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    The McMaster Department of Philosophy has now put together the following notice commemorating Barry: Barry Allen: A Philosophical Life Barry…

Citing Foreign Courts

The U.S. Supreme Court is increasingly citing decisions by foreign courts. I don’t like the practice, for a variety of reasons that I’ll sketch briefly. But I must first make clear that I don’t object to all such citations. For example, sometimes foreign law supplies the rule of decision for a case in an American court; or sometimes a foreign judicial opinion contains an interesting argument or datum worth citing with credit to the original. My objection is to citing a foreign decision as authority in a case involving U.S. domestic law, e.g., the U.S. Constitution; in other words as a precedent, that is, as a reason for following it that is independent of its intrinsic persuasiveness; as evidence, in short, for a budding international consensus that should influence U.S. law.

My objections are numerous but I am going to mention just ones that relate to what I said yesterday, in my response to comments on my first posting, about the judicial process. The first is that it is undemocratic to subject Americans to even the limited rule of foreign courts, except to the extent that treaties or other conventional sources of international law authorize the delegation of lawmaking to foreign bodies. There is a profound political difference between even an appointed, life-tenured U.S. federal judge and a judge of a foreign country. The U.S. judge is appointed by an elected official (the President) and confirmed by an elected legislative body (the Senate) and is subject to removal by impeachment, and his court is subject to budgetary and other controls and influence by Congress. If he is a lower-court judge, he is influenced by the President’s authority to nominate him to a higher court. He is in short a part of a system of checks and balances; he has a degree at least of democratic legitimacy. A foreign judge is not subject to any political process within the United States.

Second, legal principles are not instantiations of a universal moral law, but the product of local political, cultural, and historical circumstances. Without a deep study of foreign legal, political, and social systems–a study that few U.S. judges or justices, or for that matter academics, have made or are capable of making–it is impossible to determine whether a foreign decision on gay marriage, abortion, hate speech, capital punishment, religious establishments, etc. is the product of a reasoning process, values, ideology, or other circumstances that are the same or similar in the United States. Gay marriage is the most obvious current example. The opposition to it in the United States is largely though not entirely religious in origin, and so in countries that are much less religious than the U.S. opposition is muted; but this says nothing about whether the U.S. position is "wrong" because out of step with these other countries.

Third, the citation of foreign decisions is a form of figleafing, reflecting the efforts of opinion writers (often law clerks still suffering from the misconceptions of law students) to escape responsibility for stating the true grounds of decision. A judge or justice who votes in favor of homosexual rights is reluctant to admit that he is doing so not because the Constitution commands that he do so but because he is sympathetic to homosexuals or minorities in general, or dislikes the motivations or beliefs of the people who object to homosexual rights, or never misses an opportunity to invalidate unequal treatment, or thinks homosexual rights the new liberal frontier. If instead he can point to an emerging international consensus (as the Supreme Court did in invalidating capital punishment of 15 year olds), he can minimize the appearance of subjective decisionmaking by pointing to something outside his personal values, politics, emotions, and ideology. It would not be figleafing if American judges really were willing to take their cues from foreigners, but I don’t believe it. Almost the whole world prohibits hate speech, but in the U.S. it is considered constitutionally privileged and the fact that we are out of step with the rest of the world seems not to bother any of the judges who cite foreign decisions.

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40 responses to “Citing Foreign Courts”

  1. So, I'll ask again…

    Do you believe the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas was incorrect insofar as it relied on foreign courts and/or insofar as it overturned a law that enforced local popular morality, replacing it with judicially imposed morality?

  2. I also like (former Posner clerk) Tim Wu's "judicial shout-out" theory from his piece in Slate, which I think has some validity:

    Should the Supreme Court care what other countries think?

  3. True, judges are in their right to simply claim that a given decision is or is not in accordance with constitutional rights, without having to cite anything superfluous from a constitutional framework. True, all deserve equal treatment under the law, including various minorities. However, some minorities are politically bogus, when requesting positive rights by modifying constitutional law and by requesting institutional changes. Granted, all should be treated equally and this amounts to acknowledging the negative rights in the constitution. But to then claim that a given minority deserves “positive rights”–the right to view confidential information, marriage, or what have you, then judges and society are being asked to consider not only mere citation of the US constitution but some quirky notions about freedom. But that is a slight of hand. Notice that positive rights are requested by arguing that one has negative constitutional rights which lead or are inclined to justify or make evident the positive right in question. Same sex marriage, excusing the expression, is that type of request.

    True, citing foreign cases, judicial reasoning, or treatises may not necessarily coincide with the American circumstances comprising a case under US judicial scrutiny. If a foreign element is included in the main argument regarding a judicial opinion and it overshadows all else, then such an opinion would be suspect to those in the legal community. Such a practice includes the ability to arbitrarily intervene without an overarching judicial body or a US mechanism to provide a check and balance. But there seems nothing wrong to cite in parallel form. Judges can be erudite. To have judges search for “the first principles of the US Constitution” when enthralled in cases is acceptable because the system is confined. To have judges include foreign elements that serve as central rationalities is a step toward changes that might undue the hard-won respect that our US judicial system has garnered.

  4. Shag from Brookline

    Before the Civil War, many, many nations had outlawed slavery. Isn't it a shame that the SCOTUS of those times neglected foreign laws outlawing slavery and decisions of those nations' courts on the subject? Or was the Civil War and its devastation necessary to make the point here? Or should we merely accept that positive law can have negative effects on humane principles?

  5. Does the same apply to foreign countries and US legal decisions?

    If China is going to get serious about enforcing Intellectual Property rights, a good place for them to start would be copying and pasting all the US legal decisions in this area. It's better than reinventing the wheel.

    Wouldn't the US legal system benefit from decisions from a foreign judiciary if we started experiencing legal problems that another country had decades or even centuries dealing with?

    Imagine if the elections in Iraq go badly and even Fearless Leader admits we are going to be occupying that country for the forseeable future. Seems to me the British courts, with centuries of decisions concerning cases involving colonies, would have answered already many of the questions that will come up if this happens.

  6. Prof. Roger Alford

    I too am quite skeptical of the use of comparative sources to interpret the Constitution and have thought and written about the issue quite a bit in recent years.

    Why should the Court resort to comparative material as a device to resolve whether a particular measure violates a particular provision of the U.S. Constitution? If the central function of the Court is to resolve cases and controversies, it surely cannot be, as many scholars have recently suggested, because we wish to enhance the global rule of law, or promote international judicial dialogue, or encourage our system to be less insular. Those concerns might be delightful unintended consequences in an adjudicative process that views comparativism as justified. But they cannot be why we adjudge a discrete measure as falling within or afoul of a particular constitutional line. Rather, the use of comparative material must be deemed appropriate or inappropriate based on whether recourse to it comports with a particular judge’s interpretive mode of constitutional analysis. Rightly understood, one’s willingness to engage in constitutional comparativism will depend on one’s theory of constitutional decision making.

    So how does constitutional comparativism fare under various classic theories?

    1. Originalism. Originalism will not embrace contemporary comparativism because it does not advance the fundamental objective of interpreting constitutional text based on the framers’ moral perceptions. Contemporary practices at home and abroad are of no utility in servicing that objective. That said, originalism has always embraced historical comparativism, particularly experiences rooted in English practices, to secure a greater understanding of the constitutional context. But such an approach offers little comfort for constitutional comparativists who are looking to a future new world order, not a past enlightened age.

    2. Majoritarianism. Majoritarianism is another constitutional theory that is ill-suited for recourse to comparative material. An approach of judicial deference to the political branches offers few opportunities for courts to rely upon foreign experiences. Interpretive majoritarianism is a better candidate assuming one could invoke the broadest possible conception of community standards. But the longstanding tradition of the Court has been to cabin community standards to values reflected in our own national experience. Even if a persuasive argument could be made for a broader notion of a community standard in certain contexts, such as regulation of obscene speech on the Internet, the Court has refused in cases such as ACLU v. Ashcroft to expand communitarianism beyond our borders.

    3. Natural Law. Appeals to comparative experiences are quite logical if one espouses a natural law theory of constitutionalism. Early experience in constitutional interpretation often relied upon natural law to limit legislative action. Modern variations of this theory find in the interstices of the text rights that are inherent but not enumerated. This tradition also finds expression in abstract, moral readings of constitutional text to embrace natural law shibboleths such as fairness, justice, liberty and dignity. If the Constitution simply advances such abstractions, then appeals to foreign experiences to establish fundamentality or universality are to be anticipated. For reasons of judicial hegemony and substantive indeterminacy, however, the natural law tradition is discredited as a constitutional theory, except in the substantive due process’s doctrine of “implicit ordered liberty” which was the genesis of the foreign citations in Lawrence v. Texas.

    4. Pragmatism. As far as classic constitutional theories go, pragmatism is the leading candidate for a theory that can sustain constitutional comparativism. Not surprisingly, Justice Breyer is its leading advocate. To the extent resolving constitutional questions depend upon consequentialist ends, then proposed solutions to shared problems could benefit from transnational recognition. But pragmatism is hardly capable of sustaining the full freight of the comparativist agenda. For one thing, pragmatic decisions that enhance civil liberties are rare, and in a number of recent cases (Eldred, Glucksberg, Burson) are offered as a rationale by the State for curtailing not advancing constitutional rights. Moreover, the human rights movement espouses notions of universality and fundamentality that are inconsistent with an empirical, pragmatic theory that denies the existence of teleological truth. Pragmatism lacks the necessary “summum bonum” that most comparativists demand. (I think a willingness to embrace the basic tenets of the human rights movement explains why two leading pragmatists, Judge Posner and Justice Breyer, are so far apart on the use of constitutional comparativism. Breyer’s comparative ambitions are “pragmatism plus”.)

    5. A New Comparative Theory? Interestingly, because classic constitutional theories do not capture a thorough-going theory for constitutional comparativism, we are now seeing some scholars such as Dean Harold Koh at Yale advance a new theory of constitutionalism, something like a “Charming Betsy” rule for constitutional adjudication. This theory suggests that to the extent a constitutional provision may admit of more than one interpretation, one should interpret the provision consistent with international norms, and do so out of a decent respect for the opinions of humankind. In my view, such a theory struggles for legitimacy based on established criteria (well articulated by Richard Fallon). These criteria include protection of political democracy (as Judge Posner has already suggested in his post), promotion of the rule of law, and advancement of a morally defensible set of individual rights that privileges international norms over sovereign values.

    Prof. Roger Alford

  7. Steve Marsh (Ethesis)

    I find myself having seen most of the use of civil law citations in a way that I wish I had thought to call figleafing. This is especially true since if you take the majority of external law sources (by population numbers governed by them) the results come out differently, the same if you take raw numbers of jurisdictions. It doesn't fare any better if you track trends by numbers rather than sticking to a very limited set of European countries given the explosion of reactive laws passed in a number of non-European countries.

    The conclusions only follow if the court citing the law in the same sense some people cite proof texts. I'm glad to see that someone notes that.

    In addition, most jurisdictions do not value prior decisons made by courts the way we do, so that citing their laws is actually citing to their legislatures and not their coutrs.

  8. Third, the citation of foreign decisions is a form of figleafing, reflecting the efforts of opinion writers (often law clerks still suffering from the misconceptions of law students) to escape responsibility for stating the true grounds of decision.

    What an unjustified swipe at law clerks. Judges are responsible for every single word that goes out under their names. Noone ever says that a particularly brilliant turn of phrase in a judical opinion must have been the work of a clerk, but every typo and miscue is blamed on nameless, faceless clerks. Even if it were true that the clerk originated a citation to foreign authority, the decision is the judge's work and the judge deserves the blame for letting it stand (leaving aside the question of whether any blame is actually deserved).

  9. would it be possible to impeach and remove a judge who cited foreign law as a deciding factor in a case, on the basis of violation of the oath to uphold the Constitution? if not, could Congress pass a law that would authorize such impeachment and removal?

  10. Judge Posner is content for American courts to cite foreign decisions provided they do not offer them as binding authorities. He holds it acceptable to cite them when they contain "an interesting argument or datum". But Posner gives no example of any American court citing any foreign decision as binding authority, and it would be helpful to know whether there are such examples. (Certainly none of the foreign citations that aroused Scalia's ire were offered as authorities to be followed even if wrong. They were offered as suggesting persuasive reasons to be followed to the extent that they are right.)

    If foreign cases are *not* cited as binding authority, then the question whether it is undemocratic for American judges to defer to them does not arise; they are not deferring. But Posner also offers an independent objection that, if sound, would apply also to their persuasive use. He says that legal principles are "the product of local political, cultural, and historical circumstances." Countries differ, and judicial decisions should be sensitive to these differences. He offers an example. We should not assume that Americans could be able to live with same-sex marriage just because the Canadians, the Dutch, or the Belgians are; those are liberal, tolerant, and fairly secular societies. The United States, Posner reminds us, is different. (He only mentions the religious difference, but I think he would concede that it explains nothing without the greater willingness to turn private faith into public policy.)

    That legal principles are context-dependent seems correct. But now notice that they vary not only with place but also with time. The distant past is a foreign country. For the reasons Posner gives, judges should therefore also be cautious about citing old decisions of their *own* jurisdictions. Moreover, the argument from democratic legitimacy is attenuated, and at some point extinguished, in the case of very old legislation. Thus we may sometimes find that, even taking into account context-dependence, fresh law from a foreign jurisdiction is a better guide to contemporary principles than is old law from down home.

    In Bowers v. Hardwick, the US Supreme Court stressed the antiquity of criminal prohibitions on homosexuality: "Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." How could something be a fundamental right if it had long been forbidden? Overruling that decision, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas said, among other things, that these proscriptions are no evidence of a persisting moral consensus, citing to the contrary not only domestic law but also foreign legislation and a 1981 decision of the European Court of Human Rights. (In Scalia's dissenting opinion, these "foreign views" were described as "dangerous dicta".)

    Of course, Posner is quite right to say that judges sometimes use foreign decisions as a fig-leaf to cover their own moral and political views. Few judges, however nativist, are beyond the opportunistic citation of foreign law when they think it might persuade. In his Lawrence dissent, Scalia warned that if America decriminalized homosexuality there could be no logical stopping point short of gay marriage. Scalia's authority for this proposition? Halperin v. Toronto–a Canadian case!

  11. These are very general arguments addressed at a very specific issues. When you come down it it, Judge Posner seems opposed to only two uses of foreign opinions: as binding precedent, and as evidence "for a budding international consensus that should influence U.S. law". I don't think that any rational judge would cite foreign opinions as binding precedent, at least not until the United States decides to cede some sovereignty. So we are only talking about using foreign opinions as evidence of consensus.

    I'm not even sure that Judge Posner is going so far. Would he have problems citing a foreign consensus on negotiable instruments law to clarify the interstices of UCC Article 3? I somehow think not. If so, he is only opposed to using foreign opinions as evidence of consensus on "social" issues. Which means that only one of his arguments is really relevant: "legal principles are not instantiations of a universal moral law, but the product of local political, cultural, and historical circumstances".

    This argument is valid, but irrelevant. It does not solve the problem he originally proposed: should we use foreign law as evidence "for a budding international consensus that should influence U.S. law"? It merely shows that an international consensus should not necessarily decide US law. I agree with this; the US is legally unique in some respects, such as our devotion to free speech. But "influence" does not mean "decide." Based on Judge Posner's argument, I see no reason why a foreign consensus could not, say, create a rebuttable presumption of law in an otherwise interstitial case.

  12. Judge Posner:

    Do you feel the same way about citations to law review articles, treatises, and other secondary legal literature? Presumably many of the same objections (other than the cultural one) apply. What about federal courts citing (out-of-jurisdiction) state-court precedent? Same undemocratic and figleafing problems.

    There's nothing wrong with looking to other sources, including foreign law, to see how different approaches play out in practice, or to learn the arguments for and against a position, or to see if there's some settled consensus on a matter. If a court gives any of these non-binding sources more weight than that, ordinarily it's failing to fulfill its judicial role.

  13. Sorry about reposting, but I can boil down my previous post into one sentence (which Ben also seems to allude to).

    How does a court citing an international consensus differ from a state court citing and following a "majority rule" of sister states?

    Judge Posner's argument seems to imply that there is no difference.

  14. Hate speech "constitutionally privileged"?
    Not here in the People's Republic of New York City.

  15. Steve Marsh (Ethesis)

    What an unjustified swipe at law clerks. Judges are responsible for every single word that goes out under their names. Noone ever says that a particularly brilliant turn of phrase in a judical opinion must have been the work of a clerk, but every typo and miscue is blamed on nameless, faceless clerks.

    I'm not a judge, so I guess my typos are my own. I've seen lots of clerks claim credit for brilliant turns of phrase, not to mention interesting theories.

    However, part of the justified use of clerks is to prevent typos and miscues.

  16. I'm afraid my comments are much too voluminous for the comment section:

    http://scrivenerserror.blogspot.com/2004/12/being-american-not-necessarily-good.html

    As a military officer before becoming a lawyer, I saw too much arrogant refusal to recognize the applicability (which is NOT the same thing as precedential value) of "foreign" concepts. This is a particularly nasty case of "not invented here" that is not refuted by saying "but legal precedent is different," if only because "legal precedent" is a particularly elastic and ill-defined term whose meaning usually changes from sentence to sentence whenever it is used in an argument.

    That said, I think that Judge Posner's original post (however misguided I may believe its overall thrust) opens a window onto a serious issue of the proper use of not just precedent in particular, but citation in general, in judicial opinions.

  17. In the spirit of earlier postings, I think it important to make finer grained distinctions not only among the different ways that American judges reference and use foreign and international judicial precedents, but also among the different types of precedents themselves. It may, for example, make a significant difference to evaluating the legitimacy of an American judge’s citation to a non-US judicial decision whether the case he or she references was decided by (1) a court in another country interpreting its own constitution, (2) a court in such a country interpreting a treaty (including a treaty to which the United States is a party), or (3) an international tribunal interpreting such a treaty.

    You suggest as much when you state that “it is undemocratic to subject Americans to even the limited rule of foreign courts, except to the extent that treaties or other conventional sources of international law authorize the delegation of lawmaking to foreign bodies.” This could be a major concession that legitimizes a broad spectrum of citations to non-US judicial authority. For example, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Olympic Airways v. Husain recognizes the values of deferring to the decisions of foreign judges when interpreting a treaty to which the US is a party. These values that include accurately determining the contracting parties’ shared intent and striving to interpret the treaty in a consistent and uniform manner. The US Supreme Court will confront analogous issues this spring in Medellin v. Dretke, when it considers how much deference (if any) to give to the judgment of the International Court of Justice imposing certain remedial obligations on the US for violating its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with regard to foreign nationals convicted of capital crimes.

    The referencing of or even deference to foreign and international judicial authority in these contexts is also in tension with your statement that “legal principles are not instantiations of a universal moral law, but the product of local political, cultural, and historical circumstances.” When it comes to treaties and other international agreements, it may well be that sufficient global or regional consensus exists—even among nations with otherwise highly divergent legal, political or social systems—to justify appropriate references to foreign and international judicial precedents by American judges.

    Prof. Larry Helfer

  18. I must admit I am mystified by the antidemocratic argument re foreign precedents. These foreign laws are not self-executing but have effect only through the US judiciary, with its democratic constraints, as Judge Posner notes. The Judge knows well that precedents do not powerfully constrain our judges, and we are certainly a great distance from foreign precedents having much influence. I have assumed that foreign decisions were cited as some interesting datum or argument to be credited. As such, they would be no more antidemocratic than reliance on, say, economic principles.

  19. Two questions:
    1. If judges ought to use considerations of democracy in ruling on cases, then should they not also do so in deciding their judicial strategies? That is, if most voters today think they’ve consented to a rule-of-law, formalistic system, shouldn’t a judge be required to try, at least, not to deliberately go with his gut?

    2. In light of the strong considerations you bring against citing foreign judges, it seems relevant to ask why domestic judges of the distant past are democratically legitimate as (sometimes posthumous) lawmakers on substantive contemporary questions. I refer specifically to substantive questions like how severe a harassment is, or how cruel a punishment is, or what sentence ought to be meted out, etc. Often in such cases, a judge will take the remotely past rulings of other judges as a gage of when to call something outrageous, or acceptable, or cruel, etc. Rather than determine whether a work environment was made hostile by a harasser, for example, a judge will simply say something like, in case A, from 10 years ago, the harassment was much worse and the judge still said no, or, alternatively, it was much less, and he still said yes. So, the judge reasons, that must be the standard, ergo, I rule as follows. Now I know laws passed long ago are upheld today. But they are also known to the public and are subject to review and revocation. By contrast, precedent is an ambiguous grab bag, most voters don’t know it and may not have accepted a system ruled by it, and it is also far from clear that they consent, today, to a legal system that chooses precedent, with nothing more, as a guide to substantive questions (about what is “cruelty,” what is “harassment,” etc.).

  20. This is a very easy call. Foreign courts and/or legislatures (even dictators, I guess) may well have enacted or decreed good policies in their respective countries that many here in the U.S. wish were also duplicated here. Fair enough

    But, those aren't AUTHORITY.

    There's a distinction between a good idea and an authoritative dictate.

    Also, it's ad hoc to the extreme, since one could find any policy (or groups thereof) supported by some country (or coalition thereof) to justify any particular position on any particular subject.

    For example: A radical new Bush appointee to the Supreme Court cites Saudi Arabia courts for the proposition that cutting off Scott Peterson's arm is a consistent with an "evolved" approach to 8th Amendment jurisprudence.

    The mind reels that supposedly smart people, even learned judges, are buying into this muddled legal gobbledygook.

  21. Yet another Posnerian essay expressing the viewpoint that "business good, human rights bad." The essay goes so far as to deny that interpertations of international human rights, such as those at Nuremburg, should be binding on United States courts. He condemns recognizing human rights norms, such as the right not to be subject to discrimination for one's sexual orientation or executing juveniles, yet in the entire of the essay where is the condemnation of citing foreign business precedents which regularly occurs in the interpretation of trade agreements and contracts?

    Of course the essay conveniently leaves out that our Courts have been citing as persuasive authority foreign courts since the very first rulings of the United States Supreme Court, including the issue of individual rights.

  22. Judge Posner,

    Let me ask how your analysis differs from a citation to another state's law (or other domestic jurisdiction's law). Are you equally concerned, for example, that Claifornia courts might cite to Judge Cardozo's MacPherson or Palsgraf decisions as authority in deciding on a question of negligence or causation in a California case? Or that New York courts might cite to Judge Traynor's decisions in deciding some contract issue? It is possible that many of your concerns about local politics would also militate against using even inter-state precedents, though you don't seem to be advocating that position.

    If you're drawing a bright line around the United States (which it appears that you are doing) and accepting that New York courts might cite Judge Traynor, then isn't your critique open to an empirical criticism — "Is the difference between New York and California really different in kind from the difference between New York and Canada, Great Britain, et al?"

  23. . . . point to an emerging international consensus (as the Supreme Court did in invalidating capital punishment of 15 year olds)

    There could be a special reason for that. If "unusual" (in "cruel and unusual") means "unusual in the United States", there's a circularity problem. If it means "unusual internationally", international consensus is relevant.

  24. Some of the general arguments here downplaying the lack of democratic legitimacy of citing foreign decisions are definitely off-base. For one, it is obviously entirely different for one state to cite the decisions of another state; each state is part of one nation and each has must have a republican form of government. The comparison of international law and foreign law by Les Green to old American legislation is simply bizarre. Old legislation can be overturned by Congress at any time, international law, in contrast, is not under the dominion of Congress. It is amazing that such a simple distinction was missed by Mr. Green. Further, the comparison to secondary sources is also ridiculous. Secondary sources are cited, but typically because they claim to extract patterns concerning U.S. law. As the Declaration of Independence proclaims, ultimately, governments "derive their just from the consent of the governed." Foreign law and international law which cannot be connected to the consent of the American people is obviously unjust and illegitimate.

    On the other hand, as a conservative Republican, I would love to see Democrats advocate for the use of foreign law as binding precedent or important guidance decisive in some cases. That would help ensure continuing Republican dominance of the Federal government in the future.

  25. err… that should be, governments "derive their just powers, from the consent of the governed." I hate typos.

  26. Judge Posner:

    Enjoying immensely your postings so far. If you are still open to topic ideas, might I suggest something on the nature of "free will." Braoadly speaking, science, it seems, continues to gather more and more evidence that we are, in entirety, physically determined systems and that the conscious sense of free will merely an epiphenominal afterthought.

    Obviously the subject is better suited to a multivolume treatise than a short blog entry, but I would be interested to read any of your thoughts on the subject, e.g. – does such research impact you as a federal judge? a modern interested man? how do you see a future american society (legal or broader) reacting (if at all) to the death of free will?

    I am a young man (and a young prosecutor) and believe it likely that scientific advancements in this field will underlie the great public debates of my life. Any thoughts?

  27. Judge Posner: Is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) constitutional, in your judgment? If so, why? If not, why not? Thank you. I enjoy your blog posts. Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

  28. David,
    Will you please explain two things to me and the readers of this comment thread?

    First, your opening argument: "Some of the general arguments here downplaying the lack of democratic legitimacy of citing foreign decisions are definitely off-base. For one, it is obviously entirely different for one state to cite the decisions of another state; each state is part of one nation and each has must have [sic] a republican form of government." I don't see how the distinctions you draw are relevant to the case you are trying to make. States, being states, are sovereign. And what does a republican form of government have to do with democratic legitimacy? Believe it or not, North Korea has a republican form of government. Which is to say, it is not a monarchy.

    Second, why the strong language addressed to Mr. Green's arguments? You may not agree with them, but why call them "bizarre," and "ridiculous"? I may not be a conservative Republican, but I am a lawyer. Believe me, such florid language does nothing to strengthen your case.

  29. But if the counter-majoritarian difficulty can be overcome by the need for judges to check the democratic nature of the legislature (after all, without such a check any legal process rationale becomes null) then there seems to be no a priori reason for foreign decisions to be off-limits.

  30. So the citation of foreign decisions is a form of figleafing, reflecting the efforts of opinion writers to escape responsibility for stating the true grounds of decision. If a judge, instead of admitting that he voted as he did, not because American law commands that he do so but because he is sympathetic to the interests he voted to support (or dislikes the interests or the individuals he voted against), can point to an emerging international consensus, he can minimize the appearance of subjective decisionmaking by pointing to something outside his personal values, politics, emotions, and ideology.

    And if instead of admitting that he voted as he did, not because American law commands that he do so but because he is sympathetic to the interests he voted to support (or dislikes the interests or the individuals he voted against), a judge can point to some aberrational U.S. court opinion, an opinion that ignores long-settled interpretation (including U.S. Supreme Court interpretation) of a particular provision in the Constitution or other law, he can minimize the appearance of subjective decisionmaking by pointing to something outside his personal values, politics, emotions, and ideology. If he cares to minimize it, that is.

    How much smaller, really, is the figleaf that shrouds judicial opinions that point to an emerging international consensus than the figleaf that shrouds opinions that point to an aberrational appellate ruling? Or that misrepresent the holding of a cited opinion or two, or that misstate (or fail to state) key issues or key facts, in order to minimize the appearance of subjective decisionmaking?

    Yes, almost the whole world prohibits hate speech, yet in the U.S. it is considered constitutionally privileged, and the fact that we are out of step with the rest of the world seems not to bother any of the judges who cite foreign decisions. But that’s because a provision of the Constitution, as the Supreme Court interprets it, affirmatively bars such a prohibition. If Posner can point to a correspondingly specific provision of the Constitution that prohibits gay marriage or that bars the prohibition of the death penalty for 15-year-olds convicted of capital crimes, he should mention it to the judges who cite foreign decisions. Who knows; maybe that will bother them.

    So don’t hold back, Judge Posner. Do tell.

  31. Joe,

    As you know, U.S. states are only partially sovereign. They have given up part of their sovereignty to other states when they joined the union and allowed federal law to become the supreme law of the land. Thus, the people in state X are already affected by the laws made by the people in state Y. It is an internal state matter whether a state court wants to consider the Cardozo's Palsgraf decision – it is unobjectionable since that decision has roots in the American people.

    As for your assertion that North Korea is a republic, that is an absurd statement. Its not a monarchy? Well, it is ruled by a hereditary dictator, is it not? Your statement that North Korea is a republic is bizarre and ridiculous, even by your narrow definition of republic. But besides that, your definition is clearly wrong. In addition to being a non-monarchy, in a republic, just power derives its authority from the consent of the governed. You can call China or the USSR republics if you want to buy that little piece of propoganda, but that is clearly not what is mean by the guarantee of a republican form of government in the U.S. Constitution. Obviously.

    Second, I call Mr. Green's argument bizarre and ridiculous because it was precisely that. It misses the point entirely, which is that international law and foreign law are not under the dominion and control of Congress. If Mr. Green had addressed this obvious point somehow, then his argument, perhaps, would not be bizarre and ridiculous. Your own argument concerning the definition of republic is likewise bizarre and ridiculous, because you did not consider alternative definitions and especially not the definition relevant to the United States Constitution.

    Under your theory, it would be okay for California state government to be ruled in the same manner as Communist North Korea. (In terms of the structure of state government. I imagine federal law and the incorporated portions of the Bill of Rights would still apply.) That IS bizarre.

    By the way, if you think that me calling a bizarre argument bizarre does not strengthen my case in your eyes, I think that is all the more reason to do so. You may be a lawyer, but Im not so sure about your analytical skills. Mr. North Korea is a republic!

  32. David James Hanson

    Reading the daily postings this week from Judge Posner provides me much tasty food for thought. Have long valued the Judge as a wise man. Judge Posner, you state:
    "legal principles are not instantiations of a universal moral law"

    In response a Mr. Alford complains, among other things, about "natural law" (which he claims is "discredited"–true enough, but is it TRUE or FALSE, that's the question). Mr. Alford claims that natural law supports the notion, which you properly condemn, of our US courts citing foreign courts as expressing some elite-favored "international consensus".

    Would you please expand upon your view of the historical Blackstonian/American view of natural law? Specifically please comment upon the natural law as a human jurisprudential outgrowth of "revealed" or "Divine Law". Do you agree or disagree with William Blackstone in his declaration that: "Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human law should be suffered to contradict these." And, is not this viewpoint truly what the "originalist" constitutional interpretation must reach, in that every single one of our Founding Fathers in Philadelphia in 1787 would have agreed with Blackstone?

    I look forward to reading your thoughts about natural law as William Blackstone and our Founding Fathers understood it. Thank you, Judge Posner, for making yourself available to us members of the American public.

  33. David,
    Is it possible to disagree with you and not be bizarre and ridiculous?
    -Joe S.

  34. Joe,

    Of course. But only if one makes an argument that is not bizarre and ridiculous. For example, before making a critique of an argument, knowing the various definitions of a given word and then, if you must choose the facially less plausible one, providing good (if not convincing) reasons. Im not saying what position to take, even on something as basic as the proper definition of a republic in the U.S. Constitution. But when such a position is taken it should be done with an awareness of the possibilities.

    The same criticism applies to Mr. Green. He can say what he will about the importance of"freshness" in law and assert that recent foreign law or international law might be more reflective of "modern" values, but he should at least grapple with the most obvious counter-argument, including the fact that such law is not under the dominion of Congress and is not derived from the consent of the People. To add to this, not only are not the most obvious counter-arguments made, the point is just obviously wrong. But being plainly wrong and incredibly weak is only part of why the argument is bizarre and ridiculous; the other reason is because it fails to address obvious objections. In fact, I would not use the terms bizarre and ridiculous to modify Mr. Green's argument, but for his failure to think of and address obvious objections.

    This is illustrated by the question which essentially asked whether the Supreme Court of California citing and adopting Cardozo's Palsgraf decision is not the same problem. After all, the states are sovereign, and so are nations. The counter-argument to this is not as blatantly obvious, and it is an interesting point, so it does not go into the bizarre and ridiculous category. No, it just goes into the plainly wrong category. In fact, if the Supreme Court of California adopts the Palsgraf decision (rather than just using similar reasoning) it does violate the rights of the people of California in the sense that Palsgraf is not derived from them. In fact, I do not know of a court which has adopted the decision of another state by reference and as future authority, as opposed borrowing its reasoning as persuasive. But if this were to occur, it would be less objectionable since not all law that governs those in California is derived from California government anyway. At the end of the day, this is one country. (Which does not imply that I think it is wise for the courts of one state to adopt the opinion's of another. In fact, I think it would be wrong for the Supreme Court of California to adopt Palsgraf, as opposed to its reasoning as persuasive authority. But that would be a merely internal matter to be worked out within the State of California.

    Anyway, the point is, while I called Mr. Green's argument and your argument bizarre and ridiculous, I did not so modify the argument from the person who made the Wenger's state sovereignty argument. I disagree with all of these arguments, but reserve for the few the terms bizarre and ridiculous.

    So, to answer your question. Whether an argument is bizarre and ridiculous depends not on whether I agree or disagree. In fact, it would be possible for a correct conclusion to be argued for in a bizarre and ridiculous manner. 🙂

  35. I hesitate to enter the dispute between Joe and David about exactly how "bizarre and ridiculous" my views are; and my inclination to side with Joe on his points about simple courtesy is surely suspect under the principle 'nemo iudex in sua causa.'

    Still, David is too charitable to me in one respect. Not only did I not address what he considers to be obvious (and fatal) objections to my "bizarre and ridiculous" view, I actually didn't address any objections at all, hoping that my interlocutors (if any) might move the discussion forward. So I welcome his substantive point, as well as Judge Posner's clarification of his own views.

    David thinks my analogy between old laws and foreign laws is worthless, because old legislation can be overturned at any time by Congress, whereas foreign law cannot. There is a helpful point here. A more careful statement would acknowledge a spectrum of possibilities: some old laws can indeed be repealed by a simple majority of a current legislature, some (including constitutional ones) cannot be overturned by a legislature at all, and some, depending on the disposition of the judiciary and the nature of judicial review in the relevant legal system, fall in between. So to put the case more carefully, we need to say that *to the extent that* old laws are not *easily* modified by people now living, they cannot be relied on to express the values (etc.) endorsed by those people. (Nor can they be said to be legitimated by the "consent of the people". I am surely one of the last living consent theorists writing in jurisprudence, but even I agree with Hume against Locke to this extent: the consent of our ancestors cannot bind us.)

    Remember, of course, that I am here only testing the *second* of Posner's arguments against citing foreign law: that foreign cultures and values may be unlike domestic ones. My argument is that this gap may also arise in circumstances where some 'nativists' seem less troubled by it.

    Judge Posner's rejoinder takes a rather different tack from David. Posner agrees with me: he concedes that no American judges are in fact treating foreign law as binding authority, and he even agrees that old law *should* sometimes be given less authority than current law. He proposes two conditions for that: "a court will not consider it absolutely bound by its old decisions, but will treat them as authorities, in part because there is a considerable continuity in legal culture within a state over time, and in part because of the reliance interests that judicial decisions generate."

    Now, the only thesis I was disputing was Posner's claim that the possible gap between the *moral and political values* of different jurisdictions that explains why it is wrong of judges to cite foreign law in a *non-binding* way. The proposal I just quoted, however, is about their *authoritative* use. (Without going into it here, I note in passing that his proposal that stare decisis should depend on reliance interests makes it possible for foreign legal norms to become binding on American judges.) But I am puzzled by Posner's invoking the supposed continuity in "legal culture" as a reason for the normative import of old laws. On one, mainly institutional, understanding of that term, it doesn't seem sufficiently deep to matter normatively; on a richer one (taking it to be mean shared moral and political values) it doesn't seem sufficiently true to warrant a categorically different treatment of foreign laws and old laws. But maybe I'm wrong to think that Posner's considered view is that they warrant *categorically* different treatment; maybe he just thinks that courts should be cautious with respect to foreign decisions–and that's probably fair enough.

    Here is my own reason for a measure of caution with respect to foreign decisions. It is easy to make errors when pronouncing about materials of which one is largely ignorant. Consider again the example a number of people mentioned: in his Lawrence dissent Scalia cited the Canadian case of Halperin as evidence for the proposition that striking prohibitions on homosexual conduct could only end in gay marriage. He also described the Canadian decision as a "judicial imposition". Now, as any Canadian lawyer knows, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is constitutionally prohibited in Canada, and as any American lawyer knows, it is largely permissible in the US. Every Canadian appeals court to consider the question found the old common law marriage rule to be discriminatory–it a fairly easy case in Canadian law–moreover, if Parliament doesn't like those rulings, it has the power to derograte from them under s.33 of the Constitution, so it is hardly a "judicial imposition". So every proposition for which Scalia cited Halperin as evidence is false. (This is quite apart from the question what a jurisprudential nativist is doing citing foreign cases at all; but here again I'm inclined to agree with Posner–there is a lot of fig-leafing in the cases.)

  36. A not-to-small niggle about an aspect of Prof. Greeen's December 30/04 post which has nothing to do with the merits of what he wrote.

    We're not yet quite as advanced, in Canada, as we would be if his statement

    "as any Canadian lawyer knows, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is constitutionally prohibited in Canada"

    were _now_ literally, absolutely true. It might well not be, yet. It has to be qualified under current jurisprudence.

    As he knows (and most Canadian lawyers should know)section 1 of the the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."

    Technically – and precedent (stare decisis) is all about technicalities – Canada does not yet have a decision from its Supreme Court in which that court has ruled that "discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation" is something that can NEVER be jusified under s. 1 under any circumstances whatsoever.

    I, for one, can't fathom a basis for a constitutionally valid limitation based on sexual orientation that would survive s. 1. But we don't, in my view, yet have a decision that says that. Indeed, it would be contrary to principle for a court to make that sort hypothetical ruling.

    Apologies for the digression.

    David Cheifetz

  37. Apologies, too, for misspelling Prof. Green's surname.

  38. Judge Posner says: "He is in short a part of a system of checks and balances; he has a degree at least of democratic legitimacy. A foreign judge is not subject to any political process within the United States."

    Pretty minimal checks and balances, though, no? Some scholars accuse many judges of leaving precedent in the wind for their own sense of economic or social justice. Shouldn't the court then include an economist and a sociologist?

    When clerks recount that judges often instruct their research toward a pre-arranged outcome, I feel citizens deserve far more information about how the process unfolds. Does most of the legal profession still believe that Supreme Court clerks should keep their experiences to themselves for ever? Would a 40 year rule do some enormous harm?

    Thanks for what you do,
    Dave Meleney

  39. I hope the original Dave–who so presumptuously accused Les Green of "bizarre" and "ridiculous" arguments–will acknowledge that Professor Green has a very good point, both in his reply and his original posting.

  40. I share the sentiments re citations of various secondary sources, including sister states etc. When upholding NY domestic law, is it wrong to cite "alien" jurisprudence from other states? How about law review articles and so forth, which often are in dispute of clear legal precedent and constitutional requirements?

    Likewise, as to inappropriate comparisions, it is noteworthy that quite a few of the citations are of English common law systems that are quite comparable to ours.

    The law clerk swipe was petty.

    Finally, the "problematic" citations should be cited. For instance, the infamous use of foreign law in Lawrence was a brief two paragraph discussion that was in response of CJ Burger's citation of "Western" law to justify the other side. Strangely, many originalists do not criticize the latter citations.

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