bowman is laboring under a very narrow, insider conception of the academic job landscape, one that is going to become less and less descriptive of the whole, rather than more, as the university continues its transition from a institution devoted to educating elites to a system of mass education, like K-12.

  35. I want to echo and amplify the excellent comments of Daniel Kaufman (especially #12) and Phil Prof. It may be true that B.A.-only regional state universities employ more adjuncts that public R-1s (caveat: I'm not sure how one should count graduate student employment), but the case for additional tenure lines is made primarily on consistent, excellent general education enrollment and encouraging student interest in upper division classes. Being able to "teach across the curriculum" is also really attractive. I wouldn't overlook someone from an MIT-model school, but I'd be looking for evidence that they can develop a meaningful introduction to philosophy course on the assumption that this may well be the only exposure to philosophy their students ever get.

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