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More on the allocation of scarce medical resources during the pandemic, and a lack of consensus among bioethicists about how to proceed

Bioethicist Thomas Cunningham (Loyola Marymount Bioethics Institute) writes:

Thanks as always for your continued commentary and wise read of the news of interest to the world and to philosophers, broadly conceived.

Sometime around March, you discussed allocation of scarce resources in US hospitals on your blog. At that time I suggested there was a consensus in the bioethics community about how to do this. I am writing today to revise my assessment, as this is very much in the news and may remain of interest to you and your readers.

Here in Los Angeles, we are experiencing absurdly low supplies for various resources. Speaking generally, and not about my health system in particular, I am aware of shortages in ventilators, machines that deliver high concentrations of oxygen to patients, oxygen itself, hemodialysis machines, feeding pumps, IV machines, the lines that they require to deliver therapies to patients, and other equipment. Hospitals are also seeing such unprecedented volumes of hospitalized patients that they have considered implementing triage protocols to allocate patients to lower levels of care that have adequate staffing, as reported here.

The first article above gets it right regarding the lack of consensus on triage: “Doctors and ethicists in Los Angeles and across the U.S. have not been able to agree on a single methodology for prioritizing patients, or even concur on the appropriate factors when determining who should get medical care.” But this is not the whole story. There is general consensus on basic principles, including that bedside rationing is ethically sub-optimal, and that rationing decisions during this pandemic crisis should be made by individuals or teams operating independently of bedside physicians and staff.

The dissensus concerns what specific protocols to implement and why. Some have argued for incorporating egalitarian corrections for equity into triage protocols (e.g., White and Lo in a recently published paper). Yet, this approach has only recently been codified, so few if any are using it. Most are instead using protocols that include fewer equity concerns, like essential worker status or life-cycle position to break ties within priority groups (e.g., White and Lo’s original approach). My sense is that most jurisdictions and facilities go even further, removing all factors from consideration that may be construed as entailing bias in decision making, such as age, gender, ethnicity, disability status, and so forth. California’s guidance is a perfect example of this approach.

As a philosopher and clinical ethicist, I find this lack of consensus disappointing and concerning, especially as we may enter a phase in the coming weeks where such protocols will effect patients when implemented. My principle concern is that we have not succeeded quickly enough in marrying consequentialist approaches to allocation—prioritizing with a singular focus on maximizing benefit, in terms of saving the most lives—with egalitarian approaches that recognize a legitimate duty to allocate resources in light of the harms that populations have suffered from this specific crisis. Additionally, I am concerned with the weaknesses in modeling the phenomenon of rationing in actual hospital settings. This is an issue of knowledge: We know too little, with inadequate certainty, about how hospitals function to tailor principled allocation protocols to fit the conditions of their implementation.

I am a philosopher of science by training, so it is no wonder these weaknesses are the ones that disturb me. I would hope that in the future these profound, real-world implications of ethics and epistemology in medicine attract the attention of philosophers. People have died because of bedside rationing. Many more will die because of widespread triage if we must do this. How well the protocols are designed and implemented is likely to influence how many die (though that’s an empirical question).

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One response to “More on the allocation of scarce medical resources during the pandemic, and a lack of consensus among bioethicists about how to proceed”

  1. Dr. Cunningham is right: Bioethicists have not succeeded in marrying a consequentialist approach (maximizing medical benefits) with an egalitarian approach (alleviating rather than reinforcing the socio-medical burdens of the pandemic) to triage. This may not be surprising to philosophers who specialize in moral theory, because consequentialist theories and egalitarian theories of ethics are incompatible. What makes bioethics different from traditional moral theorizing is that it seeks to “balance” elements of our “common morality” in terms of principles (in a roughly Rossian fashion). The principle of beneficence gives us a reason to maximize the good (however the “good” is defined) and the principle of justice gives us a reason to do so fairly and equitably. There is no guidance for how to do this, however (again not surprising to moral theorists). This was precisely the problem I (and my other colleagues) faced in March-April, 2020 when we were drawing up our hospital’s triage policy (I wrote a little bit about it here: https://ochuk.wordpress.com/2020/05/13/against-consequentialism-in-triage-planning/)

    The way we have things set up now is that we emphasize things like patient autonomy and justice during non-crisis periods (the more deontological side of bioethical principlism) and shift to an emphasis on maximizing benefit and reducing harm during crisis periods (the more consequentialist side of principlism). Yet even under this set-up there is little consensus as to when “crisis standards of care” should be invoked. As we saw in New York in the spring of 2020, political leaders were loath to do this, and the effort to expand ICU treatment capacity was expanded into the parking lots of hospitals.

    The truth is bioethicists and medical professionals do not want to become members of a “God committee” even if they feel it is in their job description. The problems are too difficult to work out and the moral distress of doing so is too great. Even if they come up with a sensible plan, the chances of it being carried out are slim because the conditions in which it applies are too desperate and imperfect to expect any real compliance. Exhibit A: the vaccine rollout in the US where even determining which health providers should be prioritized has proved difficult.

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