Amusing; some excerpts from the interview:
Like everyone, I’m tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness of these systems compared to the history of earlier AI. But the disposition of some philosophers to take seriously the question whether these things are conscious or might soon become conscious is just ridiculous. They are assuming that the physical substrate is irrelevant. They all think that the material conditions for consciousness can be given in functionalist terms….
Functionalism is substrate-independent. It’s more than likely that the truth is one which links physical processes and systems of certain kinds to mental phenomena. Complicated data centers have absolutely nothing in common with the physical character of a nervous system. We have strong reasons to believe that while there may be consciousness elsewhere in the universe, it would require the appearance of some kind of organism with something analogous to a nervous system….
Bats are conscious. We just don’t have the imaginative capacity to form a conception of the aspects of that subjectivity that depend on echolocation. It would be radically unscientific to conclude that bats are not conscious from the fact that we can’t imagine what it’s like, but in the case of AI, there is a very simple reason that the supposition that they might be conscious is ridiculous. All they produce is language, and language by itself is not a natural manifestation of consciousness. I apologize for being too exercised about this….
I don’t exclude the possibility of life forms that are physically and chemically quite different from ourselves being conscious. We know so little about how this happens, even in the human brain, that it seems to me premature to think that you might be able now to create something else that has these same characteristics.
And then there’s this amusing exchange with the interviewer:
I’ve actually met the person at Anthropic whose job it is to model welfare, to look after Claude’s interests. I should say you’re rolling your eyes now.
There’s nothing that’s good or bad for it in the sense that something can be good or bad for a cockroach—there’s no mental life there in the ordinary sense. It’s not a mind. It’s not somebody that we have to care about. It’s a machine. Here are some of the smartest people on the planet being completely idiotic. Well, intelligence is not completely transferable, I guess.
I guess I’m basically with Nagel on this issue, despite my strong disagreement with him on other matters. So if Nagel is wrong, why?




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