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Florida purports to bar faculty from testifying in a voting rights trial–is it legal?

Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida, the clean-cut Trumpian face of the Republican Party's future, has now moved to block faculty at the University of Florida from testifying in a case brought against the Republican attempt to prevent the "wrong" people from voting:

Three University of Florida professors have been barred from assisting plaintiffs in a lawsuit to overturn the state’s new law restricting voting rights, lawyers said in a federal court filing on Friday. The ban is an extraordinary limit on speech that raises questions of academic freedom and First Amendment rights.

University officials told the three that because the school was a state institution, participating in a lawsuit against the state “is adverse to U.F.’s interests” and could not be permitted….

The university’s refusal to allow the professors to testify was a marked turnabout for the University of Florida. Like schools nationwide, the university has routinely allowed academic experts to offer expert testimony in lawsuits, even when they oppose the interests of the political party in power.

Leading experts on academic freedom said they knew of no similar restrictions on professors’ speech and testimony and said the action was probably unconstitutional….

Robert C. Post, a Yale Law School professor and expert on academic freedom and the First Amendment, said he knew of no other case in which a university had imposed prior restraint on a professor’s ability to speak.

“The university does not exist to protect the governor,” he said. “It exists to serve the public. It is an independent institution to serve the public good, and nothing could be more to the public good than a professor telling the truth to the public under oath.”

Obviously what Florida has done is outrageous and, as Professor Post says, contrary to one of the purposes of a public university.  But is it illegal?  Probably it is, but, unfortunately, I fear it is complicated, and has the potential to expose a weakness in existing legal doctrine about speech by public employees. 

Lurking in the background is the 2006 Supreme Court case of Garcetti, which held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Speech by a public employee which can be grounds for discipline after the fact can also presumably be proscribed outright.  Now Garcetti involved a prosecutor who claimed constitutional protection for a memo to his superiors about a warrant whose factual basis he deemed wanting.  The Court rejected the attorney’s claim, noting that “his expressions were made pursuant to his duties” in the prosecutor’s office.   But are not the teaching and writing of a professor at a public university all “expressions…pursuant to his duties”?

One of the dissenters in Garcetti, Justice David Souter, raised the worrying implications for academic freedom of the majority's decision.  This elicited the following concession from Justice Anthony Kennedy in the majority opinion:

Justice  Souter suggests today’s decision may have important ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value. There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.  We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship and teaching.

In other words, the Supreme Court simply left it open whether the Garcetti rule applies wholesale to professors at public universities.  Florida will presumably claim that Garcetti permits it to prevent its employees, the professors, from testifying.   Of course, there is not just the academic freedom issue here, but also the fact that testimony at a trial seems to serve an especially important public interest, one that courts, unsurprisingly, take seriously.  The current Supreme Court also includes three former professors–Justices Barrett, Breyer, and Kagan–as well as two Justices who have been quite involved with the academy (Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, although Kavanaugh may have soured on the academy for the obvious reasons).  Still, it would be foolish to think this very conservative court will necessarily fill the gap left by Garcetti in a way that protects the academic freedom of faculty at public universities.

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8 responses to “Florida purports to bar faculty from testifying in a voting rights trial–is it legal?”

  1. Thanks for this post. I’ve seen a lot of complaining on Facebook, and I am shocked at how many law professors are missing the key question that you raise. I tend to think that the professors should be allowed to testify, but I also think that the framing that Florida is simply stopping them from doing professors always do because the state disagrees is missing the point.

    A couple of considerations I think are important here:
    1. This is not just regular academic work, this is paid expert testimony
    2. This is not just advocacy, but testimony in a pending court case in which the employer is the other party

    I think there are a lot of reasons why these shouldn’t make a difference, such as the fact that it seems odd that the outcome should depend on whether the professors volunteer or not. Further, when you work for a state school, saying you can’t be involved in any litigation against the state creates a huge bar that wouldn’t apply to private schools (sort of a monopsony argument). Further, what have states done with respect to clinics where state employed law professors might be counsel? In the extreme case they try to shut the clinic down, but is there precedent in how loyalty rules have been applied in that case (and is it reasonable for an employer to treat clinical lawyer professors the same/differently than other professors who might be adverse in litigation)?

    But regardless of how these come out (I favor letting the professors testify), they are the issues to address, IMO, and conflating that with some sort of blanket censorship muddies the issues.

  2. Prof. Volokh discusses in his blog, and cites Hoover v. Morales, which is on point with this case (the 5th Cir. struck down a policy that disallowed state employees (professors) from serving as experts in litigation against the state. The question in my mind is whether that case survives Garcetti. https://reason.com/volokh/2021/10/31/univ-of-florida-blocks-professors-expert-witness-work-in-case-against-florida-government

  3. Thanks for the very interesting post, Brian. I'm a political and legal and moral philosopher rather than an expert in American constitutional law, but it seems to me that the provision of testimony in a trial of this kind is not "pursuant to their official duties." The professors have become qualified to act as expert witnesses through the research and teaching which they have undertaken pursuant to their official duties, but the provision of the testimony itself is not something which their academic responsibilities call for them to do. Hence, the proffering of testimony by them seems to me to fall outside the scope of Garcetti.

    Were the defendant in this case the University of Florida itself, certain employer-employee restrictions could be applicable. However, although the University is of course a state institution, the defendants in this case are the Floridian Secretary of State and various county election supervisors. Thus, it strikes me as quite a stretch to say (as Michael Risch does above) that the testimony would be provided "in a pending court case in which the employer is the other party."

    As far as I can tell, the action by the University of Florida has been impelled largely if not entirely by a concern that retaliatory action might be taken against the University if the testimony is provided and if the litigation produces a ruling that goes against the defendants. I do not see how such a motivation for the imposition of restrictions on communicative freedoms could be countenanced under any plausible understanding of the First Amendment.

  4. That's certainly an argument that should be made on behalf of the professors. But it's a bit tricky to say what the "official duties" are. Take the Garcetti prosecutor: suppose he wanted to go on a TV show to opine, for a fee, about criminal prosecutions outside his jurisdiction. Is it obvious his office could not bar him from doing that? Sure he's doing it on his own time, and being paid by someone else, but his office might worry how his televised opinions might affect pending cases in their office, or how the judges in their jurisdiction might react to it. Thus, it might well affect the work of the DA's office.

    Not all those considerations apply in the case of the academic experts on voting rights, of course; but their speech is't clearly extramural speech, so beyond the reach of Garcetti: they are speaking about their professional expertise, the basis for their employment at the university.

    Of course, I hope your kinds of arguments prevail or, even better, that courts make clear that Garcetti does not apply to public university professors *tout court*. But I'd be surprised if Florida didn't seek a legal opinion about whether they could get away with this, and I would imagine Garcetti loomed large in the advice about how this could be permissible.

  5. It's a crude measure of the complexity of the issue, but the American Law Reports annotation titled, "Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties," runs to almost 500 online pages. ALR surveys almost comprehensively all domestic courts' holdings related to the titular issue. Among the several references in the annotation to Garcetti, the paragraph below suggests a degree of wariness from the Court over too broad an application. Granted, the Court frequently disapproves of Ninth Circuit holdings, and here the worry is about restrictions on religious practice, not voting rights.

    "Denying certiorari, the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 2019 WL 272131 (U.S. 2019), let stand the Ninth Circuit decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 869 F.3d 813, 347 Ed. Law Rep. 10, 130 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 707, 101 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 45871 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2019 WL 272131 (U.S. 2019), that affirmed a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a case in which a former football coach at a public high school alleged that the school district violated his First Amendment free speech rights when it fired him for kneeling in silent prayer on the 50-yard line after each game. Justice Alito issued a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito agreed that it was appropriate for the Court to decline to take up the case, given the unresolved factual questions as to whether the school district fired the coach for failing to supervise his players after games or because his post-game prayers would lead a reasonable observer to believe that the district was endorsing a religion. Nevertheless, Justice Alito was troubled by the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public school teachers. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit had applied Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 737, 87 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 42353, 152 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 60203 (2006), in a 'highly tendentious way.' That case permitted a public employer to regulate employee speech that was part of the employee's job duties, but it also warned employers about attempting to convert private speech to public speech. In its decision below, the Ninth Circuit read Garcetti to allow public school teachers and coaches to be fired whenever they engaged in an expression the school did not like while on duty, and the Court of Appeals applied an expansive definition of being on duty. This approach would allow a school to fire teachers for folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer before eating lunch, if they were visible to a student."

  6. A simple question: what if the testimony were volunteered rather than remunerated? That would seem to at least obviate contractual concerns, and place the issue squarely in the realm of first amendment ones. I admit that I am alarmed by DCR's report @5 that seems to expand the notion of "being on duty" as a professor. As Emeritus of a public university, I sincerely hope I am not "on duty" in perpetuity.

  7. The issue is not addressed in the contract and employee handbook?

  8. J. Bogart – see the Volokh post I link to above. It describes the policy and when it came into being.

    For those with paywall access: Academic Freedom after Garcetti https://www.jstor.org/stable/27975326

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