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    The McMaster Department of Philosophy has now put together the following notice commemorating Barry: Barry Allen: A Philosophical Life Barry…

Lederman on the tasks for Chinese philosophy scholarship

Philosopher Jeremy Goodman calls to my attention this essay by philosopher Harvey Lederman (who does formal work, but also works on Chinese philosophy) on the tasks confronting Chinese philosopy, and suggested it might make a good topic for discussion; an excerpt:

The meat that scholars of Chinese philosophy have in our mouths are these curious, beautiful,
and inspiring texts. As I see it, our job as scholars is to tell the story of these texts: to understand the people who wrote them as well as the people who read them; to bring to life their ideas, regardless of whether they seem familiar or unapproachably strange; and to determine as best we can which of these ideas are plausible and which are not. Our job is to teach students to read these texts with care, with reverence 敬, but also with a critical, skeptical eye. In both our writing and in our teaching, our job, like the impersonator 尸 of the dead at a ritual, is to bring these ideas to life in a very literal sense, to make it possible for others to have a real conversation with them, in the hope that all of us can better understand their authors’ beliefs and the challenges they faced as they sought to live virtuous lives in often quite challenging political circumstances.

I am afraid that this job is not glamorous or easy. It requires humility, patience, and an exacting
discipline. The texts often do not speak to the most exciting recent trends. But our job is still to impersonate them, even when they don’t talk about what we most wish they did. This job can be a lonely one. We wake up in the morning and wonder if we really need to re-read hundreds of pages of challenging, confusing passages again, and the only person who says we need to isourselves. The job is also slow. We watch our colleagues (or perhaps another half of ourselves) produce dozens of papers or books in other areas. But our jobs cannot be done quickly—we cannot write those dozens of books—since we must respect, reread, and rethink, our texts. Our work has only the slow glory that belongs to the miniaturist, a glory realized in details, which appears in long-labored works only to those who are willing to look closely themselves.

This is well-said, and not at all specific to the study of Chinese philosophy it seems to me.  Comments are open for reader reactions.

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8 responses to “Lederman on the tasks for Chinese philosophy scholarship”

  1. "The texts often do not speak to the most exciting recent trends."

    For me personally, this is what makes that work so worthwhile (part of its "glamor") — great historical texts often speak to issues and themes that are blatantly ignored in "recent trends". Or they operate with compelling methodologies that the status quo (arbitrarily, I'd say) rules out as invalid or uninteresting. That said: I also don't find that the "recent trends" are particularly exciting… The real issue here (to me) is that one's work is not (easily) appreciated by those steeped in the allegedly exciting trends — often incentivizing inaccurate or mediocre scholarship in hopes that one can make these texts seem relevant to contemporary academic discussion. (I do not look forward to how much of Zhuangzi's texts will be mangled by analytical minds.) One wishes one could say: "This does not speak to the recent trends at all – that is why it is worth reading!"

  2. Anon working in Chinese Philosophy

    The best explanation why work on Chinese Philosophy has received little attention or respect is because it is, by and large, not very good. Some of the good work that has been done has received its fair amount of attention (Lederman himself has published on Wang Yangming in the Philosophical Review after all), but there is just very little published work of that quality. This is so, even if the historical texts themselves are fascinating and philosophically rich.

    Therefore, it makes perfect sense when Lederman says that his "colleagues in “core analytic” philosophy are frustrated by what they see as a lack of rigor, care, and precision in scholarship on Chinese philosophy." (p.2) I cannot imagine someone drawing the same verdict about recent work in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy. Even those who believe that there is little to no philosophical value to doing work in History of Philosophy cannot justifiably say that, for example, Jessica Moss's recent book on Plato's Epistemology is marred by "lack of rigor, care, and precision".

  3. Two comments:

    1. I too don't see what is specific in these remarks about the study of Chinese philosophy. (I also think Lederman acknowledges this somewhat on p.2.) I'll be teaching some of Plato's Symposium this week, for example, and I confess that sometimes I find the text "unapproachably strange" in its discussions of sexual relations between boys and older men and its mythology. But nevertheless, I am to determine which ideas are plausible and worth teaching to students and, perhaps someday, writing about. I don't do much different when teaching or researching on Chinese texts.

    2. I largely agree with Anon that scholarship on Chinese philosophy is a mixed bag in terms of its appeal to core analytic philosophers, and I've often wondered why it is a problem, and what can be done about it.

    On the "why" of the problem, I think the main issue is that work in Chinese philosophy that appeals to analytic philosophers requires that you do two things at the same time each of which is a career in its own right. On the one hand, you need to be a sinologist: you need to know your Chinese, understand the history of the texts, authorship issues, the commentarial tradition, the cultural context, non-English scholarship, and more. On the other hand, you need to be a philosopher and know your "core analytic" philosophy topics and methodologies. Much of what gets published is lacking in at least one respect: It's sinologically rigorous, but philosophically confused; or, it's philosophically rigorous, but sinologically irresponsible. The best work does both, but it is rare.

    I will note that things have gotten much better over the past decade or so. There are some excellent programs, especially in East Asia, that have produced scholars who can walk the sinology walk and chew "core analytic" bubblegum at the same time.

    On the "what to do", well, I'm definitely in agreement with Lederman that there's probably nothing better to do than to increase the amount of careful, rigorous work on Chinese philosophy by doing that work. It is a slow grind, but so is much else worth doing. It would be great if there were more resources or top programs to encourage students to pursue careful, rigorous work in Chinese philosophy, sure, but Chinese philosophy is far from the only subfield that could use more representation at top PhD granting institutions. (e.g., Fig 6 at https://franksaundersjr.com/pgr-findings/.

  4. What Lederman's says is balanced and well put. Working in the history of philosophy myself, I very much agree with the line that "the slow, precise work of the careful impersonator is not likely to land us on the front page."
    But to add to what was already said in preceding comments: There are some people who only consider a text clear if its content fits into a Humean worldview, especially when they read quickly. It thus seems important to me to emphasize that the double duty of having to be a historian as well as a philosopher involves to walk the tightrope of being rigorous and careful (for there is indeed a lot of work that isn't) while not taking "clarity" to mean "fits easily into a worldview that is favored by many contemporary analytic philosophers". That's a tricky task—you don't want to be unclear either—but it is not impossible.

  5. I tried to clarify my thoughts in response to some helpful pushback: https://twitter.com/LedermanHarvey/status/1707112056351052158

  6. I'm puzzled by the implicit equation of "a Humean worldview" with the "worldview that is favored by many contemporary analytic philosophers." But putting that aside, what would be an example of a work that "only consider a text clear if its content fits into a Humean worldview"?

  7. 'The job is also slow. We watch our colleagues (or perhaps another half of ourselves) produce dozens of papers or books in other areas. But our jobs cannot be done quickly—we cannot write those dozens of books—since we must respect, reread, and rethink, our texts'.

    Let's talk about how this impacts, if at all, promotion and/or tenure applications. My colleagues pump out superficial, shorter shit at three times the rate…

  8. Another anon working in Chinese Philosophy

    The subfield has many self-inflicted problems. For instance, this passes for scholarship:

    The author has variously argued that Aristotelian metaphysics and Cartesianism are at the root of colonialism.

    The author's work has been promoted on Warp, Weft, and Way, the main online hub of the subfield…

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