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Is it even lawful to consider “diversity” in hiring?

MOVING TO FRONT FROM APRIL 9, SINCE TIMELY AGAIN (ALSO SEE THE INSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMENTS)

In a discussion of the earlier poll, one junior faculty member asked:

I was a bit surprised to see so many people admit to doing more than #1 [i.e,. outreach to candidates from underrepresented groups]. My impression was that even #2 [using "diversity" as a tie-breaker] violates most universities' nondiscrimination policies and was illegal in the U.S. I wonder if some legally or other institutionally informed readers might be able to shed some light here.

Title VII says that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice" (https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964). The Department of Labor says that universities' affirmative action obligations as federal subcontractors do not allow "the use of race to be weighed as one factor among many in an individual’s application when rendering hiring, employment or personnel decisions, as racial preferences of any kind are prohibited under the authorities administered by OFCCP" (https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/faqs/AAFAQs). What am I missing here?

Apart from the legal issue, my own institution's DEI compliance office has told me that it violates our university's nondiscrimination policies to consider a candidate's race or gender once they have applied, even as a "tiebreaker." That's why HR doesn't pass that information along to hiring committees. I would be interested to hear whether individuals or departments who practice #2 or #3 have actually consulted their compliance offices about this, and what their institutions' policies are.

I put this question to Professor Michael Selmi, a leading employment law and civil rights expert, now at Arizona State University.  He kindly gave permission to share his answer:

The question of whether race or other characteristics can be used in a break-the-tie situation varies some but has generally been perceived as permissible under existing legal obligations.  A number of states (including California) have passed laws that ban the use of race in hiring or admissions and states may impose tighter restrictions than the federal government.   Private universities under Title VII are generally seen to have more leeway than public universities under the Constitution but the law is murky in this area, in large part because there are few challenges to affirmative action policies or practices in hiring and the admissions' cases, like Harvard's, are not directly applicable.  As a result, and this is true in discrimination cases generally where hiring cases are relatively rare, what Universities and employers do with respect to diversity and inclusion issues often flies under the radar so to speak but I suspect that in a challenge to a situation where a University used race to break a tie, the University would likely prevail against a legal challenge taking into account the importance of diverse faculty to a University, issues of academic freedom and perhaps past discrimination….        

Under Title VII and likely the constitution using diversity to do more than break ties is problematic; there might be some circumstances where it could be justified (depending on the job, the history of the institution etc) but it would be more difficult.  (Many of the cases are quite old now and it is certainly possible that if a case reached the current S. Ct., it would create a per se rule against the use of race but it has not done so yet.)  Of course, in most circumstances, it would be difficult to prove diversity was used to do more than break ties and a tie can be seen in a number of different ways.  

I'll open this for comments from other law readers knowledgeable about this area.  Because, as Professor Selmi notes, these cases are rarely litigated, a lot of possibly unlawful behavior flies under the radar.  The current Supreme Court will, if it considers the issue, likely impose more constraints, as Profesor Selmi also notes.  As some other readers wrote to me, there is obviously a lot of bad faith operating here:  institutions, on the one hand, promote "diversity" continuously, but officially disapprove of using race etc. as a hiring criterion, yet often expect it sotto vocce as it were.

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14 responses to “Is it even lawful to consider “diversity” in hiring?”

  1. Alexander Guerrero

    The fact that these cases are rarely litigated might mean that "a lot of possibly unlawful behavior flies under the radar." It might also mean that a lot of lawful behavior is currently being deemed unlawful by departments and universities that don't want to have to integrate their still racially segregated faculty departments.

    And it might also mean that many current academic hiring practices constitute illegal discrimination *against* racial minorities. It is, after all, not trivial for a profession to remain as white as academic philosophy has remained over the last 60 years (and, of course, much longer than that), with many departments being all white or nearly all white.

    There are lots of "explanations" of this, of course, pointing to the "pipeline" and much else. But those explanations have typically been seen as uncompelling in other contexts, with disparate impact litigation putting pressure on entities of various sorts to justify the hiring and employment rules and practices that are generating these racially disparate outcomes. Why is it that your department's last 18 offers have been to non-Hispanic white people? Why is it that your department, with 16 people on the faculty, is all white? Explain and justify, in detail, your search procedures, going all the way back to identification of hiring needs, how you are advertising the position, how you are defining and evaluating merit, how you are interviewing candidates, how you are discussing candidates, how you are determining which offers should be made, and how you are correcting for possible implicit or explicit bias throughout all of this.

    There is a case regarding implicit bias that I have made elsewhere: https://dailynous.com/2014/05/16/the-legality-of-hiring-for-diversity/

    Additionally, in many departments, there is a powerful case that explicit affirmative action (beyond mere 'tie-breaking') is appropriate and indeed required.

    There is a straightforward case that affirmative action is required to overcome past discrimination in those educational institutions where past discrimination existed. (Arguably, this creates a significant disanalogy with the admissions cases, where those efforts have already been made, many institutions now have a close to demographically representative student body, etc.)

    Federal law on this is pretty clear, actually, even if the few Supreme Court cases dealing with admissions decisions are all over the place.

    This is from 34 CFR Sec. 100.3(b)(6)(i) and (ii), governing education institutions that receive funds from the Department of Education, NONDISCRIMINATION UNDER PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION EFFECTUATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:

    "(6)(i) In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.

    (ii) Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin."

    Consider two cases.

    (1) A Black applicant is not offered a job in an all-white department (a department which has always been all white, and which brought in no non-white candidates to interview, has never made an offer to a non-white candidate, etc.) and the eventual hire for the job is a white candidate.

    (2) A white applicant is not offered a job in what was previously an all-white department, and the department hires a Black applicant, using some modest amount of affirmative action at some point on their way to making their hiring decision (perhaps choosing, intentionally, to interview and bring to campus more non-white candidates, and penalizing those candidates less for not having as much teaching experience nor as many publications as some of the other applicants, while also noticing that those candidates were doing much more by way of service to the profession).

    Neither applicant in (1) or (2) has a very strong legal case as a practical matter (the evidential burden alone in these hiring decision cases is hard to overcome), but the legal case under existing law is much stronger for the applicant in (1) than for the applicant in (2).

    Now, with our current Supreme Court, it might be that, in the future, the law will be 'clarified' (created) so as to rule out any use of affirmative action policies at all in the context of academic hiring and employment and administration of academic programs, in stark tension with the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act just referenced above. But that is not the law currently. As Professor Selmi notes, the current (misguided, confused) Supreme Court jurisprudence on admissions is "not directly applicable."

    For those interested, there's a very recent law review article that tries to think about 'target of opportunity' hiring under the Supreme Court affirmative action in admissions/diversity theory jurisprudence, and quite reasonably concludes it fits poorly with that rationale (which is, of course, partly because of how limited and misguided that is as a rationale for affirmative action programs more generally): https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/media/304779

    Importantly, however, that article also helpfully discusses the more relevant employment law case of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (followed on by Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County), which would arguably permit target of opportunity style programs upon a showing of either (a) a recent history of actual discrimination or (b) a 'manifest demographic imbalance' in a job category. Although (a) might be hard to show in some cases, (b) will often be as simple as just bringing in the past 50 years of faculty rosters for a department. The article gets in to some details regarding the showing of demographic imbalance (relative to what is an important question, but even if relativized to PhDs awarded or something of that limited sort, there still would be a strong case in a lot of factual circumstances).

    My view is that, contrary to affirmative action programs for faculty hiring being barred under existing law, they are actually required in many actual university contexts under existing law. Even if one doesn't go in for that strong a view, one should at least have the view that there is no law that prohibits the use of affirmative action programs for faculty hiring in places in which there is an unaddressed history of discrimination and/or a current manifest demographic imbalance regarding the composition of a philosophy department faculty. Unfortunately, many philosophy departments are such that one (or both) of those factual conditions obtains.

  2. A University of Chicago colleague (not from law or philosophy) wrote to me this morning: "I thought I would pass along our own university's take on the legality of considering race, gender, etc. in hiring. We've had the University's Office of Legal Counsel…advise us on the way we conduct searches, and he told us repeatedly and emphatically that the University considers it illegal to take these factors into account when hiring (but not when recruiting)."

  3. Alexander Guerrero

    Here's my question: given (1) that the law is (at best) unsettled on this point, (2) that there's a powerful legal argument that the law even requires these affirmative action programs in hiring in some cases, and (3) that there's no real threat of litigation from these cases, whatever the law is, why is it that so many university offices of legal counsel are so conservative (and emphatically so) on this point?

    The cynic in me thinks that (3) is being used to basically block any real pressure to change. "We don't really want to do anything, so we will pretend that we legally can't do anything, and no one is going to sue us anyway."

    "The University considers it illegal" is quite a phrase. Not, "here is the clear, unequivocal, relevant law that bars it."

    People should organize and put pressure on their university counsel offices on this point. Why is this the position they are taking, given the current state of the law?

  4. This exact legal issue came up before the Supreme Court (in reverse) in a 1996 case called Piscataway Board of Ed v Taxman.

    The issue was related to a decision to lay off a teacher in the Business department of the local high school. State law was very specific about the criteria that must be used in such cases – non-tenured faculty had to be laid off first, and then layoffs were to proceed in order of reverse seniority according to a detailed formula specified by the law.

    In a quirk of fate, all the teachers had tenure, and the two teachers with the lowest seniority – Debra Williams and Sharon Taxman – both started working for the Board of Ed on the exact same day 9 years earlier. They were close friends and work colleagues in the same department. Critically, however, Sharon Taxman was white and Debra Williams was Black, and Williams also happened to be the only Black faculty member in the Business department.

    Specific as state law was, it did not specify tenure tiebreakers down to the day, so the Board of Ed had the discretion to choose which of the two teachers to lay off. The Board next assessed their classroom performance, evaluations, volunteerism and certifications and determined that they were "two teachers of equal ability" and "equal qualifications." Surprisingly, this was not the first time this situation had come up – in past instances a random tiebreaker process had been used which included drawing numbers out of a container, drawing lots or having a lottery.

    But in all those instances, none of the teachers had been Black. Now, the Board turned to its Affirmative Action Plan from 1975 that specified it would seek to attract diverse candidates and “ when candidates appear to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action program will be recommended [for hire].” The AAP was only focused on hiring, not termination, nonetheless the Board felt that it provided the appropriate guidance.

    The Board ended up firing Sharon Taxman (as documented in the record) solely on the basis that she was white, Debra Williams was Black and the members felt it was important to retain Williams to demonstrate the Board’s commitment to maintaining a diverse faculty.

    Taxman sued under Title VII, won at the District level, and then won again when the BoE appealed to the Third Circuit. When SCOTUS granted certiorari, it was to determine the question of “whether an employer may layoff one of its employees using race or gender as a plus factor to create a more diverse workplace environment?”

    The breadth of the question presented and overall right-wing turn of the Court on affirmative action issues spooked major civil rights organizations. Corporations also feared what lawsuits they might face around their AAP programs if SCOTUS were to rule for Taxman.

    Together they quickly raised $400k as a settlement fund for the BoE. After 7 years of litigation this was also incentive enough for Taxman to settle, removing the case from SCOTUS’s docket. To this day, SCOTUS has not taken up the issue again in such a direct way. Nonetheless, since then most corporations and public employers have decided that affirmative action plans and direct racial preferences would not survive litigation and as a result are mostly disfavored.

    Debra Williams retired from teaching in 2010.

  5. I'll venture an answer to Alex's question under #3, although I'm happy to be corrected by those more expert on the state of the law. It seems to me the law is *somewhat* unsettled, but the writing is on the wall (see, e.g,. Rafal Konopka's comment at #4); the legal arguments for requiring affirmative action are colorable (not sure they're "powerful," but they could be made), but would only succeed in very specific contexts, esp. where an institution has a documented history of race discrimination. I suspect, though, the real crux is Alex's assumption that "there's no real threat of litigation from these cases." There hasn't been much litigation so far, but legal counsel offices are conservative and err on the side of avoiding costly legal trouble. And with the current SCOTUS leaning far to the right, and many appellate courts also leaning far toward the right, I don't think it's foolhardy to expect litigation on these issues may become more common.

    Faculty should, as Alex suggests, ask university counsel to justify their assessment that any consideration of race is forbidden and how confident they are in it.

  6. As a member of Rutgers faculty, you might be interested in the case from Piscataway I posted about here: https://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2021/04/is-it-even-lawful-to-consider-diversity-in-hiring.html#comment-6a00d8341c2e6353ef02788021c2b4200d

    Coincidentally, it was a case I learned as a Rutgers grad, when it was still relatively fresh some 20-odd years ago. While it ultimately was not decided by SCOTUS, the Third Circuit decision that found race-based criteria unlawful under Title VII remains red-letter law in the circuit (DE, NJ, & Eastern and Middle Districts of PA) as far as I know. It’s also among the reasons why Rutgers does not allow for race-based preferences under the AAP plan it’s required to maintain under federal law.

  7. In 2019 CRS updated a report, "Affirmative Action" and Equal Protection in Higher Education, that provides useful background for this discussion: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45481

  8. There is also, I should think, a state law or state-constitutional-law component. And legal counsel offices thinking just about federal constitutional issues surely not only read the tea leaves of the Supreme Court, but also the law and composition of their own circuits.

  9. Dear Alexander Guerrero,

    I'm interested in better understanding this issue, in particular from the perspective you've so eloquently defended here. And, in my own case, I tend to find that learning works better in the context of specific examples. Taken together, this leads me to ask: could you please point me to a specific example of a contemporary philosophy department that is racially segregated, seeks to remain racially segregated, and which uses hiring and employment rules and practices to achieve and sustain its goal of a racially segregated faculty?

    I'm not necessarily looking for an example where these issues were litigated. I'd be more than grateful for an example illustrating the issues from a scientific or commonsense perspective.

    I also re-read with great interest your DN post from a few years back; thanks for linking to it here. Has your assessment of the scientific merit of explanations based on implicit bias changed significantly in the nearly seven years since that post? For instance, have any recent findings caused you to raise or lower your confidence in the consequences of implicit bias, or implicit bias training, in relation to hiring practices?

  10. Alexander Guerrero

    Hi John. Well, there are many philosophy departments that are entirely Non-Hispanic White, and in that sense racially segregated (these include relatively large departments like Brown, Dartmouth, Indiana, Princeton, UCLA, and UC Irvine, as well as smaller departments like Mt. Holyoke, Reed, Swarthmore, and Wellesley). There are many other departments that have an almost entirely Non-Hispanic White philosophy faculty. These would all fail by the 'manifest demographic imbalance' standard. I don't know the extent to which they "seek to remain racially segregated" (I assume that they do not!) but that is not required to fall afoul of anti-discrimination law, according to the employment line of cases I referenced above.

    I am aware that the science around implicit bias is complex and contested. I don't take any stand on that, although I assume (what I hope is uncontroversial) that some people are both (a) biased against members of various groups, perhaps in small and subtle ways; and (b) do not explicitly notice and endorse those biases. Take that to be what is meant by 'implicit bias' in that post. I don't take a stand on the effectiveness of implicit bias training. I do think there are various practices that might help counteract implicit bias without trying to remove or eliminate that bias. Indeed, most of what I have in mind assumes that is the better way to go.

  11. Hi Alex,

    That's very helpful, thank you.

    On my initial reading of your initial comment (Apr 8, 9:39 am), I thought you were saying that departments wanted to remain segregated (they "don't want to have to integrate their still racially segregated faculty"), that this was a challenging goal (it's "not trivial for a profession to remain [that] white"), and that departments used employment rules and practices to overcome that challenge ("the hiring and employment rules and practices that are generating these racially disparate outcomes"). But now I see that this reading doesn't align with your actual view, because you assume that departments do not want to remain segregated. Along with you, I don't think they want that either.

    So is the idea, then, that the observed frequencies entitle us to infer that despite not seeking racial segregation, faculty in these departments nevertheless use employment rules and practices to create and maintain racial segregation? Or is it, perhaps, inessential to your view that departments even use the rules and practices to that effect, and the entire matter boils down to the improbability of observed frequencies?

    Again, I'm not necessarily asking for this to be tied to existing case law (although the Yackee article was really remarkable and relevant — thanks for that). I'm mainly just interested in better understanding what you have in mind. If certain details I happened to be focusing on are inessential to your argument, that's useful information (to me, at least).

  12. Alexander Guerrero

    Hi John. Perhaps it would have been clearer if I said that many faculties don't want to have to integrate their still racially segregated faculty if that will require them doing much of anything at all different in terms of what they are already doing.

    So, rather than a positive desire to remain segregated, they just have a positive desire not to do anything at all different from what they are currently doing (how they are conceiving of the field, how they are assessing and defining merit, how they are assessing and defining hiring needs, how they are advertising the field and specific positions within it, who they are trying to reach and teach, what programs they are creating, how much they do in terms of outreach and support and mentoring of students and scholars from underrepresented groups, what conferences they are holding, who they are inviting to campus, how they are conducting searches and interviews, what courses they teach, what talks they attend, what books and journals they read, what philosophers and philosophical traditions they take the time to engage with and teach, which philosophical problems they take seriously and prioritize, and so on).

    Unlike almost every other profession and academic field after the 1950s and 1960s, academic philosophy has basically not seen it as a problem that the field remains overwhelmingly, disproportionately Non-Hispanic White. And many particular departmental faculties have not seen it as a problem (certainly not a problem that merits significant action or response) that their particular department remains entirely or nearly entirely white.

    So, in one sense, it's not fair to say that they "want to remain segregated." But, in another sense, I hope you can now see what I mean when I say that.

    I also think there may be many people who do want their department to remain segregated, given what they perceive to be the "costs" of integration at this point in time. We might say of them that it is a foreseen but unintended consequence of their views that on their view their department ought to remain segregated. Or they don't want segregation de dicto, just de re. Is this helping?

  13. Yes, indeed, it is, Alex, thank you. Any further thoughts of mine likely won't be relevant to the legal issues that the thread is dedicated to. Perhaps I'll follow up with you offline at a later time, if that would be welcome and I have anything potentially worthwhile to share.

  14. Alex Guerrero may be right that universities are legally obligated to engage in affirmative action in hiring. But that's beside the point. The question is not whether affirmative action in university hiring is legal. The question is whether it is legal for university hiring committees to "treat membership in an underrepresented group as a tie breaker" (or more) when choosing between job candidates. Those are not the same thing. If you look up your university's affirmative action policy, I very much doubt that it says that you should or even can have a preference between job candidates on the basis of their gender, race, or other protected status. Such a preference would violate Equal Employment Opportunity regulations as well as the explicit promises made by universities when collecting demographic information.

    In general, people seem to assume that affirmative action in hiring is the same as affirmative action in admissions. It's not. See for example the Q&A from the OFCCP below (https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/faqs/AAFAQs):

    Q: Are the affirmative action obligations OFCCP enforces similar to the affirmative action steps taken by some educational institutions to increase the racial diversity of their student bodies?
    A: No. While OFCCP seeks to increase the diversity of the federal contractor workforce through the variety of affirmative action obligations described above, the obligations it enforces are wholly distinct from the concept of affirmative action as implemented by some post-secondary educational institutions in their admissions processes. In contrast to the affirmative action implemented by many post-secondary institutions, OFCCP does not permit the use of race to be weighed as one factor among many in an individual’s application when rendering hiring, employment or personnel decisions, as racial preferences of any kind are prohibited under the authorities administered by OFCCP. See 41 CFR 60-1.4(a), 60-300.5(a) and 60-741.5(a). OFCCP therefore does not permit the use of race as a factor in contractors’ employment practices to achieve diversity in the workforce, either by using race as one factor among many to achieve a “critical mass” of representation for underrepresented minorities or through direct numerical quotas or set-asides. See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003); Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978). OFCCP’s affirmative action regulations expressly forbid the use of quotas or set-asides, provide no legal justification for a contractor to extend preferences on the basis of a protected status, and do not supersede merit selection principles. See 41 CFR 2.16(e).

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