…by Kit Fine and Gideon Rosen. From the opening remarks:

Academic philosophy is generally healthy in most respects relevant to the work of the Commission. In almost every part of the subject, high scholarly standards are brought to bear, both in the vetting of manuscripts for publication and in the evaluation of individual scholars for appointment, tenure and promotion. Since philosophy is often focused on normative questions connected to public policy, much work in the field could be considered “advocacy.” But as the main Report emphasizes, politically engaged scholarship of this sort is consistent with the highest
scholarly standards so long as the empirical and philosophical bases for the philosopher’s normative conclusions are handled responsibly, as they generally are in contemporary moral and political philosophy. Moreover, even in areas of this sort, the culture of philosophy is generally open to the expression and defense of a range of viewpoints. Journals and academic presses routinely publish work that is critical of the prevailing liberal consensus, both from the left and from the right. It is
certainly true that notably conservative positions (in the contemporary American sense) are underrepresented in academic philosophy relative to their representation in the wider world (Peters et al. 2020). But we see no reason to believe that this pattern is the result of pernicious censorship or gatekeeping.

The main exception to this overall assessment of which we are aware concerns scholarship in the philosophy of sex and gender, a small but important subfield within social philosophy. For roughly a decade now, this relatively new field has been marked by what amounts to a de facto orthodoxy around a cluster of substantive ideas: that socially relevant sex and gender categories are socially constructed, that sex in human beings is not binary, and most importantly, that trans women are
women and should be treated as such for every social and legal purpose. Scholarship that questions these assumptions is routinely met with the sort of opposition that is designed, not to challenge objectionable positions on substantive grounds, but to suppress discussion.

The clear rebuke of the “usual suspects” in academic philosophy who cannot abide free discussion is appropriate. There are clearly other orthodoxies in Anglophone philosophy, that limit discussion, but their motivations do not seem to me primarily political in character. But in that regard, I would not say the condition of Anglophone philosophy is quite as healthy and open as the report suggests.

I invite comments from those knowledgeable about academic philosophy in the Anglophone world. Comments must include a full name and a valid email address, or they will not appear.