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“AI and the University”

Following up on this, philosopher Dan Kaufman, who taught for a quarter-century at Missouri State University, shares a draft of his provocative remarks being presented today at Florida Gulf Coast University. Some of this seems to me right, some debatable, all interesting. Comments are open, and signed comments will be preferred. Professor Kaufman’s text follows:

AI and the University

The university was once an institution whose purpose was the education and acculturation of elites, which is why classics dominated the curriculum. This conception of the function of higher education was revised in the mid 20th century to include science and engineering, a development that was controversial in itself as evinced by the (in)famous F.R. Leavis/C.P. Snow “Two Cultures” debate. But in the United States, the real transformation occurred after the Second World War and the GI Bill, when the university began to turn, gradually, into an institution of mass education. And while its research mission largely remained unchanged, its main pedagogical charge today is to prepare and credential people for the white collar professions. This new profile and mission, when combined with contemporary market forces, have put the entire system at risk and left it even more exposed and vulnerable to the impact of AI than it would have been otherwise. Indeed, I don’t see how the university survives in its current form.

Once higher education became mass education, efficiency and cost took on an overriding significance. The research, residential, and amenity-rich infrastructure these places provide is an extraordinarily expensive proposition, with the costs being passed directly down to the student. This was fine when undergraduates were overwhelmingly from privileged backgrounds, and half of the point of going to university was for the experience, socialization, and connections doing so would garner — I was in no hurry to graduate from the University of Michigan in 1989 — but in the current environment, the mad inflation of undergraduate tuition and residency has sent students and their families scrambling for faster and cheaper ways to complete an undergraduate degree.

Community colleges have risen to the challenge, transitioning from the largely vocational role they once played, into a cheap alternative for the first two years of college. So swiftly has this occurred, that within the twenty four years that I taught at Missouri State University — from 1999-2023 — I watched it change, in real time, from a traditional, four-year, residential institution into what is essentially a two-year finishing school. Beyond gutting programs whose enrollments depend on their place in the general education curriculum, the question of why the university should maintain all of these fantastically expensive student-life amenities for students who will not be living on campus — as few upper-classmen do — becomes harder and harder to answer.

Speaking of general education, it isn’t long for this earth. Even back in my day, the question of why an aspirant hotel manager or accountant should have to slog through two years of general education studies, in addition to a major and minor, had become difficult to answer in a way that did not strain credulity, but today, the rationales have become so thin that they no longer bear any scrutiny at all. “Well-roundedness” is all very well, but not to the tune of $100-200K, per student. Even putting aside the current moment of degenerate political leadership, in which rationales like “Education for citizenship” and “Developing the next generation of leaders” sound like a sick joke, whatever momentary plausibility they might have had evaporates, once you realize that they imply that those without college educations — around 60% of the population — are unsuited for citizenship or leadership, which is demonstrably untrue. And I shouldn’t have to explain why saying, “You need to attend our institution for four years, so we can justify millions of dollars in infrastructure” is not going to resonate with those who are so strapped that they don’t know whether they’ll be able to pay their mortgage or health insurance premiums from one month to the next.

But, you’ve come to hear about AI, and my point is that given the current state of higher education, adding it to the mix is like pouring gasoline on a smoldering pile of coals. The introduction of LLMs into an institution of higher learning would be disruptive under any circumstances, but the transformation of the university into a white-collar vo-tech had already begun to send the resulting, incoherent, bloated mess of an institution on its way out the door. Adding AI will simply accelerate the process. Whether this is to be celebrated or bemoaned, I leave up to you, but that it will happen, I have little doubt.

Most of the critical focus has been on the “consumption” side of the ledger, and since I am now retired, I can only sympathize with the legions of teachers who find themselves wringing their hands over how to credibly assess students in the age of generative AI. Even before the widespread use of this software, cheating had become a serious problem, due to the availability of online encyclopedias, which made nonsense out of any assignment intended to be completed at home. In my classes, all the assessment used to be take-home — papers, exams, etc. — so as not to sacrifice precious lecture hours, but when more than half of what I received one semester was copied straight from Wikipedia or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I switched entirely to in-class modes of assessment, a practice I maintained until my retirement. (Giving half the students zeroes — my preferred penalty for cheating — was not an option the Dean would allow.) But, from what all of my friends who remain in the business are telling me, generative AI has made the situation much worse.

The problem is so obvious that it shouldn’t need repeating: the point of education is for students to acquire skills that they previously lacked, and if they cheat their way through school, they won’t. But, this is an even bigger problem, now that going to college has been reduced to a purely transactional arrangement.

Someone who pursued higher education on the old model might still get a lot out of the experience, even if he or she learned nothing academically speaking. (I’m imagining a real-world version of Bertie Wooster.) But, if the sole reason for going to college is to learn how to be an accountant, hotel manager, social worker, etc., then the fact that a person has not learned how to do the relevant tasks renders the entire exercise — and expenditure of money — pointless. And if too many generations of graduates come out of the university not knowing how to do whatever it is that the job for which they have been preparing requires, then it will not be very long before employers stop viewing a college degree as any kind of credible credential. Indeed, this process is already underway.

Much less discussed is the impact of generative AI on the production side of higher education, and it is on this that I want to spend the remainder of my time. 

We already treat undergraduate teaching — and especially, introductory-level teaching — as a burden to be offloaded to the university’s lowest-level, most poorly paid employees. At places with graduate programs, this means they are taught by probationary faculty, adjuncts or graduate students, while in the schools lacking them, it is just the first two. (Of course, if your department is small and unimportant enough, as mine was, all of the faculty may have to do at least some introductory-level teaching, though it still is widely resented.) With the imperative being to teach stuff as cheaply as possible, handing the job over to chatbots seems inevitable, and is already happening in places. Will doing this make the skill-acquisition problem even worse than it already is? It seems a near certainty. Will anyone be willing to pay 100-200k for it? It seems unlikely. Does this mean that large numbers of faculty — and the people managing the administrative infrastructure around them — will be left unemployed? Undoubtedly.

As bad as all of this is, however, what the widespread use of generative AI will do to academic research is worse.

In my own discipline — philosophy — there is a disturbing trend in which my colleagues not only publicly admit to using chatbots to conduct their academic research and write their papers, but are proud of doing so and suggest that AI-written philosophy represents an inevitable future. If this is happening in a subject as unfriendly to automation as philosophy, you know it is much worse in those areas that are more amenable to it.

I have no doubt that some people will be interested in reading scholarship “written” by a chatbot, but the idea that this could sustain professional academic disciplines is fanciful at best. Given how chatbots work, there is only so much recycling, re-aggregating, and redistributing of existing material that is possible before it all becomes rather thin stuff, and the more scholars use AI to do their research, the less original writing will find its way into the bots, and the more anemic academic publishing will get. Eventually, given enough time, little to nothing will be left but recycling, re-aggregation and redistribution.

The argument one always runs into, when engaging with the subject at this level, is that the purpose of scholarship is to produce truths, and that it doesn’t matter where they come from. When having such conversations, AI defenders will ask, “If a cure for cancer was discovered by a chatbot, wouldn’t it be just as useful as if it had been discovered by a person?” and the question is a perfectly fair one, but only in a very limited sphere. Certainly, the value of some scholarship is a function of this kind of simple utility, but much of it is not. Indeed, outside of medicine and engineering (broadly construed), I would suggest that the value of most scholarly research cannot be measured by such a calculus. Please understand that I am not invoking the airy — and in my view, purely rhetorical — idea that academic scholarship is intrinsically valuable, a claim that is both undemonstrable and in a transactional framework, unpersuasive. Rather, I submit that in many if not most cases, scholarship has no immediate or obvious material benefit but rather, adds to our collective understanding in ways that may prove useful in the future, but often in a manner that we cannot specify or predict.

But, even with regard to scholarship whose value is a matter of simple and demonstrable utility, the offloading of it to generative AI raises the long term problem just mentioned. The more the material on which the bots are trained is itself produced by bots, the less original, human input goes into the system, and the more iterations of reaggregation occur, the less new knowledge will be produced. Sure, right now, chatbots are going to “notice” useful aggregations of existing scholarship that we might have missed and which may produce novel technologies, cures, and the like, but the longer and more involved in the process they are, the more this will yield diminishing returns, until eventually, little to nothing novel comes out of scholarship at all. Certainly, human imagination has a lot to do with this, but perhaps even more important are our values and ambitions which, of course, lie beneath every human endeavor, not just scholarship.

At this point, I can only hope that those running our colleges and universities will come to understand the essentially human and social role that they play in our civilization, and sooner rather than later, given the speed with which this second transformation is occurring. It took decades to turn our colleges and universities into white collar vo-techs, but I fear that their automation by chatbots may take only a single one. This hope, however, is tempered by the sober realization that at least thus far, not only do our colleagues not appear to see the proverbial writing on the wall, but far too many of them think that handing over their work and their institutions to generative AI is actually a positive development.

If nothing is done, and we continue on our current course, I see the following happening. (These are, of course, guesses not predictions.)

–Spending four of one’s most productive years in residence for purposes of acculturation, socialization, contemplation, and leisure is by its nature an elite activity and will become one again. It will be done primarily at SLACS and the most prestigious, well-endowed universities. 

–Past the point of entertainment, the humanities and liberal arts will largely become the province of “educated amateurs.” They will not remain professional, academic disciplines in most places.

–Education and training for the blue- and white-collar professions will be done in dedicated trade schools, and will take a year and a half to two years to complete. If there are masters levels of study, they will be combined into a single 3-4 year program.

–Research and Development will be done at dedicated institutions, financed by a mixture of government and industry funding. They will be charged both with teaching the next generation of researchers, as well as conducting the research itself.

–The number of four-year colleges and universities, commensurately, will shrink drastically, with the state university system and middling private institutions being hit the hardest.

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34 responses to ““AI and the University””

  1. “Given how chatbots work, there is only so much recycling, re-aggregating, and redistributing of existing material that is possible before it all becomes rather thin stuff.”

    Yeah, and steam/IC engines just move a piston back and forth!

    This meme is a useful rule of thumb for identifying someone who hasn’t seriously looked into the technological details of contemporary AI. Yes, the fundamental engine is next-token prediction, but the machines being constructed around it are vastly more complex, and capable, than that suggests.

    I know many of us humanities types desperately want to blithely dismiss this technology, but you signal ignorance when you latch onto this justification for doing so. I’m not saying that AI will ever be good at impressive, creative contributions to philosophy (though it is evidently already better at philosophy than the median human being, or even median undergraduate at an American university), but I’m not placing any bets.

    (I always and only post pseudonymously on this and other philosophy blogs, but I always use the same pseudonym. I understand the importance of accountability for this discussion. Hopefully Brian is okay with this!)

    1. Actually, the talk was developed with the help of someone who works in AI software development.

      This point — “the fundamental engine is next-token prediction” — is all that this portion of the argument requires. And I stipulated that up- front, the software will “notice” useful aggregations that we otherwise would have missed.

      But this is only one small piece of the overall case. I appreciate your reading and commenting!

      1. Hi Dan,

        Actually, no, that the engine is next-token prediction does not entail that “there is only so much recycling, re-aggregating, and redistributing of existing material that is possible before it all becomes rather thin stuff”. The fact that you think that underscores my original point! But if your AI SWE friend can correct me, I’d welcome it.

        (Brian: this will also answer your question, I think.)

        To start with, next-token prediction arises out of embedding bits of language as vectors into very-high-dimensional (i.e.: >10000 as of GPT-3 — which is by now a very outdated model) space, where the relative distances between vectors (very roughly) capture semantic relationships between bits. These original vectors undergo another several more transformations, which amounts to a statistical model with an astounding number (GPT-3: well over 100 billion) of parameters.

        I don’t see why we should think that a statistical prediction model ‘only recycles, re-aggregates, or redistributes’ existing data. Do you think that’s all that any statistical models — of, say, predator-prey dynamics or unemployment — do as well? The point can’t be made just by leaning on the fact that the model was calibrated on training data — all learning is. (Did you somehow learn English by *not* ‘training on whatever words are available’, as Brian put it?) Anyway, none of that means that when a trained model is *then* given novel input, it cannot generate novel output. Quite the opposite: LLMs produce novel sentences all the time.

        Second, your argument wouldn’t go through unless none of the machinery built out around the ‘next-token prediction engine’ bore on the machine’s ability to do something beyond ‘recycling, re-aggregating, re-distributing’. That’s like saying that, because an engine only produces back-and-forth motion, it cannot be used to traverse the Sierra Nevadas. That’s false: it depends entirely on how the engine interacts with the rest of the system. In the case of LLMs, the critical next phase is reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF), in which the model is further refined through a large amount of (often low-granularity) feedback from people grading its outputs (commonly, they just look at the outputs of two models, given the same input, and rank them as better and worse). The human feedback is synthesized into a separate — you guessed it — machine learning model that is essentially a utility function estimating values of outcomes, and the LLM’s billions-parameter model is further tweaked on its basis to maximize utility (‘reward’ as the RLHFers call it). (I’m describing ‘classical’ RLHF — I’m sure modern techniques at the frontier labs are much more sophisticated, which is a problem for your argument because you need none of that to matter.) At this point, we are well outside of ‘learning on whatever text is available’, since the model is tweaked based on, essentially, real-live human beings’ (often snap, non-verbal) judgments about it. They do not even need to articulate what they’re looking for or what the goal is. However you want to redescribe what is happening at this point, it is certainly false to say that the model (post-RLHF) has only learned (or ‘learned’ if we want to be pedantic) on existing text. It’s accordingly also hard to see how the model can only, then, produce text that is a recycling/reaggregating/redistributing of existing text.

        Third, LLMs as any of us (except maybe your SWE friend) have ever encountered them actually operate within a ‘harness’ that involves, among other things, connections to external tools, additional memory, safeguards, etc. in much the way that an engine is attached to a transmission and wheels or a CPU is attached to RAM and peripherals. This harness allows the system to literally do things beyond the generation of text, such as send commands to a program, query a database, verify a proof, or search the web — actions that result from the (RLHF’d) next-token prediction engine’s spitting out directives, because those connections are set up to receive LLM-produced outputs and translate them into commands. Here, too, unless you think that activities like mathematical deduction or executing a program and feeding it information you just got off of Google is recycling, etc., then I don’t see why we should think your argument goes through *just* because the engine is next-token prediction.

        1. Your analogies continue to be so poor that it is difficult to make sense of the point being made.

          I was quite explicit that imagination and motivation fueled by values — i.e. the things that matter to us; that we *care* about — are essential to the kind of novelty that characterizes human investigation, creation, and invention. Remove these — as well as sensation, perception, and judgment — and one is ultimately re-aggregating, however sophisticated the process may be.

    2. “the fundamental engine is next-token prediction, but the machines being constructed around it are vastly more complex, and capable”

      Since you concede how the basic engine works, please explains how they are “vastly more complex and capable” for the benefit of the rest of us.

      1. Unless we accept dualism, ultimately any creative process comes down to high-level emergent consequences of a very complex system whose individual parts sound mindless at a sufficiently low level. Take natural selection as an analogy: at the base level, the process is just differential selection between incrementally varying parameters, but at the high level it gives rise to extraordinary adaptive complexity. There’s a level of analysis at which AI is just reinforcement-learning layered over next-token prediction; equally, there’s a level of analysis at which AI is just electrons and nucleons interacting in Coulomb potentials. I don’t think either description tells us much about what kind of high-level-describable features it might develop.

        In any case, I would have thought that the last few months of mathematical results would have put paid to the idea that all AI does is “recycling, re-aggregating, and redistributing of existing material”. Without prejudice as to whether it can contribute to philosophy, to be sure.

        1. True enough, but at least with words, AI is training on whatever words are available. I’d still like some explanation of how it manages to pull off the feat in a way that avoids Kaufman’s worry. Perhaps someone can supply one for the uninitiated!

        2. I’m a mathematician who works on AI research, though not specifically on training LLMs. Basically, we really don’t know what’s going on inside there. And if that worries you, it worries me, too.

          Training LLMs proceeds in two phases. The first phase, pretraining, works the way you and Prof. Kaufmann describe: the LLM “learns” statistical distributions of which words are likely to come next, and just predicts that. The second phase, fine-tuning, uses reinforcement learning to shape the “persona” and capabilities of the LLM. The LLM is presented with a series of tasks. Multiple responses are generated for each task, each response is graded, and the most successful response is reinforced, so that it will be more likely in future. (I’m eliding some details, such as the use of supervised fine-tuning, but they don’t change the big picture much.)

          The issue is that we don’t really know how the LLM “learns” to do well on the reinforcement learning tasks. There’s been some research that suggests this procedure only “sharpens” the probability distribution from pretraining – if there is *some* chance that the base LLM gets the right answer, fine-tuning will ensure it *always* gets the right answer, but if the base LLM *never* gets the right answer, fine-tuning won’t help. However, that research was done by academic researchers using comparatively limited resources, and we don’t know if it still holds for large-scale RL runs like the frontier labs are doing. We also don’t really know how small the original probability distribution needs to be: for any combination of characters, even a proof of finite-time blowup in Navier-Stokes, there’s *some* microscopically small chance that the LLM will generate that sequence of characters, so maybe it can “sharpen” even that. We really don’t know.

          This is, incidentally, why LLMs are better at math and code then they are at philosophy or writing: math and code can be automatically graded, so you can scale reinforcement learning on those domains much further. Maybe if we had a billion English teachers who did nothing but grade LLM responses for a year, it would eventually spit out the next great novel.

  2. “Giving half the students zeroes — my preferred penalty for cheating — was not an option the Dean would allow.”

    That sentence is the fulcrum this talk genuinely pivots on. If the institution affords a landscape where academic misconduct becomes genuinely rational, then the purpose of skill acquisition is conceded before the point has gotten off the ground, and before generative LLM’s have entered the chat.

    It would be rather straight forward to discern who actually did their work with a quick 5 minute conversation about the paper with the student. If they can’t explain the move in the literature and their own interpretation of it as found in the submitted assignment, then you can point to the very strong possibility (though not outright proof on its face) of academic dishonesty, which would be revealed rather quickly thereafter.

    And none of the preceding matters if there are not consistent and substantive consequences. Yes the above is time consuming. But if institutions had consistent and substantive consequences, then I suspect you would see a rather sharp decline in misconduct after the first assignment of the semester.

    My preferred enforcement regime is: first offense, grade F and expulsion from the course. Second offense, grade F and expulsion from program, or institution. It is a hard but fair one and done. Zero Tolerance without completely wrecking a student while allowing them to learn from a bad mistake. But this is merely one possible way forward.

    But, there is another part lurking in the background: the university is now in the business of white collar vocational training (using Kaufman’s own words). The degree is the product. The students are customers. And rapid expulsions and F grades would endanger that product and (in the short term) dramatically reduce income streams from those customers. And so we see the root of misconduct tolerance grounded in a business model that essentially incentivizes all of the enabling behaviors. The “Client/Vendor” relationship is deemed too valuable to harm, and so enforcement without consequences is as serious an enforcement regime as is permissible now.

    It is really a sad state of affairs, and is also prior to generative LLM’s. This is an institutional governance issue, not a generative AI issue.

    1. I agree, which is why I said explicitly that AI will simply accelerate something that is already happening.

    2. Apologies if I’m reading you uncharitably, but it sounds like you are advocating for course failure and later expulsion on the basis of two five-minute, one-on-one chats between the student and their teacher. While you said that academic dishonesty ‘would be revealed rather quickly thereafter’, I’m not sure I see how.

      Even setting aside the (reasonable) worry that this proposal is draconian, I don’t think you have to be a victim of AI boosterism to be worried about it. Nobody likes overregulation, but underregulation is also bad. Imagine this power in the hands of your more unreasonable or unscrupulous colleagues. I think you can see both how such power could be abused, but also how there would be no checks on negligence, either.

      1. “Though not outright proof on its face” is where the heuristics from the conversation would inform next steps. Plagiarism of the sort LLM’s have enabled is increasingly hard to detect and requires a portfolio of evidence to get to the point of official sanction. But once the proof is overwhelming, it really does need to be acted on commensurate to the seriousness of the infraction. And preferably with some teeth to protect the value of the grades of conscientious students.

        Other data points would be things like Version History can be requested. For those universities with SharePoint or Google Drive, this is baked in to the collaboration environments for example. Or email chains with document versions in them. Have your students make use of those environments, and sell the use of those environments to them as insurance against plagiarism as well as data loss. The point being for them to show something of the evolution of the assignment. If they can’t even supply that, then the plagiarism detection, paired with a bum discussion, gets you materially closer to validation of the initial finding. There are next steps after all this, for sure. But it moves things along pretty briskly through the workflow.

  3. I am glad to see a serious academic like Prof. Kaufmann confront this issue directly, and I hope that it’s the beginning of a real, difficult, important conversation among scholars. There are details I could quibble with – for example, I don’t think it’s at all clear that “aggregation” is all that LLMs are doing; we don’t really know what’s going on in there – but I think the overarching message is correct and needs to be heard.

    The one issue that I think Prof. Kaufmann does not address, though, is that we do have agency. If we don’t like scholarship’s trajectory – and who among us does? – then we can take action to change it. I don’t have any great suggestions for how to do that yet, but I am doing a lot of reading and thinking on the subject, and I hope that others are too.

  4. A lot of institutions and state systems you can look at their math, and the math does not add up. Penn State is shutting 7 branch campuses this year but even that does not alter the financials moving forward.

    Penn State, located in the geographic center of Pennsylvania, has very little industrial build out. What exists in Happy Valley, is University Park and State College Inc., a purely extractive economy of wealth from aspirational parents and students. Currently, Penn State and State College Inc need ~45,000 premium-paying undergraduates, ~15,000 incoming first-years. This is the operational baseline for this aspirational school in the middle of nowhere except rents that can easily run over $1,000 a month *per bunk.*

    I mention this preamble to point out, that Kaufman issuing his high challenge, “At this point, I can only hope that those running our colleges and universities will come to understand the essentially human and social role that they play in our civilization,” is strangely off message. We are discussing AI? Then we are no longer talking about these places and especially, their leaders.

    The way I see it, at the level of real finances, it is exactly the aspirational parents and smart students that are going to stop subsidizing these “colleges and universities,” precisely because of AI capacity quickly eroding “consumer confidence” so to speak. The very demographic a school like Penn State needs, will be the first to see the place in the middle of nowhere is a horrible deal, if what you want is just the knowledge.

    Decouple the brick-and-mortar university from the intellectual capital, and you get a better feel for what we should hope for. Swift evacuations.

    Why subside an extractive industry?

    1. My last response got cut off. So, I’ll try again.

      Why is it “off message”? I was quite explicit: AI will exacerbate transformative trends that are already underway.

  5. For whatever reason, over ten years ago, I took courses in an MFA program. This was before AI. AI is good at chatting on a subject and sounding intelligent, and collating what is out there, and in the case of a piece of writing sounding like students in a workshop.
    It is nowhere near the level of my teachers, who had taste, judgment and a life.
    I imagine philosophy is maybe a little different. If philosophy is like bean counting, I guess AI can be a brilliant philosopher.
    There is more to wriitng (yes I mean this) than moving around words and more I’d guess to philosophy than applying logic

  6. I think we need to separate several different issues here: the future of the university, the future of education, the future of philosophy as a profession, and the future of philosophy itself.

    I agree that AI may create serious problems for university education. If students outsource to AI the cognitive work they are supposed to develop or demonstrate themselves, both education and assessment are undermined. AI may also weaken the value of degrees, disrupt the economic model of universities, and reduce academic employment.

    But none of this shows, by itself, that philosophy is in danger.

    Universities are institutions in which philosophy is currently taught and professionalized, but they are not a condition for the existence of philosophy. Universities may shrink and philosophy may remain. A decline in professional philosophy jobs is not the same thing as a decline in philosophical activity.

    In this respect, I actually find Professor Kaufman’s prediction quite plausible: the humanities and liberal arts may increasingly become activities of “educated amateurs.” Where I differ is in how that possibility should be evaluated.

    Why should this count as the decline of philosophy itself, rather than the decline of philosophy as a profession?

    AI greatly lowers the cost of access to literature, argument comparison, objection generation, translation, and conceptual analysis. As a result, people outside universities may be able to participate in philosophical inquiry at a much higher level than before. Professional academic philosophy could contract while philosophical activity expands.

    This distinction also matters when technological innovation threatens established institutions. New technologies change not only how work is done, but also who can do it, who controls access to it, and which forms of expertise remain scarce. Existing institutions therefore have incentives to resist change. Some of that resistance may be justified, but some may reflect institutional self-preservation. The interests of the university should not simply be identified with the interests of philosophy.

    More importantly, philosophy should not be reduced to the production of answers.

    Philosophy also involves deciding what counts as a question, challenging assumptions, changing conceptual boundaries, and reconstructing the question itself. Here consciousness may matter. Human beings do not merely process information about pain, death, selfhood, freedom, value, and meaning. We experience them. That experience may affect which questions become important and which problems we continue to pursue.

    At the same time, current non-conscious AI has complementary strengths in search, comparison, objection, reconstruction, and large-scale knowledge processing.

    For that reason, the most promising model at present may not be human philosophy versus AI philosophy, but a hybrid.

    Human consciousness can contribute experience, salience, value, and friction with the world. AI can contribute search, comparison, criticism, and reconstruction. AI may therefore not reduce original human input, but amplify it.

    So I would distinguish three claims:

    AI may threaten the university.

    AI may threaten some forms of philosophical education and professional employment.

    But it does not follow that AI threatens philosophy itself.

    If philosophy does become increasingly an activity of educated amateurs, that may not be the end of philosophy. It may simply be the end of one institutional form in which philosophy has been organized.

    1. This whole comment is actually a nice bit of philosophy on which to test its own claims.

      I ran this through Pangram 4.0. Anybody care to guess the result? Did you suspect that? Does it matter?

      1. Yes — AI was involved.

        More precisely, my comment was produced through a human–AI hybrid process. The underlying questions, distinctions, and direction of the argument were mine, while AI helped with organization, compression, translation, and testing objections.

        But I think there is a more important issue here than whether Pangram detected AI involvement.

        The most interesting question may be a metacognitive one: when academics evaluate AI, are they applying to themselves the same analysis they would apply to other established institutions facing technological disruption?

        Universities routinely study historical cases in which new technologies alter who can perform a task, reduce barriers to entry, weaken existing forms of professional scarcity, and redistribute authority. They also study the tendency of established institutions and professions to resist changes that threaten their existing roles.

        But when AI begins to affect universities, academic employment, credentials, gatekeeping, and access to intellectual work, can the same analytical framework be applied inward?

        I am not claiming that academic criticism of AI is merely self-interest. Some resistance may be entirely justified. My question is whether institutional self-preservation is being treated as a possible variable in the analysis at all.

        My own case makes this especially interesting to me.

        I am not an academic philosopher. I work in disability welfare, graduated from a low-ranked welfare-oriented university, and have no formal training in philosophy. I am very much an outsider to academia.

        And yet, through working with AI, I have been able to enter philosophical discussions, develop arguments, receive criticism, revise them, and become a Pro User on PhilArchive.

        I do not regard that as proof of philosophical ability. But I do think it is evidence that AI may change who is able to participate in philosophical activity.

        Without AI, I would have had far less access to this kind of discussion. But without my own questions, the AI would not have produced this particular line of thought either.

        For example, the distinctions I wanted to pursue — between the crisis of the university and the crisis of philosophy, between technological disruption and institutional self-preservation, and between intelligence and the still-unresolved problem of consciousness — were not initially supplied to me by AI.

        Once those questions were raised, AI became extremely useful for search, comparison, criticism, reconstruction, and expression.

        So perhaps the important distinction is not simply “human-written” versus “AI-written.”

        It may be between different distributions of cognitive labor.

        In my case, the human role has been to notice a problem, assign importance to it, and continue returning to it. The AI role has been to amplify the inquiry.

        This is also why I think the question of consciousness remains relevant. AI may be able to generate questions when prompted, but that is not obviously the same as independently selecting a question as significant, assigning it weight, and persistently returning to it. Whether conscious experience contributes to those processes remains unresolved.

        So yes, the Pangram result is interesting. But perhaps the more revealing question is not whether AI helped write the comment.

        It is whether AI is changing who can participate in philosophy — and whether those of us evaluating that change are sufficiently aware of our own institutional position when we judge it.

      2. Yeah, I clocked this one right away as almost surely AI. Given the username, I should allow that it *might* be that AI was primarily used as a translation aid, but this has the feel of fully AI-generated content.

  7. My experience with LLMs as a layperson/non-philosopher is that the aforesaid are excellent as spell checkers and translators (and, at a non-empirical remove, ostensibly as coders), but that unless one is expert in a given subject—even one as comparatively provincial or jejune as personal genealogical research—the proverbial revelation that the emperor’s clothing is considerably more threadbare than it initially appears becomes much more glaring and obvious. What initially presents itself as impressive intelligence can, upon closer inspection by someone who actually knows the field, turn out to consist of a mixture of genuine pattern recognition, extensive but unevenly deployed knowledge, and the production of linguistically plausible inferences whose validity the non-expert is poorly equipped to assess.

    My first question to an academic philosopher regarding LLMs, then, would be: how good are the best LLMs actually at discussing philosophy? Or, put otherwise, at what point, and in what sorts of philosophical problems, does the threadbareness of the machine begin to become apparent to someone properly trained to recognize it? I would be inclined to collate such observations across particular philosophical questions and subfields in order to arrive at a rough heuristic measure of their reliability, and then repeat the experiment every few months to see whether their performance in this particular domain is in fact improving, stagnating, or perhaps merely becoming more convincing.

    My second question would be whether, notwithstanding the potentially mediocre limitations of the present “best” models, practicing—or, more precisely, experimenting qua trained philosopher—with and on LLMs might not itself constitute a potentially highly useful, perhaps even invaluable, exercise in the acquisition of technical and more general knowledge, albeit perhaps more so in some philosophical subfields than others. It seems to me that the machine’s limitations could themselves be philosophically informative: one would be studying not merely whether an LLM can produce apparently philosophical discourse, but what sort of cognitive or quasi-cognitive performance actually underlies that discourse, and where a hypothetical correspondence between linguistic fluency and substantive understanding breaks down.

    For example, I could imagine philosophers specializing in areas related to human cognition using LLMs precisely in order to investigate the effects of interacting with these unprecedentedly dynamic and seemingly inexhaustible linguistic juxtaposition machines. They might, for example, ask whether such interaction can induce compulsive psychological effects in a nontrivial minority of users, much as social-media platforms are alleged to do, particularly, though by no means exclusively, in children. If such effects were demonstrated to be statistically significant, the obvious next questions would concern their precise nature and mechanism: how unprecedented the phenomenon actually is, how it differs from or resembles previously known forms of technological or social conditioning, and how deeply its operation can be traced into the cognitive mechanisms ascertainable by the means and methods of contemporary science, while remaining attentive to the wider philosophical questions concerning the nature and significance of those mechanisms themselves.

    1. I just want to address this comment:

      > What initially presents itself as impressive intelligence can, upon closer inspection by someone who actually
      > knows the field, turn out to consist of a mixture of genuine pattern recognition, extensive but unevenly
      > deployed knowledge, and the production of linguistically plausible inferences whose validity the non-expert
      > is poorly equipped to assess.

      I think things are a bit different in math and coding than they are in other fields. I definitely remember when this would have been an apt description of LLM coding and math, even just two years ago. But they have gotten radically better, to the point where this is no longer an accurate description in those two subfields. They’re not perfect – in particular, the code they write tends to work but be extremely verbose and hard to read – but they have gotten really, really good. You can see that in things like the size of Microsoft bug patches, which have exploded – they’re frantically patching vulnerabilities discovered by LLMs. Or in the recent result on finite-time blowup for the Navier-Stokes equations – there are some question marks next to that right now, but even if it turns out that there was training data contamination, completing the proof is still operating at a level comparable to a good human mathematician.

      Will that success eventually extend to fields like writing and philosophy? I have no idea. I hope not.

        1. Sorry, I don’t follow? The whole point of the open letter is that these AI engines *are* producing innovative solutions to problems, just that “innovative solutions” may not be what we actually need.

  8. Many thanks to Prof. Kaufman’s thoughtful and provocative piece. Just my two cents in 3 points:

    1) One point Prof. Kaufman did not mention is demographics and the “enrollment cliff” that will dramatically transform higher education around the world (https://www.wsj.com/us-news/education/college-admissions-demographic-cliff-16dec51f). There are all sorts of predictions about how bad it will be, and the impacts won’t be evenly dispersed, but it’s an exacerbating factor for all the things Prof. Kaufman mentioned. In fact, I might argue that it will become a driving factor for much of it. “Demographics is destiny”, they say.

    2) I think the bigger risk of AI disruption is on the research side rather than the teaching side (at least for philosophy—I can’t speak to other disciplines). For teaching, traditional methods of teaching are being challenged and even upended, but i think enough teachers, particularly those being trained now or recently, have enough creativity and sense to design assessment methods that effectively integrate AI in ways that can challenge students and fulfil their pedagogical goals. Experienced faculty who have honed their pedagogical methods for decades and are unable or unwilling to change may be casualties here, but given the diversity of teachers and teaching styles in the profession, i think this is an area where there’s room for faith, at least based on the creative solutions I’ve seen being adopted and frameworks for AI in education. The cart is still far ahead of the horse, but i think it’s possible to close the gap.

    3) On the research side (at least in philosophy), i think the situation is far more susceptible to substantial disruption, and so I worry about peer review, which is already an imperfect process but the best we’ve been able to manage thus far. One reason is that the traditional peer review process relies on a tremendous amount of unpaid labor from increasingly stretched faculty (namely, editing and reviewing articles and books). There are many bold predictions and strong stances to take on being pro-AI in research or anti-AI in research, but the bottom line is that at least on the processing side of things, we should expect an overall increase in submissions, much of it AI assisted or completely written by AI, that may overwhelm traditional peer review system. And I think this will be a net negative for research.

    One natural way to combat this would be to incorporate AI into this process (e.g., have AI screen submissions or even have AI write referee reports), and this may or may not be happening already. But then a critical amount of frontier research in philosophy will transform into a discipline of robots talking to other robots—a situation about which there will inevitably much reasonable and unreasonable disagreement.

    1. (Sorry, I feel I’m becoming the gadfly in this conversation!)

      Regarding 1: I learned to take the ‘demographics is destiny’ slogan with a hefty grain of salt ever since watching Florida turn deep red after being assured that, there and elsewhere, the diversifying population signaled a Democrat tsunami. I honestly think that, regarding meso/macro social phenomena, you get the best mileage out of ‘nobody knows anything’ instead.

  9. “said explicitly that AI will simply accelerate something that is already happening.”
    – The metaphor people use is “force multiplier” – and it is true that it applies for all the “bad aspects” of the social system in which it is embedded. In my (current) profession of cyber security we see this dual nature clear enough. Or rather, perhaps, triune – in our case, multiplication of the discoveries of vulnerabilities and their exploits – by both “good actors” and “bad actors”. The third case, the slop, which can be seen as the garbage produced by attempting the tools and not finding anything worthy of report, is what alarms me more than the stuff by the bad actors, some of the time, and interacts with the social systems in strange and unfortunate ways. For example, I’m in Canada – comparatively wealthy by world standards; my employer receives unsolicited “bug reports” from folks from less affluent countries. These have often been done by buying some of these AI products in a hope that they can be used to to find something that will allow them to make some profit. What usually comes is at best something trivial – that the hapless folks do not know is such – or at worst something utterly irrelevant. (Due to our various policies we don’t even acknowledge these reports, though – and you feel for the person spending their little resources here.)

    I mention this all because I do (as someone with philosophy as a background, especially) care about the future of academia and philosophy in particular. I think there’s a case to be made that this three part categorization also applies to what will become of philosophy. You will get the magnfication of the good (people able to synthesize and analyze ideas better); you will get the “person who uses it to churn out yet another paper a [time interval here] when they really shouldn’t” and then the journals – as is already happening – will also be flooded with just garbage.

    My secondary point also is relevant. My non academic career has been in software, including application security. People say that the bots are “good at coding”. It is vital to realize that this, which is only still partially true, only applies to a small part of how software is build. I don’t think my profession more than aspires a lot of the time to be an engineering discipline, but to borrow a Kantian idiom, perhaps it is a regulative ideal. That is to say, there is more to software development than writing code — there is requirements gathering and refinement, there’s planning of releases, there’s certain forms of testing that are hard to automate, there are human factors like UI selection (“does this look good in green or in yellow?”) and more.

    I would thus encourage philosophers and others to think of their discipline in finer grained terms. What are the tasks philosophers perform? I have of course views on this, but I’ll leave it to those in the profession to think this through. I note that this also allows one to figure out where the bottlenecks in producing output (whatever that may be; the metaphilosophical question is independent of this) better. In software, people say at most 10-15% is “coding” (or programming in the proper narrow sense). So we can borrow from the algorithm and computer architecture people and work out how much that would at most improve performance – using a simple calculation with something called Amdahl’s Law. (My late father, a pharmaceutical chemist, told me that chemists also knew of this same speed up relation; maybe it should be generalized. :))

  10. I think that Kaufman is probably wrong about AI’s capacity for original research but concern about universities survives and even intensifies.

    1. The claim that current AI merely recycle ideas and needs human insights to make epoch-making advancements (like going from Newtonian mechanics to special and general relativity) is probably wrong. Even when re-using and connecting older ideas, AI can use abstraction, analogies, instantiation, and so on and come up with new, highly non-trivial ideas, which AI can then reuse, including to improve itself (its architecture, training, etc.) and the environment in which it operates (e.g. its harness and information handling). Dependence on previous ideas and the next-token prediction mechanism do not seem to rule out that recursive improvement could take place and lead to epoch-making advancements.

    2. Until recently, for me, the main question about AI and research was “what can AI-augmented human researchers do more and better?” Now, for me, a likely scenario (though not a necessary one) is that human researchers, however AI-augmented, will be redundant, first in pure mathematics and then, gradually, in other fields more and more involved with material manipulations (e.g. laboratory experiments).

    In sum, there is concrete possibility that scientific (broadly construed) progress and the flourishing of human inquiry will separate somewhat soon. So, for me, the pressing questions are
    – “What forms of human participation to scientific discovery are worth sustaining when we are no longer necessary to make scientific progress?” and
    – “Would these forms of human participation preserve enough of what we value in participating to scientific discovery?”

    I do not have answers but I think that these issues are central to think about AI and universities. For example, I sometimes read that humans will continue doing mathematics just as we continue playing chess even if machines are better than us at chess. Even if that is true (and it is a big “if” for me), it is difficult to imagine the related extensive, expensive, and intensive system of doctoral studies, conferences, grants, and so on not to shrink and lose prestige of some significant types (like social or epistemic).

  11. I can’t speak to what LLMs and AI in general might be capable of now or in the future. What fascinates me in the present AI debate is rather the question why humanity would want to have a technology that ultimately can replace it (well, perhaps not entirely, but in many respects). Without predicting the end of the world, it does seem to me that AI, if it indeed becomes so powerful as some here claim, will become similar to nuclear weapons: we have created them and we can’t use them for anything on pain of destroying ourselves. (Yes, I know, there is the alleged threat of mutual destruction. Perhaps that’s what AI will be used for in the end.) More than that, we leave AI in the hands of people who want to make money, which is not exactly the kind of motivation I would want people to have when dealing with such potent technology. So, to me, all this debate just throws up the underlying paradox of the whole matter: why have a technology that ultimately does not serve us (ultimately: because it makes us superfluous and useless)? Out of sheer curiosity? Thirst for knowledge? Not sure it is worth it…but perhaps this is just how things are, the human condition, if you like.

    1. Besides purely cynical reasons: a significant chunk of these guys think that the AI superintelligence – assuming we can keep control of it – will be able to do things like make us immortal, automate all labor, eliminate all suffering of any kind, etc. I’m skeptical for a whole parcel of reasons, but many of the people working at OpenAI, Anthropic, etc. seem to be true believers.

      1. I don’t see how one could be out there to make as much money as possible (and also believe, as most of these people do, in some kind of libertarian utopia) while wanting to save humanity. I don’t doubt that these people believe that these are not incompatible motivations and belief systems, but to my mind, their case is a classic case of the reduction of cognitive dissonance. They exhibit one of the classic coping strategies, namely: trivialize the conflict.

        Anyway, none of this is particularly interesting, at least I have little fascination with the mindset of our tech bros. The base question is more interesting and is surely the question any technically advanced civilization has to face: what are the limits of progress? Shall we just go on to discover and create any crazy technology that might wipe us off of the face of this earth? Again, the parallel with nuclear weapons offers itself: once the genie is out of the bottle, we should make sure that it is under our total control. If we cannot even come near to acquiring such control, we should destroy it. We are right now moving in the exact opposite direction. That is worrying.

        1. You’re conflating tech-bros and the AI community. There’s certainly overlap, but they’re not at all the same group.

          There’s a social context here that I think most people are missing. The AI community has been debating these issues since the early oughts, and there are antecedents going back even further. They don’t all agree, either – Eliezer Yudkowsky, the guy who wrote *If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies*, is a member of this community. And while some are libertarians, plenty are not. Amodei just proposed a global treaty to slow down AI progress; that’s hardly a libertarian move. There’s even an academic literature on this subject, from people like Yudkowsky and Nick Bostrom. But nobody except the AI community was paying attention until ChatGPT came out, and now outsiders are parachuting into debates that have been going on for decades… But you asked for the pro-AI viewpoint, and that’s it: some people believe that artificial superintelligence can fundamentally alter the human condition for the better, and that it’s worth the risk.

  12. ‘Some mathematicians are still wary, however. “The big story now in mathematics is that nobody wants to share anything,” Buckmaster told the Guardian. “Mathematics is different today than it was only a few days ago. We have to decide what to do about that.”’

    https://www.theguardian.com/science/2026/sep/12/openai-mathematicians-millennium-prize-problem

    At this point—though perhaps it’s just a transitory state—AI seems, to many unsurprisingly, to be as much poisoning the well of knowledge as it is potentially deepening it. Of course, as a subject of deep philosophical study, it would hardly be the first moving target; one might argue along ‘quantum physicalist’ lines that the entire universe is that to a scientist, and in parallel perhaps as much so to a trained philosopher. However, considering that the most influential public-facing LLMs are black-box proprietary products, there appears to be a real informational vulnerability for both random variance from the engines themselves and something more directed from the other side of the interface—a risk seemingly hinted at by Prof. Tristan Buckmaster regarding the epistemic uncertainties of sharing research with these systems, particularly as an active scientist. As such, this might prove less of a problem to philosophers tout court—not so much that an LLM might steal a philosophical researcher’s ‘lunch,’ but rather the dynamic, ever-shifting opacity of questions of ideological framing, artificial epistemic limits, and a manufactured sense of depth vis a vis LLMs tout court, even while keeping in mind, as others have noted here, that elementary mathematical principles underlie greater levels of complexity as a rule in nature itself. However, it seems entirely possible, in light of consistent warnings from experts, for a sort of LLM minor or major Orwellianism or dystopianism to conceal itself under false and/or superfluous clouds that mimic true aleatory opacity: in other words a chameleonic mimicry in both rhetoric and fact that pursues obfuscation by active computational measures, and where the pro-actors, according to some companies themselves, need not be human—indeed that being the point.

    1. ‘However, it seems entirely possible, in light of consistent warnings from experts, for a sort of LLM minor or major Orwellianism or dystopianism to conceal itself under false and/or superfluous clouds that mimic true aleatory opacity: in other words a chameleonic mimicry in both rhetoric and fact that pursues obfuscation by active computational measures, and where the pro-actors, according to some companies themselves, need not be human—indeed that being the point.’

      This is just the kind of pretentious sentence that Orwell would have despised. See his ‘Politics and the English Language’ .

      We have an LLM dystopianism (which may be big or small) concealing itself under clouds . These clouds however are not genuine clouds but sometimes false or fake clouds. (How can a metaphorical cloud be fake? Perhaps the author means not that the clouds are themselves false or fake but that they are *composed of falsehoods*, which I guess they would have to be in order to conceal the dystopianism, which seems to be rather shy.) Sometimes these clouds are superfluous. Presumably this means that this big or small dystopianism conceals itself behind clouds even though it doesn’t really need to do so. (It could, in some sense, get by without the aid of the clouds. ) These clouds mimic aleatory opacity. This means that they *seem* to have aleatory opacity even though they are not really ‘aleatory’ or not really ‘opaque’ . Perhaps they seem to be opaque by chance but the chance is the product of design. Or perhaps they seem to be opaque but on closer inspection turn out to be see-though. Perhaps they are both see-through and NOT due to chance, while somehow pretending to be both. Why do these clouds need to mimic being chance-induced and opaque in order to do their dystopianism-concealing business? God knows. However there are ‘other words’ to help us. Apparently something or other is engaging in ‘chameleonic mimicry’ that is a kind of mimicry that mimics one thing in one context and another in another. (That’s what chameleons do. They change colour depending on the colour of the surrounding surfaces.) I am not sure whether the thing that is engaging in chameleonic mimicry is the dystopiansism (small or large) that we started out with, or whether it is one of the sometimes superfluous clouds that it uses to hide itself. If it’s the clouds then they are sometimes unnecessary and sometimes false clouds that can change their colouration according to context. If it’s the dystopiansim itself that is engaging in chameleonic mimicry then we can perhaps see why it can do without the clouds. Anyway, this thing that is engaging chameleonic mimicry sometimes does it with rhetoric and sometimes ‘in fact’. Now I can just about see how either an LLM dystopianism or or a metaphorical cloud might engage in chameleonic mimicry with the aid of rhetoric but I am not sure how either of them could do it ‘in fact’ unless this simply means that the dystopianism or the cloud really is engaged in chameleonic mimicry. Perhaps it is not a dystopianism but an actual LLM that is supposed to be doing the mimicry. If so, this is a pretty banal observation since mimicking a human conversational partner is exactly what LLMs are designed to do. Anyway, either the dystopianism or the cloud pursues obfuscation by computational measures of some kind. What these measures are is not entirely clear, since we don’t know whether it is a dystopianism or a cloud that is pursuing them, but there are pro-actors involved who are sometimes human and sometimes not. And the point of something or other (the process, the preceding discussion – what?) is that the pro-actors are sometimes not human.

      This word-salad is so awful that one might actually prefer the plodding prose of an AI-generated text.

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