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MOVING TO FRONT FROM MARCH 9–SOME QUITE INTERESTING COMMENTS, MORE DISCUSSION WELCOME
Since the media chatter about their use in Ukraine continues, readers may find this 2002 piece from the Nuclear Threat Initiative informative. More information about tactical nukes welcome in the comments.
Coincidently, I just came accross a (German) interview with Frank Sauer, a research fellow at the political department of the University of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) who does research on nuclear weapons. In essence, he says that currently he sees no reason to worry about a nuclear strike:
https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Russland-hat-keine-Hightech-Waffen-in-der-Hinterhand-article23181257.html?utm_source=pocket-newtab-global-de-DE
Q: What do you think about Putin's decision to order his "deterrent weapons" on alert? A nuclear strike would be suicide, wouldn't it?
A: Well, that depends. His statement was clearly just a political signal for now. Looking at the actual movements in the nuclear apparatus in Russia, there are no particular events that would suggest that something is being prepared or somehow an alert level has been raised in any significant way. There have been a couple of submarines that have gone out, but there have also been some that have come back. There have been a couple of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles that have been moved into the woods, but that could just be a normal rotation. Nothing has increased dramatically in numbers there. There is nothing to suggest that we should expect anything nuclear on the battlefield in the foreseeable future. In this respect, one can simply take note of Putin's message. NATO and the U.S. administration have done this and reacted quite correctly, i.e. they have accepted it calmly and have not responded in an equal way. Putin just pointed to his nuclear arsenal and said: Please don't forget that with all your sanctions and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. And we are certainly even further away from an exchange of blows with strategic nuclear weapons. Putin also knows that whoever shoots first is dead second. Especially as someone who focuses on these issues, this does not deprive me of sleep at the moment. The situation of the civilian population worries me more.
Let's hope he's right!
In the past, the rationale for Tactical Nuclear Weapons was (a) the destructive power able to be crammed into a small warhead; (b) the ability of a 'dirty' TNW to achieve 'area denial' via radiation.
The downside was that (c) their use might be deemed to have crossed a fateful red line, as regards the (unwanted) escalation implications. In this respect, as noted in the linked 2002 piece, the lower level of decision-making delegation often implied when smaller weapons are deployed on a distributed basis, isn't ideal.
It's entirely possible, and much to be hoped, that (b) isn't considered relevant in the current conflict.
As regards (a) & (c), more recently the dilemma is resolved by substituting TNWs with (i) weapons of ultra-high accuracy [in the past, the Big Bang was needed to compensate for lack of accuracy]; and (ii) other tactical weapons of enormous destructive power that are non nuclear (e.g. thermobaric weapons) and therefore do not run quite the same escalation risks.
All in all, there's some reason to hope TNWs aren't to the fore in current thinking. It's also worth pointing out that the holders of nuclear weapons – a list which includes some nations of often-questionable rationality – have (IMHO) shown a fair degree of maturity and restraint as regards their use (thus far …), even in times of outright conflict; which speaks well for the sober consideration given to their implications by even hot-headed politicians. (Even if self interest plays a part in this.)
ND (former Major, British Army)
I've come to believe the threat from the use of nuclear weapons, outside an accident or lone wolf/fanatical terrorism, are less and less as time goes by. Do the global elite show any sign they want to live in an apocalypse? Big yachts, Davos, owning a football club, their children, all gone. Do they really want to live in a bunker the rest of their life? Consider the history of conflict since world war 2. Even the Nazis did not resort to readily available chemical weapons when the end came. The core leadership probably knew the order would be ignored by the more rational leaders that wanted it all to end and survive. The attempts late in the game to assassinate Hitler surely was a signal that there was a red line that even those savages wouldn't cross.
I have come to believe the more likely sinister threat is biological. What would be the qualities of a mass destruction weapon that only killed the enemy and not you? Further, the need to keep it's use secret would be paramount. Genetic manipulation seems to me where the most danger lies. For example, a pathogen uniquely designed to harm only certain populations.
Thoughts in response to Nick Drew and A Sharon:
1) For the sort of conflicts the US gets into, I agree there's not a lot they can do with tactical nuclear weapons that they can't do with precision weapons and conventional high-yield weapons. I don't think I buy the claim that they're not useful to Russia in a NATO/Russia conflict. For one thing, NATO is likely to have at least air superiority, which is going to make deploying really big conventional bombs difficult, whereas it's pretty hard to shoot down a nuclear-tipped cruise missile or artillery shell. For another, the 'really big' conventional bombs one sees described have yields around 10-40 tons of TNT. The Hiroshima bomb had a yield of around 15 *thousand* tons of TNT. My understanding is that most of the 'tactical' weapons deployed in the cold war had yields not that much lower – at least in the kilotons – and I don't see any reason not to think that Russia has many tactical weapons of that kind of yield.
So if Russia, say, wanted to knock out a NATO airbase in eastern Europe, or a US carrier group, I think (though as always I'll defer to real experts) that they would find it pretty easy using tactical nuclear weapons, and very difficult indeed without using them.
Which brings me to
(2) I agree with A Sharon that no-one in NATO or Russia is going to intentionally trigger a strategic nuclear exchange out of the blue. But that's not the danger (and never has been): the danger is an escalatory spiral. I gave an example in the last thread; for another, suppose
(a) NATO gives in to various hawks and implements some kind of no-fly zone
(b) Despite initial protestations, it rapidly needs to alter its rules of engagement to hit Russian surface-to-air missile installations inside Russia
(c) Russia retaliates by launching conventional airstrikes against the NATO airbases from which the interdicting NATO aircraft are based, and gets torn up by NATO air defenses
(d) Russia hits those airbases with low-yield tactical nuclear weapons; they are destroyed, with substantial loss of life, including many civilians even though they avoid targets close to major urban areas.
(e) NATO retaliates in kind, which inevitably means attacking targets on Russian soil.
(f) Russia attacks some fairly-symbolic target in a NATO nuclear power, probably the US, as their own retaliation-in-kind for an attack on their own territory.
(g) God knows. (This is the point at which NATO and academic war-game exercises normally stop and say 'we hope it doesn't escalate further'.)
I think every step from (b) to (f) is fairly plausible given the previous step. No-one knows how likely a nuclear war is to follow from (f). For these reasons policy-makers in NATO are being *really careful* not to do (a) or anything similar. (I think the reason why proposals to give the Ukrainians fighter jets are stalling is that no-one can work out how to deliver them without escalation – either Ukrainian pilots are flying aircraft into the combat zone from NATO bases, or else NATO pilots are flying combat aircraft over Ukraine.) But it's really hard to stop wars escalating and no-one really knows what Russia's red line is.
Which brings me to
(3) I can see ways in which, at some future point, A Sharon's worry about biological weapons would be frightening. But (as we've seen with COVID) viruses mutate very easily and it's hard to think something as delicately constructed as a selective-targeting instruction would be robust. And viruses spread relatively slowly and we have responses to them.
Nuclear weapons, by contrast, exist right now, can be delivered to any point on the globe, cannot be defended against now or in the near future, and can obliterate cities. And several thousand of them are currently controlled by the leader of a nation with whom we are in conflict only barely short of outright war, whose personal survival is at least somewhat threatened by that war, and who has given at least some (contestable) signs of instability.
*Probably* the war won't escalate to the point where Russia uses tactical nukes; *probably* we can control further escalation beyond there. *Probably* Putin is not crazy enough to actually use nuclear weapons anyway; *probably* people in his command-and-control system would refuse to carry out a launch order once given. But the correct response to being told 'there probably won't be a nuclear war' is not to be reassured: it is to be deeply, deeply concerned.
Step (A) is the most implausible given that it would be all risk with little-to-no-reward. The Russian airforce hasn't been doing much anyway. The sheer amount of Stingers that we've flooded into Ukraine has kept them at bay. Most of the destruction is just from Russian artillery. A no fly zone wouldn't help the Ukrainians take out the artillery. It's clear the Ukrainians are only calling for a no-fly zone because it would involve American pilots getting shot down by Russians and would trigger article 5. No one is buying it. Also, NATO is a coalition, so one dumb politician couldn't order it to happen. I think that even if several politicians were dumb enough to try to order such a thing there's still a very good chance that the respective militaries would disobey the order given how stupid it is.
The problem with (B) is that it generally isn't a good idea to attack surface to air with air, so this would involve intermediate range missile barrages or ground forces. That's far too much of an escalation to be plausible, imo.
I think (C) is also fairly implausible. Russians would likely attack the Eastern European countries hosting the airbases with cyberwarfare to shut down their critical infrastructure and force them to stop. Also, if push came to shove I suspect the Russians could just hit the air bases with missiles. I don't see how a tactical nuke would help. If they can shoot down all the cruise missiles they can shoot down the nuke. If it's in range of Russian artillery, they can destroy the base without a nuke.
The only scenario I see where Russia would be desperate enough to use a tactical nuke is on a superior NATO force advancing on Russian territory.
@ David Wallace
I don't disagree with most of your analysis. Also, Putin's lack of 'conventional' military success has been truly remarkable and, we must assume, deeply humiliating – particularly for Putin inasmuch as he greatly wishes to impress Xi as well as make his mark on history. So: fair enough, and who knows where humiliation leads?
That said, I note that your troubling hypothetical starts with a no-fly zone. BUT those in NATO quickest to call Russian intentions in this whole affair (US, UK) disavowed a no-fly zone strongly from the moment it was first floated. So everyone is on the same page as regards the dangers down that road and, I'm guessing, other parallel roads.
(Funnily enough, some of the most hawk-like voices in the UK just now are writers in the very liberal Guardian newspaper, e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/13/toxic-putin-is-going-for-bust-the-west-must-stop-him-before-this-contagion-spreads … did I really say 'funnily' there?)
You correctly say TNWs stand a greater chance of success against a carrier group etc than any likely Russian conventional threat which, as we've all noted, has been deeply unimpressive of late. But (a) are you suggesting that Putin could safely attack a US carrier group conventionally, without that also having the gravest implications for global peace? And (b) just how crazy would he need to be, to think: "I'm failing badly against these Ukrainian SOBs. I know what, let's chew off something really big …"
I think a lot of that is plausible (and I hope you're right) although I repeat my observation that things that probably won't lead to a nuclear war are still alarming given the stakes.
On a couple of specifics:
– I agree that a no-fly zone is (dangerous) symbolism rather than militarily significant. And I agree that it's very unlikely to happen given the escalatory risk. (I think it, or something stronger, would have happened already absent that risk.)
– my understanding from the various informed analysis in the news is that it's difficult to manage a no-fly zone without attacking ground-based defenses. And I'm skeptical that NATO, having already taken the risk of declaring a no-fly zone, will sit back and allow its aircraft to be fired upon by Russian air defenses without retaliating.
– I don't think we know anything much about how effective cyberwarfare attacks are against NATO military systems.
– Point taken, largely, about missile/artillery attacks; that said, the point about nuclear weapons is that you only need to get one of them into the general vicinity of the target to make a mess of it.
– I can (just about) see NATO military commanders resigning if told to implement a no-fly zone. I can't see them just flat disobeying. It's fairly clearly a lawful order and the (imo very unwise) voices in the media calling for one include several former military officers, some pretty senior.
The “carrier group” comment was in reference to the other thread, where someone suggested the US should use a carrier group it (apparently) has in the vicinity to attack a Russian column approaching Kyiv. I suggested that would also be a severe escalatory risk that might – not probably, but plausibly – trigger a Russian nuclear response given that they probably couldn’t touch the carrier group conventionally.
I agree that Russia just spontaneously attacking US naval forces is really really unlikely.
I agree that it's hard to imagine NATO having a no-fly zone without attacking Russian surface-to-air missiles. My point is that striking Russian anti-air would be such significant escalation in a single step that they are more likely to just back off. Though it's hard for me to envision the mindset where they would send planes into a warzone to shoot down Russian planes and not expect to get shot down in return.
Regarding cyberwarfare, I doubt the Russians can do anything against NATO bases directly. But it would not surprise me at all if they were able to shut down Poland's power grid and attack their financial institutions, which might make Poland rethink hosting air raids against Russia.
You may be right that a tnw is the easiest way to make an airbase unusable, but it likely isn't the best way.
I doubt they would openly refuse the order, but the top brass could give them a plan that they couldn't execute or would take months to put in place. E.g., tell them that they would have to build a brand new base in Romania or that they could only do it from the sea while telling their contacts in Turkey to refuse to let the group through. They only need to drag their feet until the conventional Ukrainian military and government collapses, which unfortunately shouldn't take much longer.
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